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Introduction and Basic Arguments
General Aim, Levels of Analysis and Method
This thesis concerns relations between the United States of America and the 
European Economic Community during the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations which took place in Geneva, Switzerland 
from 1963 to 1967. The Kennedy Round was promoted by the Administration o f 
American President John F. Kennedy in 1962 and became the largest trade negotiation 
hitherto undertaken, concerning 80% of world trade, the attendance of forty-eight 
governments and an average reduction of the tariffs between the US and the EEC o f 
35%, considerably more than had been achieved through previous negotiations. For the 
first time in GATT history, moreover, agriculture and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were 
addressed as well as the problems of less-developed countries (LDCs). The Kennedy 
Round (subsequently referred to in this thesis as the Round) clearly marked a climax o f 
post-World War II international trade cooperation and its results set the tone for 
international trade for the following years.
A history of the Round can tell us more than how and why trade was or was not 
liberalised, for it was much more than a commercial negotiation; it also speaks to us o f 
the history o f the EEC in the 1960s, EEC-US relations, and American responses to 
European integration. The Round was fundamentally important to the EEC. Not only 
was it the first major trade negotiation the EEC attended which required a clear 
definition o f its commercial policies and whose outcome determined its position in 
world trade; the negotiation was also bound up with other dimensions o f the EEC, such 
as the 1963 and 1967 British applications to join the Community and the French vetoes 
that opposed them, the definition and settlement o f the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), the Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise, and the role of the 
European Commission in the European integration process. The Round played a 
similarly key role in transatlantic relations and US policy towards the EEC. It was 
launched by the Kennedy Administration as an instrument to further liberalize 
international trade, reduce the discriminatory effects of the EEC’s regional trade 
agreement and to enhance economic and political interdependence across the Atlantic. 
The Round, therefore, was a very intricate and complicated negotiation whose 
importance extended well beyond trade.
Books on the Kennedy Round have already been written. Johns Evans in his The 
Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: Twilight o f  the GATT? focuses on American 
trade policy, the functioning o f  GATT, and the impact the Kennedy Round had on 
GATT.1 Thomas Curtice and John Vastine in The Kennedy Round and the Future o f  
American Trade also describe American trade policy and provide a detailed account of 
each major trading sector discussed in Geneva, the main obstacles to trade liberalization 
and the results achieved.2 Ernest Preeg in his Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis o f  
the Kennedy Round o f Negotiations under the GATT goes beyond a discussion of US 
trade policy and GATT history, to describe the negotiations that took place in Geneva 
and the main results of the Round.3 Thomas Zeiler in his account of US trade policy and
1 Evans, J.W. The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: Twilight of the GATT (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1971).
2 Curtice, T.B. and Vastine J.R.jr, The Kennedy Round and the Future of American Trade (New York: Praeger, 1971).
1 Preeg, E. H. Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotiations under the GATT (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institute, 1970).
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the Kennedy Round, American Trade and Power in the 1960s, complements his 
discussion of American trade policy with an analysis o f the ability o f American power 
to dictate its vision of trade relations to, above all, the Europeans.4 Steven Dryden in 
Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade fo r  Free Trade focuses on the role o f  
the agency responsible for conducting trade negotiations, the U.S. Special Trade 
Representative, its relations with the other branches o f government and its ability to 
support free trade in Geneva.5 Alfred Eckes Jr., in addition to his classical book on US 
trade policy Opening Am erica’s  market: U.S. foreign trade policy since ¡776, edited an 
oral history dedicated to American trade policy and, in particular, to the Kennedy and 
Tokyo (1974-1979) Rounds, Revisiting U.S. 'Trade Policy: Decisions in Perspective, in 
which some o f the actors who elaborated American trade policy and some negotiators 
who participated in these two rounds provide insight into the American strategy.6 
Despite the different vantage points from which these books address the Kennedy 
Round, they all share a common dominator: that is, they present the negotiations 
exclusively from the American point of view, either because they were written by 
American officials who participated in the Kennedy Round in different capacities, such 
as Preeg, Evans, Eckes and Curtis and Vastine, or because they were written using 
American archival sources, such as Zeiler and Dryden. None of the above cited books 
fully consider the question of US policy towards the EEC and European integration, 
despite the fact that this was a basic component o f  US trade and foreign policy since the 
end of World War II and came to have an important impact on the US position in the 
Round.
Gian Paolo Casadio in Transatlantic Trade: USA-EEC confrontation in the 
G ATT negotiations attempts to provide a broader vision of the Round by also 
investigating the position o f the EEC; however, as his account was written in 1973 it 
was not grounded in archival sources, an essential foundation for providing a full 
account.7 More recently, two other books have been published that, following Casadio, 
try to go beyond the American point of view. Donna Lee in M iddle Powers and  
Commercial Policy: British Influence at the Kennedy Round has investigated the 
influence o f the British government on American stances in the Kennedy Round.8 
Sophie Meunier in Trading voices: The European Union in International Commercial 
Negotiations has analysed the role of the EEC and the Commission in international 
trade negotiations and dedicated a section to the agricultural negotiations of the 
Kennedy Round but, astonishingly enough, grounded her analysis in a handful of 
American archival sources, rather than European sources, meaning that, even in a book 
that purports to focus on the European Union, once again, only the American point of 
view is represented, leading to an often misleading depiction of the EEC and European 
Commission’s stances in the Kennedy Round.9
Even though the literature on the Kennedy Round may appear vast, a 
comprehensive history that investigates the positions o f the EEC has not yet been 
written, despite the fact that the EEC was one of the main protagonists of the
* Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and Power in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
5 Dryden, S. Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
6 Eckes, A. E. Jr. Opening America’s market: U.S. foreign trade policy since 1776 (Chapel Hill : University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995); Eckes, A. E. Jr, Revisiting U.S. Trade Policy. Decisions in Perspective (Ohio, Ohio University Press, 
2000).
1 Casadio, G.P. Transatlantic Trade: USA-EEC confrontation in the GATT negotiations (Famborough: Saxon House, 
1973).
8 Lee, D. Middle Powers and Commercial Policy. British Influence at the Kennedy Round (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1999).
9 Meunier, S. Trading Voices. The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2006).
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negotiations. In short, accounts of the US-EEC negotiations have been written solely 
through American eyes, a full account of US policy towards European integration in the 
context o f US trade policy is lacking, as is an account of EEC participation in this 
important trade negotiation despite the significance and impact of the Kennedy Round 
on the history of the construction of the EEC. A void in the literature o f both the history 
o f transatlantic relations and European integration is clearly apparent.
By analysing the relations between the US and the EEC in the Kennedy Round, 
this thesis intends to fill that void. In the following pages I focus on the process o f 
liberalization of international trade, the overlapping of negotiations among the six 
governments (the Six) of the EEC on the position the EEC was to occupy in world trade 
with simultaneous negotiations underway in Brussels, and transatlantic relations. As the 
above description suggests, this thesis contains three levels of analysis and addresses 
three major issues. The first level concerns the relations among the Six, the role of the 
European Commission in the elaboration of a common commercial policy, and its 
conduct o f negotiations in Geneva with third countries. Here I aim to illustrate the 
importance of trade relations in keeping the Six together despite the many quarrels 
among them and how the Six pooled their sovereignties into one common commercial 
policy in the Kennedy Round, thus shedding some light on the origin o f the EEC as a 
global actor. I show that that the Kennedy Round had a major impact on the 
construction of the EEC as it defined its position in world trade and was the first 
important framework through which the EEC acted as a unit constituting, I argue, its 
first act o f foreign policy.
The second level of analysis concerns transatlantic relations and US policy 
towards European integration. Since the end of World War II the United States had 
supported European integration at a regional level as a means to strengthen Western 
Europe in the context of the Cold War. The US subordinated its trade interests to its 
security aims and was prepared to accept European trade discrimination. Here I focus on 
American efforts to shape its policy towards the EEC through the Kennedy Round, the 
problems posed by the subordination of foreign trade to security policy and how 
American support for European integration influenced American stances in the Round. 
The third level of analysis deals with the foreign trade policies o f the US and the EEC 
and the liberalization o f international trade, illustrating how these trade policies shaped 
the patterns of international trade and attempting to answer questions concerning why 
trade was liberalised in the industrial sector but not in the agricultural sector and 
whether the EEC represented a stumbling block or a stepping stone to the liberalization 
of international trade at the end of the Round.
The method used in the composition o f this thesis is that o f historical narrative. 
Adopting this method is necessary because the participation of the EEC in the Kennedy 
Round was such a complicated and intricate affair, linked to simultaneous negotiations 
and events in Brussels, and given an added layer of complexity by the state of EEC-US 
relations. The first, fundamental and, at the same time, difficult task of this thesis is to 
provide an account of the still unexplored participation of the EEC in the Kennedy 
Round and to get the historical facts straight. This task appears to be of crucial 
importance as no account yet links EEC participation in this GATT Round to other 
events taking place in Brussels. Therefore, a simple description and analysis of the 
EEC’s participation represents a major contribution to the history o f the EEC, 
transatlantic relations and international trade. This implies that the scientific method of 
political and social science has been intentionally put aside as an inadequate to frame 
for this thesis. Yet, it does not mean that this thesis does not offer the opportunity to 
generalize about EEC participation in the Round, US-EEC relations, and how trade was
3
liberalized. On the contrary, this thesis aims to meaningfully contribute to the 
theoretical debate taking place at each of the three levels of analysis. To reach this goal, 
the following sections present the theoretical framework for each o f the three levels in 
order to set this thesis in context. After the facts have been reconstructed, in my 
conclusion, I try to draw theoretical lessons from the historical narrative.
The Kennedy Round: an American attempt to manage 
globalization?
The first level o f analysis presented concerns the liberalization of international 
trade. Keeping the experience o f the 1930s in mind, when floating rates and trade 
protectionism were seen to have encouraged destabilizing speculation, competitive 
depreciations and discouraged trade and investments, well before World War II was 
over the American and British governments tried to organize the world economy to 
favour currency stability and an open world trading system in order to enhance 
economic growth and full employment. This was the aim of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement of 1944 and its institutions, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the International Trade Organization and, after its failure, the GATT, which 
was created in 1947.
Under the impulse of the United States, a process of increasing economic 
interdependence was initiated, a process currently defined under the term globalisation. 
In effect, the United States engaged in promoting an open, non-discriminatory 
international economic system that favoured economic interdependence. In this context, 
GATT had the crucial role o f promoting and, at the same time, regulating the 
internationalisation of the world economy and its growing interdependence, thus 
favouring a process that had been active up to the early years of XXth Century. Thus 
GATT and its multilateralism were conceived as an intergovernmental framework to 
regulate international trade and manage its globalisation.
This means that GATT was not designed as a forum to pursue a radical 
liberalization o f international trade, but rather as an instrument to liberalise, 
multilateralize and also regulate and manage it. In addition to rules that promoted free 
trade, such as the basic most-favoured-nation (MFN) rule, GATT also had rules that 
allowed states to protect their market from foreign trade competition. States could 
maintain quota restrictions and tariffs if  they had a balance-of-payments deficit; they 
had the right to restrict imports o f  agricultural products when necessary in order to 
implement measures to restrict domestic production; further, they were allowed to 
refuse to extend MFN treatment to other contracting parties in such circumstances; 
finally, under article XXIV, they were allowed to establish a regional trading area, 
creating an exception from the M FN rule. GATT was, therefore, a flexible instrument 
that made rules for of liberalization and multilateralization of trade more acceptable to 
contracting parties. It represented a balance between free trade and protectionism. In 
this way, GATT pursued what fully deserved to be called embedded liberalism .10 
GATT was compatible with the trade policy o f the United States, where the push for 
free trade coexisted with requests for protectionism, and also with that o f European 
countries, where requests for protectionism at the end o f WWII were more accentuated 
than in the US. In fact, the rejection of the radical protectionism of the 1930s and the
10 For a definition of embedded liberalism see Ruggie, J.G. "international Regimes, Transactions and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order" in Krasner, S.D. (ed) International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
UP, 1983), pp. 195-232. Concerning the flexibility of GATT see Zeiler, T. W. Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of 
GATT (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
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careful move towards liberalization that had to lead to “economic goals o f the post-war 
consensus inevitably also endangered the position of the some elements of that 
consensus and it was this which gave the commercial policies of the period their 
peculiar mixture of liberalism and protectionism”. 11
This major aspect o f GATT has two crucial implications. Since the beginning, 
GATT was not dominated by a confrontation between free traders and protectionists. 
Rather, it was characterized by the effort of each government to favour the liberalization 
o f sectors in which it was more competitive and, at the same time, to require protection 
for the sectors likely to be damaged by an increase in international competition. This is 
the key for interpreting the history of the liberalization and non-liberalization of 
international trade during the GATT and, subsequently, World Trade Organization 
(WTO) years.
The second implication is that governments maintained an important role in 
managing international trade and conducting foreign trade policy. International trade 
was not left to the functioning of market rules and, in what concerns foreign trade 
policy, governments calculated more than pure commercial interests, also taking 
security and, more broadly, the general aim o f promoting perceived national power and 
wealth into consideration. Thus, while governments stressed their support for liberalism, 
in practice they played an active role in the global market through trade policy and 
subordinated their support for liberalism to other considerations such as domestic 
requirements and diplomatic and security issues. As a result, trade policy was 
determined by a combination o f these factors.12
The elaboration of US trade policy deserves special attention here, as it was the 
United States that launched the Kennedy Round. US trade policy is the “result of 
confrontation and compromise between the nationally and internationally oriented 
foreign policy executive and the more parochial representative element” rather than the 
product o f interest group positioning or the workings of global economic relations. 
Therefore, rather than viewing US policy makers as passive against the pressure of 
interest groups, “decision making entails the White House corralling social interests in 
order to achieve the nation’s mercantilist and internationalist objective of increased 
wealth, political unity and national security” . Foreign trade policy, in this way, results 
from a bargain between “the foreign policy executive and the representative element 
under government direction, and fo r  the national interest” .13 This bargain allows the US 
President to navigate the conflict between liberalism and protectionism in trade policy, 
that is to say between the foreign policy executive and representative elements. As 
Zeiler notes, “this dualism undergirded the Kennedy-Johnson trade policy through a 
concept referred to as the ‘fair-trade doctrine’”. Thus the US executive would promote 
tariff reductions and free trade in light of national and international interests while, at 
the same time, protecting sectors hurt by imports. A reduction of trade barriers would 
boost exports, thus fostering domestic growth, financing the military and aid 
commitments abroad, and, therefore, strengthening the West in the Cold War context.
11 Milward, A.S. The European rescue of the nation-state (London: Routledge, 1992 and paperback edn.2000), pp. 129- 
130.
uFor the role played by states in setting trade policy as elaborated by the sta tist theory see Zeiler, T.W., American 
Trade and Power in the 1960s, pp. 1-20. Zeiler, who interpretes the elaboration of American foreign trade policy in the 
framework of the statist theory, also usefully synthesises m arket and class conflict theories which oppose the statist 
theory in explaining how US trade policy is set. For the statist theory see also Ikenberry, J.G., Lake, O.A., Mastanduno, 
M. "Introduction: Approached to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy" in Ikenberry, J.G., Lake, D.A., 
Mastanduno, M. (eds.), The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca, NY, Cornell UP, 1988).
13 This reconstruction of the elaboration of US foreign trade policy is grounded on Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and 
Power in the 1960s, pp. 17-20. Quote is from p. 17.
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Such liberalism was tempered by the need to protect social interests and, in fact, the US 
government would not hesitate to protect trade sectors and restrict imports, especially 
when the imports threatened a voter constituency. Thus mercantilism, protectionism and 
liberalism coexisted in US foreign trade policy.14
It is against this backdrop that the history of liberalization -  and non­
liberalization -  of trade during the Kennedy Round must be considered. At the heart o f  
this thesis is the argument that the Round represented an initiative o f the U S 
government in 1962 that aimed to support the process of favouring an open and non- 
discriminatory trading system in order to increase world economic interdependence. 
This initiative became ever more urgent because of the existence of a regional trade 
agreement in the multilateral system: the EEC. At the end of World War II, the US tried 
to foster interdependence through a global and open system of trade and payments. In 
this context, the EEC could be accepted if  it contributed to achieving US political 
objectives in the area -  above all the containment of Germany and the Soviet Union — 
and if  it remained open to world trade. Thus, the Round and the sweeping liberalization 
of international trade the US government proposed was rooted in the American need to  
favour an open and multilateral trading system, to regulate international trade, to  
enhance economic interdependence among the USA, the former British colonies, 
Western Europe, Japan, Latin America and the LDCs, and, finally, to integrate the EEC 
in the multilateral system. US aim was to strengthen interdependence, at the time when 
European regionalism was taking form, through the multilateral institution of GATT. 
And given that EEC regionalism also extended to agriculture, the US resolutely moved 
to include this sector in the Round for the first time in GATT history in order to 
decrease European discrimination in agriculture and to manage the world exchange o f  
foodstuff. Thus in the US attempt to enhance economic interdependence and manage 
globalization GATT came to have a paramount importance.
The response of the EEC to the US initiative was mixed. In the industrial sector 
-  albeit in varying degrees -  the Six unanimously agreed to reduce protectionism. While 
the aim was to protect certain sectors, they were disposed to reduce tariffs in order to 
enhance their exports to European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries and to 
attack US tariffs. They surely aimed to maintain common external tariffs at a level that 
would give substance to the EEC regional area, but they also determined it was in their 
interests to increase economic interdependence across the Atlantic and in Europe. The 
Six’s reaction concerning the agricultural sector was totally different. An analysis of the 
way agriculture was dealt with in the Round is of crucial importance as we are still 
struggling with the consequences. In fact, this issue has contemporary resonance: 
agriculture remains a stumbling block in the Doha Round initiated in 2001.15 The 
American proposal to include agriculture in the Round hit on one of the most important 
common policies of the EEC: the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Six had 
decided to set up a strictly protected and regulated regional agricultural market 
supporting agriculture as a kind of welfare policy using protectionism to maintain living 
standards for farmers. In truth, there were differences between the positions o f the Six. 
France considered the EEC a preferential market for its foodstuff, while Italy, Germany 
and the Netherlands hoped to use the Round to maintain their imports of cheap food 
from outside the EEC. However these differences were not enough to undermine the
14 Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and Power in the 1960s, p. 18.
15 For an account o f the negotiations in the Doha Round over agriculture see Das, D.K. "The Doha Round o f Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations and Trade in Agriculture" in Journal of World Trade", Vol.40, No.2, April 2006, pp. 259-291.
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interest all Six had in maintaining the regional approach of the EEC in the agricultural 
sector.
In light of this situation, I show that the US lacked bargaining power to reduce 
EEC protectionism. In fact, Washington also had agricultural products to protect, such 
as the meat and dairy products for which it had enjoyed a GATT waiver since 1955. The 
US demanded liberalisation from others while offering too little itself. This prevented 
the US from presenting itself as a free trader in agriculture in Geneva and impeded their 
strategy to push the EEC in that direction. The US also lacked bargaining power to 
support the products it aimed to export to the EEC, above all grains, as it had no 
meaningful concessions to offer the EEC in exchange for a reduction o f  protectionist 
measures. This sheds light on the basic argument that the GATT works like a bazaar. 
Governments reduce protectionism only when they can obtain a valuable concession 
from another participant in the Round in return. It is, therefore, the bargaining power 
each government brings to the table that can induce the others to reduce protectionism 
by offering something valuable in exchange that matters. During the Kennedy Round, 
the US could not offer the EEC anything that would weaken its regional stance on 
agriculture because the EEC had a critical interest in maintaining regionalism and no 
critical interest in enhancing its agricultural exports to the US. The US exported a 
substantial number of agricultural products to the EEC, but the EEC had no relevant 
exports to the US. Pressure for liberalization is closely related to exports-dependence 
and the EEC had no dependence in this area. As a result, I argue, the EEC strongly 
preferred trade regionalism to the world interdependence promoted by the US and ended 
the Round as a major regional stumbling block. 6
I demonstrate that the Round was not a confrontation between free traders and 
protectionists. Each government asked for liberalization in some sectors and, at the 
same time, for protectionism in others. These requests were dictated by the position 
each government occupied in the multilateral system, their broad interests, and the 
interests of each specific trade sector. This is precisely what happened in Brussels when 
the Six had to decide which sectors they wanted to exclude from liberalization. This is 
also precisely what happened in Geneva in the bargaining among the EEC, the United 
States and other Kennedy Round participants. Having promoted the Round, Washington 
made a major effort during all negotiations to bring the Round to a successful 
conclusion. Yet, this does not imply that it firmly pushed for the liberalization of 
international trade across the board. Washington too had sectors it desired to protect 
both in the industrial (for example, textile) and agricultural (for example, meat and dairy 
products) sectors. The liberalization of trade went hand in hand with protectionism and 
regulation.
Thus my basic argument is that the Kennedy Round achieved meaningful results 
by significantly reducing tariffs in the industrial sector, in this way contributing to the 
internationalisation of the economy that the US had been promoting since the end of 
World War II. However, it did not lead to the erection of a liberal international system 
across the board. Tariffs remained a major obstacle in some industrial sectors, such as 
textiles and chemicals, and non-tariff barriers were not meaningfully included in the 
negotiations, while agriculture was a failure because not only was it not liberalized, but 
no agreement was reached on how to regulate it either.
16 Meunier, on the contrary, focuses her explanation of why agricultural trade was not liberalized on the EEC unanimity 
vote procedure and the lack of latitude granted to the EEC Commission, above all after the Empty Chair Crisis. As 
shown in the rest of the thesis, Meunier's analysis totally ignores the patterns of trade between the EEC and the USA 
and the misinterprets the effects of the crisis on the Commission and on the EEC voting procedure. Therefore her 
interpretation is not accepted in this thesis. See Meunier, S. Trading Voices, pp. 74-101.
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The Kennedy Round, the US and European Integration
As noted, the Kennedy Round also tells the story of Atlantic interdependence 
and the US approach to European integration. This section aims to develop a conceptual 
framework for analysing relations between the EEC and the US in the 1960s, this thesis’ 
second level of analysis. More specifically, it aims to provide a key to interpreting the 
US approach to European integration and, in this way, to shed further light on how US 
trade policy was elaborated and the degree to which the US stance towards European 
integration influenced the negotiations and the results o f the Round.
Concerning the US approach to European integration, the most reliable 
interpretive key is provided by the “empire to integration” argument of Lundestad. This 
scholar makes a comparison between the policy of the US and the other Great Powers in 
the areas the US dominated. He argues that the US promoted the integration o f Western 
Europe and by promoting “the unity of the most important area under its influence, it 
behaved rather differently from other leading power in history. Throughout history 
empires have been rules from an imperial centre. This imperial centre has almost always 
tries to guard its special position and if there was one development it feared, it was the 
emergence of anything that looked even remotely like an alternative centre. Divide-and- 
rule was an important imperial technique in keeping the empire subjects in their place.” 
Thus, by favouring and supporting European integration, the US certainly acted 
differently than other Great Powers. The second and crucial argument Lundestad makes 
is that while American support was in this sense unique, Washington still aimed to  
exercise “some form of control over Western Europe” . In the course of the Twentieth 
Century, the US intervened twice to prevent Europe from being dominated by a hostile 
power. Through its desire to control Western European developments, the US was 
protecting its own interests. Thus, while the American aim was not so different from 
that o f other Great Powers, its method for maintaining control was certainly different. 
Lundestad specifies that unlike traditional empires, most of the countries under 
American influence were independent. At the same time, however, the US maintained a 
predominant role. “In the looser sense o f the term, the American sphere o f influence 
could be called an ‘em pire’”. On the one hand, the US organized its “empire” in a 
different way than other Great Powers: it supported the establishment of a supranational 
Europe and, consequently, the possible development o f an alternative political centre, 
but, on the other hand, it also “protected its prominent position” . This was clearly 
reflected in the US position towards European integration. The United States favoured 
integration, not for the sake o f Europe, but in the service of its own interests, most 
notably to contain Germany and the Soviet Union. However, Europe could not become 
an independent “third force”; US support for European integration was subordinated to 
maintaining an integrated Europe in the wider Atlantic framework of NATO and 
GATT, “Through this Atlantic framework, the United States would presumably be able 
to protect its leading role within the Western world, although this could not be a 
guaranteed  once a supranational Europe had been established”.1
Lundestad’s interpretation of the US approach to European integration 
represents the starting point of this thesis for analyzing the US stance towards the EEC 
in the Kennedy Round and also sheds some light on initiatives for a new Round. My 
basic argument is that the specific aim of the Round was both reducing EEC trade 
discrimination and maintaining the EEC in the Atlantic framework of GATT and
17 Lundestad, G. "Empire" by Integration. The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997", (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 1-4.
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NATO. In the interdependent framework the US shaped at the end of World War II, the 
six Western European governments opted for a new form of cooperation: integration. 
The US supported and encouraged this, but at the same time needed to control the 
process and influence its development in a direction that would be favourable to 
American interests. The reduction of EEC discrimination became the focus of US 
foreign economic policy and an instrument to increase Atlantic trade and political 
interdependence. The new GATT Round was considered a tool to obtain these goals. 
The US had structured its relations with Europe through the creation o f an Atlantic 
framework composed o f NATO, GATT and European integration. European integration 
was not conceived in opposition to Atlantic interdependence, but, on the contrary, was 
closely connected to it. The problem would be if the EEC adopted inward-looking and 
protectionist policies. The US used GATT to address and manage European integration. 
In this way, the new Round was the response of the United States to the creation of the 
EEC, its prospective enlargement between 1961-1963, the general need to address 
different aspects of European integration and strengthen the Atlantic alliance. In this 
sense, GATT was a major economic pillar in US Cold War strategy.
At the same time, the US maintained support for European integration. One of 
the basic arguments o f this thesis is that this support conditioned US foreign trade 
policy and the stances of American negotiators during the Kennedy Round. The US’s 
serious interest in European integration and the way it would condition US trade policy 
was demonstrated as early as 1958 when the Treaty o f Rome was approved by GATT 
despite its inconsistency with GATT rules due to the support of the Eisenhower 
administration, which held that the economic problems caused by the EEC should be 
addressed only after the EEC was established. Consequently, the elaboration of the US 
political response to the creation of the EEC and the resulting new pattern of 
transatlantic interdependence was shifted to the Kennedy Administration, which 
initiated a sweeping reduction o f protectionism. However, Kennedy and, following him, 
Johnson’s trade policies were too influenced by US support for European integration. I 
demonstrate that, while one o f the US’s fundamental aims was to reduce EEC 
discrimination in agriculture, this aim was weakened by US support for the principle of 
the CAP, one of the EEC’s most important common policies which played a key role in 
favoring EEC integration. I also demonstrate that US trade policy was influenced by 
European integration again during the Empty Chair Crisis when the US position was 
dictated by the need to keep the Kennedy Round alive and to preserve the Round as a 
framework where the European Commission could play a major role and the Six could 
regain unity, despite opposition from the US Department of Agriculture. Thus, as 
argued in the previous section, US foreign trade policy came under the influence of 
geopolitical requirements and the Cold War, while at the same time, remaining precisely 
the policy through which Washington pursued its security aims.
This thesis further traces the evolution of US support for European integration 
from the Eisenhower to Nixon administrations, as it was during this last administration 
that the reductions agreed during the Round were implemented. Since the outset, 
European integration was both an opportunity and a challenge for the US. I show that, 
with the passing of the time, concerns that European integration was becoming more of 
a challenge than an opportunity were increasingly voiced in the US Congress and, then, 
within the Johnson and Nixon administrations. These concerns emerged out in the open 
when the Six paved the way for EEC enlargement in 1969, potentially increasing trade 
discrimination towards the US at a time when the US was experiencing serious 
economic difficulties. I show that Nixon maintained support for integration, but this 
support became more pragmatic. The American position towards the EEC became less
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conciliating and more confrontational and, I argue, as American support turned hostile, 
their support for British entrance in the EEC also weakened.
The Kennedy Round, the Six and European Integration
Analysing EEC history from the point o f view o f GATT and trade relations, th is  
thesis aspires to make a major contribution to the history of European construction and, 
consequently, to the existing debate in the field. The aim of this section is to provide a  
schematic analysis o f the major theories of European integration and to place my thesis 
in this broader field o f investigation.18 The debate over the dynamics and reasons fo r  
the process of European integration was introduced by American political scientists 
when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and then the EEC were created 
in the 1950s. Two different explanations developed and still dominate the debate: 
institutionalism and intergovemmentalism. Among the institutional theories, 
neofunctionalism has been the most relevant. It was elaborated by American scholars 
based on the experience o f the ECSC and EEC, placing institutions at the centre o f  
European integration. Neofunctionalism predicted that economic integration in one 
functional area would almost certainly spill over into other sectors as integration 
embodied the most rational form o f  organising an economy. As a result o f  functional 
pressure and the underlying inability of governments to provide solutions to economic 
problems in the national framework, nation states would be pushed towards integration. 
At the same time, labour and business interest groups, aiming to maximize economic 
welfare, would redirect their allegiance to supranational institutions and, as a result, the 
supranational level would becom e the new centre of power. In this spill over process, 
supranational institutions and the European Commission in particular would have the 
opportunity to push the integration process ahead through the method of linkage. 
Finally, as a consequence o f the integration process, Western European countries would 
form a federal Europe. It was from this neofunctional and federalist point o f view that 
that the history of European integration was narrated.19 The basic shortcoming o f  
neofunctionalism was that it failed to predict the events of the 1960s and the further 
evolution o f the EEC as it became clear that not only did governments remain in full 
control o f the EEC, they also expanded their functions. No spill over mechanism, 
moreover, was in effect and interest groups did not necessarily ask for further 
integration.20 An opportunity to revive neofunctionalism came with the more active role 
o f the Commission under the Presidency of Jacques Delors (1985-1996), who seemed 
more capable of moving European integration ahead.
W hile neofunctionalism put institutions at the centre of European integration, 
intergovemmentalism, first promoted by the realist school of international relations 
theory in the 1980s, considered national governments the main actors of the European 
integration dynamic. Pressure for integration came from the political interests of the 
nation states that firmly controlled the EEC. According to this framework, supranational
18 For a brief but exhaustive description o f theories of European integration see Rasmussen M. Joining the European 
Communities : Denmark's road to EC-membership, 1961-73 (Florence: EUi PhD thesis, 2004), pp. 4-19 and Dinan, D. 
"The Historiography of the European Union” in Dinan, D, Origins and Evolution of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp.297-324. For a full account see Rosamond, B. Theories of European Integration 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan; New York: S t  Martin's Press, 2000).
19 The basic works of neofunctionalism theory are those of Haas, E.B. The Uniting of Europe: political, social, and 
economic forces 1950-1957 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958) and Lindberg L.N. The Political Dynamics 
of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963)
20 For a critic to neofunctionalism and federalism as theories to explain the European integration see Milward, A.S. and 
Sorensen, V. "Interdependence or Integration?" in Milward, A.S. and others (eds.) The Frontier of National Sovereignty 
(London, New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-32.
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institutions were considered instruments to further national interests.21 The 
intergovemmentalism approach was boosted by Alan S. Milward’s theory of European 
integration.22 Milward attempted to answer the question of why nation states, after they 
recovered from World War II, were becoming more powerful in the postwar period 
while, at the same time, surrendering sovereignty to supranational institutions. Milward 
concluded that there was no antithesis between the nation state and the supranationalism 
of the EEC and “that the evolution of the Community since 1945 had been an integral 
part of the reassertion of the nation state as an organizational concept”.23 His basic 
thesis was that national governments went beyond traditional international 
interdependence and surrendered sovereignty to supranational entities in key policy 
areas with the aim of ensuring their survival and strengthening themselves. Therefore 
nation states chose to go beyond traditional interdependence when it suited them. Far 
from undermining nation states, as neofunctionalism and federalism did, European 
integration was an essential instrument used to enhance the authority of nation states.
In Milward’s theory, the process of European integration was part of the 
historical development of European nation states. At the end of World War II, a general 
consensus emerged according to which European States had to provide welfare for all 
major social groups in order to attract the allegiance o f citizens, and to accomplish this 
they had to increase their power and function. Higher rates economic of growth, in this 
context, were a major concern because they would allow an expansion of welfare 
programmes and the reaching o f  full employment. Such economic growth, it was held, 
depended on an increase the trade of manufactures in Western Europe. During the 
1950s, an increase in intra-European trade took place and this was centred on the 
German market, “The policies o f national development sustained this pattern and 
required it to endure. At the same time, the same policies also demanded an increasingly 
selective and sophisticated form of protection for newly developing industrial sectors as 
well as, on occasion, for sectors becoming uncompetitive. The outcome was a search for 
a new form of neo-mercantilist commercial policy which could combine a more rapid 
trade expansion with more selective and more easily adjustable forms of protection”. 24 
At the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, the US and the UK had laid down the 
principles o f a more open framework of interdependence. However, out o f the lengthy 
discussions on the way tariffs and quantitative restrictions could be “mutually and co­
operatively adapted to the perceived common interest of sets of western European 
countries with similar industrial and commercial objectives, there emerged a rejection of 
the inherited framework of interdependence” by Italy, Germany, France and Benelux, 
who chose a “new form of international framework -  integration.” The objective of 
binding access to Germany and further liberalizing it within a regional integrated 
framework was the main motivation that led to the formation o f the EEC and its 
customs union. Moreover, “behind the protection of a common tariff [...] they forged an 
instrument both protectionist and expansionist which have all of them part of an 
increasing share of the trade within the common market until the 1970s”.25 In this way, 
the regional integrated framework of the EEC was an instrument to face the increased 
internationalisation of trade and the world economy while, at the same time, offering the
21 For the first proponent of intergovemmentalism see Hoffmann, S. "Reflections on the Nation State in Western Europe 
Today" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21 No. 1,1982.
22 Milward, A.S. The European rescue of the nation-state (London: Routledge, 1992 and paperback edn.2000) and The 
Frontier of National Sovereignty, op.cit.
23 Milward, A.S. The European rescue of the nation-state, pp.2-3.




future security that would come from binding Germany in a safer framework than th a t 
provided by interdependence, thus resolving the greatest political problem of European 
interdependence: the future o f Germany.26
The main goal o f the nation state to provide a welfare policy -  and therefore to  
strengthen itself -  was not pursued in a national framework, but, rather, an international 
one, more precisely, at the regional level of the EEC through European integration an d  
the surrender of sovereignty. It w as through European integration and the formation o f  a  
regional market that the member states were able to strengthen themselves.27 T h is 
“surrender” provided a set o f advantages for member states which were lacking in th e  
merely interdependent framework, making it more attractive. First, the irreversibility o f  
the process could guarantee the certainty o f the bargain agreed upon, that is access to  
one another’s markets for manufactured goods and a permanent arrangement fo r  
agriculture. The agreed upon bargain of the member states was institutionalised through 
the Treaty of Rome and, subsequently, the acquis communautaire and a centralized 
legal system that would make the promises irreversible and guarantee member states a  
certain control over the integration framework they had established. Moreover, th e  
formation of the customs union strengthened the bargaining position o f the EEC in  
negotiations with third countries, above all through their ability to exclude third 
countries from the customs union.
Thus, as Milward put it, “the rapid evolution in the structural pattern of foreign 
trade between western European states was a powerful stimulus to further integration by 
means o f trade, in spite o f the unwillingness o f politicians to leave such vital matters fo r 
decisions to technocratic functionaries meeting away from their national capitals”. The 
continuity in EEC history was provided by “nation-state’s use o f the supranational 
integrationist institutions to  strengthen and secure policy choices which had been taken 
domestically” .28 The drive towards integration was propelled by member states and 
their national interests. This implies that supranational institutions were not the motor o f  
integration but rather instruments used to forward the interests o f member states, 
enjoying no independent role. In fact, the task of policy making was allotted to the 
Council o f Ministers which kept control over the future development of the EEC in the 
hands o f member states.29
Milward’s theory o f  European integration, with its emphasis on the importance 
o f the regional dimension o f the EEC, the key role of trade, and the central position o f  
nation states, furnishes the interpretative framework for an analysis o f the commercial 
and political stance of the EEC in the Kennedy Round. The customs union and common 
commercial policy together with the CAP were the two most import features of the 
Treaty o f Rome, requiring the liberalization of trade among the Six and a common 
commercial policy and, it follows, a common external tariff towards third countries. At
26 Milward, A.S. The European rescue of the nation-state, pp.44-45.
27 Ibidem, p. 133 and Milward, A.S. The United Kingdom and the European Community, p. 134.
28 Milward, A.S. Economics and Politics in the history of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.35-36.
29 Milward's approach to European integration gave way to subsequent scholarship, among which Andrew Moravcsik's 
work. This author redefined Milward's approach by focusing solely on the commercial interests of big EEC member 
states. With his "liberal intergovernmentalism" approach, Moravcsik indicated commercial interests as the only interests 
that dictated the preferences of member states and relegated geopolitical interests and federalist ideology to a 
secondary and marginal plan. Using theories o f political science and political economy, Moravcsik used a three-step 
process to define his theory. Moreover supranational entrepreneurs, as the European Commission, basically played an 
irrelevant role. Moravcsik developed the concept of the integrationist machinery of the EEC/EU emphasising that it 
permitted member states to play a two-level game in which domestic political actors working within the bounds of 
rational choice theory could pursue policy choices, some of which emerged as national preferences which were then 
bargained for intergovernmentally at the supranational level. Moravcsik, A. The choice for Europe: social purpose and 
state power from Messina to Maastrich (Ithaca, N.Y : Cornell University Press, 1998).
the same time, the Treaty required the development of a single voice towards third 
countries in order to be effective. Article 111, in fact, assigned the Commission the 
exclusive right to negotiate tariffs with third countries in GATT for the transitional 
period (originally set for 1958-1970) and, therefore, pooled external representation of 
the EEC for tariff affairs. Article 111, however, did not give a free hand to the 
Commission; it was to be assisted by the 111 Committee whose members were 
appointed by EEC member states.
This thesis aims to make a leading contribution to the history of the EEC and, in 
particular, the development o f its commercial policy. This thesis analyzes the 
bargaining among the Six that took place in Brussels for setting the common positions 
to be presented in Geneva, how EEC institutions worked in international trade 
negotiations, the reasons that led the Six to move from six national commercial policies 
to one common commercial policy and from six single voices to one single voice and 
how the process occurred, and, finally, the different trade interests of the Six and how 
and why they were reconciled. This thesis also focuses on the role of the Commission in 
this intergovernmental bargain which lead to the elaboration of the common commercial 
policy. In this way, this thesis traces the evolution of the EEC decision-making 
mechanism for the elaboration, and then conduct, o f the common commercial policy, 
showing how and why the EEC became a single important actor in world trade and, 
finally, illustrating the place the EEC regional area retained in world trade and the 
multilateral system which emerged out of the Round.
All Six were interested in attending the Round as a way to reduce discrimination 
in Western Europe, which was divided into two trading blocs -  the EEC and the EFTA 
-  and to attack American barriers. Above all, the Six had a major interest in attending 
the Round as a trading unit, emanating from the political and trade interests that had led 
to the creation of the EEC and the development of a common commercial policy. Post­
war policy had led the Six to choose to face the internationalization o f trade with a 
regional agreement, thus allowing a new form of international cooperation to prosper, 
notably integration. EEC regionalism was an instrument to face the multilateral 
framework and world interdependence. This choice required the maintenance of EEC 
regionalism within GATT and, consequently, to negotiate as a unit in the new Round. 
The maintenance of unity required, however, a major effort as the Six had to reconcile 
their often divergent trade interests in both the industrial and agricultural sectors of the 
Kennedy Round. But, again, the need to defend their regionalism and negotiate as a unit 
led them to compromise. I also argue that a dichotomy existed between the foreign and 
trade policies of Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. In the confrontation between 
de Gaulle and the American government, these five countries were always keen to voice 
their support for the United States and for Atlanticism in general; however, when it 
came to trade, they sided with the French, as all Six shared common interests in this 
field.
A study of the EEC position in the Round also permits to shed light on the 
internal bargain that took place among the Six in Brussels on crucial topics related to 
the Round, such as the CAP, and to analyze relations among the Six and the reasons 
they had in joining the EEC. I argue that France was not only interested in the 
agricultural common market, as is often maintained, but also had an important critical 
interest in joining the EEC to enhance the exports of its industrial goods. Moreover, I 
argue that the representation often cited in accounts o f the Kennedy Round o f France as 
the major troublemaker and protectionist actor as President de Gaulle conducted policy 
in opposition to US interests is wrong. In fact, the other five EEC countries also had 
sectors to protect. The Germans almost put the Round in danger with their agricultural
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protectionism and were not of as much help in moving the Round forward as th e  
Americans had expected. Moreover, analyzing the history of the EEC from the point o f  
view o f the Kennedy Round shows that the CAP also had an external dimension and 
was not negotiated in isolation in Brussels. I argue that the content and pace of its  
elaboration was dictated by the EEC’s need to attend the Geneva negotiations and w as 
also eased by US support for European integration. The study of the Kennedy Round 
also consents to approach another event which has been broadly debated in the EEC 
history, the Crisis of the Empty Chair and the Luxembourg Compromise. My basic 
argument is that the Crisis and the Compromises had no effect on the EEC commercial 
policy and its adoption, because already before the Crisis erupted in June 1965, the Six 
had agreed that no government was to be put in minority position on issues of crucial 
importance, among which lay the Kennedy Round and the CAP. I also show that one o f  
the governments that refused majority vote as firmly as France was Germany.
As noted, the Commission was attributed the role of negotiating agent by the 
Treaty o f Rome. Member states were actually not so eager to relinquish the authority to  
negotiate with third countries to the Commission, above all when they faced a major 
negotiation with an important partner like the US as in the Kennedy Round. Therefore, 
they wished to attend the bargain and to allow third countries to have negotiating and 
speaking rights, implicitly undermining the negotiating role of the Commission and the 
EEC’s united position. Through a description o f the relations between the Commission 
and the member states, their bargain to set a common EEC position in Brussels, and the 
role of the Commission as negotiating agent on behalf o f the EEC, this thesis desires to 
make a contribution to a heavily debated issue, the role o f the supranational body in the 
elaboration and conduct o f the EEC’s common commercial policy and, more broadly, in 
the European integration process. My central argument is that the Commission was not 
independent in pursuing its role. Any final decision on the positions o f  the EEC in 
Geneva was firmly in the hands o f member states, while the Commission had to 
negotiate in Geneva under the surveillance o f the 111 Committee. However, 1 argue, 
this lack o f  independence did not mean that the Commission was a passive actor; on the 
contrary, it played an important role. Under the Treaty o f Rome the Commission had 
the right to make proposals to the Council of Ministers to set EEC positions in Geneva. 
It was through this authority that the Commission was able to influence the decisions o f  
member states and, thus, the elaboration o f the common commercial policy. The 
Commission, moreover, was able to influence the outcome through its technical skills 
and its mediating role among the Six. As a result, it played an important role, enhanced 
its authority, and became an important actor at the negotiating table in Brussels, an actor 
the Six were eager to put their trust in. The EEC position in Geneva, and therefore its 
commercial policy, also owed to the proposals of the Commission and its very vision o f 
the common commercial policy. This was above all true for the agricultural section o f 
the Kennedy Round in which the EEC negotiated along the lines elaborated by the 
Commission and accepted by the member states. The Council o f Ministers and the 
Commission were hence locked in an interdependent relation, in which the final policy 
was set by the Council, but the Commission remained a significant actor in the 
elaboration of the common commercial policy.
In addition, I argue that the Commission was also able to influence the EEC’s 
position through its negotiating role in Geneva where it negotiated under the mandate 
received from the Council of Ministers and with the assistance of the 111 Committee. 
The mandate was initially quite strict and the 111 Committee attended the negotiations 
with third countries. Member states had a rather pragmatic approach to the Commission, 
shaping their position according to one principle: how well their interests would be
represented and defended. When they held that it was in their interests for the 
Commission to represent them, they did not oppose it; however, if they believed their 
trade interests would not be defended, or when their views differed with those of the 
Commission, they did not hesitate to contest it and to reclaim authority for the conduct 
of trade policy with third countries. This applied to all o f the Six: to France, where 
President Charles de Gaulle was always keen to voice his dislike for the sovranational 
institution; and also to Germany and the Netherlands, two countries traditionally vocal 
in their support for supranational ism. Over the course of the negotiations, the need to 
effectively bargain with third countries and to defend their trade interests spurred the 
Six to allow the Commission to play the role of sole negotiating agent as this unity 
brought the strength necessary to defend EEC trade interests. In the final phase of the 
Round, the Commission was able to rid itself of the presence of member states and to 
negotiate with more freedom and flexibility outside the strict mandates received from 
the Council o f Ministers. The Commission was able to establish itself as the sole 
negotiating agent and saw its role amplified both internally and externally. I show that 
the Commission was able to achieve this aim rightly after the Crisis of the Empty Chair, 
which is commonly considered as having weakened the Commission. On the contrary, I 
argue, the Crisis had no effect on the role of the Commission in the elaboration and 
conduct o f common commercial policy.30 Member states resigned themselves to the fact 
that to effectively negotiate in Geneva and defend their trade interests, the EEC needed 
to be represented by a single actor. Thus the Six’s trade interests and their need to 
maintain the EEC’s regionalism favored the Commission’s role, confirming that this 
institution was instrumental to the interests of member states.31
Attending a GATT Round was very important for the EEC. Through 
participation in the Kennedy Round, the Six defined the EEC’s position in world trade. 
One of the motivations for the creation of the EEC was rightly to favor a freer trade at 
the regional level in Europe through a new form of international cooperation, that is 
integration. Against this background the US launched a new Round of multilateral 
negotiations to further liberalize international trade through the traditional mechanisms 
of international cooperation in both the industrial and agricultural sectors. This required 
that the Six agree on a direction for EEC external trade relations by defining how open 
to world trade the EEC was to be. Defining the EEC’s position in Geneva required that 
the Six define a common agricultural and industrial policy in Brussels. The Kennedy 
Round coincided with this definition and, at the same time, pushed it. I show that the 
EEC ended the Round as a liberal actor in the industrial trade, despite the fact that it had 
its protected sectors also in this field, but as a major protectionist actor in the 
agricultural sector with major consequences on world trade.
The Kennedy Round was crucial for the EEC because it marked the EEC’s 
existence as a single powerful trading actor on the world stage. The exordium had taken 
place in 1958 when the Six had to defend the consistency of the Treaty of Rome with 
GATT in Geneva. But it was at the end of the Round that the EEC, by demonstrating 
the ability to participate in a major negotiation with a single voice, became one of the 
leading commercial actors in the international and multilateral system. Its participation in 
the Kennedy Round gave the EEC an international political identity and, it can also be 
said, represented the first manifestation of an EEC common foreign policy. Rightly so,
30 Meunier says, but does not prove it, that the Crisis weakend the negotiating role of the Commission. See Meunier, S. 
Trading Voices, pp.74-101.
31 For an account of the Commission role as negotiating agent see Pollack, M. The Engines of European Integration: 
delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the EU (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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it was in the arena of international trade and through the implementation o f a com m on 
commercial policy that the EEC confirmed its existence and became an international 
actor.
Sources for the Thesis
This thesis rests on extensive archival research. From the perspective of E E C  
participation in the Round, this thesis aspires to be a history of the EEC and not only o f  
the Six; it aims to go beyond the national framework and to depict the EEC as a sing le  
actor. The position o f the EEC in Geneva, moreover, was the outcome o f intensive 
bargaining in Brussels attended by the Six and the Commission. For these two reasons, 
major attention has been focused on studying the archives of the EEC -  the Council o f  
Ministers, COREPER, the 111 Committee and the Commission -  both in Brussels an d  
in Florence so as to compile a leading source of research. The historical archives o f th e  
European Union in Florence were also useful to study the personal archives o f  
individuals such as Jean Monnet and Max Kohnstamm, Edoardo Martino, Emile N oel 
who were not involved in the Kennedy Round but were in constant contact w ith  
participating officials. In Brussels, research was also conducted in the personal archives 
of the Commissioner responsible for the Kennedy Round, Jean Rey, deposited at th e  
Université Libre de Bruxelles.
The major attention given to EEC sources does not imply that no consideration 
was given to the Six’s national archives. However, research in national archives has  
required making a choice based on the languages the author speaks and the availability 
o f the archives. As a result, this thesis is grounded in German and French archival 
sources, but, unfortunately, not in Italian, Luxemburgish and Belgian archives, which 
remain closed, and Dutch archives, because the author does not speak Dutch. In an  
attempt to overcome this limitation, a careful and prolonged study has been conducted 
in British archives -  the Public Record Office -  which have been useful in completing 
the picture o f the positions of the Six and the Commission. As a matter o f fact, German, 
Italian and Benelux officials involved in the Kennedy Round had the good habit -  good, 
that is, for the sake o f this study -  to inform London of the debate taking place in  
Brussels, negotiations in the Council of Ministers, and the elaboration o f the single 
position o f  the Six and the Commission. These accounts, while obviously partisan, were 
very frank and open in tone and have allowed me to complete the information I acquired 
from the EEC and national archives. The British archives, moreover, provided a most 
useful and neutral description of relations between the Americans and the EEC. On top 
o f  this, the British held a key position throughout the round dictated by their relevant 
place in world trade and their willingness to join the EEC, so an account of the Kennedy 
Round is significantly enriched by a study of British archives.
For what concerns the American side, I have undertaken research at the Kennedy 
and Johnson Libraries and at the US National Archives and Records Administration in 
College Park, Maryland. A careful study has also been conducted o f the volumes of the 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) dedicated to the Kennedy, Johnson and 
Nixon Administrations. In my study of the American sources, I have paid attention to  
materials dealing with the Kennedy Round, and have gone beyond this to further 
investigate materials concerning US policy towards European integration. I have 
conducted a careful analysis o f hundreds o f telegrams and general correspondence 
exchanged between the US government and US Ambassadors to the capitals o f the Six, 
London, and the smaller EFTA countries, concerning both the Kennedy Round and 
EEC-US relations in general. This has allowed me to highlight the close relationship 
that existed in US policy among the Kennedy Round, the CAP, European integration
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and the Cold War. As with the British archives, the American sources have been useful 
for completing the picture of the EEC’s position. Germany, Italy and Benelux also had, 
as in the British case, the good habit o f informing the American government and 




The background to the Kennedy Round: the USA, 
GATT and European Integration (1944 -19 6 2 )
Introduction
Chapter one describes the background to the Kennedy Round, in order to place it 
and the trade relations between the USA and the EEC, in a wider perspective. The 
period analysed stretches from 1944 to 1962. The former date has been chosen, as in 
1944 the American and the British governments gathered in Bretton Woods (New 
Hampshire) to draw up the fundamental principles for governing world economics after 
the end o f  WWII. The latter date has been chosen, as in 1962 the Dillon Round, the 
trade conference preceding the Kennedy Round, was concluded in Geneva. In dealing 
with this period, this chapter focuses on US goals in shaping the international trading 
system at the end of the war and US support for European integration.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part describes the aims o f  
America in implementing a multilateral and open trading system, in order to emphasise 
the importance which the Democratic leaders attached to the multilateral institutions, 
considered essential elements in promoting national and international security. It 
describes how the Cold War, and the need to integrate the Federal Republic o f  
Germany, led the USA to support European integration and the latter’s trade 
discrimination, and further explains the foreign security role that regional trade 
agreements acquired within US foreign policy in the context o f the GATT, 
notwithstanding the latter’s supposed multilateralism. It analyses, therefore, how the 
USA adapted its foreign trade policy to the context o f the Cold War, along with the 
former’s support for European integration. The second part describes GATT activities 
from 1947 to 1958, and highlights that, in the GATT system, liberalisation o f 
international trade coexisted with protectionism, and that it was exactly this factor, that 
kept GATT alive. The third part deals with the creation of the Treaty of Rome, 
establishing the EEC in 1957, and the presentation of the Treaty to the GATT 
Contracting Parties in 1958. It emphasises that it was thanks to the US support for 
European integration that the Treaty was accepted despite its inconsistency with GATT 
rules, and it explains how the Eisenhower Administration, after having supported the 
Treaty, moved to launch a new GATT Round so to reduce EEC discrimination, 
integrate it into the multilateral system and keep it open to world trade. This part also 
illustrates that, even if  the Treaty was a crucial milestone towards Western European 
integration, its immediate consequence was to produce a fracture among the OEEC 
countries. Indeed, it would be rightly this fracture, confirmed by the French veto to 
British membership of the EEC in 1963, that increased European interest in the new 
GATT Round launched by President Kennedy in 1962.
1.1 American foreign trade policy at the end of WWII and the 
creation of GATT
Well before the end of World War II, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull were convinced that the lack of an open world economy during the 1930s 
had been one of the causes o f the war. Therefore, it became imperative that the
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protectionism and unilateralism that had characterised those years be prevented from 
reappearing. To this aim, new international and multilateral institutions had to be 
created to ensure the stability o f monetary relations, facilitate an increased exchange o f 
goods, and to establish an open and multilateral world trading system, as a means of 
promoting broad international and national aims. The underlying belief was that it was 
not feasible to have a strong international trading community without also having strong 
national economies. Running parallel to this was the belief that these institutions would 
strengthen national economies by ensuring the freer flow of trade on a multilateral basis 
and a viable international monetary system, and by restricting the ability of 
governments to resort to unilateralism. The requirements o f nations and the 
requirements o f a world economy were thus inextricably linked. Thus, the original 
American position in favour of multilateralism and freer trade -  while undoubtedly 
compatible with the American economic interest o f expanding its trade, considered 
necessary to the achievement economic growth and full employment -  was informed by 
the belief that pre-war protectionism had been a leading cause of the Second World 
War. The correlation between multilateralism and security was firm in the minds of 
Democratic leaders and represented a fundamental issue in US foreign policy.1 Trade 
policy was thought to make an important contribution to the achievement of 
fundamental American national goals -  economic growth, full employment, and rising 
per capita real income.
To enforce the envisaged multilateral system, and to perform the key functions 
of regulating international trade and payments in the post-war economic system, the 
creation of three new key international institutions was envisaged. The international 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(World Bank) were established at the international conference o f Bretton Woods in 
1944, while the International Trade Organization (ITO) was finally drafted in 1948 at 
the Havana Conference on Trade and Employment (November 1947 - March 1948), as a 
Specialised Agency within the structures o f the United Nations. Drafted under the 
leadership of the US Department o f State, the ITO contained principles o f multilaterally 
agreed open markets and the disapproval of discrimination. As such, the United States 
engaged in reconstructing the world economy by attempting to stabilize exchange rates 
and liberalise international trade through the implementation of a multilateral system 
based on non-discrimination and the unconditional most-favoured nation rule (MFN 
rule).5
While waiting for the final draft of the ITO and of the Havana Charter, the key 
actors in international trade, the United States and the United Kingdom, chose to 
immediately conduct a round of negotiations to reduce tariffs. Needing a trade 
agreement to conduct the negotiations and then to eventually regulate the results, they 
adopted the existing draft o f the Charter’s “Commercial Policy” Chapter, reformulating 
it as a separate trade agreement. This separate and provisional treaty, the General
1 Gardner, R.N. Steriing-Dollar Diplomacy: the Origins and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1980). See also Introduction. United States foreign trade policy, January 14, 1969 — 
Administrative History Office of the Special Representative for trade negotiations -  Box 1, LBJL.
1 For a description of the Bretton Woods negotiations and the creation o f the monetary system in addition to Gardner, 
R.N. Steriing-Dollar Diplomacy; see Triffin, R., Europe and the money muddle : from bilateralism to near-convertibility, 
1947-1956 (Westport, Conn : Greenwood Press, 1976); Eckes A J. A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the 
International Monetary System, 1941-1971 (Austin: Texas University Press, 1975) and Cohen, B J . Organizing the 
World's Money, (New York: Basic Books, 1977). For a comprehensive description of the Havana conference see: Brown, 
W.A. The United States and the Restoration of World Trade: an analysis and appraisal of the ITO Charter and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1950), Diebold, W. The End of ITO ( 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952) and Zeiler, T. Free Trade, Free World: the Advent of GATT (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999). Zeiler also describes the relation between GATT and the Cold War from 1948 
to 1953. The description that follows on the ITO is taken from these books.
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Agreement o f Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was signed on 30 October 1947 by some 23  
major trading countries.1 GATT had the temporary status as a forerunner of the ITO a n d  
came into force on 1 January 1948, as the principal international instrument used by its  
members to negotiate reciprocal reductions of tariffs, and to ensure that trade 
restrictions other than tariffs did not impair or nullify the concessions negotiated in  
1947-1948.
The two main purposes o f the General Agreement were to provide, firstly, a se t 
of rules for the orderly functioning of world trade, and, secondly, a framework fo r  
continuing negotiations on the reduction of trade barriers. It could be reduced to three 
essential facets. First, it contained tariff “schedules”, or lists of concessions (named 
products for which specific tariff treatment has been agreed upon), with separate 
schedules for each participating country or “contracting party”. Second, there was a  
code o f  agreed rules, or “general provisions” to guide the import and export trade 
practices o f the contracting parties. Third, through periodic meetings of representatives 
of the participating countries, GATT provided a broad international forum fo r 
discussion and the settlement o f common problems within international trade.4
GATT soon established itself as the key international agreement dealing w ith 
international trade, given that in 1950 it became clear that the US Senate would not 
ratify the ITO. While, following the State Department’s lead, the US government 
attempted to obtain worldwide agreement on the ITO, this international agreement 
advocating open markets and the disapproval of discrimination seemed to be out o f  
touch with the real practices o f international trade, and American trade practices in  
particular. In effect, in the United States there was not clear-cut support for liberal trade. 
Farmers lobbied for a decrease in imports of foreign goods and protested against other 
countries’ export subsidies, while the textile industries asked for import quotas on 
foreign goods, claiming that the rise in imports of textile products would cause falls in 
production and employment. Congress responded to requests of protection by qualifying 
its commitments to liberal trade. First, tariffs would be reduced only on a reciprocal 
basis, while in 1947 protective clauses were attached to the Reciprocal Trade Act, 
which authorised the US government to enter into trade negotiations to reduce tariffs 
under the GATT. Congress adopted the escape clause -  which permitted the withdrawal 
o f a ta riff concession that might injure an industry -  as a legitimate device in trade 
negotiations, while the peril point provision -  which set a point at which a tariff 
concession could hurt a domestic producer -  became a stable part of the Reciprocal 
Trade Act. As such, in the USA, support for freer trade went hand in hand with 
protectionism. Moreover, Latin American states were more interested in import 
substitution than in free trade and made crystal clear their opposition to the ITO.
3 This chapter and the all thesis refer to the GATT 1947. This agreement has now been incorporated into the GATT 
1994, one of the Agreements making up the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The countries were: Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States.
* Hine, R.C. The Political Economy of European Trade: An Introduction to the Trade Policies of the EEC (Sussex and 
New York: Wheatsheaf Books, St. Martin's Press, 1985), p, 39 and United States and the world trade in perspective. 
Seventh Annual report of the President of the United States of trade programme. September 1963 -  1969. LBJL 
Administrative History Office of the Special Representative for trade negotiations -  Box 1.
1 For a description of the ITO and of the GATT system see: Curzon, G. Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques (New York: Preager, 
1965), Kock, K. International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947*1967 (Stockholm, Amlquist and Widsell, 1969) Jackson, 
J.H. The World Trading System. Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1992) 
Anderson, K. (ed.) Blackhurst, R. (ed.) Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (London: Harvester, 
Wheatsheaf, 1993); Hudec, R.E. The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 197S), 
Hoeckman, B.M. Kostecki M.M. The Political Economy of the World Trading System. The WTO and Beyond (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001).
Needing allies, and reluctant to allow the USSR to exploit these quarrels, the US 
government showed itself unwilling to push hard for the approval o f the ITO.
With the failure of the ITO, only the apparatus of the GATT was left to the US 
government, and the world trading system, to reduce discrimination and liberalize trade. 
In truth, its tariff reduction procedure was cumbersome, making any sweeping reduction 
in protectionism difficult. In fact, governments bargained bilaterally and then, if  
agreement was reached, the tariff reduction was multilaterialized. Moreover, despite its 
strong proclamation o f free trade, it allowed for discrimination. However, as Zeiler 
notes, GATT alone survived because it was able to combine a shrewd mixture o f 
political and economic interests, o f free trade principles and protectionism and, in this 
sense, it accurately embodied US interests.5
1.2 GATT and the role of regional trade agreements in the 
containment policy of the United States
The General Agreement was based on comparatively few basic principles, the 
most important of which was non-discrimination. The non-discrimination principle was 
grounded on the most-favoured-nation (MFN) rule, which provided the foundation for 
the multilateral trading system: each contracting party was bound to apply tariffs on 
imports coming from all other members at MFN rates, that is to say, “any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all 
other contracting parties” . The drafters, under the pressure of the United States, gave a 
prime position to this principle, as a way of putting an end to the use o f preference 
systems, curbing the practices o f economic nationalism and establishing the credibility 
of the MFN rule from the outset.
At the same time, exceptions were allowed in certain special circumstances. 
Among these exceptions, the most noteworthy one would turn out to be o f great 
importance in the creation of the EEC in 1957, namely article XXIV. This article 
permitted the contracting parties to form a customs union and a free trade area, giving 
preferential treatment to imports coming from other member countries of the regional 
agreement, under certain conditions, without extending this treatment to the other 
GATT contracting parties 6 Initially, the Havana Charter had only a short section on 
regional trade agreements (RTAs), and American support was confined only to customs 
union. When GATT was drafted as a provisional forum for tariff reductions, the 
negotiators expanded this section to stress the importance and legitimacy of customs 
unions and, almost at the end o f the negotiations, on the insistence o f Syria and 
Lebanon, they included the notion of a free  trade area. These two regional trade 
agreements were to be clearly differentiated from discriminatory systems like
5 Zeiler, T. Free Trade, Free World; see also Diebold, W. The End of ITO and Baldwin, R. Krueger A.O. The Structure 
and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p, 12.
6 For a description o f Article XXIV of GATT 1947, in addition to books mentioned in the previous footnotes, see WTO, 
Regionalism and the World Trading System (WTO: Geneva, 1995); for a legal history of Article XXIV see Mathias, J.H. 
Regional Trade agreements in the GATT/WTO. Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirements (The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2002), Dam, K. W. The GATT, Law and International Economic Organisation (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), p 274-291. For an assessment on the issue multilateralism versus regionalism see 
also De Melo J (ed.), Panagariya (ed.) New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge; New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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Commonwealth preferences, which were zealously censured by the United States, an d  
excluded from the charter because protectionist.7
In order to grasp the aims o f the United States regarding RTAs, it is worthwhile 
to analyse article XXIV. This article allowed customs unions and free trade areas if (1 )  
trade barriers after integration did not rise on average; (2) duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce were eliminated with respect to substantially all trade between 
the constituent territories o f the regional agreement, and, for the customs unions, 
substantially the same duties and other regulations o f commerce were applied by each 
o f the members of the union to the trade o f territories not included in the union. A rticle 
XXIV made it clear that the aim of a customs union, or free trade area, was to facilitate 
trade between the member countries rather than to raise barriers to trade with other 
GATT members. The drafters, while condemning “soft” regional agreements, approved 
the “all or nothing” approach o f total discrimination o f customs unions and free trade 
areas, because it was thought that these increased global economic welfare and avoided 
the rise o f  preferential areas.*
Article XXIV reflected the position o f the US government towards regionalism 
and multilateralism: these RTAs were stepping-stones to freer global trade. The 
underlying belief was that there was a movement towards freer trade every time internal 
tariffs were eliminated on substantially all commerce. As Clair Wilcox, deputy chief o f  
the American team in Havana, put it “A customs union creates a wider trading area, 
removes obstacles to competition, makes possible a  more economic allocation o f  
resources, and thus operates to increase production and raise planes o f living.
Today, this view has turned out to be too simplistic, and the drafting of the 
Article too vague; too simplistic because the formation o f RTAs created after the end o f  
WWII has demonstrated that they did not automatically bring about an improvement in 
the allocation of world resources, and too vague because the provision “to si/bstantially 
a ll trade” between members of the RTA was so imprecisely drafted that, it was unclear 
whether the members of RTAs had to reduce all their tariffs by, for instance, 80%, or 
whether they had to eliminate all barriers covering 80% of their trade. Because of this 
ambiguity, the Article became a source of never-ending debate, when in 1958 for the 
first time a major RTA, the EEC, was presented to the GATT.10 Though, what is 
relevant here is that for the American drafters of the GATT, multilateralism and 
regionalism were part of the same process of liberalising international trade, regionalism 
being one fundamental component in the establishment of an open and multilateral 
trading system.
7 Evans, J. W. The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: Twilight of the GATT? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), p. 40, Wilcox, C. A Charter for World Trade. (New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 70-71 and Asbeek 
Brusse, W. The Americans, the GATT, and European Integration, 1947-1957: a Decade of Dilemma in Heller, F.H., 
Gillingham, J.R. (Ed.), The United States and the Integration of Europe. Legacies of the Postwar Era. (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1992), p. 224
6 Mathias, J.H. Regional Trade agreements in the GATT/WTO. Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirements (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2002), p. 2. As R.H. Snape notes "The exception rules were constructed so as to discourage 
all preferential schemes less than (almost) full preferences, so as to discourage the proliferation of preferential 
agreements: the political cost of negotiating preferences thus was deliberately made high. It is argued that an 
abundance of partial preferential agreements is more likely to damage the development and maintenance of a liberal, 
multilateral trading system than is a small number of almost complete preferential agreements" R.H. Snape "History and 
Economics in GATT's Article XXIV" in Anderson, K. (ed.) Blackhurst, R. (ed.) Regional Integration and the Global Trading 
System, pp. 273-291. Quote from p.287.
9 Wilcox, C. A Charter for World Trade. (New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 70.
10 As Kenneth W. Dam writes it is not possible to reproach the draftsmen o f the Havana Charter and then GATT for 
being bad economists. Jacob Viner published his book on customs unions only in 1950, and it was only following his 
book that professional economists started investigating the conditions required to bring about such improvement as a 
consequence of the creation of a RTA. See Viner, J. The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1950) and Dam, K. W. The GATT. Law and International Economic Organisation (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 274-283.
The start of the Cold War represented a fundamental, historic change regarding 
the way in which American leaders wanted to shape international trade after the end o f 
WWII, as it broke the universalistic perspective o f a multilateral trading system, with 
the consequence that multilateralism had to be adapted to the new bipolar strategic 
perspective." Most importantly, the beginning of the Cold War pushed Washington to 
favour European integration. As early as during World War II, the US government had 
considered the question of whether to encourage such integration and, in particular, a 
European customs union, as a way of facilitating the removal o f trade barriers and, 
consequently, enhancing the access of US goods. A customs union would also promote 
European efficiency and prosperity that would, in turn, advance political stability. 
However, it would also house German economic resources and integrate the latter 
economically and politically into the European continent, so fostering the stability of the 
area. The break out of the Cold War definitely moved Washington to support European 
integration as a way of reinforcing Western Europe politically, integrate and maintain 
West Germany in the Western camp and bring to an end the rivalry between France and 
Germany. Washington also retained the economic reasons to support European 
integration. An economically unified Europe represented a more economically efficient 
market than the single markets o f the individual countries and, by fostering economic 
growth, it could provide a bigger market for outsiders’ exports. Moreover, the creation 
of a mass market and the acceleration in the growth-rate of income in the dynamic 
European market could enhance demand for American products. In the long run, once 
economic recovery was achieved, the European regional group could turn into an active 
player in the multilateral trading system, representing an open market for American 
exports, and bearing its share of the common defence burden.12
The Cold War transformed the role o f RTAs, assigning them a geopolitical 
profile and the context of security policy. It was in this new context of the Cold War, 
and in the attempt to reconcile American plans for the future o f Western Europe with 
the support for multilateralism, that the Democratic Administration amended the 
General Agreement’s rules, expanding the section related to RTAs and emphasising 
their well-founded and legitimate role, as mentioned above. Then, in the context of the 
containment policy, the United States got ready to also accept the creation of 
discriminating trading blocs, in order to stimulate regional discriminating self-help 
groups, with the political goal o f creating a strong bulwark against Soviet expansion. It 
was against this background that, in the same year that the Truman government signed 
the Havana Charter for the worldwide ITO, it also consented to the agreement for the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). While the ITO symbolised 
American support for a multilateral, non-discriminatory, and global trade system, the 
OEEC endorsed the principle o f discrimination by the recipients of the Marshall Plan, 
which promoted the unity of Western Europe on a regional basis.”
Thus, the aims of containing the Soviet threat, strengthening Western Europe 
and bringing to an end the rivalry between France and Germany pushed Washington to 
support European integration and made possible the supporting for a discriminating 
trading bloc. By establishing the foundations o f a future customs union, the Marshall 
Plan sought to pave the way to European political union, and the USA accepted
11 On Cold War and GATT see Kostecki, M.M. East-West trade and the GATT system (London: Macmillan, 1979).
12 Asbeek Brusse, W. The Americans, the GATT, and European Integration, 1947-1957, p. 224.
13 Milward, A.S. The reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London: Methuen, 1984); Mil ward, A.S. *Was the 
Marshall Plan necessary?" in Diplomatic History 13 (1989) 231-253. Asbeek Brusse, W. The Americans, the GATT, and 
European Integration, 1947-1957, pp 243-244; Lovett, W.A., Eckes, E.A. JR. and Richard L. Brinkman, R.L. U.S. trade 
policy: history, theory, and the WTO (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 76-77 and Zeiler, T.W. Free Trade, Free 
World: the Advent o f GATT, p.137.
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European discrimination as the price for this unity. The Cold War and the Marshall Plan 
meant that any general principles averse to West European governments' ow n 
reconstruction principles were pushed into the background.
1.3 Negotiation rounds 1947 to 1956 and the treatment of agriculture 
in GATT
It was in this context that GATT started its activities. Between 1947 and 1956, 
four tariff rounds of multilateral negotiations were held within the legal framework o f  
the General Agreement. These were the Geneva Tariff Conference (1947), the Annecy 
Tariff Conference (1949), the Torquay Tariff Conference (1950-1951) and a second 
Geneva Tariff Conference (1956).14
The first round took place between April and late October 1947 and was held a t 
the same time as preparations for the final agreement o f the 1TO. As the power of the 
American executive granted by Congress under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act 
(RTAA) to reduce tariffs expired on 30 June 1948, the Truman Administration was 
eager to start the negotiations as soon as possible, and without waiting for the ITO to  
come into existence in order to achieve a substantial reduction of tariffs and elimination 
of preferences, and notably the Commonwealth preference. This latter goal resulted to  
be problematic because the British had no intention o f dismantling preferences and, in 
fact, the round was threatened by a breakdown due to the differences in opinion 
between the USA and the UK. Under the RTAA, the US government lacked the 
authority to  achieve the sweeping reductions o f tariffs and non-tariff barriers that would 
have pushed the British and the Commonwealth countries to eliminate their preferences. 
The US Congress kept its strict control over the tariffs and the RTAA -  firmly grounded 
on the traditional American practice of a piling of bilateral, product-by-product tariff 
agreements, which could be altered by various Congressional safeguard clauses and 
“peril point” conditions -  did not offer a convincing opportunity for long term bargains. 
Consequently, the United Kingdom aimed at maintaining its preferences as a bargaining 
chip for future negotiations, hoping to get the bargain it most sought, notably 
guaranteed easier access to the American market. At the same time, Commonwealth 
countries had no intention of giving up their preferences on the British market while the 
US Congress kept Commonwealth agricultural exports out of the American market." 
The conference was rescued by the decision o f the American delegation to accept small 
British concessions on the preferences that the UK enjoyed in the Commonwealth, 
while the other Commonwealth countries agreed to make greater reductions. In addition 
to keeping discrimination, the first Round also established the future method for GATT 
working, consisting of more than 100 separate, carefully bilateral negotiated accords 
that could be then multilateralized.16 Thus, this first round proved to be a test for the 
functioning o f the MFN rule technique of negotiating, and it achieved satisfying results: 
an average reduction of tariffs of 19%.
14 For description of these four rounds, in addition to sources mentioned below, see Kock, K. International Trade Policy 
and the GATT 1947-1967 p.70-86, Hoeckman, B.M, Kostecki, M.M. The political economy of the World Trading System, 
p.100-104, Hoda, A. Tariff Negotiations and renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO. Procedures and Practices. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Evans, J. W. The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy; 
Asbeek, B. W. Tariff, Trade and European Integration 1947-1957. From Study Group to Common Market (New York: St. 
Martin Press, 1997) and Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and Power in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995).
15 On British economic policy at the end of WWII see Milward, A.S., Brennan, G., Britain's place in the world import 
controls 1945-60, (London: Routiedge 1996),
16 Zeiler, T. Free Trade, Free World: the Advent o f GATT, p. 55.
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The Annecy and Torquay conferences were held relatively soon after the 
creation o f the General Agreement and consisted o f accession negotiations. The first 
was convened to enable negotiations to take place between existing contracting parties 
and eleven governments that had requested accession, o f which nine eventually became 
contracting parties. At the end o f the round, the average tariff cut was fixed at 2%. At 
Torquay, negotiations took place between the contracting parties and six governments 
that had applied for accession, the largest being the Federal Republic o f Germany, and 
among the contracting parties themselves to negotiate additional concessions. The 
Round resulted in an average reduction of 3%. The unwillingness of the Commonwealth 
countries to reduce their preferences led to the result that no tariff cuts were obtained 
between the United States on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, Australia and New 
Zealand on the other.
The Geneva Tariff Conference of 1956, the fourth round, was fairly unique. 
Only 25 out 39 contracting parties agreed to participate and, among these, concessions 
were agreed upon only by twenty-two. However, as all the major trading nations 
attended the negotiations and exchanged concessions, this tariff conference is generally 
regarded as a round of multilateral negotiations. The average tariff cut of the round was 
2%. At the end of the second Geneva conference, the weighted-average tariff of the 
main industrialised countries had been reduced to some 15 percent since 1947.r
T ab le  1: N egotiating rou n d s 1947 to  1956
Year Name of the round and 
number of attending 
countries
Average Depth of Tariff Cuts in 
% Ad Valorem in the industrial 
sector
Outcome: Number of concessions 
exchanged
1947 Geneva 23 19 Concessions on 45.000 tariff lines
1949 Annecy 29 2 5.000 tariff concessions
1951 Torquay 32 3 8.700 tariff concessions
1956 Geneva 33 2 2.700 tariff concessions
S o u rc e : 1 lo eck m aii. B .M , k o s te c k i, M .M . T h e  po litica l e c o n o m y  o i th e  W o rld  T ra d in g  S ystem ., p . 1Ü1 a n d  A sb e ck . 13. 
W . T a riff , T ra d e  a n d  E u ro p e an  In te g ra tio n  1 9 4 7*1957 , p. 118.
The greatest part of these tariff reductions was made in the industrial sector. 
GATT did not distinguish between agricultural and non-agricultural goods, calling for 
equal treatment for all goods entering world trade. This lack o f distinction can be 
explained by considering the trade interests of the countries that drafted the General 
Agreement. The United States and the United Kingdom, who were responsible for the 
bulk of the drafting, represented the interests of large exporting countries. The United 
Kingdom, having always kept its market open to the importation of foodstuffs, and 
bearing in mind the interests of the big exporting counties of the Commonwealth, such 
as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, could not have taken a different position. The 
United States, one of the largest exporters o f foodstuffs, had increased its domestic 
production during WWII, and therefore needed to remove or outlaw trade barriers to its 
exports. However, at the same time, the United States asked from, and obtained, the 
right to restrict imports o f agricultural products when necessary to implement measures 
to restrict domestic production (article XI o f GATT). As for the other non-European 
countries, they also supported equal treatment given the fact that they were exporters of 
agricultural commodities and would have not signed the Agreement without the 
assurance that their agricultural exports would be treated as favourably as non- 
agri cultural exports. The only potential opposition could have come from the area that 
before WWII had been the stronghold of protectionism in agriculture. Western Europe. 
However the interests o f the European countries were too variegated to oppose the equal
17 Hoeckman, B.M, Kostecki, M.M. The political economy of the World Trading System, p. 103
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treatment in GATT. Moreover, they were mostly concerned with acquiring the right to  
use quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes, which they obtained.18
Notwithstanding this equal treatment, from the very beginning, agriculture was 
actually exempted from key GATT rules, and all the four Rounds dealt, for the most 
part, with non-agricultural goods, thus leaving agriculture outside of the efforts to  
reduce barriers to trade. Both the United States and Western Europe extensively used 
machinery for supporting domestic agricultural production set up from the 1930s. 
Moreover, in 1955, the United States, facing a surplus of domestic agricultural 
production, requested a waiver from GATT contracting parties to impose restrictions on 
imports o f a number of products. The GATT membership was forced to approve an 
open-ended waiver requested by the US to enable it to apply the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act which had been approved by the US Congress in 1954/1955. The Act 
imposed on the administration the introduction o f quantitative import restrictions (QRs) 
on a range o f agricultural products whenever such a form of protection was needed to 
implement domestic US agricultural policies.
In truth, the reduction o f  tariffs achieved in the four rounds concerned also those 
agricultural products protected by tariff devise, but quota restrictions and the domestic 
farm policies of the contracting parties, which for the most part protected the 
agricultural sector, had not been touched. As a result, at the end of the 1950s, reduction 
of protectionism for agricultural products lagged far-behind that for manufactured ones. 
Thus, even though GATT’s stated purpose was to lower trade barriers to create an open 
free market between its members, with its many exceptions to non-discrimination and 
liberalization, it proved to be a flexible instrument able to adapt to the protectionist 
requirements o f its contracting parties. In this sense, there was a large embedded 
element in GATT that, more than liberal trade, favoured ‘embedded liberalism’.
Despite this flexibility, at the end of the second Geneva round in 1956, GATT 
did not seem to be in a healthy condition: the impetus to reduce tariffs had fallen since 
1947, while agriculture had only been marginally touched by the liberalising efforts. 
When six governments of continental Europe -  the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and The Netherlands (hereinafter the Six) -  
decided in 1955 to try to achieve trade liberalisation at regional level, some thought that 
the GATT concept had essentially failed.1* The General Agreement allowed regional 
trade agreements, but with GATT activities clearly languishing, and because of the 
importance the six countries had as a bloc in the context of world trade, it seemed that 
the end had arrived. As it is shown in the following chapter, this fear proved to be short 
sighted as the appearance of a regional trade agreement in Western Europe led the 
General Agreement to play a crucial role which gave it new impetus: to integrate 
regional trade areas into its multilateral framework.
1.4 US support for European integration in GATT: the presentation 
of the Treaty of Rome to the GATT Contracting Parties
Since the Marshall Plan, the United States had supported the European 
integration process. As such, when, in 1955, the Six decided to start negotiations 
leading to the EEC, the Eisenhower administration gave its support. From a political
18 This description of agriculture treatment in GATT is taken from Curzon, G. Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, pp. 
166-208; Josling, T.E, Tangermann, S., Warley, T.K. Agriculture in the GATT (London: Macmillan/St.Martin Press, 1996) 
and Avery, W.P. (ed.) World Agriculture and the GATT (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) and Evans, J. W. The Kennedy 
Round in American Trade Policy, pp. 60-86. For a fuller description of the treatment of agriculture in GATT see chapter 
11.
19 Curzon, G. Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, p. 208
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point of view, it was hoped that the EEC would strengthen Western Europe in the 
context o f the Cold War, end the rivalry between France and Germany and link West 
Germany to the Western camp. While from an economic point of view, the EEC would 
reinforce Western Europe economically and so, finally, would make possible the 
realization of the multilateral trade and payments system. It also assumed that the EEC, 
by raising the growth rate of the six members and representing a more efficient market 
than the respective individual markets of the Six, could enhance American exports. To 
this aim, the EEC had to develop into an open regional agreement integrated into 
international trade. Washington feared that the EEC could become inward looking, a 
trade bloc closed to foreign exports and whose trade would be centred in on itself. The 
EEC was not only a bulwark against communism, and an expanding market, but also a 
customs union that would pass from the separate national tariff schedules o f the member 
countries to the common external tariff of the EEC, and which would dismantle tariff 
barriers to internal trade. At any rate, Washington believed that the political advantages 
that European integration provided were worth some trade discrimination, and that it 
would be possible, once the EEC established, to ensure that the EEC evolved into an 
open regional area.10
This political and economic support for the EEC led the Eisenhower 
administration to have a conciliatory and tolerant attitude towards the inconsistency of 
the Treaty o f Rome with GATT. The US priority to have the EEC fully settled pushed 
the Eisenhower administration to postpone any doubts on the potential discriminatory 
effects of the Treaty of Rome and any negotiations on this, its most controversial aspect, 
until after the EEC was firmly established. In truth, not all the Eisenhower 
Administration shared this line. The Treasury and Agricultural Departments focused on 
the discriminatory effects of the EEC, and held that any negotiations with the Six after 
the Treaty of Rome had gone unchallenged in Geneva might be too late to change it, 
leaving the Six free to unalter their position. The State Department, however, was in full 
control of the relations with the EEC and was therefore able to ensure that its line 
prevailed. As a result, as Romero put it, “this new, crucial advancement o f European 
integration was allowed to entrench itself behind the shelter of the USA’s friendly 
diplomacy” . In Geneva the Six could count on Washington to have the Treaty of Rome 
approved.11
Under article XXIV of GATT, contracting parties entering into a customs union 
were required to present to the other contracting parties the implementing treaty, to 
ensure that it was conformity with the provisions of the General Agreement. 
Recommendations by the other contracting parties could lead to reconsideration and 
revisions in the customs union treaty. Following these provisions, the Treaty o f Rome 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) was submitted, in order to 
discuss its conformity, to the General Agreement. The discussion resulted to be the first 
significant test for the relationship between multilateral and regional trade in the GATT 
framework, and led to the acceptance of a treaty establishing a customs union that 
evidently contravened GATT rules, in spite o f the opposition of Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia and, above all, the United Kingdom.21
20 On the attitude of the Eisenhower administration towards the EEC see Winand, P„ Eisenhower, Kennedy and the 
United States of Europe, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993); Lundestad, G. "Empire" by 
integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998).
21 Romero, F. "Interdependence and integration in American eyes: from the Marshall Plan to currency convertibility", in 
Milward, A. S The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory 1945-1992 (London; New York : Routledge, 
1994), pp. 155-182. Quote from p. 171.
22 In addition to sources mentioned below, this reconstruction of the study of the conformity of the Treaty of Rome to 
the GATT rules is grounded on Kock, K. International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967, p.122-131, GATT Basic 
Instruments and Selected Documents, Sixth Supplement (Geneva 1958) and, in particular, Alkema, Y. Regionalism in a
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When the Treaty of Rome negotiations started in 1956, the six future members 
of the EEC guaranteed to the other GATT members that the other Contracting Parties 
would be notified of the Treaty, in accordance with paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV, 
after its signature, but prior to its ratification. At the end of March 1957, while notifying 
Geneva of the Treaty o f Rome, the EEC representative, Baron Snoy et d’Oppuers, 
underlined the compliance of the Treaty with GATT, adding that “as long as the Six 
would remain contracting parties to the General Agreement they would scrupulously 
observe their obligations under this agreement” .“ The Treaty of Rome contained many 
references to GATT, stating that the customs union and commercial policy would be 
implemented in conformity with the Geneva rules and that the institutions o f the EEC 
would maintain all appropriate relations with the United Nations, its specialised 
agencies and with the GATT itself (see Articles 9, 110, 116 and 229).
In 1957, at the twelfth GATT session, a special Committee was set up to decide 
on the conformity of the Treaty o f  Rome. The Committee was supposed to analyse four 
aspects o f the Treaty: the arrangements provided with respect to tariffs; the use o f  
quantitative restrictions; trade in agricultural products; and the associations o f overseas 
countries and territories. Notwithstanding the formal assurances regarding its 
conformity, the Treaty o f Rome, in its most characterising features -  implementation o f  
Common External Tariff (CET) and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), associations 
of former colonies, and quantitative restrictions -  did not comply with the GATT at all.
Concerning tariffs, in order to establish a customs union as an essential element 
o f the European Economic Community, the Treaty o f Rome had set the level of the 
Common External Tariff (CET). The CET was determined not by negotiations between 
the members over the rate of duty to be charged on each product, but by the application 
o f the standard formula, set out in Article 19 o f the Treaty of Rome. This required the 
CET to be fixed “at the level o f the arithmetical average o f the duties applied in the four 
customs territories covered by the Community” on 1 January 1957. As a result, high 
French and Italian duties were averaged with low German and Benelux ones. For a few 
sensitive products (List G products), where adjustment difficulties were anticipated, the 
rates o f duties were determined by negotiations.14 As noted above, the poor drafting o f 
article XXIV.6 provided that the common external tariff on the whole had not to be 
more restrictive that the general incidence before the creation of the customs union, and 
that, where the common external tariff involved an increase in any rate previously 
bound in GATT by a member state, a release had to be negotiated with the other 
contracting parties that were beneficiaries o f that binding. Being so vaguely drafted, 
these paragraphs became sources of everlasting debate. The EEC member states 
asserted that they had incorporated GATT provisions into the Treaty o f Rome, as 
outside countries would be compensated for any increase in the low tariffs by the 
simultaneous reductions of high tariffs. The other contracting parties did not share the 
EEC position, rightly and obviously pointing out that the volume of trade affected by 
the changes in the duties had also to be considered.
No less problematic was the issue of quantitative restrictions. GATT rules were 
quite clear: member countries o f a customs union should eliminate all restrictive 
regulations between them. But the question o f how quantitative restrictions should be
multilateral framework. The EEC, the United States and the GATT. Confronting trade policies, 1957-62. (EUI Ph.D 
Dissertation), pp. 65-117. For a portray of the legal basis between the General Agreement and the Treaty of Rome, see 
Hilf, M., Jacobs, F.G., Petersmann, E.U. The European Community and GATT (Deventer, the Netherlands; Boston: 
Kluwer, 1986).
23 Cited in Hilf, M., Jacobs, F.G., Petersmann, E.U., The European Community and GATT, p. 34.
24 See Hine, R.C. The Political Economy of European Trade, p. 76. For a description of the negotiations on the way of 
calculating CET see: Asbeek, B. W. Tariff, Trade and European Integration 1947-1957. pp. 143-184 and Frank, I. The 
European Common Market. An Analysis of Commercial Policy (New York: Preager, 1961).
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treated when third countries were involved was less clear. According to the Six, they 
could remove quantitative restrictions among them, without extending the liberalisation 
to non-EEC members. The other contracting parties could not agree with this position, 
supporting the idea that quantitative restrictions also had to be eliminated against third 
countries.
Concerning agriculture, this sector was included in the Treaty of Rome, but as 
there was no agreement among the Six on how to regulate this sector, no details were 
given: thus, on the one hand, it was not possible to say whether on this aspect the Treaty 
of Rome complied with GATT. On the other, it was precisely this vagueness about the 
treatment o f agriculture which was considered as contravening GATT, and much 
comment focused on this elusiveness, Furthermore, the fear that a common agricultural 
policy could lead to the exclusion of all, or a large part of, trade in the agricultural 
sector was in the air in Geneva. Among the countries most opposed to the EEC’s 
position were Australia and Canada.
The greatest conflict between the Treaty o f Rome and the GATT rules arose 
over the Treaty’s provisions for associated overseas territories, and this issue represents 
the clearest example of American unwillingness to oppose the EEC. The Association 
Agreement -  by which each member’s colonies, that is to say those o f France and 
Belgium, would enjoy a preferential trading arrangement with the entire Community -  
turned out to be the most debated part of the Rome Treaty. Critics of the Association 
Agreement correctly argued that it did not establish a free trade area, which would have 
complied with Article XXIV, but an old system of preferences, and therefore 
contravened GATT on a point o f maximum importance, i.e. colonial preferences.
From the start o f the debate over the Treaty of Rome’s conformity, two 
questions troubled the work of the GATT Committee: the extremely diverging positions 
of the actors involved into the discussion, and the weight of the EEC. The EEC member 
states uncompromisingly asserted they had incorporated GATT provisions into their 
Treaty, and that it therefore complied with the General Agreement; in stark contrast, the 
other contracting parties, in particular the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia, firmly disagreed. Fearing a contraction o f their trade with the EEC, the other 
contracting parties considered the legal assessment o f the Treaty as a way of obliging 
the Six not to apply certain measures considered damaging to the former’s trade. Unlike 
the United States, they did not consider the EEC as a stepping stone towards the 
realisation of the multilateral trading system or as means to strengthen Western Europe 
in the Cold War, but rather as a discriminating regional bloc, harmful to their trade. 
Consequently, for them, it was necessary to prove the conformity of the Treaty of Rome 
from a legal point of view, in order to reduce any negative effects of the EEC to a 
minimum.
However, the core obstacle to the work of the Committee was that even if, from 
a legal point of view, it made sense to verify the Treaty of Rome’s conformity, from a 
practical point of view, the size and weight o f the EEC made it impractical to makes its 
existence depend upon the Treaty’s legalistic conformity to the General Agreement.“ 
Furthermore, the Treaty was the result of strenuous bargains between the Six, and in 
many cases the compromises arranged by them were the result o f a violation of GATT 
rules. Hence, for the EEC, making concessions to the other GATT members under 
Article XXIV meant reopening the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome. And no one in 
the six capitals of the EEC had the intention of so doing; on the contrary, the Six had
25 Hudec, R.E. The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, p. 196.
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made it clear that a finding that the Treaty was inconsistent with Article XXIV w ould  
result in their withdrawal from the GATT.*6
Against this backdrop, the risk Washington wanted to avoid was that the E E C  
could be faced with the choice o f renegotiating the Treaty of Rome -  which w a s  
impossible -  or being declared in formal violation of the General Agreement. Facing  
these risks, in Washington the necessity emerged of finding an ad hoc political solution, 
which could resolve the problem in a pragmatic way, so to reconcile the unwillingness 
of the EEC to compromise with the mistrust o f the other contracting parties and with th e  
credibility o f GATT itself. In America’s policy, the construction of the EEC was a s  
important as the existence of the GATT, as the EEC was the cornerstone of th e  
American Atlantic policy and a stepping-stone towards a multilateral trading system , 
while the GATT represented that multilateral system, which had to accommodate th e  
regional one. For this reason, a settlement that did not put the very existence o f the EE C  
and GATT at risk was indispensable.
Thus, after a year of tough negotiations between the contracting parties with n o  
result, under the pressure of Washington it was decided to put all the legal problems 
aside and to use a pragmatic approach. In the words o f the Committee: ‘7 / would b e  
more fru itfu l i f  attention could be directed to specific and practical problem s, leaving  
aside fo r  the time being questions o f  law and  debates about the compatibility o f th e  
Rome Treaty w ith Article XXIV o f  the General AgreementX  The Committee decided to  
opt for a political and pragmatic solution, deciding that rather than to look for a  
legalistic confrontation between the Treaty o f Rome and the General Agreement, a  
practical solution would be preferred. As a result, no formal decision on th e  
compatibility of the Treaty of Rome was acquired, even if the Treaty was, in m any 
cases, in violation of GATT rules.
The pragmatic solution was accepted due to the support of the American 
government who had particular reasons to support the Treaty o f Rome, and had th e  
political preoccupation of “getting the Community o ff to a flying start”, as Curzon 
wrote.18 In Geneva, the Americans underlined that it was necessary to ensure that th e  
EEC would develop an outward-looking perspective, and, to this purpose, the role o f th e  
GATT was to verify whether the Treaty of Rome could lead to the implementation o f  a  
customs union, in a reasonable period of time, and not to analyse, article by article, the  
entire Treaty.19. As such, the Eisenhower administration believed that the role of GATT 
should be to monitor the development of the EEC, so as to keep it open to world trade 
and to integrate the commerce of the Six members into the world economy.
At this point, it is important to explain how this pragmatic approach worked. A s 
there was no way of reconciling the two opposing positions regarding the CET, it was 
pragmatically decided to maintain contact with the EEC so to monitor its tariff policy, 
and to look for the possibility o f obtaining compensation from the EEC in future 
negotiation rounds. As for quantitative restrictions, the pragmatic solution was that the 
Six extended unilaterally to other GATT members half of the first 20% increase in 
global quotas between themselves, making further steps conditional on negotiations and 
compensations. As for agriculture, the GATT contracting parties could do nothing more 
than wait for the Six to start elaborating the CAP, however they obtained the promise 
that the Six would send reports on the state of approval o f this policy. As for association
26 Snape, "History and Economics in GATT's Article XXIV" and Hoeckman, B.M, Kostecki, M.M. The political economy o f 
the World Trading System, p. 353.
27 Cited in Kock, K. International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967, p.123.
28 Cureon, G. Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, p.280.
29 Snape, R.H. "History and Economics in GATT's Article XXIV" and Hoeckman, B.M, Kostecki, M.M. The political 
economy o f the World Trading System. P. 353.
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of former colonies, the debate that followed was animated, but the EEC knew it could 
count on the support o f the United States and, as such, the association was tacitly 
accepted. This decision stored up future troubles for free trade, both because the desire 
to obtain a position of equality with the EEC’s associates represented one o f the reasons 
which led to the developing countries’ demand for the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP), and then to the whole pyramid o f the EEC’s preferential trade 
agreements.10
For the EEC, its entrance into the world trade arena was extremely positive: the 
Treaty of Rome, even if  in clear violation of GATT provisions, went into effect without 
legal scrutiny, and with the support of the United States. For Washington, the 
negotiations demonstrated that the GATT could be a means to support broader 
American foreign policy objectives of promoting European integration. At the same 
time, if the one hand, Washington kept a soft and sponsoring position towards the EEC 
during the 1958 negotiations, on the other, it also realised that EEC discrimination had 
to be reduced, as it could hurt American exports and the multilateral trading system. The 
uncompromising position of the EEC in the negotiations proved to Washington that the 
commercial policy of the Six had to be carefully monitored, and fully integrated into the 
GATT. With this aim in mind, a fifth negotiating round was thought to be necessary. It 
was for this reason that the Eisenhower administration decided to promote the Dillon 
Round (1961-1962). With currency convertibility achieved by the leading European 
countries in 1958, which came to symbolise the final economic recovery of Europe, the 
United States thought that the moment had arrived for the EEC to play its part in the 
multilateral system, assuming all the consequent responsibilities.
1.5 The economic division of Western Europe
Before casting our gaze on the American initiative to set up the new round of 
GATT negotiations, it would be helpful to consider developments that were taking place 
in Western Europe and which, as explained in the remainder of this thesis, influenced 
the Kennedy Round.
When, in 1955, the negotiation leading to the Treaty of Rome started, one thing 
was certain in London: the United Kingdom would not take part to a European common 
market. London wanted to keep its commercial and political ties with the 
Commonwealth and its special relations with the United States, it had an inferior 
proportion of trade with the continent in comparison to that which it had with the 
Commonwealth, and was anxious about competition from German producers.31 After 
having rapidly decided not to join, initially London’s policy towards the customs union 
project was to ignore it, hoping the project would fail. But, since the United Kingdom 
exclusion’s from a European bloc could damage its trade position, when it appeared that 
the negotiations among the Six had some chance of success, London felt that an 
alternative had to be elaborated so that the implementation of a European customs union 
could be embraced without weakening the other ties the United Kingdom had. Thus in 
October 1956, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, officially the 
idea o f a pan-European free trade area (FTA) under the auspices of the OEEC.32
30 Pomfret, R. The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements (Oxfbrd:OUP, 2001), p. 108
31 For the British position towards the European integration process and the FTA initiative see Milward, A.S. The United 
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The UK argued that a FTA should be formed between the Six and the rest o f t h e  
OEEC: each member o f the FTA would reduce barriers to trade with the other m em bers, 
while keeping an independent customs policy towards non-members. The suggestion 
excluded agriculture, as London wished to protect this sector from European 
competition. The bulk o f Britain’s food was imported from the Commonwealth, and th i s  
flow of trade could not be turned away by purchases on the European m arket. 
Therefore, from the British point o f view, had the advantage of balancing the in terests 
towards the Commonwealth with those towards continental Europe.
In elaborating the FTA project, however, little attention was paid to the in terests 
of the Six, which immediately considered the FTA a way to allow United Kingdom t o  
keep its advantages in trading with the Commonwealth -  cheaper food and raw m aterial 
imports from that area -  whereas the Six would bear the cost of increased com petition 
within the FTA in the industrial sector. France and Italy did not want a deal excluding 
agriculture: they aspired at exporting foodstuffs to the United Kingdom and a proposal 
aimed at keeping French and Italian exports out from the British markets, while open ing  
France and Italy to British and German competition in the industrial sector, could n o t  
receive their support. The FTA, lacking the protection system elaborated in the E E C , 
exposed French and Italian producers to increased foreign competition without th e  
safeguards offered by the common external tariffs and the common agricultural policy. 
The same position prevailed in The Hague, where the Minister o f  Agriculture, S icco  
Mansholt, thought his country needed new foodstuff markets to join the FTA. "
In West Germany, the representatives o f the industrial sector generally endorsed 
the British proposal: the FTA could add to the advantages of the common m arket 
between the Six, the advantage o f preventing any future discrimination against G erm an 
exports by Scandinavian countries or other important OEEC markets such a s  
Switzerland. In the 1954-1957 period, 30% of the growth in value of German exports 
was directed to European countries outside the Six. Among these countries w ere  
Sweden and Switzerland, who supported the FTA. At the same time, there were a lso  
sectors that could lose from Scandinavian competition, like non-ferrous metal and p ap er 
producers, while the textile sector was not happy about strengthening competition from  
India, Pakistan and Hong Kong, caused by a closer association with the B ritish 
Commonwealth. As the sectors o f the German industry that could gain from the F T A  
could also gain from the EEC, it was not difficult for Chancellor Adenauer to defend th e  
Treaty o f Rome and the relation with France, while treating the FTA only as an added 
bonus.*
When de Gaulle came to power in June 1958, he did not take long to realise th a t 
France had more to gain from the Treaty of Rome than from the FTA. The Common 
Market guaranteed France an area where its industrial sector was able to compete w ith  
the industrial sectors o f the other five members, while its agricultural exports could b e  
directed to the huge German market and be financially supported by the EEC. O f  
course, this required that the envisaged common agricultural policy had to b e  
implemented in a way which was favourable to French farmers. Adding these 
commercial considerations to the political ones, in November 1958 France ended 
negotiations for the FTA, stating that without single external barriers, without th e  
harmonisation in the economic and social spheres, and without the inclusion of th e  
agricultural sector, it was not possible to create a FTA.Ji
33 Fauri,F. Italy and the Free Trade Area Negotiations 1956-1958, p. 47 and Milward, A.S. The United Kingdom and the 
European Community, p. 256 and p. 296.
*  Milward, A.S. The United Kingdom and the European Community, p. 276-277.
35 On de Gaulle's acceptance for the Treaty of Rome and rejection of the British FTA see Lynch F.M.B *De Gaulle's F irst 
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The breakdown of the FTA marked the end of the collaboration in Western 
Europe that had existing since the Marshall plan in 1947. The OEEC was now split, and 
a trading bloc, the EEC, existed within it. From a trading point of view, the failure of 
the FTA meant that deep discrimination would be put into practice not only within 
Western Europe but also in global trade because the EEC member states still had 
colonial empires, and, hence, were attached to the developing world. For Britain -  the 
biggest European trading nation at that time -  this split also meant that it had lost a 
forum in which it could exercise its political influence over Western Europe. This loss 
of influence in the OEEC context should be considered along with the British inability 
to have a leading role in the GATT discussion over the conformity of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1958.
After the GATT discussion on the Treaty of Rome, and the end of the idea of the 
FTA, the implementation of the Common Market could begin. From 1 January 1959, 
the Six started reducing their internal barriers under the timetable laid down in their 
Treaty. This date was critically regarded in London, where the Treaty was seen as 
bringing about a major change in the relations with continental Europe. However, on the 
Six's side, attention was given to setting up the customs union in a less challenging way 
towards third countries. The first scheduled tariff reduction among the Six was 
generally granted to the all GATT contracting parties, and the general increase of 20% 
on import quotas applied to EEC trade was granted to all OEEC members.M Thus, while 
appearing intransigent in stressing its determination to implement the common market, 
in practice the EEC showed comprehension for the discriminatory effects on the other 
countries. The different trade interests inside the EEC helped in formulating this 
position: West Germany and the Netherlands wanted to protect their trade relations with 
the non-EEC members and, in particular, with the OEEC countries.
Although the EEC tried to make its first move towards the customs union as 
uncontroversial as possible, the issue of trade relations between EEC and the other 
OEEC members was still seen as critical in Western Europe. In November 1959, the 
French Foreign Minister said that it was not possible to treat such an issue only from a 
European point of view: on the contrary, the matter had to be considered in a wider 
context, taking the trade interests o f the United States into consideration. By 1958-1959 
France had grasped that to keep the access to West German agricultural market it was 
better to consider trade problems on a multilateral basis in order to avoid any 
preferential link, such as an agreement within the OEEC.r The same view had been 
taken by the European Commission of the EEC in February 1959, when, in a report on 
this matter, the argument “Europe first” was put aside, and it was stated that the forum 
where the European Commission wished to tackle trade negotiations was the GATT. 
This viewpoint was not shared by the other five members of the EEC, who yearned for 
some forms of collaboration with the European non-EEC members, independently of 
GATT.1® However, nothing could be agreed upon and no understanding was elaborated 
and, in practice, Geneva remained the only arena available for dealing with the trade 
division of Western Europe. This was also because the United States firmly opposed 
any bridge building across Europe. It could accept the EEC trade discrimination for its 
political implications, but it had no intention o f tolerating the trade discrimination of the 
bridge building solution, which had no political relevance for America.
36 Shonfield, A. International economic relations of the Western World, 1959-1971 Vol.l, Politics and trade (London: 
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In any case, while the Six discussed what to do, the initiative was taken b y  
countries that had not joined the EEC. On 4 January 1960 the Stockholm Convention 
instituting the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was signed by the U nited  
Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Austria and Switzerland. The aims o f  
negotiating such an Association were, first, to form a minor version of the FTA -  o n ly  
in the industrial sector -  which, if  successful, might attract the EEC members, so pu tting  
pressure on the EEC in case the latter was not working because o f the F rench 
obstructive behaviour; second to obtain compensation for the discriminating effects 
deriving from the EEC.” Thus, in 1957, a first trading bloc, the EEC, had been created; 
in 1958 a proposal to “bridge building” between this bloc and the non members, th e  
FTA, had failed; another trading bloc had been agreed upon in response in 1960. As a  
result, the process leading to the trade division of Western Europe was complete.
1.6 The Dillon Round of Trade Negotiations (1960-1962) and British 
bid for EEC membership: paving the way to the Kennedy Round
As illustrated, the signing o f the Treaty of Rome and the development of th e  
GATT discussions over the this Treaty in 1958 led the Eisenhower administration to  
promote a new Round, with the aim of reducing both the discrimination o f the EEC and, 
more broadly, barriers to international trade. In the State Department strategy, once th e  
EEC had been established, negotiations could start with the Six to decrease th e  
discriminatory effects o f  the EEC on US trade and the multilateral system. The proposal 
for a new round was another piece of that pragmatic solution invented for fitting th e  
EEC into the GATT, and it has to be seen against the backdrop o f the role which th e  
GATT was to have in supervising the development of the EEC. At that time, th e  
General Agreement was the only organisation which offered the United States th e  
possibility to monitor the evolution of the commercial policy o f the EEC.* A new  
GATT Round was also important for GATT and multilateralism. In the 1950s, Western 
Europe had showed more interest in the OEEC than in the GATT. Then the EEC w as 
set up and the British reacted with the pan-European FTA. All this could overshadow 
the Geneva institution and its multilateralism, at a time when US had no other forum to  
discuss trade matters with Western Europe. With this in mind, a new round could 
reinforce the primary role o f GATT and, offering the possibility of reducing tariffs a t 
multilateral level, kill any prospect of bridge- building in Western Europe.
On top of this, the State Department had received objections from the 
Departments o f Agriculture and Commerce. Being more concerned with the future o f  
American trade than with European integration, Agriculture and Commerce feared the 
protectionist aspects o f the EEC -  in particular o f the CAP -  and wanted the 
Eisenhower administration to act to alleviate the discriminatory effects. Moreover, a t 
the end o f the 1950s, the USA started experiencing a growing deficit in the balance o f  
payments, coupled in 1958 with a decrease in the trade surplus. Thus, Washington felt 
that a new  Round could be an instrument to enhance its exports. Tariff reductions were 
thought to lead to an expansion o f world trade and, in particular, of trade in more
39 Milward, A,S. The United Kingdom and the European Community, p.308. See also Corbet, H.r (Ed.) Robertson, D. 
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competitive American goods, accordingly helping to reduce the American monetary 
problems caused by the deficits in the balance of payments.41
Given the fact that the Six would start implementing the customs union with the 
first 10% internal-tariff cut on 1 January 1959, the Eisenhower Administration felt it 
necessary to act as soon as possible. In June 1958, the American government authority 
to conduct international trade negotiations under the RTAA was due to expire and 
Eisenhower requested its renewal for five years from Congress with the intention of 
starting a long-term trade negotiation in the GATT framework as soon as possible. On 
20 August 1958 Congress renewed the RTAA for three years. In truth, even if the 
American executive was granted the authority to reduce tariffs by up to 20% over a 
four-years period, the available bargaining power was modest because of the existence 
of the escape clause and peril-point procedures and because no reduction o f more than 
10% could be made in any one year. At the GATT ministerial meeting of October 1958, 
armed with the new authority o f the RTAA, Under-Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, Douglas C. Dillon, officially suggested a round of multilateral tariff 
negotiations, which eventually came to bear his name.
The Six received the American suggestion in a mixed way. On the one hand, 
they already had a busy agenda, occupied with the schedule to reduce tariffs at EEC 
level and ongoing negotiations to reduce barriers on at European level. On the other, 
though, they saw the proposed negotiations as a possible way of ending the disapproval 
of the GATT contracting parties with regard to the Treaty of Rome. Aware that formal 
acceptance of the CET from Geneva was impossible, the Six knew that the only 
possibility was to attend a GATT tariffs conference where the other contracting parties 
could claim that the CET was too high, but, by accepting to negotiate their reduction, 
implicitly recognising it. In any case, since the results of the previous rounds had been 
rather meagre, and given the fact that Washington lacked authority to substantially 
reduce tariffs, the new Round did not promise serious reductions in tariff duties, so 
putting in danger the existence o f the CET. As such, no major reason existed to reject 
the US proposal. France and the European Commission also looked at the American 
suggestion from another point o f  view: a new GATT round would offer the possibility 
of pushing to a definitive end the Free Trade Area negotiations, and all plans for dealing 
with the issue o f  the division of Western Europe. The Commission had its own peculiar 
reason to favour the new round. Article 111 of the Treaty of Rome conferred to on this 
institution the authority to negotiate tariff reductions. Thus, for the Commission, the 
Geneva negotiations were an opportunity to start affirming its role on the international 
stage.
The decisive move for EEC participation and, consequently, for the participation 
of all the OEEC members, came from Paris on 14 November 1958 when the French 
announced that they would not join the FTA. This decision totally changed the picture 
of European trade relations. For one thing, the United Kingdom and the other non-EEC 
members of the OEEC started considering the possibility of multilateral negotiations as 
a way of alleviating the discrimination coming from the Common Market. Further, West 
Germany and the Benelux countries started supporting the multilateral framework as a 
way of diminishing the negative effects on their trade stemming from the 
implementation of the CET, which had raised their tariffs, in particular on intermediate 
goods. Therefore after the failure of the FTA, which was supposed to soften the 
discriminatory effects of the EEC at European level, attention turned to the multilateral
41 Shonfield, A. International economic relations of the Western World, 1959-1971 Vol.L, Politics and trade, p. 168 and 
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forum of GATT to find a way out o f the problem of the Western European economic 
split.42 The problem of the trade division o f Western Europe, accentuated by the creation 
of the EFTA in 1960, was moved into the multilateral arena of the General Agreement 
and the issue would be dealt with at the same time as trade relations between Western 
Europe and the United States.
For the United States to conclude the round by 1961. Firstly, the power to 
negotiate o f the US president was due to expire on 30 June 1962; secondly, the EEC 
members would start adapting their national tariffs to the CET on 1 January 1962, and 
this entailed that the negotiation under Article XXIV:6 -  which required the EEC to 
compensate exporters negatively affected by higher duties raised by the adjustment o f 
the Six’s national rates to the common external tariff on 1 January 1962 -  had to be 
accomplished before that date.4* Moreover, since the EEC could not attend a GATT 
negotiation until the exact level of the CET was fixed, it was necessary to open the new 
round with the XXIV:6 negotiations. Therefore, after spending 1959 agreeing on 
procedures, the round was officially opened on 1 September 1960. The first part of the 
Conference (Compensatory phase) was devoted to conducting renegotiations under 
Article XXIV:6 with the EEC, while the second (Reciprocal phase) to holding a general 
round of negotiations between contracting parties for new concessions.44
The first phase, which in fact turned out to be a confrontation between the EEC 
and the other contracting parties, took place between September 1960 and May 1961. It 
had been scheduled to end four months earlier, but difficult haggling dragged on until 
the Common Market made concessions acceptable to other GATT parties. Quarrels over 
broken “bindings”, or previously agreed upon tariff levels, proved to be one in a string 
of disputes between all the contracting parties -  but primarily between the USA and the 
EEC. The Six had broken bindings on prior tariff commitments, amounting to 1,100 
rates valued at $2 billion worth o f imports, after its members had averaged their tariffs 
together. The GATT made obligatory certain compensatory concessions through EEC 
duty reduction on other products, but the Six resisted. In setting their external tariff, the 
Six averaged the high French and Italian rates with the lower German and Benelux 
ones. This procedure, the Six declared, as they had in 1958 discussion, lowered the 
overall aggregate tariff level of the EEC, while the increase of German and Benelux 
tariffs was balanced with the decrease of French and Italians tariffs and thus 
compensated outside exporters neatly.
The other GATT contracting parties objected, asserting that what was significant 
was not the EEC internal balance between the decreases and increases o f tariffs, but the 
position of each supplying country before and after the implementation o f the CET. 
There was not considered to be compensation if a supplier to the German market saw 
the German tariff increase, even if the Italian one decreased. After much quibbling, 
American obtained concessions on bound duties in the EEC totalling $ 1.6 billion on 
991 tariff rates, less than Washington had first sought. However, the Six refused any 
further cuts, and this phase o f the talks, having already been extended four months past 
its initial deadline, ended in the autumn of 1961 with America’s grudging 
acquiescence.45
42 Shonfreld, A. International economic relations of the Western World, p. 168-169.
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With the bulky procedure o f bilateral item-by-item negotiations, and within the 
modest authority granted to the American delegation by the RTAA 1958, the second 
task o f the conference was a reciprocal reduction of the tariffs of all participants. It was 
in this second phase of the conference that the major confrontation between the United 
States and the EEC continued."6 The EEC initially offered an across-the-board 20% cut 
in its common external tariff, subject to reciprocity. Used internally by the Six in 
reaching their common tariff, this approach of across-the-board tariff cuts on all 
products in major categories of goods could replace the bulky method of negotiating on 
each item. Yet, the source of the EEC offer was mainly internal. In 1959 France and 
Italy had suggested accelerating the tariff-cutting schedule of the Community. As West 
Germany and the Benelux countries were hesitant about increasing trade within the EEC 
at the expense of trade with non-members, they demanded a 20% reduction o f the CET. 
France and Italy responded negatively to a unilateral reduction of the CET, and Belgium 
suggested that the reduction had to be offered to the GATT contracting parties on the 
basis for reciprocity."7
However, under the RTAA, the United States lacked the right to proceed with 
20% linear reductions, as its negotiating authority was severely limited by the peril 
point procedure. Thus, the Six attached exceptions to the linear provision because 
Washington could grant concessions on only one-fifth of the Common Market’s 
requests on manufactured goods. The US offer, because o f this limitation, fell far short 
of the 20% across-the-board figure, and a massive pullback of offers by others was 
avoided at the last minute when President Kennedy, “at his peril”, authorised the 
American delegation to go beyond the peril points on $76 million of US imports. 
Nevertheless, the average reduction in industrial tariffs was only about 10% for the EEC 
and slightly less for the United States."*
Although the United States could not match the original offer of a 20% linear 
reduction, it was the inadequacy o f the EEC’s position on agriculture that was the chief 
stumbling block as the bargaining intensified in 1961. Among the four issues that had 
dominated the 1958 GATT negotiation on the conformity of the Treaty of Rome, the 
agricultural issue remained the most problematic not only for the US-EEC relations but 
also for EEC-EFTA and EEC-Commonwealth relations. By 1961, the Six and the 
Commission had started elaborating their CAP, which, with its variable levy system, 
threatened to reduce imports to this area. Consequently, foodstuff-exporting countries 
such as Denmark, Canada, Australia and New Zealand had the firm intention o f making 
agriculture the major issue of the Dillon round.49
Soon, the biggest puzzle for the agricultural negotiations became the EEC 
variable levy. The EEC wanted to withhold from the Round certain items such as grains, 
rice, poultry, dairy products, and meat on the ground that, on these items, it planned to 
establish common agricultural policies based on variable fees and could not negotiate 
before the CAP had been settled. In contrast, the United States wanted concessions from 
the Six because agriculture represented the sector where trade barriers were most 
expected to rise as a result of the CAP. Washington asked for interim quantitative 
assurances to cover the period before the establishment of a common agricultural
46 This portray of the Dillon round has been made using as mainly sources: Alkema, Y. Regionalism in a multilateral 
framework., Preeg, E. Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotiations under the GATT 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1970) and Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and Power in the 1960s.
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48 Preeg, E. Traders and Diplomats, pp. 40-41
49 Essentially this guaranteed that certain European farm products would not be undersold by non-EC agricultural 
importers. A "levy" or imports tax would be put on these farm imports so ass to ensure that their price in the European 
Community was not competitive.
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policy.50 As a minimum, Washington wished to receive from the Common Market a 
concrete pledge that grains, poultry, rice and other products covered by the variable levy 
would not face prohibitive barriers in the EEC. It is worth noting that Washington did 
not choose to oppose the variable levy system on the ground that it was inconsistent 
with GATT rules. The CAP and the variable levy system were considered the price the 
USA had to pay for the growth o f the EEC and European integration. An open challenge 
to the CAP was considered a challenge to the EEC, as well as to European integration. 
And the USA, as had already been demonstrated in 1958, did not want to openly oppose 
the EEC and endanger its existence. After all, the EEC was founded on economic 
integration, which also presupposed a common agricultural policy.51
The Six, arguing that the EEC was still in the process of constructing its 
agricultural policy, refused to provide any concessions. Moreover, they claimed that the 
variable levy system would not be operated in such a way as to damage US exports. In 
reality, the EEC assurance was not so reassuring, as the aim of the variable levy system 
W s  to prevent competition from outside the EEC. After tough negotiations, and after 
the US Department of Agriculture had suggested suspending the trade talks to signal 
American displeasure, thus risking the collapse o f the entire round, the negotiations 
were settled, even if only for the time being, thanks to the Department o f State’s 
decision to outdo those voices in Washington asking for greater agricultural concessions 
by the EEC as a condition to conclude the Round. Anticipating what would then happen 
in the Kennedy Round, tough debate took place between Orville Freeman, Secretary of 
Agriculture, and Under Secretary o f State, George Ball, but in the end President 
Kennedy sided with the State Department. Thus, the EEC and the USA formally agreed 
that Washington had “unsatisfiednegotiations righ ts”, acknowledged in the “ standstill” 
agreements under article XXIV that froze existing tariff levels for hard wheat, maize, 
sorghum, ordinary wheat, rice and poultry. The EEC pledged not to increase protection 
on these products until the CAP was implemented, and undertook not to implement any 
restrictive or import controlling system. Mostly important, while implementing the 
CAP, the Six agreed to open negotiations with the United States to discuss the state of 
the American exports included in the standstill agreements.“
Thus the stalemate on agriculture was broken when the USA assented to 
completing negotiations without satisfactorily resolving the deep problems created by 
the emerging CAP through maintaining the right to seek satisfactory compensations 
under GATT article XXIV. But the U S’s acquiescence was merely considered the end 
of a first phase. In January 1962, the Kennedy administration took the initiative for a 
new Round that had to meaningfully include agriculture in the liberalising effort, and a 
major confrontation between the USA and the EEC over agriculture seemed merely 
postponed.
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The Dillon Round ended on March 7, 1962. The results were not wholly 
fruitless, although tie  gains in term of trade were only modest. The talks on agriculture 
had won a promise from the Common Market to maintain the status quo on farm 
imports, and stimulated efforts to reach agreement in the future. Both sides made 
concessions on manufactured goods, reducing tariffs by 20% on average: the Six on 
transportation equipment, electrical and industrial machinery, and chemicals, and the 
United States on machinery, electrical apparatus, steel, and automobiles. Agricultural 
products -  excluded few products covered by tariffs -  EC SC products, and List G 
products -  whose CET level had been set in February 1960 and the Six did not wish to 
change them again -  were not included in the Dillon Round. Chemicals were excluded 
because the US delegation had no authority. As a result, the 20% reduction concerned 
only one third US-EEC trade, so reducing by 7% the average protection for all sectors.
The Dillon^ound was a success for the Six. The other contracting parties had 
come to terms with the CET and the implementation of the CAP, even if criticised, was 
safe for the time being. Thus, the Six discovered that the General Agreement and the 
multilateral dimension could serve their national interests. Second, like the 1958 debate 
on the Treaty o f Rome, the Dillon round showed where the strength to dictate GATT 
lay, namely in Washington and Brussels. The negotiations crystallised around the 
quarrels between the EEC and the USA and once these two actors reached a deal, the 
other contracting parties had had no choice but to accept the agreement. In this way, the 
negotiations over agriculture were settled when the USA and the EEC agreed to settle, 
and countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand had no other option but to bow to 
the agreement.
More than one aspect illustrates the unexceptional results o f the Dillon round. 
The first factor concerns the method of negotiating the lowering o f tariffs: the Dillon 
round proved that the utility of the item-by-item method of negotiation had come to an 
end.” In previous rounds it had been functional, even if cumbersome, because tariffs 
were so high that they were not difficult to reduce. However, because the nature of this 
method of negotiating inevitably focused on selected industries, with the passing of 
rounds it had become increasingly time-consuming, above all with the increase in 
number of the contracting parties attending the rounds. Moreover, for governments it 
was becoming increasingly difficult to convince an industry to accept a reduction in 
tariffs, while other industries remained untouched by the reduction. Some industries 
began to challenging a system in which other firms* gains were paid for by their losses. 
Hence, for a government the only way to appear neutral towards industries was to adopt 
a linear approach. This was true above all for the EEC. Just as this method concentrated 
its effects on a selected industry for the tariff reduction, it also focused its effects on a 
specific country, making it appear that an EEC member was gaining at the expense of 
another, and thus altering the delicate equilibrium within the Community.M
A second factor illustrates the difficulties in reaching a deal in Geneva, and 
consequently explains the mediocre achievements of the round: the inadequacy of the 
power of the US executive. Under the RTAA, the American government was grievously 
short o f bargaining power, and US government finally became aware that it was not 
possible to negotiate effectively under the limitation of this Act. President Kennedy felt 
that a new trade bill was needed to attend GATT multilateral conference in the future. ”
The Dillon round highlighted that the US and the EEC -  the two major trading 
blocs -  had not yet found a mutually beneficial basis for the long-term economic
53 Curzon, G. Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, p . 100.
M Shonfield, A. International economic relations of the Western World, p. 175. 
ss Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and Power in the 1960s, p.64-65.
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relations critical to both regions, as many decisive problems were still on the agenda. 
This need, linked to the awareness that the item-by-item bargaining had outlived i t s  
utility, and that a new kind of authority was required to negotiate effectively in Geneva, 
steered Washington to believe that a new multilateral conference of a different kind w as  
necessary in order to reduce the discrimination of the EEC and to defend Am erican 
interest. Thus the results of 1960-1962 negotiations proved to be a for subsequent 
negotiations.
Other causes of the modest results of the Dillon round should be looked for in  
factors external to, and independent from, the General Agreement and its procedures, 
namely in the British application to join the EEC in 1961. In July 1961, while, in  
Geneva, negotiations between the EEC and the USA dragged on, Prime Minister H arold 
Macmillan stepped in, announcing that the United Kingdom would apply for EEC  
membership. London was then followed by Ireland, Denmark and Norway. T h e  
perspective o f the UK joining the Common Market changed the substance o f the round. 
Firstly, when the round started, Western Europe had just been divided and the G A TT 
was seen as a forum to deal with trade problems on a European level. Then, while th e  
governments1 teams were negotiating in Geneva, Macmillan made his announcement. 
Suddenly the chance arose once more that the Western European market could b e  
unified thanks to the entrance o f Britain and the other EFTA members into the EEC. In  
the EEC, the requests of applications diminished the interest in the burdensome 
discussions in Geneva: Germany and The Netherlands had pushed for EEC participation 
in the Dillon round as a means o f diminishing discrimination among the OEEC 
members. With the EEC enlargement, the split in Europe seemed on the verge o f  
healing and there was no longer any impetus to negotiate in Geneva. Moreover, the first 
phase o f the Brussels negotiations for new EEC membership took place contemporarily 
with the last phase o f the Dillon round, and even if  the round was obviously not 
interrupted as such by the British application, and the negotiation teams were left in 
Geneva, events in Brussels absorbed more of the attention o f the involved governments 
than did the time-consuming GATT talks.
Secondly, the British request for EEC membership also had an important impact 
on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, changing the perspective of the country that had 
suggested the hold of the multilateral conference. Washington had launched the Dillon 
round to  also deal with the discriminatory effects of the EEC. With the possibility o f  
Britain and other EFTA countries joining the Common market, the EEC would become 
a bigger market and the discrimination effects on non-members could be accentuated. 
The Kennedy Administration came to the conclusion that the Dillon round was not 
sufficient to  resolve this issue, and a new and large multilateral negotiation had to be set 
up, to cope with the negative trade effects on American trade that could derive from the 
enlargement of the EEC. As such, Washington lost interest in the Geneva discussion 
and the urgency to conclude a successful round was lost
The state of agriculture also triggered the American loss of interest in the Dillon 
round. The CAP had been a matter o f concern since the 1958 debate. This concern grew 
after July 1961 when Washington had to consider not only the discrimination from the 
CAP formed by six countries, but also the discrimination arising from the potential new 
link between the EEC and the Commonwealth. Immediately after Britain announced its 
application, the American delegation in Geneva tried to attain an arrangement with the 
EEC before the British entrance. When Washington realised that the Six were inflexible 
on their refusal to grant more concessions to American exports to the EEC market, 
President Kennedy understood that in order to settle the agriculture question within the
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GATT, a new approach would be required.54 The Dillon Round was not sufficient to 
deal with the developments that were taking place in Europe and a bold new start to deal 
with the EEC and European integration was necessary.
Conclusion
This chapter has described the US stance towards multilateralism and 
regionalism. It has explained how the United States supported the European integration 
process and the EEC as a means of unifying Western Europe politically. However, at 
the same time, Washington feared that the EEC could become restrictive and inward- 
looking, a trade bloc closed to foreign exports and whose trade would be centred on 
itself. Therefore, after having defended the EEC, the Eisenhower administration decided 
to promote a GATT Round -  the Dillon Round -  in order to decrease the discriminatory 
effects of the EEC, In this sense, the multilateral framework had to play the crucial role 
of integrating the EEC.
The difficulties in negotiating crystallized during the Dillon negotiations due to 
the cumbersome tariff-reduction procedure and to the lack of authority of the US 
President, and the British application to join the EEC led President Kennedy to launch a 
following round. In this sense, the Dillon Round opened the way for the Kennedy 
round: the need for new US trade legislation, the anachronistic nature of the item-by- 
item negotiating approach, and the crucial question o f agriculture combined with the 
UK application to become a member of the EEC, and led to the American initiative for 
new multilateral conference. The British request to join the EEC changed the policy of 
Washington towards the ongoing Geneva talks and the scenario o f the future of intra- 
European trade. Hence, the British decision represents an external cause o f the modest 
results of the Dillon round, but at the same time, it also contributed to the elaboration of 
President Kennedy’s policy. The Americans needed a bolder policy to deal with the 




The American initiative for a new GATT Round: 
strengthening Atlantic interdependence
Introduction
In the first chapter we described the American policy of reorganising the international 
economic system at the end of World War II and its effort to set up a multilateral and 
open trading system. We also illustrated how the US government tolerated European 
economic discrimination as a means of strengthening Western Europe and unify it 
politically, and how it also favoured the creation of the OEEC, and then of the EEC. In 
this framework, GATT would serve as to means to pragmatically decrease European 
discrimination and integrate the EEC into the multilateral trading system. We concluded 
that, however, by the early 1960s, with the success of the EEC and its envisaged 
enlargement, the US government realised that a new policy was needed to deal with 
Europe and that the first area in which a broader initiative was needed was, indeed, that 
o f international trade, as the difficulties of the Dillon Round had demonstrated.
In this chapter we shall analyse America’s response to the success of the EEC 
and its subsequent development. While the Eisenhower administration reacted to the 
creation o f the EEC with strong and open support, with its major preoccupation being to 
set the EEC “off to a flying start”, the Kennedy administration, on the other hand, had to 
face up the Community’s success, as well as its envisaged enlargement. Kennedy 
needed a policy towards Western Europe which could address the changes that were 
taking place. The aim o f this chapter is to show that Kennedy’s trade program, and his 
initiative for a new Round, set the direction and the tone o f the American response to 
European developments. The USA was aiming to diminish the discriminatory effects o f 
the EEC through multilateral trade liberalization, while at the same time strengthening 
the links between the two sides o f the Atlantic. The new trade initiative was part of 
Kennedy’s Grand Design to establish an Atlantic Partnership between equals, aiming 
not only at strengthening the link between the USA and the EEC, but had also at 
reaffirming the importance of the Atlantic alliance as the only framework in which 
European integration and the EEC could develop. Thus the Kennedy administration, just 
as the Eisenhower administration had tried to do with the Dillon Round, used the 
multilateral GATT forum for dealing with problems raised by European integration and 
regionalism.
2.1 Problems across the Atlantic
After having urged Europe to unite, in 1957 Washington watched the EEC’s 
coming into existence and its establishment as a trading area. The USA had supported 
the unity o f Western Europe, because o f the fact that it strengthened the area politically 
and it formed an expanding market for American exports. But, at the same time, a 
united Europe was also perceived as a potential threat to the Atlantic alliance, due to the 
risk that the former could develop in an inward-looking way, completely independent of 
the USA. As such, there existed the danger that the two sides of the Atlantic could 
become two rival blocs in the economic, military and political fields. By 1960 the EEC
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was successfully established, and this success gave rise, in the Eisenhower, and then 
Kennedy, administrations, to the concern of preventing the EEC from forming a 
separate commercial and political force with policies independent of those of the United 
States. The European unity process had American support, but the latter felt it necessary 
to maintain it within the multilateral system and Atlantic alliance. At the end of the 
1950s, the US government concluded that transatlantic relations had to be restructured 
in order to deal with the developments that were taking place in Europe.
The need to prevent an independent and discriminating Europe was more urgent 
than ever due to the policy of French President, Charles de Gaulle. US relations with 
France were becoming strained, above all due to issues concerning NATO and nuclear 
strategy. The French President was trying to develop an independent defense policy 
which Washington perceived as a threat to NATO and to American leadership. Next, 
while Washington supported an EEC as a supranational group with an open border to 
the outside world, and in particular with the United States -  so requiring the UK join of 
the EEC -  de Gaulle advocated a French-led EEC based on the nation state. As noted by 
Lundestad, de Gaulle represented the main political challenge to the “primacy of the 
Atlantic framework, or, more directly expressed, the American-dominated framework” 1
Problems in transatlantic relations also stemmed from other sources. During the 
1950s the United States ran an almost continuous balance o f payments deficit. This was 
the more or less intentional consequence of an international policy aimed at rebuilding 
the economies of Western European countries and reducing their dollar shortage, the so- 
called “dollar gap”. In so doing the USA was acting as the residual source o f world 
liquidity, financed by deficits in its own balance of payments and the linchpin of the 
monetary regime based. In 1958 the persistent American deficit began to increase 
dramatically, seemingly as a result of the combination of economic recession in the 
USA, overseas military spending, American investments abroad, and a sharp decrease 
of the trade surplus (Table 1).
T able 1. Selected US balance-of-paym ents figures 1957-1962 In S m illions
Overall trade balance Direct Military Expenditure Abroad Direct Investments Abroad
1957 6271 -2,841 -2,447
1958 3462 -3,135 -1,181
1959 1265 -2,805 -1,372
1960 4892 -2,753 -1,674
1961 5571 -2,596 -1,598
1962 4521 -2,484 -1,654
1963 5224 -2,304 -1,976
1964 6801 -2,133 -2,328
1965 4951 -2,122 -3,468
Source: Survey o f  Current Business (U nited  States Departm ent o f  Commerce. Bureau o f  Economic 
Analysis), O ctober 1972 and June 1975.
The deficit in the balance o f payments became a major issue for the Eisenhower 
Administration at the end of the 1950s, when the European dollar gap became a dollar 
glut, and these dollars were increasingly cashed in for gold, and US gold holdings 
started to fall dramatically. From 1950 to 1960 the American gold supply fell from $22 
billion to $17 billion, which represented the pre-war level, and in 1960, for the first
Lundestad, G. "Empire* by integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) p. 61. On De Gaulle's policy, among the many scholars who have dealt with the issue, see 
Vaisse M. La Grandeur: Politique Etrangere Du General De Gaulle, 1958-1969. Paris: Fayard 1998) and Bozo, F, Two 
strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).
43
time, foreign dollar reserves exceeded American gold reserve. The erosion o f US gold 
holdings, combined with deficit in the balance o f  payments, undermined the credibility 
o f America’s pledge to convert any dollar into gold, and these factors began to cause 
concern on both sides o f the Atlantic, as the situation could threaten the strength o f the 
dollar and the entire international monetary system." In this context, the combination o f 
EEC discrimination against US exports, the growing competitiveness of European 
producers and the capital outflow o f US investment in Europe could no longer be 
considered as favourably as when the US balance of payments did not represent a 
problem and the gold reserve seemed unlimited.3
Within the Eisenhower Administration, the deficit in the balance of payments 
and the gold outflow sparked debate on the cause o f the deficit, as well as on US foreign 
military policy. In addition to foreign investments, Eisenhower and the Treasury 
Department pinned the blame squarely on USA military expenditure abroad, and in 
Western Europe in particular. Therefore, either the US had to reduce its military 
commitments, or the Europeans, under the American defense umbrella, had to 
collaborate in some way to reduce the deficit. In I960, Eisenhower put pressure on the 
European allies, and on German Chancellor Adenauer in particular, to increase their 
spending on military commitments, without success, however.4
Thus, signs that the relations with Western Europe had to be in someway 
reformulated were clear during the Eisenhower administration’s final years. In fact, 
plans to reshape them were already afoot. In August 1960, the report “The North 
Atlantic Nations. Task force for the 1960s. A report to the Secretary of State” was 
prepared by Robert Bowie, a policy planning official, for the Secretary of State 
Christian Herter. The report addressed a broad range o f problems in the economic, 
political and military fields that the countries of the Atlantic Alliance were envisaged to 
face in the 1960s. Inter alia, it suggested nuclear sharing arrangements between the 
Americans and the Europeans, and that a multilateral conference should be held to 
substantially decrease barriers to trade in order to stimulate US economic growth by 
increasing American exports, to increase trade integration between the two sides o f the 
Atlantic and to  soften discrimination arising from the economic divide in Western 
Europe and to  give more markets to the LDCs. To achieve these major trade aims, a 
major revision o f US trade legislation was needed. The report also underlined the need 
to avoid the fragmentation o f the Atlantic alliance and to strengthen its unity in the 
context of the Cold War, as well as the need for the Atlantic alliance to coordinate its
The literature on monetary problems for this period is vast. See, among the others, Strange, S. International Monetary 
Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971 (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Cohen B. J. Organizing 
the World's Money: the Political Economy of International Monetary Relations.(London: Macmillan, 1978); James, H. 
International Monetary Cooperation Since 1945 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund: 1995), Stem, R.M. The 
Balance of Payments. Theory and Economic Policy (London: Macmillan, 1973), Bordo, M.D. and Eichengreen, B J .  (eds.) 
A retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lesson for International Monetary Reform, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993).
3 Borden, W.S. "Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy" in Paterson, T.G, Kennedy's quest for 
victory: American foreign policy,1961-1963 (New York; Oxford U P , 1989), p. 61 and Zoumaras, T., "Plugging the Dike: 
the Kennedy Administration Confronts the Balance-of Payments Crisis with Europe" in Brinkley, D. and Griffiths, R.T 
(Eds.) John F. Kennedy and Europe (Baton Rouge: Luisiana State University Press, 1999), p. 170-171.Benoit, E. Europe 
at Sixes and Sevens. The Common Market, the Free Trade Area Association and the United States (New York: Columbia 
UP, 1961), p.123-127.
4 On the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations' debate over the deficit in the balance of payments and the link with 
the security issue, see Zimmermann, H. Money and Security, Troops and Monetary Policy in Germany's Relations to the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 1950-71, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002) and Gavin, F. J. Gold, Dollars, and 
Power. The Politics of International Monetary relations, 1958-1971. (Chapel hill and London: University of North 
Caroline Press, 2004).
44
economic and monetary policy. Finally, the report put forward the idea of an Atlantic 
partnership o f equals.5
As the Eisenhower mandate was coming to an end, the responsibility of solving 
the balance o f payments problem, of encouraging Europe to pay more for defence, and, 
in general, o f shaping relations with the other side of the Atlantic was passed on to the 
Kennedy administration. Thus, while Eisenhower had to deal with the creation of the 
EEC, Kennedy was the president who had to deal with the many problems that were 
emerging between the two sides of the Atlantic. For Kennedy, it became paramount to 
develop a policy to deal with the evolution of the relationship between Europe and the 
United States which would recast the Atlantic alliance keeping a way that would 
guarantee the continued existence of Atlantic unity and American leadership.
2.2 In search of a policy for Europe and the European allies: 
towards a new GATT Round
Kennedy’s elaboration o f a policy towards the European allies and the EEC 
remained along the same lines as that elaborated by Eisenhower, and ideas already 
mooted by Bowie. In the Kennedy administration, Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, George Ball, was to have a prominent role in economic and 
European affairs. Immediately after Kennedy’s election to the White House in 
November 1960, Ball sent the new President a report advocating a long-term policy in 
the context of a unified Western Europe that should reflect Ball’s major concerns: 
NATO, Western Europe and the trade relations of the Atlantic alliance. Ball proposed 
long-term policies for NATO, nuclear cooperation and economic development that 
reformulated Bowie’s suggestions. In the trade field, his plan was to provide the 
government with new and greater powers to develop commercial policy, enlarging the 
authority of the US President to reduce tariffs in order to grant him the power essential 
to maintain the unity of the Atlantic Community through a sweeping liberalization of 
trade. Ball drafted comprehensive foreign economic legislation that gave the President 
authority over a five-year period to reduce tariffs by 50 per cent across-the board. On 
top of this, the future Under Secretary suggested that a plan for a “partnership Between 
a United Europe and America within a Strong Atlantic Community” be proposed. Ball 
therefore considered US foreign trade policy an essential element in maintaining the 
interdependence of the two sides o f the Atlantic.6
Kennedy backed the report, and during the interregnum Ball received the 
assignment o f organising and chairing task force on foreign economic policy for the 
new administration. The report produced by Ball’s task force suggested concentrating 
the administration’s trade program on a new and bold trade initiative aimed at tackling 
the Common Market. The EEC had to be used as “a justification for a major new round 
of trade negotiations and a precedent for reducing tariffs by percentage cuts across the 
board rather than the tradition item-by-item haggling”. The President had to be 
equipped with a trade law able to bargain down the CET to a level that would permit 
outsiders to compete in the Common Market. It was felt that a failure to reciprocally 
reduce tariffs with Europe could cause the fragmentation of the Western economy and
5 For a full description of this report see Winand, P. Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (New York: 
S t Martin's Press, 1993), p. 161-173.
6 The report was named the Stevenson report as Ball wrote it on behalf of Adlai Stevenson. See Ball's memories The 
Past has Another Pattern (New York: Norton, 1984), p. 159-165 where the importance Ball attached to trade is also 
illustrated by the fact that he describes his entrance to the State Department as "the tradesman's entrance to foreign 
policy". See also DiLeo "George Ball and the Europeanists in the State Department, 1961*1963" in Brinkley, D. and 
Griffiths, R.T. (eds.) John F. Kennedy and Europe, pp. 263-280.
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the multilateral system into separate trading blocs. At the same time, the desired 
increase of US exports through a far-reaching liberalization o f international trade, would 
foster economic growth and, by increasing the trade surplus, would help to close the 
balance-of-payments deficit. And with this latter aim in mind, Ball also made clear his 
views on the responsibilities of the Europeans: “any surplus countries accumulating 
foreign exchange [...] should accept a responsibility to take measure to increase its 
imports of goods and services” from the USA. Therefore, in addition to reducing EEC 
protectionism, the US President had to  be provided with legal authority to set up a new 
GATT Round for far-reaching liberalization of international trade in order to favour the 
expansion o f exports seen as crucial in stimulating economic growth and, by increasing 
the trade surplus, ending the deficit in the balance of payments. In this sense, trade 
policy was to serve broader American foreign and domestic interests.’
Ball transformed his suggestion into an active policy when he was appointed 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in January 1961, and oversaw the 
drafting of the Trade Expansion Act which authorised US President to start a new 
GATT Round for a sweeping liberalization of international trade.8 The expiring of the 
RTAA in 1962 gave Ball the opportunity to put into practise his ideas, and from January 
1961 Ball worked on preparing a trade bill with a totally new approach. Ball called for a 
“grand design”, as he put it, along the lines of his reports, to conduct an effective 
foreign policy and address the changes that were taking place. Domestic prosperity 
depended on a new approach to Europe, as US internal growth and a wealthy and secure 
Free World could be ensured only through the development of a new economic policy 
in collaboration with the allies. For this reason, the country needed “a comprehensive 
economic policy bill” that would reformulate American foreign and trade policy 
towards Western Europe. With this aim in mind, it was necessary to seek Congress’s 
approval for a new trade bill that, through a new GATT Round, would not merely 
provide trade liberalisation for its own sake, but which would rather in fact encourage 
the establishment of a rational organization of the Western world economy. In Ball’s 
policy, trade represented a decisive component in the US relationship with Europe and 
the EEC, and had the role o f ensuring the survival of the Atlantic Alliance, given the 
fact that trade created a interdependence between nations.9
The issue o f the US balance-of-payments deficit remained crucial in transatlantic 
relations, and to be inextricably linked to the US trade programme and the latter’s 
policy regarding the EEC and the Atlantic allies. For Kennedy, solving the deficit 
remained a priority as he deemed that this factor, and the threat to the supremacy of the 
dollar, threatened the United States’ overall position in the world and its capacity to 
have effective policies in the context of the Cold War. One of the first and most 
important tasks he set himself was to adopt measures to close the deficit and stop the 
gold outflow which threatened the strength of the dollar and, as a consequence, the 
international monetary system.10
However, building a consensus in this policy area was not an easy task for the Kennedy 
administration. Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon strongly advocated the withdrawal of
1 Report to the Honourable John F. Kennedy, dated 31 December 1960. Pre-presidential papers-Transition files, Task 
Force reports, Box 1073, JFKL. Ball chaired also the task force on balance of payments and the OECD.
8 Ball's central role in the formulation o f trade policy is also mentioned in the oral history of the Kennedy Round 
reported in Eckes, A  (ed.) Revising US Trade Policy. Decisions in Perspective (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).
9 George Ball memo to Dean Rusk, January 1961. General Correspondence Folder, 48-164, B General, 1 January -31 
March 1961, Box 12 JFKL.
10 Zoumaras, T., "Plugging the Dike: the Kennedy Administration Confronts the Batance-of Payments Crisis with 
Europe", p. 174. For a full account o f the monetary policy of the Kennedy Administration see Zimmermann, H. Money 
and security and Gavin F.J. Gold, Dollars, and Power.
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US troops from Western Europe and saw the reduction of American military 
commitments as the easiest way to resolve balance of payments problems. Dillon was 
convinced that the deficit was not caused by the role of the dollar as the main source of 
liquidity in the growing world economy, and that adjustments and interventions in other 
fields, such as capital outflow and overseas expenditure, would allow the international 
monetary system to be preserved. On the contrary, the State Department, and in 
particular Ball, strongly rejected the solution of withdrawal on the ground that it would 
undermine Western European confidence in NATO, and damage America’s willingness 
and capacity to defend Europe. Ball, believing that the deficit was the result o f a flawed 
international monetary system, developed plans to provide new source of international 
liquidity, even if  this implied restraint or ending the dollar’s role as a reserve currency. 
This debate betrayed the split regarding perceptions of what the causes of the deficit 
were, and, as a consequence of what remedial measures were required. These factors 
hampered Kennedy’s ability to tackle the issue. The President identified America’s 
security commitments to Western Europe as the main cause o f the deficit. However he 
was hesitant in reducing American military commitments to Europe for fear of the 
serious consequences this move could have on relations with the European allies. At the 
same time, Kennedy was also reluctant to follow Ball’s reforms which would have a 
major impact on the standing of the dollar, and whose effects could not be guaranteed. 
A sa  result, the response that emerged to the problem of the balance of payments was 
not made up o f structural measures such as the withdrawal o f US troops from Europe or 
the reform of the monetary system. Instead, it consisted o f a set of less dramatic 
measures which, taken as a package, were targeted at ending the deficit. Thus, certain 
initiatives were taken to reduce the capital outflow, as well as stabilize the dollar and 
reduce gold drain, and achieve rapid, non-inflationary domestic growth. Furthermore, 
America set out to convince the Europeans, and above all Germany, to share the US 
military burden.11
This burden sharing had to take place not only through increased European 
military spending, but also in the context of trade. As already noted, it was felt that 
expansion of US exports was needed to stimulate US domestic growth and, by 
increasing the trade surplus, had to help to reduce the deficit in the balance of payments. 
The Kennedy Administration aimed at increasing the already favourable trade balance 
to a level high enough to compensate for military commitment and investments in 
Europe. NATO allies had to share this burden by accepting more imports from the USA 
as a form of ‘compensation’ to the US. The USA needed a substantial increase in 
exports, unless it was to make fundamental changes in foreign commitments.12
In the Kennedy Administration, foreign trade policy and a new GATT Round 
came to have numerous fundamental objectives. A far-reaching liberalization o f trade 
was seen as essential in increasing the interdependence between the two sides of the 
Atlantic, as well as in reducing EEC discrimination, stimulating US growth and helping 
to rectify the deficit in the balance of payments. It was with these aims that the Kennedy
11 On the different initiatives taken by the Treasury in this field, such as the Gold Poll of 1961, the "Roosa Bonds", the 
General Agreement to Borrow, the Operation Twist and Interest Equalization Tax (IET) see Block, F.L. The Origins of 
International Economic Disorder. A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the 
Present (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp.177-181.
12 FRUS 1961-1963 Voi. IX. Foreign Economic Policy, 2/19. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant 
for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 21 
January 1963. Zoumaras, T., "Plugging the Dike: the Kennedy Administration Confronts the Balance-of Payments Crisis 
with Europe" p.172-176. For a specific analysis of US initiative for a new round and the link with the issue of the deficit 
in the balance of payments see Coppolaro, L. "Trade, GATT and the US balance of payments in the 1960s* in Adrews, 
D. Revisiting Bretton Woods (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007).
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administration framed its trade policy and regarded a new round of GATT negotiations 
to reduce barriers to trade as a necessity.
2.3 The impact of the EEC on US trade
Before continuing the inquiry into the reasons which led the Kennedy 
Administration to  launch a new Round, we should first focus on US trade patterns with 
the EEC, in particular from 1959, when the implementation o f the EEC customs unions 
began, to 1962, when the Kennedy Administration formally suggested a new Round, as 
well as examining the main features o f the EEC of which the US government was most 
apprehensive due to their perceived potential impact on US and world trade.
The United States was not as dependent on foreign trade as the European states. 
In 1950 exports accounted for 3.6 percent o f GNP, for 3.9 percent in 1955, for 4.1 
percent in 1960 and 3.8 percent in 1962. Moreover, only 8 percentage of US industrial 
output was exported, and 15% of farm production went abroad.13 As illustrated, 
however, trade surplus had a crucial weight in the balance o f payments.
Table 2: US e x p o rts  1954-1962 (in th o u sa n d s  o f  USS)
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962
World 14699 15418 18870 20609 17841 17569 20532 20954 21614
Industrial countries 8387 9021 11363 11875 9763 10384 12617 12928 13283
Western Europe 4495 4675 5989 6262 4964 5110 6852 6821 7152
United Kingdom 798 995 969 1145 905 1100 1492 1212 1130
EEC 2806 2597 3663 3867 2871 2869 3987 4170 4577
Canada 2950 3383 4130 4017 3540 3827 3813 3838 4053
Asia 1184 1427 1855 2069 1907 1671 2182 2232 2455
Japan 691 680 995 1317 987 1080 1451 1841 1574
Western Hemisphere 3096 3021 3551 4314 3892 3408 3634 3817 3649
Developing countries 5740 5814 6864 7982 7525 6742 7686 8009 8316
Source: D irection  o f  trade statistics historical, 1948-1980 (W ashington. D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund. 2002)
As Table 2 shows, the EEC was a major market for in US exports, and in 1960 it 
became America’s first market, overtaking Canada. The beginning o f the 
implementation o f  the EEC customs union did not prevent the USA from increasing 
their exports to the Six. American exports to the Six increased from a total value of 
$2,869 million in 1959 to $4,577 million in 1962. As such, As such, despite the customs 
unions, not only did American imports not suffer, they in fact increased in volume. 
Table 3 illustrates that among the Six, Germany was the largest export market for the 
United States. Notwithstanding the beginning of the implementation of the customs 
union, American exports to Germany rose and did so by a faster rate than to the other 
five members o f the EEC.
United States Bureau of Census, The Statistical History o f the United States. From Colonial Times to the Present 
(New York : Basic Books,1976) Series U 201-206 Foreign Trade Related to Various Measures of Production: 1869- 
1970, p. 887. Just to make a comparison, in 1962 in Italy exports accounted for about 12 percent of its GNP, in 
Germany about 15 percent and in the United Kingdom over 16 percent.
T able 3: US expo rts  to  th e  Six 1954-1962 (in  thousands o f  USS)
Source: See tabic 2
Trade with the Six was important also from the point of view of the trade balance. As 
Table 4 illustrates, a considerable part o f the US’s surplus stemmed from trade with the
EEC.
T abic  4 US tra d e  b a lan ce  1954-1962 (thousand  o f USS)
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
World 4024 3561 5522 6730 3349 789 4362 5218 4092
EEC 1800 1356 2113 2178 1039 266 1530 1767 1929
Source: See table 2
It should be noted, though, that the fact that the start of the implementation of 
the EEC customs union did not impede to the USA from increasing its exports and trade 
surplus with the EEC was not particularly reassuring for Washington, as in 1962 the 
customs union’s implementation was only just beginning.
In 1956-1957, in supporting the EEC, the USA had assumed that a system based 
on European preferences would increase intra-EEC trade more rapidly than trade with 
other areas. Indeed, the threat that the implementation of the customs union posed was 
that of altering trade patterns by increasing intra-European trade in a way 
di sproportionally higher to trade with other areas, and this risk was seen as greater with 
the final part of the implementation of the customs union between the Six, The only 
way to avoid such a risk was to set the CET as low as possible.
This was a major goal for Washington. Higher economic growth among the Six 
was of great interest to Washington, as this factor was expected to offset EEC trade 
discrimination, as it would increase demand for foreign products, and hence for 
competitive American exports.14 Again, this would only follow, however, if  tariffs walls 
against non-member suppliers could be kept low. For the United States to exploit 
European growth and dynamism -  one of the reasons which had led to American 
support for the EEC -  the essential condition was that the CET had to be set at low
14 The GNP of EEC from 1957 to 1963 increased at an average rate of more than 5 %, as compared with a rate of 3% 
in the United States and about 2,5% of the United Kingdom.
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level, thus permitting efficient exports o f third countries entry into the EEC at 
competitive prices and in sufficient quantities.15
Just as the CET had to be kept low in order to ensure the existence o f an 
outward-looking EEC, the other common policies that the Six would eventually 
implement also had of a nature which ensured that a close Common Market did not 
develop. Among these policies, a prominent position was certainly held by the CAP in 
this regard. Although its exact impact on world trade was difficult to predict, both in 
terms of trade and production, Washington feared that it could lead to an uneconomic 
degree o f EEC self-sufficiency which could work to the detriment of traditional, 
efficient agricultural exporting nations, as the United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, thus causing problems not only for the USA but for the entire multilateral 
trading system.16
To better analyse the issue of agriculture it is helpful to look at some data. In 
1954, American agricultural exports accounted for 10.2 percent of total farm income, 
and in 1962 this figure had risen to 15.0 percent.17 Among the American sectors, it was 
the farmers who were most reliant on exports. In the 1950s both the US Department o f 
Agriculture and producer organisations became increasingly oriented towards 
commercial exports sales as it became clear that the domestic productive capacity 
exceeded the domestic capacity to absorb production. Moreover, expanding agricultural 
exports would increase farm incomes, thus permitting the government to reduce its 
financial support to agriculture and cut federal spending on farm programmes. This 
factor greatly influenced US commercial policy at the beginning of the 1960s, when 
Washington began to vigorously look for overseas markets for its farm products, and in 
particular for wheat, feedgrains, oilseeds, poultry and tobacco. However, the potential 
importer countries had protectionist agricultural policies that limited American 
exports.18
Among the countries that had protectionist agricultural polices there were the 
Six, which were negotiating their Common Agricultural Policy. Although the Six 
already had protectionist national systems, the harmonisation of agricultural policies 
had the potential to move towards an even greater level of protection, which could 
drastically reduce imports from outside suppliers. In 1961, American exports o f 
agricultural products to the EEC represented about a quarter o f total American exports 
of agricultural products and, most importantly, half the US trade surplus with the EEC 
originated from agricultural exports, which ran at the rate o f almost five times US 
imports from the same area. In 1958 US agricultural exports to the Six represented 31.4 
percent o f total exports to the area. In 1962 this figure had risen to 32.4 percent. US 
agricultural exports to the EEC were an important factor in both US foreign and 
domestic policies, as the EEC was the most important US market for agricultural 
exports. The USA retained the largest and most diversified export interests for 
agricultural products, and but as table 5 shows, major exported commodities were feed 
grains, soybeans and tobacco.
15 Narrative History of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiation, Vol. 1, p. 2, 1969, Administrative History of the 
Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Box 1, LBJL.
16 United States and the world trade in perspective. Seventh Annual report of the President of the United States of 
trade programme. September 1963, p. 1-7. Administrative History Office of the Special Representative for trade 
negotiations -  Box 1 LBJL.
17 United States Bureau of Census, The Statistical History of the United States. From Colonial Times to the Present 
(New York : Basic Books,1976) Series U 201-206 Foreign Trade Related to Various Measures of Production: 1869- 
1970, p. 887. For the data on US agricultural trade see Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, US Department 
of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (March 1970), pp. 18-19.
18 Warley, T.K. Western Trade In Agricultural Products in Shonfield, A. International economic relations of the Western 
World, p. 320-322.
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T ab le  5 US A g ricu ltu ra l exports to  th e  E E C  1958-1962 (thousands o f  US dollars)
Commodity 1958 1960 1961 1962
Variable-levy commodities
Wheat 79000 46332 173039 50606
Feed grains 158000 197146 194012 336457
Rice 5854 6894 15035 14247
Beef&veal meat 31 38 49 64
Pork 400 418 561 341
Lard 2100 2326 3401 2134
Dairy products 2890 2997 2084 3603
Poultry and eggs 364 28551 45835 53479
Non variable-levy commodities
Fruits & vegetables 71631 57665 69952 93070
Oilseeds (soybeans) 71052 120245 134294 174028
Unmanufactured tobacco 96452 97003 97384 106609
As % of total US exports 31.4% 32.4%
Source: SITC Classification. Source: OECD SITC Rev.2 - Historical Series 1961- 
1990 (Paris: OECD 2000) and OECD Exports, Scries B, 1958 and 1960.
With the prospective implementation of the CAP, which stimulated European 
production, Washington feared that American exports to Europe could diminish and that 
Europe could become self-sufficient in temperate agriculture, with the result that 
patterns o f world trade in wheat, feed grains, meat and dairy products would radically 
altered.19 Even more than industrial trade, European protectionism in the field of 
agriculture represented the biggest headache for Washington, even above industrial 
trade, as the general lines of the CAP’S basic structure had been made know, and did not 
reassure the USA. As such, it appeared indispensable to hold negotiations with the EEC 
on this area, in order to prevent a fall in American exports, and EEC autarky.
The State Department recognised that American support for European 
integration required support for a common commercial policy not only for industry but 
also agriculture. As such, it did not attempt to maintain US agricultural exports at the 
expense o f destroying the CAP. Further, American farmers themselves also received 
subsidies, so it was not possible to request that Europe abandon their envisaged 
protectionist system while the USA kept its own. State Department policy consisted 
more in encouraging a liberal implementation o f the CAP, so that, rather than 
embracing autarky, it moved towards economic rationalism, providing expanding 
markets for imports. Thus, the State Department and the US government as a whole did 
not contest the right of the Six to have a common agricultural policy, but were fearful 
that feared that this policy it would in fact prevent virtually all imports, and thus felt it 
necessary to prevent certain protectionist excesses of the CAP.2" In contrast, the 
Department of Agriculture, logically being more interested in supporting the interests of 
US farmers than European integration, and having to face the very well organized
19 FRUS 1961-1963, IX, Section 11/230 Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to 
President Kennedy, 23 October 1961.
20 Agriculture and the Trade Negotiations, paper written by M. Biumenthal, 2 August 1963, C.A. Herter. Papers, Box 7 
JFKL and NA State Department, CDF 1960-1963, box 721, Memorandum of conversation between French officials 
Oappier, Whal, Corson, Kojfcve, and American officials Weiss, Ioanes, DeFelice in trie framework of the Dillon Round 
negotiations, 10 October 1961.
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lobbies in Congress, was particularly vociferous in asking the American government to 
protect American agricultural exports in Europe, and in the Dillon Round it openly 
showed its opposition to the CAP itself. The GATT Article XXIV negotiations of 1958 
and then Dillon round had showed the State Department how thorny it was to negotiate 
on agriculture, not only because o f  the obvious clash with the Six, but also because o f 
the tough opposition to an accommodating stance towards the CAP coming from the 
Department of Agriculture.
In addition to the customs union and the CAP, there was a third element of the 
EEC that concerned Washington, that is the trade preferences extended by the EEC to 
the member countries’ former colonies. Washington feared that these preferential 
agreements could discriminate against Latin America and less-developed countries 
excluded from the preferential system, increasing the pressures on the United States 
market, or pushing these countries towards increasing trade with the Soviet bloc.21
Through the customs union, the CAP and the Association agreements the EEC 
could easily become a major inward-looking trading bloc in the multilateral system that 
the United States had helped to shape at the end of WWII. Thus Washington deemed as 
urgent the EEC’s integration into the multilateral trading system. If the EEC were to 
form into a closed trading bloc, the system could disintegrate into a polycentric 
combination of competing trading blocs. In this sense, the EEC represented a challenge 
not only for US-EEC trade relations, but also for the multilateral trading system as a 
whole. Thus, the Kennedy administration had to deal with those aspects of the EEC still 
unresolved -  the impact of the CET, the CAP and o f the preferential agreements -  
already discussed in Geneva in 1958 and in Dillon round. In 1958, Washington had 
supported the EEC for political reasons, while in the Dillon round American negotiators 
unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with the EEC a lowering of barriers. In 1961, a new 
bold initiative appeared essential.
2.4 Accelerating the decision: the British bid to join the EEC
Until April 1961, the EEC continued to raise the same concerns in Washington 
as since its creation. After this date, however, an additional factor was introduced. In 
April 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan informed Kennedy of his intention to 
seek EEC membership, which was then formally announced in July of the same year. 
The initiative was welcomed by Washington due to its political significance: the entry 
o f the United Kingdom would strengthen Western Europe and would counterbalance de 
Gaulle’s nationalism, and thus strengthening the transatlantic relations. From an 
economic point o f  view, the United Kingdom and other EFT A countries joining the 
EEC would put at an end the economic division o f Western Europe. Further, the 
enlargement was seen as favourable American trade. London could impede the EEC 
from becoming inward looking and could support liberal trade. The British rate was 
inferior to the EEC average, and membership could potentially stimulate British growth, 
and consequently American exports. Ball seemed to be rather keen on this argument, for 
in his opinion the EEC enlargement could increase the level o f  exports o f American 
industrial goods rather than lower it. As for agricultural products, the problem of 
ensuring fair access to the EEC for American products existed independently of British 
entry, and Ball claimed the latter eventuality could even reduce the level of 
discrimination coming from the CAP, since, traditionally, the United Kingdom was
21FRUS 1961-1963, IX, Section 11/227, Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant Petersen, Proposal for 1962 
United States Foreign Trade and Tariff Legislation, 4 October 1961.
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LU
committed to low food prices. In this sense, British membership could be beneficial 
and, as such, the British initiative was welcomed by the United States.“
While the enlargement o f the EEC, on the one hand, had to potential of bringing about 
the positive effects described above, nonetheless the prospect of the UK joining the 
Common Market created economic concerns for the United States, and further increased 
the need to act to prevent any discriminatory effects which would affect the 
performance of American exports. As table 6 shows, US exports to the EEC and UK 
represented a considerable share of American exports to industrial countries, and 
Washington considered it necessary to protect this flow of exports.
T able  6 US im ports  a n d  exports  by  to  E E C  a n d  UK
U S  t r a d e  w i t h  E E C  a n d  U K
Y e a r
—♦—Exports to Industrial countries — Exports to EEC and UK J
Imports from Industrial countries — X - Imports from EEC and United Kingdom;
Source: see table 2
It was on these difficulties that the State Department, and Ball in particular, 
concentrated. First o f all, an increase in the number of members of the EEC customs 
union would obviously amplify its discriminatory effects. Second, even if  it was true 
that British entrance could moderate CAP protectionism, this result could not be taken 
for grantedas given, as a more protectionist line could prevail in Brussels. Thus 
Washington looked with apprehension at the prospect that Britain, the world’s largest 
agricultural product importer, would adopt the protectionist system of the CAP, so 
\reorienting the area o f origin o f its imports, causing further discrimination against US 
yf* {^y-'exports. Third, if Commonwealth preferences were extended to the enlarged EEC, an 
0 ^  ¿ r  increase of discrimination against American temperate agriculture and manufacturing, 
$ and Latin Am erican ironical and tem nerate agriculture could fake nlare M oreover the
/
 ti  ri  tr pi l  t p r t  ri lt r  l  t  pl c . r r, t  
prospect was not merely of a Common Market enlarged to include the UK and, through
Ie1
22 FRUS 1961-1963 XIII West Europe and Canada. Economic and Political Integration. 16 Memorandum for the 
President "UK adherence to the European Common Market" by George Ball, 23 August 1961.
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a preferential agreement, to its Commonwealth, but of regional trading bloc composed 
o f most Western European countries, as the British decision was expected to be 
followed by other EFTA members, which would ask for either membership or for 
association. As a result, effective discrimination against outsiders would be increased. 
In 1960, the United States sent one third o f  their exports to OEEC countries, thus the 
maintenance o f access to Europe's markets was imperative i f  it wanted to avoid a fall in 
its merchandise trade balance, and diminish the incentive to large flow o f US direct 
investment in W estern Europe aimed at avoiding the CET.23
Washington ran the risk of facing discriminatory effects arising from a huge 
EEC regional bloc, potentially with preferential trade arrangements with the British 
Commonwealth and with the less-developed countries linked to the EEC by Association 
agreements. For Washington it became paramount to avoid the fragmentation o f  the 
multilateral trading system and to cushion the impact of the growing discrimination 
coming from Europe, affecting itself and others.2"1
Therefore, while accepting and openly supporting the EEC enlargement, it 
placed conditions in some specific areas: Any agreement between the EEC and the UK 
had to maintain reasonable access for third countries’ goods. Moreover it 
uncompromisingly opposed the extension o f Commonwealth preferences to all the EEC. 
The State Department reminded the British that the elimination of any preferential 
agreement had to be the ultimate objective of UK-EEC negotiations and made it 
perfectly clear to the Six and to the United Kingdom that it would strenuously oppose 
any trade agreement that would extend Commonwealth preferences to the enlarged 
Common Market. The Europeans were not the only ones to be warned. Indeed, 
Washington also made its opposition perfectly clear to Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand.25 Furthermore, Washington stated its opposition to the extension o f association 
status to the three neutral members of the EFTA, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden, who 
would not join the EEC, as the former generally opposed any development o f 
preferential areas and because, in this specific case, the three neutral countries would 
have enjoy preferential treatment without accepting the political implications o f the 
Community; as Washington was ready to accept some discrimination but not where this 
did not foster the attainment some political goal. Lastly, the Europeans had to 
reformulate the system of special trade relations with the LDCs with a view to 
eliminating discrimination between regional sources of supply by the introduction o f 
arrangements on a global basis. Thus, Washington was seeking solutions at global level 
to problems raised by EEC enlargement, so that the interests o f members and third 
countries alike were taken into account.26
I f  these conditions were met, the United States could agree to the enlargement 
and welcome it as a major contribution to the creation o f an Atlantic Community and 
the strengthening o f  the Western world. To be sure, Washington was aware that putting
3 NA 59 Department o f State, Central Files, 375.800/8-761 Memorandum by Ball to President Kennedy 7 August 1961, 
FRUS 1961-1963 XIII West Europe and Canada. Economic and Political Integration. 16 Memorandum for the President 
"UK adherence to the European Common Market" by George Ball, 23 August 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, IX, Section 
11/227, Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant Petersen, Proposal for 1962 United States Foreign Trade 
and Tariff Legislation, 4  October 1961.
24 FRUS 1961-1963 XIII West Europe and Canada. Economic and Political Integration. 17 Circular Telegram From 
Department of State to Certain Missions in Europe (London, Brussels, Paris, Rome, Luxembourg, The Hague and Bonn) 
by Dean Rusk, 5 September 1961.
25 FRUS 1961-1963 XIII West Europe and Canada. 19 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the 
United Kingdom, 17 October 1961; ibidem 23 Memorandum of Conversation between Ball, Schaetzel, Harrop and 
Rggures (Secretary General of EFTA) and Burras (EFTA Washington Information Office), 6 November 1961.
26 Ibidem; NA State Department CDF 1960-1963 box 721 Memorandum of Conversation between Ball, Tuthill, Couve 
de Murville and Wormser, Paris 17 November 1961. On this problem see also Balassa, B. Trade Uberalisation Among 
Industrial countries. Objectives and Alternatives (London : McGraw Hill. 1967), p. 27.
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pressure on the allies in order to push them to follow trade policies it desired was not 
enough. Initiatives to avoid all the negative consequences of the EEC enlargement 
appeared urgent. — __
The EEC/enlargement/did not only pose problems for American trade and the 
multilateral tradìifg~system. British entrance could fortify Western Europe and the 
Atlantic alliance, but it could also endanger the unity of such alliance. The existence of 
the EEC and its prospected enlargement raised in the Kennedy administration the 
question of whether the tremendous economic potential of this area would be used in 
harness with the United States toward common political and security aims, or whether 
the enlarged EEC would be form a separate commercial and political force. 
Commercially, the issue was the role the EEC would assume in the multilateral context: 
a regional agreement open to world trade, or a protectionist bloc? By the same token, 
from a political viewpoint, the issue was whether the economic strength of Western 
Europe would lead to the old continent developing aims and policies independent of 
those of the United States, so weakening rather than strengthening the Atlantic alliance 
and the Western world in general, or, in contrast, Europe would continue to toe 
Washington’s line. As such, the EEC, from a commercial perspective, had be kept from 
causing the multilateral system to fragment. From a political one, had to be kept from 
weakening the Atlantic framework by strengthening the Western European one, and it 
was on the condition that the EEC fortified the former that Washington could support 
the EEC enlargement and European integration.3
Washington supported an enlargement of the EEC that would diminish trade 
division in Western Europe and would empower it politically. But the United States did 
not want the Europeans to diminish trade discrimination among themselves and buttress 
Europe at the expense of US trading interests and the Atlantic alliance. The enlarged 
EEC could not be allowed to develop into an enormous regional trading system centred 
on Europe, but rather be fully opened to American exports and integrated in the 
multilateral system. Moreover it had to remain fully integrated within the Atlantic 
alliance, as the exigency of the Cold War mean that fragmentation of the Atlantic 
alliance into two pillars with different policies vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, had to be 
avoided. Only at on these conditions could European integration result in being 
advantageous for the United States, and thus receive the latter’s support. The EEC 
represented a new element in Atlantic relations, and it became crucial to find a way to 
mutually sustain European integration and Atlantic solidarity, the existence of the EEC 
and the multilateral system.
The necessity to redefine the relations between Europe and the United States in 
the light of the existence of the EEC existed well before the British decision seek EEC 
membership. With this aim in mind, a GATT Round for a sweeping liberalization had 
already been envisaged. However, the British announcement at the end o f July 
intensified the urgency of a GATT round of this kind. It appeared more critical than 
ever to act in order to avoid a dangerous economic split developing within the Atlantic 
community and increased discrimination against US exports, as well as to prevent any 
discriminatory agreement between the EEC and the Commonwealth, thief these two 
parties ignored American opposition to this. 3 In the context of this aim, the US
27 FRUS 1961-1963 XIII West Europe and Canada. Economic and Political Integration. 17 Circular Telegram From 
Department of State to Certain Missions in Europe (London, Brussels, Paris, Rome, Luxembourg, The Hague and Bonn) 
by Dean Rusk, 5 September 1961.
28 FRUS 1961-1963, IX, Section 11/227, Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant Petersen, Proposal for 1962 
United States Foreign Trade and Tariff Legislation, 4 October 1961.
29 FRUS 1961-1963 XIII West Europe and Canada. Economic and Political Integration. 20 Circular Telegram From 
Department of State to Certain Missions in Europe by Dean Rusk, 27 October 1961.
government needed new trade legislation that would allow the setting up of the new 
GATT Round. As Ball put it, “the proper road to the defence -  and indeed, the 
advancement -  o f our trading interests is to pursue liberal trade policies ourselves and to 
insist that the Common Market do likewise. This means that we must be in a position to 
reduce our own tariffs on a reciprocal basis.” 30
It is worth noting that Washington did not choose to deal with the EEC and its 
enlargement on a bilateral basis, or in the context of the OECD. The EEC enlargement 
would have global consequences on world trade, as it concerned not only the United 
States and the other Western European countries, but also the Commonwealth members, 
the LDCs and the entire multilateral system. Consequently, the proper forum to deal 
with issue was the global one o f GATT. Hence, the answer to EEC enlargement was a 
new GATT round to further reduce barriers to trade and to try to globalise, on a MFN 
basis, any preferential agreements with by the enlarged EEC.31 The aim was to use the 
multilateral arena o f  GATT to influence the evolution o f the EEC regional agreement 
towards more liberal trade.
The success o f the EEC and its envisaged enlargement led the Americans to 
anticipate developments in Europe and to suggest that a new round be held in order to 
influence the enlargement process of the EEC and affect its results. In this sense, the 
decision to launch a new round represented the culmination of multilateralism. 
Washington responded to events in the EEC regional trading bloc by invoking 
multilateralism. “ It was as if  the ghost o f Cordell Hull had returned to preside over 
American policy” .32
2.5 A new bold trade bill with the Europeans in mind
The Kennedy administration concluded that a new GATT round with broader aims than 
the previous ones represented a suitable solution to face the challenges which the EEC 
brought, by seeking to influence its future developments before that the levels of CET 
and the CAP were definitely set. After deciding that a new round was indispensable, it 
followed that a new trade bill was required and, with the RTAA of 1958 expiring in 
1962, the next step was to agree on a trade bill to be presented to Congress.
The State Department, and Under Secretary Ball in particular, played a crucial 
role in elaborating the policy to be adopted towards the EEC, however, once the 
decision regarding the new approach had been taken, Kennedy was reluctant to leave 
the State Department to its own devices in terms of the new bill’s elaboration. In order 
to ensure the bill’s passage through congress, he needed to give the impression of that it 
was the White House calling the shots, without much influence from the State 
Department, as Congress considered the latter an agency that often traded away 
American commercial interests due to foreign policy concerns. On top o f this, the 
President needed to gain bipartisan support for his trade bill. With this aim in mind, 
right after Macmillan’s announcement o f the British application, in August, Kennedy 
appointed moderate Republican Howard Petersen White House Adviser for Economic 
Affairs, with the task of elaborating a new trade program. Nonetheless, the bill’s 
elaboration did not entirely exclude Ball. In fact, Petersen strictly cooperated with State
30 FRUS 1961-1963 XIII West Europe and Canada. Economic and Political Integration. 16 Memorandum for the 
President "UK adherence to the European Common Market" by George Ball, 23 August 1961.
31 Ibidem.
32 Calleo D., Rowland, B. M., America and the world political economy: Atlantic dreams and national realities 
(Bloomington: Indiana U P, 1973), p. 82.
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Department, and the architect o f the final result, the Trade Expansion Act, remained
Ball.33
In October, the internal debate over trade policy intensified. Two particular 
issues were debated: first, whether the new legislation had simply to be a request of 
renewal o f the RTAA with some modifications, or, in contrast, whether a completely 
bold new law was needed; second, the suitable time to present the bill to the Congress: 
in 1962 when UK was negotiating with the EEC and an electoral year for the United 
States, or in 1963, after the elapse o f the RTAA, when it was hoped that the UK would 
have become a member of the Common Market and after American elections.
Petersen judged that slightly modifying the existing RTAA would be enough to 
achieve the goals o f the Kennedy administration. The President would receive renewed 
authority over a five-year period to negotiate in Geneva a 50% duty reduction within the 
legal framework of a modified RTAA. The peril point and the escape clause provisions, 
and the procedure by which these were applied, had to be changed because they limited 
the power of the President to effectively bargain in Geneva. This would be particularly 
significant if  the United States were to negotiate across the board. However, even if  
changed so not to limit the authority granted to the President, they had to remain 
beneath a level which would cause Congress alarm. Petersen recognised that such 
limited authority may not be sufficient to set up a sweeping liberalization of 
international trade, but he seemed convinced that not much could be obtained from 
Congress. Petersen also suggested that adjustment assistance should be granted to firms 
and workers injured by imports. Regarding timing, given how crucial the existence of 
the EEC was in the shaping of the trade program, he suggested 1962, rejecting the 
alternative of deferring submission of a trade bill until 1963. He recognized the 
persuasive arguments in favor of 1963, the full implications of the enlarged EEC would 
be better understood in 1963 than in 1962 and the negotiating situation between United 
kingdom and the EEC would be much clearer in 1963, and, consequently it would be 
much more evident what legislative powers the United States needed in order to deal 
with the EEC.34
Despite the persuasiveness of this view, Petersen rejected delaying the 
presentation of the new bill until 1963 on the grounds, first, that any delay would be 
interpreted as indecisiveness regarding the trade bill; in the meantime groups in support 
o f liberal policies in the foreign economic field would lose momentum, while the 
protectionists would gain in strength. If the USA was were not already in motion 
towards closer economic ties with the EEC, Congress could easily take a dangerous 
isolationist and nationalist stance. Second, to keep close economic ties with the EEC, 
the US leadership had to makes it policy known clearly and early-on. Third, Petersen 
did not share the view that the United States would be in a better position to estimate its 
negotiating needs in 1963 than in 1961-1962. United States had already been dragged 
into various aspects of the EEC with or without powers of negotiation. Therefore, the 
notion that Washington could hold aloof from the EEC negotiations for another twenty- 
one months seemed grossly unrealistic. As for the election-year versus election-off year 
timing issue, in Petersen’s view the point was not particularly decisive: all years were
33 Zeiler, T. W. American Trade and Power, p. 56. The link between Petersen and Ball was strengthen by Petersen's 
deputy Myer Rashish, who had been secretary to the Ball task force. "The real father of the Trade Expansion Act [...] is 
George Ball. Without George Ball non of this [the TEA] would have happened" said some thirty five years later W. 
Michael Blumenthal in Eckes, A. E. Revisiting U.S. Trade Policy. Decisions in Perspective, p. 49.
34 FRUS 1961-1963, IX, Section 11/229. Paper Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant (Petersen), transmitted to 
Ball under cover of an October 18 memorandum from Petersen, 17 October 1961.
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bad years for trade legislation, and the new Congress could be poorer in composition 
from the viewpoint o f liberal trade.35
Petersen’s approach was criticized by Ball who labeled it as “too little and too 
soon” .36 Ball, supported by the State Department, thought that the utility o f the RTAA 
had come to an end, and that a new completely bill was made necessary by the changes 
in the rest o f the world. Moreover, asking Congress to pass another renewal bill, which 
would have involved tough fighting, only to secure very small changes, was senseless. 
A completely new approach and trade bill were indispensable therefore, above all 
bearing in mind the ongoing Dillon round negotiations, where the American delegation 
clearly lacked bargaining authority, the consequences that EEC enlargement could have 
on international trade.37
A clean break was required, as unless a law that in its language and spirit 
suggested some form of progress was approved, tariff reductions of any significance 
would simply not be feasible. The US President had to hold out for a strong starting 
position: broad tariff reduction authority, no peril point, and adjustment assistance to 
injured firms as normal response. The United States would then have to negotiate 
international trading arrangements in a number of key agricultural products. Such goals 
required a totally new trade bill, thus doing away with the RTAA, because the ultimate 
goal was not to  simply cut tariffs between the two side of the Atlantic, but rather, in 
Ball’s eyes, to maintain the unity of the Atlantic Community through increasing trade 
between the two areas.38
As for the timing of the negotiations, Ball’s plan was to announce in 1962 the 
general directions o f a new policy appropriate suited to the new conditions of the 
trading world, and to hold o ff the drafting and introduction o f an explicit legislative 
proposal until 1963, which would not be an election year. The Under Secretary held that 
1962 should be spent preparing the ground for major changes and their implications in 
the trade law within the administration and trade sectors. Then, in the spring of 1963, 
Kennedy would ask Congress for the necessary legislation with a far greater chance o f 
success. Moreover, Ball feared that by presenting to Congress in 1962 a trade bill so 
clearly dictated by the developments in Western Europe, the Kennedy administration 
would become engaged in a Congressional debate on the position to take regarding 
European integration, a prospect the State Department wanted to avoid so to maintain as 
much maneuvering room as possible in order to avoid taking a position on European 
integration that ran counter to American long-term interests, both political and 
economic. On top of the considerations already mentioned, Ball also took into account 
the mixed feelings that existed in the United Kingdom towards EEC membership. Ball 
supported such membership and wanted to avoid the danger that announced tariff 
reductions in the framework of GATT might prevent UK entry: London could be caused 
to believe a new GATT round would be sufficient in alleviating EEC discrimination.
35 Ibidem.
36 FRUS 1961-1963, IX, Section 11/230 Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to 
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Therefore, he felt that the trade bill should be presented to Congress only in 1963, when 
it was hoped that the Brussels negotiations would be almost at an end.39
It was against this set of considerations that Kennedy had to take his final 
decision, balancing a number of major considerations in addition to American trade 
interests, such as the effect of his choice on the course of the UK-EEC negotiations, the 
interests of third countries in American commercial policies and the reaction of 
Congress.-10 Kennedy too had had doubts about presenting a trade bill during an 
electoral year, but events in Geneva and in Brussels convinced him it would not be wise 
to wait. The Dillon Round was clearly demonstrating American lack of authority to 
engage in major liberalization o f trade and in bargaining with the EEC. In Brussels, the 
Six were contemplating the implementation of a CAP that aimed at self-sufficiency, and 
were negotiating for the enlargement of their Community that would extend 
protectionism to the new members. Events on the other side o f the Atlantic led Kennedy 
to eventually make up his mind that the RTAA had to be abandoned and that the 
initiative for the new and bold trade law had to be taken in 1962, while Washington still 
had time to influence the EEC, pushing it towards being a more liberal trading bloc. 
Kennedy decided that “the evidence is clear, that events might pass us by, and that the 
fierce fight [with the Congress] which even a simple extension would entail might be 
better fought, and fought only once, for a wholly trade instruments”. Thus Kennedy 
adopted the bolder approach supported by Ball, but with Petersen’s timing.41
Kennedy’s decision to look for Congress’s approval in 1962 raised in Ball the 
concern that the United Kingdom could lose interest in joining the EEC, and that the 
opposition to membership in country could be strengthened by the prospect of gaining 
better access to the EEC market merely attending a GATT round. The Macmillan 
government had justified the decision to seek EEC membership by citing the 
discriminatory effects of economic exclusion from the EEC. But if such discriminatory 
effects could be diminished through a GATT round, justifications for membership 
would lose sway and the UK could again prefer “one world” achieved via GATT to 
EEC membership.42 In order to ensure that Kennedy’s decision would not hamper 
British membership, Ball decided to insert into the draft o f the trade bill the technical 
safeguard of the “dominant supplier” that, as shown in the next chapter, would mostly 
surprise the Europeans.43 According to this clause, the US President would have the 
authority to reduce to zero tariffs on those products for which the USA and the EEC 
together accounted for more than 80 percent of world trade. The EEC was defined as 
those countries which had agreed to achieve a common external tariff on the date when 
the United States started formally preparing negotiations. If the United Kingdom joined 
the EEC, tariffs could be cut to zero on a large range o f items, and if not the clause 
would apply only to aircrafts and margarine. Ball’s move was grounded in British 
willingness to sharply reduce tariffs worldwide and it was aimed at preventing London 
from losing interest in membership.
39 Ibidem and Ball, G. The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 198-199.
40 FRUS 1961-1963 XIII West Europe and Canada. 21 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the 
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At the sam e time, as it is more carefully described below, the dominant supplier 
clause not only had the function of encouraging British membership, but also the 
purpose of obtaining maximum advantages from the EEC enlargement, as it was aimed 
at extensively cutting tariffs across the Atlantic and at setting up a free trade area 
between the US and the EEC for industrial goods. The commodities touched by the 
clause -  chiefly machinery, railway equipment, automobile, and organic chemicals -  
were the most advanced technical goods entering world trade, for which the USA held 
an advantageous position in their manufacture. For these items American capacity to 
compete was demonstrated by the fact that their exports to the EEC and UK were 
substantially greater than imports,44 The clause had the advantage of enabling the 
United States to  negotiate down the CET of the enlarged EEC, so reducing 
discriminatory effects on third countries and cutting off the prospects of special bilateral 
arrangement with the EEC. This approach would show the determination o f the United 
States to adopt a trade program aimed at the free movement of industrial goods, and 
could encourage the EEC to remain open to world trade during its critical enlargement 
stage, and could enhance the commercial unity of the Atlantic alliance. Therefore, with 
its trade bill, the Kennedy administration intended not only to respond to developments 
in Europe but also to anticipate them.
2.6 The approval of the Trade Expansion Act
After deciding to present Congress with a completely new trade bill, giving the 
executive broad authority to reduce tariffs, the Kennedy administration had to come up 
with a strategy to  win the approval of the legislative body. It had to carefully study how 
to sell Congress a  departure from the RTAA and the increase o f government authority 
to drastically reduce tariffs. The chosen strategy consisted o f coordinating legislative 
hearings, expert testimony and press conferences in order to build support, hopefully 
bipartisan, and co-opting the opposition.45
In aid o f the Kennedy administration came Dean Acheson and Will Clayton, but 
also Christian Herter, Eisenhower’s secretary o f State. At the hearings before the W ays 
and M eans Committee of the House of Representatives, they all emphasized the need 
for a new trade bill to win the Cold War. Being a Republican, Herter’s support was o f  
utmost importance, also because the former Secretary of State was able to gain the 
endorsement of Eisenhower, who in mid-December, gave guarded support to Kennedy’s 
initiative, so providing the much needed bipartisan support. On top of this, Kennedy 
personally campaigned to get the approval o f the reduction of tariffs by the trade sectors 
to whom he presented his program by dramatizing and simplifying issues, and 
indicating those factors which were likely to help gaining support. Kennedy put forward 
an open and direct link between trade, monetary and security issues. A trade negotiation 
with the EEC had to enhance American exports and reduce investments to the area, so 
to foster economic growth and increase exports to a level adequate to compensate for 
military expenses. “I do not want the United States pulling troops home because we are
44
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not able to meet our problems in other ways”, claimed Kennedy. Reactions were less 
skeptical than expected, though no firm commitment was made.46
In the meantime, the Kennedy initiative for a new Round was also favoured by 
developments in Geneva. At the GATT ministerial meeting of November 1961, the 
Contracting Parties agreed that further work on trade liberalisation had to be so as to 
include also non-tariff barriers and agriculture, which had not really been dealt with thus 
far. Moreover, disaffection was expressed with the cumbersome item-by-item reduction 
of tariffs, and a linear approach was invoked, while developing countries expressed their 
disapproval of the GATT, seen as unproductive and unreflective of their trade interests. 
Pinpointing the lines that Contracting Parties had to follow, as shown in the following 
chapters, the November 1961 meeting provided a major source o f impetus in the 
direction of the Kennedy Round.47
Favoured in this way by developments in Geneva, the trade bill became the 
centerpiece of the Kennedy administration’s legislative effort of 1962 and the prime 
objective of White House lobbying action, having priority over almost all other bills. On 
11 January 1962, Kennedy made his State o f the Union address and officially 
announced his intention to present a new trade bill to Congress. As he had already done 
while seeking for the approval of trade sectors, Kennedy underlined elements in his 
program likely to gain Congress approval. He first focused on the Atlantic Alliance, 
stressing that one o f the basic sources of American strength lied the “united strength of 
the Atlantic community” whose members were no longer concerned purely with 
military aims but were also partners in aid, trade, defense and monetary affairs. 
However, most crucially, he stressed how the increase of US exports was necessary to 
reduce the deficit in the balance of payments and to support military expenses. It was 
against this background that Kennedy announced his intention to send to Congress a 
new five-year bill to drastically reduce trade barriers.48
On 25 January the text of the trade bill was sent to Congress. In order to 
underline the break with the RTAA, the bill was named Trade Expansion Act (TEA). In 
his massage transmitting the proposed legislation, Kennedy listed five “fundamentally 
new and sweeping developments which have made obsolete our traditional trade policy: 
the growth of the European Economic Community; the growing pressures o f the US 
balance-of-payments positions; the need to accelerate US economic growth; the 
Communist aid and trade offensive; the need for new markets for Japan and the 
developing counties.”49 Against these developments, extensive new tariff-cutting 
authority was necessary to promote the implementation of a liberal trading system so to 
meet US interests. It was through a reduction in trade protection on a multilateral basis, 
and the following increase o f US exports, that economic growth could be fostered, the 
deficit in the balance of payments could be redressed and military commitments could 
be maintained, Kennedy indicated above all the EEC and its faster economic growth as 
the area to which the USA had to increase exports. The essential condition was that 
Western Europe remained open to external trade, and this required that the USA 
accepted a reciprocal reduction in its own tariffs. To this aim, the President had to be 
conferred new and flexible authority to lower American tariffs and keep the EEC open
46 ’ New Perspective on Trade Policy: Address by President Kennedy to the National Association of Manufacturers, New 
York 6 December 1961" reprinted in Stebbins, R.P. (Ed.) Documents on American Foreign Relations (New York: Harper 
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to US exports. In this context, the dominant supplier clause had particular relevance, 
which could liberalise trade across the Atlantic to the advantage of the United States 
because, claimed Kennedy, the American goods concerned were the most competitive 
ones in the world. As for agriculture, considering the importance of the Western 
European market for US farmers, Congress had to give the US government increased 
authority to negotiate with the EEC in order to keep the latter open to American exports. 
Lastly, noted Kennedy, the expansion o f world trade would also increase LDCs’ trade, 
so aligning them with the Western world.
To push Congress to approve his trade bill, Kennedy also stressed its political 
implications. After the creation o f NATO and the OECD, claimed Kennedy, it was time 
“to write a new chapter in the evolution o f the Atlantic community. The success o f our 
foreign policy depends in a large measure upon the success o f  our foreign trade, and our 
maintenance o f  Western political unity depends in equally large measure upon the 
degree o f Western economic unity”. For this reason, Western Europe was invited to 
pool its resources in an “open trade partnership” with the United States. Somewhat 
rhetorically, Kennedy emphatically claimed that “The two great Atlantic markets will 
either growth together or they will grow apart. [...] As NATO was unprecedented in 
military history [this bill] is unprecedented in economic history. [...] This bill, by 
enabling us to strike a bargain with the Common Market, will “strike a blow” for 
freedom.” As such, to ensure Congress’ approval, Kennedy presented the trade bill as a 
tool to establish the necessary trade partnership to guarantee the strength and cohesion 
of the Atlantic alliance, and as an instrument in the new arena o f international economic 
competition and in the fight against communism, and, therefore, not simply as an 
economic issue but also a political and security one.
In March 1962, the Trade Expansion bill came under scrutiny at the hearings o f 
the House Ways and Means Committee. Big corporations such as IBM, Gillette, Ford, 
Caterpillar and Pillsbury, prospective beneficiaries of the bill through increased exports, 
backed the proposed legislation, while small companies, textiles, glass and other sectors 
and firms affected by imports opposed the liberalization program. It was in this context 
that Kennedy was pushed to negotiate an international agreement setting quota 
restrictions to protect the textiles industry and appease potential opposition. Even if this 
was not the only reason that led to the agreement, whose process had commenced well 
before Kennedy decision to present Congress a new trade bill, the result was that the 
textiles industry represented in Congress was kept from opposing the bill.50 Moreover, 
Kennedy chose to  invoke the escape-clause provision and ordered the tariff increases for 
carpets and glass recommended by the Tariff Commission in order to reduce opposition 
of both textiles and glass sectors, in an effort to show the priority he attached to the 
defense o f American interests. The Europeans did not particularly appreciate the move: 
the Dillon round had ended only twelve days earlier, and the US President had raised 
duties. Obviously the EEC retaliated, but for Kennedy the priority was to illustrate that 
safeguards remained active to protect domestic interests. Unsurprisingly, ten days after 
Kennedy’s move, the American Cotton Manufacturers Institute issued a resolution 
supporting the Trade Expansion bill. As for other sectors, the Chamber of Commerce 
worked in general support of the TEA to gain access for US firms to the EEC market, 
while the AFL-CIO supported the passage o f the bill mostly because of the extended 
unemployment benefits and retraining provisions of the Trade Adjustment Assistance
50 Diebold, W. Jr. *A Watershed with Some Dry Sides" in Brinkley, D. and Griffiths, R.T. (Eds.) John F. Kennedy and 
Europe, p. 250-251.
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program provided by the bill. The National Association o f Manufactures, representing 
both export- and import-oriented businesses, chose to remain neutral.51
However, the position of the agricultural sector, which gave Kennedy a mixed 
support, remained critical to win the support for the TEA. The need to maintain and 
possibly expand American agricultural exports to the EEC had been one o f the 
arguments presented by Kennedy in the campaign for the TEA, and the Farm Bureau 
Federation, which sought for greater access to the EEC, gave its support in view of this 
goal. However, the House Ways and Means Committee, under pressure from the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, approved an amendment prohibiting the concession 
of benefits to those countries that maintained non-tariff barriers, including variable 
import fees, against American goods. The amendment was aimed mainly at the CAP 
and was seen as a useful instrument against eventual EEC unwillingness to include 
agriculture in the envisaged new round of GATT negotiations. The amendment, whose 
application was in any case left to Presidential discretion, was reluctantly accepted.52
The amendment on agriculture was not the only one to be introduced. 
Congress’s dissatisfaction with the State Department led the House to push for the 
introduction of a major change. Congress considered the State Department indifferent 
and unresponsive to domestic interests. Having delegated much power at Kennedy’s 
request, Congress wanted to be sure that American domestic interests would be 
defended and that the negotiations would be tough and not compromised by foreign 
policy considerations. In short it wanted to allocate the authority to negotiate away from 
the hands of State Department. Therefore, Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee, suggested the creation of a special official with ambassadorial 
status, within the executive branch, with the task o f representing the USA in the trade 
negotiations, who reported to the President and not to the State Department. Kennedy, 
who did not wholly trust State Department in any case, judged Mills’ proposal as a fair 
price to pay for the broader negotiating authority he was asking. Therefore, despite 
Ball’s predictable opposition, he decided to accept the amendment and put the special 
negotiator in the White House.53
Finally, in June, the House passed the Trade Expansion Act with a vast and 
bipartisan majority. After the House’s approval, the bill reached the Senate. Again, 
Kennedy tried to appease key opponents with special measures. To senators from the 
North West disappointed by Canadian competition in lumber, Kennedy replied with 
governmental loans to the lumber industry. To neutralize the opposition coming from 
the oil sector, the Administration kept the RTAA provision that placed oil in the 
category of “national security” goods not subject to tariff cuts. Kennedy was criticised 
for these measures on the ground that he was appeasing powerful interests. However, 
they proved successful in co-opting the opposition.54
Like the House, the Senate too attached amendments. It approved Mills’ 
amendment on the negotiating authority, as the sentiment against the State Department
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was just as strong as in the House. Further, the Senate issued a resolution underlying 
that US negotiators in the prospected GATT negotiations had to ensure the maintenance 
of American agricultural exports to the EEC.55 Both this resolution and the House 
amendment prohibiting the concession o f  benefits to those countries that maintained 
non-tariff barriers clearly illustrated the key position held by the agricultural sector in 
the United States, and should be borne in mind in understanding the US position when 
the Round started. From the moment that the resolution to launch a new GATT round 
was taken by Kennedy, US farm leaders and Congress made it clear that negotiations 
had to allow the USA to increase agricultural exports. This was one of the conditions on 
which Congress approved the TEA.
The provision that received the most controversial acceptance in Senate, ju st as 
in the House, was the dominant supplier. The Senate opposed the administration’s 
purpose the clause as an instrument to push the UK to join the EEC, thus making an 
important part o f  the bill dependent on a foreign policy aim and its unpredictable 
outcome. As a result, Senator Douglas proposed an amendment, based upon a proposal 
o f representative Reuss, which permitted all EFTA countries, and not only the UK, to be 
counted along with the USA and the EEC in the 80 percent. The President would have 
the authority to negotiate the elimination o f duties on any products in which these three 
regional blocs together accounted for 80 of world trade, even if  the UK did not join the 
EEC. Ball opposed the amendment on the ground that it would be considered an 
interference with the UK-EEC negotiations or, more dangerously, because London 
could see it as an alternative to EEC membership. After tough bargaining, the 
amendment passed in the Senate, but in the conference committee that settled 
differences in the bill between the Senate and House, Ball succeeded in having it 
deleted.56
In the middle of September, the Senate approved the bill with a 78 to 8 majority 
and on 11 October Kennedy signed the bill stating “This is the most important 
international piece o f legislation [...] affecting economics since the passage o f the 
Marshall Plan. [ ...]  By means of agreements authorized by the act, we can move 
forward to partnership with the nations o f the Atlantic Community” . Thanks to the 
ability with which the law was worked through Congress, and Kennedy’s persuasion 
campaign in favour o f the bill, the act was passed with strong bipartisan support. 
However, it is also true that the Trade Expansion Act was approved because there 
existed in Congress a support for liberal trade in favour of a reduction EEC tariffs on a 
reciprocal basis so to foster American exports.57
Despite the strong bipartisan strong majority, in some parts of the administration 
it was felt that the Trade Expansion Act had been oversold, not only to the detriment o f 
domestic programs, but also in terms o f what could eventually be accomplished from 
international negotiations. Critics felt that exports were not enough to stimulate 
domestic growth and decrease the deficit o f the balance of payments, as they had only a 
limited impact on employment and business activities. Economist Seymour Harris and 
John Kenneth Galbraith questioned whether economic expansion in Europe would 
occur fast enough to draw in enough American exports so as to offset other losses.58
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Yet, what mattered was that the TEA had been approved and that the Kennedy 
Administration had been provided with the legislative authority to set up a new Round 
of GATT negotiations for a sweeping liberalization of international trade.
2.7 The Trade Expansion Act: a fair trade act to deal with 
Europe
In order to better analyze the aims o f the Kennedy administration in setting up the new 
Round and then in conducting it, a description of the TEA is necessary. The TEA was a 
totally new type of law in US trade legislation.59 As for the tariff-cutting authority, due 
to expire on 30 June 1967 and along with it the mandate o f the American negotiators, it 
TEA gave the President:
a) General power to reduce duties by half, and to eliminate duties o f 5% or less.
b) Special power to eliminate duties in negotiations with the EEC:
i) On items where the exports of the United States and the EEC together account 
for 80% or more of total free world exports to the free world (dominant supplier
clause);
ii) On agricultural commodities, if the agreement maintained or expanded United 
States exports of the same commodity;
iii) On tropical and forest products, if the EEC provided comparable access for 
such products from the free world and the products were not produced in 
significant quantities in the United States.
For tropical and forest products, the purpose of this authority was to open the EEC to 
primary products from Latin America, so reducing the discrimination o f the association 
agreements. Latin American countries exported cocoa, coffee, bananas and sugar to 
Europe and the United States was interested in maintaining the level of exports o f these 
products in order to maintain the well-being of Latin America and, at the same time, to 
reduce the pressure for US imports from the area. This factor seemed more urgent than 
ever because o f the possibility that the United Kingdom might join the EEC, extending 
preferential treatment to LDCs of the Commonwealth. However, the actual authority of 
this TEA provision was more apparent than real because the US had already granted 
duty-free treatment to commodities such as coffee and bananas, while sugar was 
substantially produced in the United States and could not be subjected to the authority. 
The Six could clearly see that the provision had been drafted above all to push them to 
change their association agreements so to accommodate Latin America.
The TEA did not eliminate protectionist measures. The peril point had been eliminated, 
but the Tariff Commission still had to report on the economic consequences of all 
contemplated concessions before negotiations, even if the President was not in anyway 
legally bound by its advice. Further, the escape clause was also much improved. If the 
Tariff Commission found that a United States industry was suffering serious damage, it 
could recommend a tariff increase. With the TEA, the President could declare a lower 
increase, or no increase at all, and could instead make available “adjustment assistance” 
in the form of financial aid to firms or workers. In any case, if he did not accept the full
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tariff increase, he could be overruled by a simple majority o f  both Houses of Congress. 
The Act repeated practically verbatim the RTAA provision under which no action was 
to be taken to reduce or eliminate tariffs when the President determined that such action 
would threaten to  impair national security. As for safeguards for domestic industries and 
labour, for the first time, the new Act empowered the President to provide adjustment 
assistance to injured industries, firms, or workers as an alternative or supplement to 
imports restrictions. In this sense, the TEA, while undoubtedly increasing US 
government authority to reduce tariffs and liberalise trade, continued the American 
traditional trade policy made up of protectionist features to deal with domestic political 
problems, as was also reflected by Kennedy’s protectionist concessions made to the 
different trade sectors, that the President preferred not to clash with, to ensure the 
passage o f the TEA. US trade policy, therefore, remained a peculiar mix o f liberalism 
and protectionism, even if  the TEA reinforced the liberal aspect. Thus, rather than 
promoting free trade, Kennedy was supporting fair trade and neo-mercantilism. This 
stance should be borne in mind to understand US positions in the Round when the 
negotiations started in Geneva and the US negotiators, while calling on the other Round 
participants to drastically reduce trade barriers, had problems in so doing in certain 
sectors because o f the strong opposition o f those sectors domestically.60
The TEA modified the manner in which trade negotiations were conducted. For 
the first time, a single official directly responding to the President had the responsibility 
of serving as chief representative of the United States in trade-agreement negotiations. It 
created the position of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations as an agency in 
the executive office o f the President, and provided that he was to be appointed by the 
president with the advice and consent o f the Senate and was to have the rank of 
ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. At the middle of November 1962 
Christian Herter was appointed as STR.61 Herter was a fervent Atlanticist, had political 
experience acquired serving as Massachusetts governor and as Eisenhower’s Secretary 
of State, and as former member of Congress, Herter would not be seen as an outsider on 
Capitol Hill.62
TEA most far-reaching clause, the dominant supplier, deserves more attention. 
The clause was clearly drafted with the aim of encouraging British membership o f the 
EEC, and to not use GATT to bypass membership and, at the same time, o f providing a 
solution to discriminatory effects that this could have on American trade. However, it 
was not clear what the expectations the Kennedy administration had of it. The clause 
was surely well suited to integrating the EEC into the multilateral system, as it would 
have created a kind o f Atlantic free trade area between the USA and the EEC, but 
enlarged to all nations through the MFN rule, so extending the liberalisation of trade to 
the all entire multilateral system and world economy. The dominant supplier clause had 
to bring together the two big markets across the Atlantic, and represented the 
commercial tool o f the Kennedy Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership. However, 
from the outset there were strong doubts about the actual possibility o f its 
implementation, as it was doubtful whether, once the negotiations for the new round had
60 On fair trade see Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and Power in the 1960s ((New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
61 Kennedy's first choice was John McCloy, who had been postwar commissioner of Germany. When McCloy refused the 
offer, upon Rashish's suggestion and with the support o f Ball, Christian Herter's name was put forward and on 14 
November, Kennedy formally offered the post to Herter. The former Secretary of State, who a few weeks before had 
criticised Congress for establishing the SRTN saying "I defy the Administration to find anyone of sufficient prestige who 
knows the subject", immediately accepted. Taber G. M. John F Kennedy and a uniting Europe, p. 73.
62 As noted by Dryden, the choice of Herter had also an ironic aspect: a former secretary of state would be take up a 
post created by Congress to dilute influence of the State department over trade policy. Dryden, S. Trade Warriors:, p 57 
and Ball, G. The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 198-199. For a description of Herter's appointing see Dryden, S. Trade 
Warriors, p,55-59. See Dryden and Destler, I.M., American Trade Politics for an account of the USTR office history.
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started, the American cutting zeal would be so drastic as to go beyond the 50 percent 
general authority,63 It was equally doubtful whether the Six would have been so 
interested in implementing a free trade area with the United States, in particular France, 
who four years before had said ‘no’ to the British Free Trade Area proposal. Maybe a 
more realistic explanation for this clause was given by Metzger, one o f the drafters of 
the TEA, who claimed that, in reality, the clause aimed more at presenting the TEA as 
completely new trade program and at showing American willingness to liberalise trade, 
than being a real instruments to bring tariffs down to zero.64
The Trade Expansion Act was clearly a watershed in American foreign trade 
policy, and a considerable improvement on its predecessors, though the legal limitations 
on the powers o f the executive to reduce tariffs were still greater than in most other 
countries. It contained specific innovations, and had potentialities that made it a tool of 
foreign policy. It introduced those changes necessary for the president to reduce trade 
barriers in the new context of the 1960s, with the EEC was emerging as powerful 
trading bloc. All the legal innovations singularly considered -  the power to cut tariffs by 
50 percent, to eliminate duties that were already 5 percent or below, the elimination of 
the peril point, the increase o f the president’s discretion in the use of the escape clause, 
adjustment assistances measures to protect employment and the dominant supplier 
clause -  were not particularly striking. But, as noted by Diebold, taken together these 
changes increased the President’s authority, and made possible a major innovation in 
American trade policy: they gave the President the power to cut tariffs across the board. 
The law did not spell out this power, but the Administration had made it clear that its 
intention was to move in this direction. In this sense, the TEA’S major innovations and 
improved government authority conferred on Kennedy instruments to treat trade as a 
part of his foreign policy.65
The most innovative aspect o f the TEA was that it named partners whose 
agreement was necessary in order to implement some clauses. Most specifically, it 
clearly spelled out the name of the EEC, and it is worth noting the extent to which 
Washington drew on some of the most important provisions o f the EEC. The dominant 
supplier clause, provisions in agriculture and for tropical products showed that the TEA 
was framed, and then approved, bearing in mind the EEC and its enlargement, and 
considered all its elements that could effect international trade, notably the CET, the 
CAP and the association agreements. Focusing on the EEC, the TEA reaffirmed the 
connection between US trade program, on the one hand, and political and security aims 
on the other.66
2.8 The TEA and the Grand Design for an (asymmetrical) 
Atlantic partnership between equals
In order to assess the place of Trade Expansion Act in Kennedy’s policy, and the 
link between trade and security issues, it is crucial to enlarge the field o f analysis and 
place the economic questions in the wider political context of the Atlantic 
“interdependence” referred to by President Kennedy and the prospects for what came to 
be called tht  Atlantic partnership. As described above, the TEA was the result a double 
set of exigencies: first, the domestic need to stimulate economic growth through the
63 This point of view is shared also by Diebold, W. Jr. "A Watershed with Some Dry Sides", p. 244
64 Metzger, S.D. Trade Agreements and the Kennedy Round, p. 27.
65 Diebold, W. Jr. "A Watershed with Some Dry Sides", p. 241.
66 Ibidem, p. 243-246 and p. 249.
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expansion of American exports to an area characterised by higher rate o f growth, and 
the exigency to protect the dollar and help to resolve the balance of payments; second, 
the need to have the authority to negotiate a lowering of trade barriers with the EEC, in 
order to fully integrate the latter into the multilateral system. Furthermore, the USA 
wanted the EEC to share the Cold War burden or, tout court, wanted the Europeans to 
pay for it. W hile in the military field they required the Europeans to pay more for 
defence costs, in the area of trade they wanted the Europeans to be integrated into 
international trade, not only for the well-being of that multilateral system but also to 
ensure an increase in American exports as a way to recompensing the United States for 
the Cold War burden.
The TEA was also the commercial tool o f the Kennedy administration in 
shaping relations with Europe after the creation o f the EEC and its prospected 
enlargement. Against the developments that were taking place in Western Europe, the 
objective of the Kennedy administration was to strengthen European unity and to keep it 
in a strengthened Atlantic framework under a firm American leadership. The Kennedy 
Administration’s answer to the need to keep the alliance united under American 
leadership was the Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership between equals. The whole 
idea o f partnership sprang from the fact that a new world actor was emerging, and that 
the EEC and the USA were interdependent, economically and politically. The ultimate 
goals o f the Atlantic partnership were to enlarge the EEC in order to bolster European 
unity, and to bring together in an Atlantic partnership two separate but equal entities in 
order to adjust differences and then combine their force to hold communism at bay, and 
to develop the global South. Thus, the Atlantic partnership was considered an 
instrument to assist USA-Western Europe relations in finding a framework for the long- 
run development o f economic and political relations, and to contain changes brought 
about by the existence of the EEC on the Atlantic alliance.67 In his very well known 
Interdependence speech of 4 July 1962, President Kennedy presented his design for an 
Atlantic partnership between equals to operate in the economic, political and military 
fields and welcomed the dawn o f an era o f interdependence between American and a 
Europe increasing in unity and considered not as a rival but as a partner. The United 
States and Europe would share responsibility for the principle tasks devolving upon the 
free world.
Kennedy asserted that he had asked and received authority from Congress to 
reduce tariffs not merely to deal with trade in order to expand markets for American 
exports, but also to set up “new reciprocal trading arrangements which measurably 
contribute to the economic, political and military strength and solidarity of the free 
world” .68 The partnership concept applied to trade consisted in linking the two sides o f 
the Atlantic into a low-tariff area in order to strengthen their unity through greater 
economic interdependence. In this sense, a far-reaching attack on barriers to trade was 
needed in order to build the economic foundation of the Atlantic partnership.69 As such, 
the TEA had to launch the Atlantic partnership by diminishing trade discrimination 
between the two sides of the Atlantic and putting establishing a firm economic basis for 
the partnership. It had not to be viewed merely as an instrument for expanding 
international trade, but as a political act taken in recognition o f the interdependence 
between the two sides of the Atlantic.70 Simply put, the TEA was the trade tool in
67 Kraft, J. The Grand Design, p. 20-21.
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Kennedy Grand Design to set up an Atlantic partnership. As Ball put it “The TEA was 
conceived as an instrument by which the United States -  through the encouragement of 
trans-Atlantic trade -  could bring about a greater a degree of common economic interest 
and policy within the Atlantic framework, and as a further step toward the creation o f 
the Atlantic partnership”. In order to achieve this partnership, the GATT negotiations 
had to create interdependence in the economic field, while the creation of a multilateral 
nuclear force (MLF) had to be achieved so to favour US control of European 
developments in the military and nuclear fields, and the United Kingdom had to join the 
EEC, thus strengthening both Western European unity, but also links with the USA.71
In truth, contradictions existed in this partnership between equals, As Winand 
notes, the Kennedy administration while “insisting that the partnership should be equal, 
continued to speak of the indispensable leadership role of the United States”.72 Hence, 
Washington pronounced partnerships between equals, but really meant American 
leadership; it said Atlantic framework but meant, as Lundestad would put it, American- 
dominated framework. Furthermore, the United States seemed willing to share the 
burdens of being a super power, but not the power. It asked EEC to accept more 
American exports as a way o f giving recompense for the military costs of defending 
Europe, and as a way of cooperating in decreasing the deficit in the balance of 
payments; but then repeated the necessity of an American leadership.
As a result, the partnership between equals initiative resembled more a cosmetic 
cover to keep the EEC firmly in the Atlantic framework, to make the Europeans pay 
more and to maintain the American leadership, than an instrument to really set up a 
partnership between equals and to share power. A united Europe had to be fitted into the 
wider Atlantic framework of NATO and of GATT. Only in such a framework could the 
United States continue to support the European integration process. As noted by 
Lundestad “to a large extent this ‘Atlantic framework’ was a code phrase for overall 
American leadership. There was never any real doubt that Western Europe belonged to 
the American ‘empire’” 73
2.9 An anticipation of the Round: the Poultry War
As a way o f closing this chapter, and to pave the way for the next one, it is 
worthwhile dealing at this point with the Chicken War, the first commercial war 
between the EEC and the USA during which the two sides of the Atlantic quarreled 
about the levy system introduced on poultry by the CAP, just as they would then fight 
about the entire CAP during the Kennedy Round. In this sense, the Chicken War was a 
Kennedy Round on a smaller scale. Hence, in spite o f the fact that a quarrel over poultry 
can appear not of only limited relevance in the history of US-EEC relations, and that 
many other trade wars occurred during the years that followed, the Poultry war is 
significant not only because it was the first trade war between the two partners, but also 
because it concerned as a crucial subject as the CAP, and because of its impact on 
American exports and world trade in general. As it is often the case with trade wars, 
behind an arcane issue as poultry lay important political and commercial questions.74
71 Components of a Strategy for the Kennedy Round written by George Ball, Preliminary Draft, December 10, 1963. 
Herter Papers, Box 7 JFKL.
72 Winand, P. Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, p. 191.
73 Lundestad, G. "Empire* by integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 , p. 40.
74 The best account of the Poultry War remains Talbot, R.B. The Chicken War. An International Trade Conflict between 
the United States and the European Economic Community, 1961-1964 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1978) 
which considers not only the trade aspects but also the political ones and tries to give a fair description of the impact of 
the CAP on American exports. The following data is taken from this book.
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These are the facts. Thanks to technological and managerial developments, 
American production of frozen broilers o f chickens increased from 1.2 billion pounds to
6.8 billion pounds between 1948 and 1962. Such an expansion pushed American 
producers to look for markets abroad and, in particular, in Western Europe. There, it 
was Germany with its rising rate of consumption that was the most attractive market. 
US exports of broilers to Germany jumped from 3.5 million pounds in 1956 to 122 
million by the end o f June 1962. Although US exports also went to the other EEC 
countries, Germany received 56% of US exports in the period June 1961-June 1962. 
American exports did not impede EEC producers from increasing their production, also 
thanks to the same technological developments that had taken place in the 1950s in the 
USA.
In January 1962, the Six adopted Regulation 22 establishing a common market 
for poultry with a variable levy to operate on this commodity from 1 July of the same 
year. Washington looked with apprehension at the negative effects the Regulation could 
have on American exports to the EEC, as it feared that the CAP would make the EEC 
self-sufficient in agriculture, beginning with chicken. While until July 1962, the United 
States could only forecast the effects o f the CAP, after that date it could start seeing the 
practical consequences. In fact, the pace o f exports of broilers drastically changed when 
the variable levy system on poultry was introduced. The GATT-bound duty o f 15% 
doubled, and was to increased by 70% in the following years, with the result of pricing 
US poultry out o f Community countries’ markets; in the first nine months under the 
levy system, US exports of broilers to Germany decreased by 40% compared to the 
previous year, whereas imports from France and the Netherlands increased dramatically.
American Secretary for Agriculture, Orville Freeman, was under the 
considerable pressure of the American poultry industry, which pushed the Secretary to 
defend American interests in the market of the Six. Freeman met EEC Ministers for 
Agriculture in Paris and Brussels and expressed his dislike for the CAP, claiming that 
his government would act to protect American exports to the EEC. On the ground that 
the levy on poultry was inconsistent with the GATT-bound duty, Freeman asked the 
EEC to reduce the levy and to start a program to limit production. The message that 
Washington wanted the Six to receive was that they could not apply their variable levy 
system without considering the negative impact on third countries or considering the 
reaction o f  the latter. The problem, therefore, was not, or not only, chickens, but the 
entire agricultural policy o f the EEC and its impact on world agriculture. The destiny o f 
American poultry exports to the EEC became a test case of the impact that the CAP 
could have on third countries for other commodities and o f Washington’s willingness to 
protect its economic interests. In addition, the issue o f  poultry became a symbol in the 
American agricultural sectors o f the US government’s effort to protect the interests o f 
farmers.75
The EEC refused to follow the line indicated by Freeman, and particularly 
outspoken in underlining his opposition to the American protest was the French 
Minister for Agriculture, Edgar Pisani, who declared that he “whished Ie pere Freeman 
would stop claiming a divine right to dispose of American food surplus in an area 
which, with the French technological revolution in full swing, was rapidly acquiring
5 FRUS 1961-1963, XIII, Section Economic and Political Integration, 53. Memorandum from Secretary of Agriculture 
Freeman to President Kennedy, 26 November 1962 and FRUS 1961-1963, IX; Section 13, 260 Letter From Senators 
Warren G. Magnuson, Henry M. Jackson, and Clair Engle to President Kennedy, 20 February 1962; Memorandum from 
D. Gale Johnson to Governor Herter on "Trade negotiations issues involving agriculture -  some preliminary comments 
and questions", 17 January 1963 Herter's papers, Box 2, JFKL.
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surplus in its own”.76 Pisani even claimed that the USA was trying to undermine the 
Common Market. With this neat refusal o f the Six to take into account the difficulties 
that the levy system was creating to the United States, the Chicken War broke out. 77
In reality, the problem was not only caused by the effects of the CAP but also by 
the fact that, as in the United States during the 1950s, a technological revolution for 
agriculture was taking place in Europe, which, as a result, was moving towards mass 
production. The EEC’s basic position was that the sharp increase of US broilers exports 
to Germany that had taken place from 1956 to 1962 was artificial and would be lost 
when EEC producers caught up with American technology. As a consequence, it was 
logical that imports from third countries would decline. The Six had their own surplus 
to be allocated and could not be expected to think about American production of 
broilers. On top o f this, the EEC claimed that US government gave a disproportionate 
relevance to the issue for domestic reasons and that, actually, the USA had a surplus in 
their trade balance with the Six which did not justify American irritation.78
For the USA, the poultry issue was a sharp warning o f the effects of the CAP 
and confirmed that the new Round would be crucial in alleviating the discriminatory 
effects of the CAP and in impeding the EEC from setting its common policy without 
taking into consideration effects on third countries. As 1962 came to an end, and the 
USA was ready to propose the new Round, a trade war across the Atlantic had just 
broke out.
Conclusion
The rapid economic growth o f Western Europe and the establishment o f the 
EEC changed economic and political relations within the Atlantic alliance. This new 
situation caused Washington to reformulate its policy on US-Western Europe relations, 
putting emphasis on partnership and cohesion between the two sides o f the Atlantic. 
The origin of the American suggestion to launch a new GATT round can be traced back 
to the economic success of the EEC and to its prospected enlargement, which drove the 
Kennedy administration to believing that trade liberalisation on a multilateral basis was 
the appropriate instrument the extent o f discrimination arising from the EEC. At the 
same time, trade liberalisation also had the political objective o f establishing an Atlantic 
partnership. Therefore, economically and politically it was the existence o f the EEC that 
inspired the American move to set up the GATT round and the Grand Design. To the 
developments caused by the EEC, its prospected enlargement and European integration 
in general Washington responded using the multilateral GATT forum to deal with 
European integration and regionalism, stressing Atlantic interdependence and trying to 
strengthen the Atlantic framework.
Trade negotiations had to secure numerous goals at once. First, they represented 
a way of increasing exports to the EEC, and this was particularly important for the 
agricultural sector, as the Poultiy quarrel was showing, and to slow American foreign 
investments to the EEC that affected the balance o f payments. Second, they represented 
an instrument to keep the regional trading area o f the EEC well inside the multilateral
76 Cited in Taber G.M. John F. Kennedy and a Uniting Europe: the Politics of partnership (Bruges: College of Europe, 
1969), p. 143.
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system in order to reduce discriminatory effects, both in the industrial and agricultural 
sectors, not only on the USA but also on other areas, such as Latin America and LDCs. 
In this sense, the Round was an instrument to set the tone o f international trade. Third, 
the GATT negotiations had a political implication as they had to maintain the Atlantic 
framework, preventing the EEC from becoming politically independent o f Washington, 
through the setting up o f Atlantic partnership.
However, the American approach did not lack contradictions. First, on the one 
hand W ashington, and above all, the State Department, supported the European 
integration process and recognised that the CET and the CAP were the elements that 
would fortify the unity of the EEC. On the other hand, it promoted the dominant 
supplier clause o f  the TEA that aimed at reducing to zero duties on a wide range o f 
goods and at establishing an Atlantic free trade area. In this sense, the line between 
making the EEC outward-looking and weakening its internal ties was rather slight.
Second, the three pillars o f the Atlantic partnership were trade liberalisation, the 
MLF and British EEC membership. Regarding liberalisation, after the refusal of the 
British FT A, it was not clear on what grounds Washington expected the Europeans, and 
above all the French, to be receptive to an Atlantic free trade area. In the military field, 
from the start it appeared clear that the implementation of a MLF would not be trouble- 
free, while the outcome of the UK-EEC negotiations was equally uncertain. As such, 
from the very beginning the foundation o f the Atlantic partnership appeared to lack 
solidity.
Beyond this, the way in which the whole affair was presented by Kennedy was a 
rather simplistic, and not always entirely convincing. From the American point o f view, 
the envisaged round o f negotiations had to respond to  the challenges of the EEC, to the 
problem of developing countries and of their search for new markets, and it had to be a 
stimulus for higher rates of American domestic growth and a solution to the problem of 
the balance o f payments. An Atlantic partnership would be implemented and in the end 
the superiority o f  the capitalist model over the communist one would be demonstrated. 
As noted by Curtice and Vastine,
‘4 The Kennedy Round seemed to promise something fo r  everybody: for the 
At land cists dedicated to the grand design o f  an Atlantic Community; fo r  those 
concerned about the growing breach between the Common Market and the rest o f  
Europe; fo r  those who believed in the importance o f  integrating the world's 
developing economics more closely with the industrial ones along economic 
patterns different from  those o f  nineteenth-century colonialism; and fo r  those 
doctrinally committed to free  trade 79
However, Washington was soon to discover that between its aims and their 
achievements lay the interests o f  its European allies, who did not share the same views 
on trade negotiations or on the Atlantic partnership.
79 Curtice, T.B. and Vastine J.R.jr, The Kennedy Round and the Future of American Trade, p. 7.
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Chapter Three
The reaction of the EEC to the American initiative: EEC 
regionalism against US Atlanticism
Introduction
In chapter two we outlined the reasons that led the Kennedy Administration to 
launch a new GATT Round aiming at a sweeping liberalization of international trade to 
include both the industrial and the agricultural sectors. We concluded that Kennedy’s 
trade program set the direction and the tone of the US response to European 
developments to come: it aimed at favouring an outward-looking EEC with a strong 
American connection through a new GATT Round which had both political and 
economic implications. The new Round represented an ambitious effort to liberalise 
world trade, and a tool to strengthen the ties between an outward looking and enlarged 
European Community and the United States within an Atlantic partnership o f equals. As 
such, the prospective Round was intended to set the tone for future world trade, and to 
encourage the EEC to integrate into the GATT and the Atlantic alliance.
In this chapter we shall analyse the reaction o f the EEC to the American 
initiative. When the TEA was presented to Congress in January 1962, the Six were busy 
negotiating on the issues which had pushed Washington to launch a new Round: the 
enlargement of the EEC, the implementation of the customs union, the Association 
agreement and the CAP. In short, the EEC was establishing the pattern of its world 
relations. After the Kennedy administration had made clear its intention of starting a far- 
reaching liberalisation of international trade, the ball arrived in the court of the Six: now 
it was up to them to respond, whether, and how, they intended to attend the Round, and 
to what extent they would support Washington’s declared intention to drastically 
reduce, or even eliminate, duties. The Six had to choose how their Community was to 
fit into the multilateral trading system and into the Atlantic alliance. The answer the Six 
got ready to give had decisive importance: the EEC was the world’s largest trading unit 
and its position in world trade was dependent on its stance in the prospective 
negotiations, and so therefore was the future of world trade itself.
Chapter three first describes the framework in which the Six elaborated their 
answer to the American initiative for a new Round in order to explain the relevance of 
the regional dimension of the EEC for all the Six, and how this regional dimension was 
considered essential for economic growth and social stability.
This chapter illustrates how the Six reacted to Kennedy’s initiative in the brief 
but crucial period spanning from 1962 until the start of 1963, that is to say before the 
French veto to British entrance into the EEC. It focuses on the reaction of France to the 
Kennedy program. Special attention to this country is necessary: from the outset France 
showed itself to be the EEC country leading the negotiations with the United States and 
put precise conditions on EEC participation in Geneva, conditions which were often 
approved by the Five. In the context o f the favourable provisions the Treaty o f Rome 
granted to the French economy, Washington had proposed a new GATT Round in order 
to decrease or even bring to zero the CET; maintain the level o f agricultural exports to 
the EEC; reduce the discrimination that the Association agreement would have for other 
developing countries; increase American exports to the EEC in order to redress
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American balance of payments; push the United Kingdom to join the EEC; set up an 
Atlantic partnership between equals whose contradictions were not difficult to identify 
in Paris and, finally, to implement a free trade area across the Atlantic. The regional 
dimension o f the EEC seemed to be challenged by the American initiative for a new 
Round, both from an economic and a political point of view. Therefore, Paris looked 
with suspicion and apprehension at the Kennedy trade program and had every intention, 
in a way or another, of limiting the impact the new trade conference could have on the 
EEC. There is also an additional reason to attach importance to the French stance. After 
de Gaulle’s veto to the British bid to join the EEC in January 1963, it was feared that 
the French President would also veto the new Round. France tactically exploited this 
fear to extract concessions from the other EEC members and the USA, while in fact 
never having any intention of vetoing the Round. The chapter then describes the view o f 
the other members of the EEC in order to highlight how the Six shared a common 
outlook, consisting in refusing to drastically cut down or eliminate duties across the 
Atlantic, in order to preserve the regional dimension o f the EEC, considered essential by 
all the Six. None of the Six had the intention o f diluting the EEC in an Atlantic free 
trade area; all o f them were interested in attending a new Round, but gave priority to the 
regional dimension of the EEC. The chapter also describes the doubts the Six had 
regarding American goals in promoting a new Round, which seemed to hide a 
hegemonic plan to dominate Europe economically.
This chapter also deals with the United Kingdom and the Kennedy Round. The 
British bid for EEC membership had been the reason the Kennedy Administration had 
hastened the suggestion of holding a new Round. An account o f the background phase 
of the Kennedy Round would not be complete without a description o f the British 
reaction.
The chapter ends by explaining how the period under review represented a first 
informal and preliminary phase o f the Kennedy Round during which events occurring in 
other areas influenced the forthcoming Round: casting his veto on British membership 
in January 1963, de Gaulle killed the dominant supplier clause of the TEA and the 
prospect of setting up a transatlantic free trade area, limited the American authority to 
cut tariffs and reduced the impact o f the Kennedy Round. Therefore, a first important 
round  o f  the Kennedy Round ended in January 1963.
3.1 The importance of the regional dimension of the EEC for the 
Six
As noted by Mil ward, the Federal Republic o f Germany had a vital role in 
Western European trade. From 1951-1958 Western European countries’ exports to 
Germany grew much faster than exports to the rest o f Europe, and the Federal Republic 
became the pivot of Western Europe’s prosperity: “The advantages of expanding trade 
with the Federal Republic were precise and indispensable to the process of 
industrialisation, modernisation and growth [of Western Europe]. The Federal Republic 
had to be embraced in a commercial and political clasp from which it could not readily 
escape” . Germany was not only the most important trade partner of most western 
European countries, but it also represented a source o f  stability for the area, as exports 
to Germany protected the region from American economic recessions. Exports to 
Germany were crucial for their balance o f  payments surplus and for that modernization 
o f manufacturing which all Western European governments were struggling to generate. 
In this sense, the creation o f the EEC embodied the solution to the problem of how to 
guarantee the expansion of intra-European trade, and how integrate the key German 
market in a European regional market. European security, in a broader sense, depended
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on the German market and, consequently prosperity, in such a crucial way that a 
commercial policy to guarantee access to that market became an essential element of 
any policy to integrate the Federal Republic to Western Europe. Along with the 
centrality of Germany, another factor should be pointed out: while German markets had 
an essential function for most Western European countries, the Federal Republic had a 
more variegated trade network. From 1951 to 1959 its exports to the rest of the world 
increased faster than those to Western Europe, and, after 1956, North America was the 
market to which German exports grew at the strongest rate. As such, the pivot of 
Western Europe was the Federal Republic which, however, itself had major trade 
interests also outside Europe. An additional important pattern should be highlighted. 
Well before the formation of the EEC, the Six represented a trading network. In fact 
from 1954 onwards, foreign trade between them grew faster than foreign trade 
elsewhere in Europe. Therefore, the relevance of the regional dimension o f trade 
between the Six had already appeared before 1957, and the Treaty of Rome, while 
surely leading to the increase of trade which took place between them from 1959 
onwards, continued a trend established previously.1
The peculiar pattern o f trade of the Federal Republic described above became 
crucial in the German domestic debate on the EEC in 1956-1958. For security reasons 
Chancellor Adenauer preferred to side with France and to opt for the “small Europe” of 
the common market of the Six rather than with the British proposal for a FTA. In 
accepting the Treaty of Rome, Chancellor Adenauer had to resist the opposition o f the 
German Minister o f Economy Ludwig Erhard who feared that the Six’s customs union 
was too small and could hurt German exports elsewhere, was unhappy about the 
dirigisie and protectionist features of the Treaty o f Rome, and was worried about the 
effects of the trade division of western Europe, and therefore favoured the British 
proposal for a FTA. Support for the FTA came also from German industry represented 
by the BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, Federation of German Industry), 
which favoured the Treaty of Rome as a first step towards a FTA in the OEEC 
framework. At the same time, a number of German economic sectors -  textile, pulp and 
paper, non-ferrous metal industries -  fully supported the Treaty of Rome for the 
protection it gave against other European competitors, and for the bigger export 
opportunities to France and Italy. It was on these sectors that Adenauer could count in 
getting the Treaty o f Rome approved and the FTA rejected, as the potential costs of 
failing to achieve a FTA were smaller than the actual gains made on the markets o f the 
other five partners o f the EEC.2 Erhard and the BDI remained the strongest advocates of 
the FTA and after its failure they looked with apprehension to the establishment o f the 
EFTA for fear that it could cause a reduction in German exports to the area. The 
German Minister and the BDI sustained that the EFTA markets were much more 
important for the economy of their country than the EEC, and continued to repeat that 
the division of Europe would not only harm German exports but also hinder 
liberalisation at European and world level. In spite of the fact that aggregate trade 
patterns showed that in 1959-1963 none of the major industrial sectors suffered from the
1 Milward A. S., The European Rescue of the Nation-State, (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), chapter 4 "Foreign 
trade, economic and social advance, and the origins of the European Economic Community", p. 119-223. Quotation is 
taken from p.134. See also Milward, A.S. The reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951 (London : Methuen, 1984)
2 Schulte, M. "Industrial Interest in West Germany's Decision against the Enlargement of the EEC. The Quantitative 
Evidence up to 1954" in Journal of European Integration History, 3, 1 (1997) pp. 3S-61; Milward, A.S. The European 
rescue of the nation-state, p. 196-198; Milward, A.S. The United Kingdom and the European Community, p. 276-277; 
Benoit, E. Europe at Sixes and Sevens, p. 86-88.
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creation of the EEC or, then, o f the EFTA, Erhard and the BDI managed to keep the 
issue o f Europe's division high on the German political agenda.3
In France, after the initial reticence in the negotiations leading to the Treaty o f  
Rome that pushed the other five negotiators to succumb to French demands in order to 
ensure French participation, the regional dimension o f  the EEC was fully embraced. As 
Lynch claims, ‘T h e  period 1944-1958 marked in France a transition from highly 
protected and controlled imperial economy, which was dependent on the United States 
for national security and financial assistance, towards a more independent state which 
was linked to neighbouring states at similar level of economic development in a set o f 
legally binding arrangements under the Treaty o f Rome.”“* The Treaty o f Rome well 
reflected French economic interests. It implemented a customs union for manufactured 
goods, in which French goods could compete in a smaller framework compared to the 
multilateral one o f GATT. It implemented a common agricultural policy thanks to 
which French farmers could be subsidized and French goods had assured protected 
outlets in the markets of the Five and, above all, Germany. It contained provisions 
allowing France to  retain links with the French Union and the setting up the Association 
agreements. W ith foreign trade starting playing a growing role in French economy, the 
Treaty o f  Rome gave France the opportunity to modernise its economy within a regional 
area protected from international competition, and represented an excellent intermediate 
solution to resolve French economic problems which could not find a solution at 
national level. Protectionism was considered a barrier and the strategy accepted was “to 
expose the French economy to a degree o f competition within a common market o f the 
Six in Europe. In doing so the French government also managed to share its problems o f 
modernising agriculture and its empire with its partners in the Common Market” .5 
Although throughout the 1950s de Gaulle had clearly stated his opposition to any loss o f 
sovereignty, when he returned power in 1958, he did not reject the Treaty. On the 
contrary, he approved the devaluation o f the franc, the return to convertibility and the 
Rueff plan which allowed France to cope with the increased competition derived from 
entering the EEC. In fact, De Gaulle continued the Fourth's Republic policy of 
strengthening the French economy through the EEC.6
As for the other four members o f the EEC, Italy fully shared France’s idea of 
favoring liberalization o f trade in a protected market: it appreciated the market 
opportunities provided by the Treaty o f Rome, and wished to open its market in a 
framework smaller than those o f GATT or the British-proposed FTA, and which did not 
include agriculture.7 The Benelux countries were traditionally more liberal, having low
3 Schulte, M. "Challenging the Common Market Project: Germany Industry, Britain and the Europe, 1957-1963" in 
Deighton, A. Milward, A.S. (Eds.) Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: the European Economic Community 1957- 
1963 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp. 167-183. See also Ambrosius, G. "The Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Common Market in industrial goods in the 1960s." in Perron, R. (Ed.) The Stability o f Europe. The Common Market: 
Towards European Integration of Industrial and Rnancial markets? (1958-1968) (Paris: Presses de l'université de Paris- 
Sorbonne, 2004), p. 47-61.
4 Lynch F.M.B. France and the International Economy: from Vichy to the Treaty o f Rome (London; New York : 
Routledge, 1996), p. 211.
5 Ibidem p. 215. See also Milward, A.S. The European rescue of the nation-state, p 133 and Milward, A.S, The United 
Kingdom and the European Community, p. 481.
6 On de Gaulle's acceptance o f the Treaty o f Rome and rejection of the British FTA see Lynch F.M.B "De Gaulle's First 
Veto: France, the Rueff Plan and the Free Trade Area* in Contemporary European History, 9, 1 (2000) 111-135. See 
also Vaisse M. La Grandeur: Politique Etrangère Du General De Gaulle, 1958-1969. Paris: Fayard 1998.), p.164.
7 For Italy and European integration see the many works o f Fauri, Ranieri and Varsori. For Fauri, F. see Italy's 
Commercial Strategy and Industrial Expansion in the Context o f the Attempts to Further European Integration (EUI Ph.d 
Thesis, Florence 1994); "Free but Protected? Italy and the Liberalisation of Foreign Trade in the 1950s" in Griffiths, R.T, 
(Ed.) Exploration in OEEC History (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1997), pp. 139- 
148; "Italy and the Free Trade Area Negotiations 1956-1958" in Journal O f European Integration (1988, 4/2), pp. 47- 
66; Lltalra e I'integrazione economica europea 1947-2000 (Bologna: II Mulino, 2001). For Ranieri, R. "Italian industry
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duties. They supported the Treaty of Rome as a means of ensuring a market for their 
exports, but they wished to keep the EEC open to world trade. The government in The 
Hague, in particular, after having promoted trade liberalization in the wider contexts of 
GATT and OEEC until the mid-1950s with no results, embraced the smaller EEC. 
However, after the completion of the Treaty of Rome, some Dutch circles believed that 
the Dutch idea o f a liberal EEC had been watered down. The Hague was aware that the 
structure of Dutch imports -  mainly semi-manufactures and end-products from non- 
EEC countries -  made it essential to have a EEC open to international trade in order to 
avoid a shift in the source o f imports from third countries to more expensive EEC 
goods. As such, The Hague favored an EEC which was liberal towards non-members.8
One thing is worth underlining. For all of the Six, the regional dimension of the 
EEC was essential because of the market opportunities it gave and the protectionism it 
provided against third countries. This was true for Italy and France, but was true also for 
the Federal Republic and the Benelux countries. For sure, Bonn and The Hague favored 
an outward-looking EEC and wanted to protect trade with third countries, however, 
notwithstanding the differences the Six had on how much the EEC had to be open to 
trade with third countries, they all fully recognized and agreed upon the importance of 
the regional dimension of the EEC, not only for geopolitical reasons, but also because it 
favoured an increase in trade, considered essential for their economic and income 
growth.
Tables 1 to 5 highlight how important trade at the regional level of the EEC was 
for the Six, and how dramatically intra-EEC traded increased in the period from 1959 to 
1962. They also show how the dismantling of internal barriers strengthened the process 
of régionalisation of trade that had already begun in 1954. Table 1 concerns Germany 
and shows that with the beginning of the customs union’s implementation, it increased 
its exports to the five EEC Member States in a dramatic way with the result that in 1962 
the EEC took 34,1 %  o f German exports, rising to 37,4%in 1963 . At the same time, the 
Federal Republic had relevant trade interests outside the EEC: EFTA countries imported 
a considerable share of its exports, a share that continued to rise in value even after 
1959, while exports to the United States decreased in 1960 and 1961, and only in 1962 
did they started to increase again.
T able  1 G erm an  ex p o rts  by destination  1954-1962 in m illions o f US d o lla rs
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
World 5226 6096 7308 8515 8751 9756 11382 12651 13236 14585
Austria 247 325 338 420 440 467 582 670 692 738
Sweden 352 425 467 517 540 545 618 652 670 748
Switzerland 299 364 446 526 491 574 713 902 1002 1076
United Kingdom 205 245 300 335 348 396 511 528 491 555
and the EEC" in Deighton, A. and Milward, A.S. (eds.) Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: the European Economic 
Community 1957-1963 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp.185-198. For Varsori, A. L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali 
dal 1943 al 1992 (Roma; Laterza 1998); Vaisori, A. Ballini, P. (Eds). L'Italia e l'Europa 1947-1979, (Soveria Mannelli: 
Rubbettino, 2004); Varsori, A. Romero, F. Nazione, Interdipendenza, Integrazione. Le relazione intemazionali dell'Italia 
(1917-1989), (Roma: Carocci, 2006). For an account of the reaction of the Italian industry to the EEC see Petrini, F. II 
liberismo a una dimensione: la Confindustria e l'integrazione europea, 1947-1957 (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2005).
8 The change of attitude of the Dutch government is described in Milward, A.S. The European rescue of the nation­
state, p. 173-196. For the position of the Netherlands on the Treaty of Rome see also Griffiths, R.T. "The Common 
Market" in Griffiths, R.T. The Netherlands and the integration of Europe 1945-1957 (Amsterdam : NEHA, 1990), pp. 
183-208 and Asbeek Brusse Tariffs, Trade, and European Integration, 1947-1957 : From Study Group to Common 
Market New York: S t Martin's Press, 1997). For Benelux position see also A.G. Harryvan, Kerstens, A.E. "Benelux and 




















































France 347 435 586 678 668 788 1001 1188 1363 1612
Netherlands 492 578 686 773 714 825 1003 1184 1224 1435
Italy 318 342 395 477 442 525 678 843 1029 1369
Belgium-Luxembourg 377 413 502 576 585 593 689 813 899 1039
EEC 1534 1768 2169 2504 2409 2731 3371 4028 4515 5455
As % of total 29,3 27,9 34,1 37,4
United States 295 387 498 601 643 913 897 870 966 1051
As % of total 5.6 9.3 7,3 7.2
Source: D irection  o f  T rade Statistics H istorical, 1948-1980 (W ashington, D .C.: International M onetary  
Fund, 2002).
Table 2 concerns France. Comparing to it Germany, France also had a large 
proportion o f exports going to the EEC (38,3% in 1963), but had a lower percentage o f 
exports going to the EFTA countries and to the USA. This does not mean that France 
was not interested in trade outside the EEC, but rather that compared to Germany, 
France had somewhat less relevant, though still important, trade links outside the EEC.
T ab le  2 F re n c h  e x p o r ts  by  destination  1954-1962 in  m illions o f  US d o lla rs
1964 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
World 3631 4454 4236 4735 4786 5350 6854 7209 7345 806$
United Kingdom 241 358 278 280 250 251 347 367 348 398
Norway 33 37 39 42 46 39 39 50 69 62
Portugal 23 34 35 43 39 39 55 54 59 60
Switzerland 162 210 225 233 194 232 314 364 427 502
Sweden 89 91 71 73 82 99 118 104 125 133
Austria 24 40 39 40 35 45 55 59 64 78
Denmark 44 58 41 50 38 55 71 83 84 80
EFTA 616 828 728 761 684 760 999 1081 1176 1313
A s  % of total 17 14,2 16 16.3
Germany 352 505 475 546 535 736 943 1096 1272 1341
Belgium-Luxembourg 286 340 356 381 325 379 513 600 634 735
Italy 164 190 187 205 173 267 401 489 554 748
Netherlands 105 145 131 141 104 145 186 238 254 269
EEC 907 1180 1149 1273 1137 1527 2043 2423 2714 3093
As % of total 25 28,5 36,9 38.3 ,
United States 156 210 226 246 304 470 401 417 426 421
As % of total 4,3 8,7 5.8 5.2
Source: see table 1.
Table 3 portrays Dutch exports. With the implementation o f the customs union, 
the Netherlands considerably increased their exports to the Five. As was the case with 
the Federal Republic, the EFTA markets took a considerable share of Dutch exports. 
Ranking the EEC members’ interests in trade with EFTA measured by share of exports 
to the area, the Netherlands were second only to Germany. On the contrary, exports to 
the United States were less significant and rather instable.
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T able 3 D u tch  ex p o rts  by destina tion  1954-1962 in millions o f  US do lla rs
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
World 2351 2632 2804 3038 3189 3579 4007 4260 455$ 4934
Sweden 107 128 134 148 146 151 191 191 195 190
Switzerland 56 64 74 61 79 85 92 110 128 124
Denmark 62 57 59 81 85 91 103 112 114 92
United Kingdom 277 332 335 337 383 387 441 426 485 477
Norway 55 53 46 64 74 79 68 74 69 77
Portugal 12 10 11 13 13 16 20 19 17 22
Austria 15 22 25 28 32 38 43 46 48 54
EFTA 584 666 684 762 812 847 958 978 1056 1036
As % of total 24,8 23,7 23,1 21
Germany 379 458 516 572 611 780 909 991 1112 1284
Belgium-Luxembourg 336 372 406 480 482 529 575 647 675 744
Italy 48 66 73 84 88 97 129 137 165 227
France 99 133 161 151 156 191 237 267 304 391
EEC 862 1029 1156 1287 1337 1597 1850 2042 2256 2646
As % of total 37 44,6 49,6 53,6
United States 158 159 179 159 181 209 196 192 200 203
As % of total 6,7 5,8 4.3 4,1
Source: sec table 1.
As for Italy, table 4 shows the strong increase in exports to EEC members. The table
also shows that Italy had major interest in iexports to EFTA and, at the same time, a
considerable share o f exports went to the United States
T ab le  4 I ta lian  ex p o rts  by destination  1954-1962 in m illions o f  US d o lla rs
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963
World 1615 1833 2118 2511 2556 2876 3636 4178 4660 5039
Norway 15 15 13 17 21 21 25 23 29 28
Austria 57 69 77 85 73 81 111 116 128 149
Denmark 20 19 18 20 20 27 35 49 59 SI
Portugal 9 11 13 22 17 18 21 27 25 35
Sweden 49 50 53 71 68 68 73 100 108 100
Switzerland 118 135 160 195 196 210 244 288 336 326
United Kingdom 130 134 139 159 175 217 250 282 281 270
EFTA 398 433 473 569 570 642 759 885 966 959
As % of total 24,6 22,3 20,7 19
France 97 108 154 162 135 173 276 320 432 525
Germany 184 233 288 356 363 470 602 749 911 907
Be Ig iu m-Luxe mbo urg 39 50 49 62 58 73 94 116 136 183
Netherlands 36 45 53 55 52 76 107 128 160 184
EEC 356 436 544 635 608 792 1079 1313 1639 1799
As % of total 22 27,5 35,1 35,7
United States 129 160 202 231 255 345 387 382 441 480
As % of total 8 12 9.4 9.5
Source: see table 1.
As table 5 reveals, among the Six it was Belgium-Luxembourg to have the 
highest rate EEC-destined exports, the latter, already accounting for 46,4% of exports in 
1959, rising to 61% by 1963.
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T able  5 B elg ium -L uxem bourg  exports by d e s tin a tio n  1954-1962 in  m illions o f  US d o lla r-  * ~
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
World 2278 2747 3130 3154 3019 3279 3766 3912 4313 4824
Austria 15 18 17 19 19 26 26 28 34 32
Denmark 53 58 53 51 50 55 70 69 74 64
Norway 37 47 45 41 39 35 42 44 46 43
Portugal 25 31 28 30 34 31 44 55 22 25
Sweden 83 96 96 105 81 91 110 117 98 95
Switzerland 65 76 96 91 89 91 105 114 130 138
United Kingdom 145 179 202 178 174 195 210 206 216 277
EEFTA 423 50S 537 515 486 524 607 633 620 674
As % of total 18.6 16 14.3 14
France 222 278 338 351 323 294 392 441 536 704
Germany 222 327 321 326 352 442 596 603 764 896
Italy 64 61 64 67 69 86 116 126 172 248
Netherlands 483 575 693 724 630 700 803 919 986 1093
EEC 991 1241 1416 1468 1374 1522 1907 2089 2458 2941
As%  of total 43.5 46,4 60 61
United States 191 246 304 267 287 444 358 371 414 411
As % of total 8,3 13,5 9,6 8,5
Source: see table 1.
Tables 6 and 7 give an idea o f EEC trade patterns as a whole. Table 6 concerns 
the destination of EEC exports. From 1958, the year before implementation of the 
customs union began, to 1962 the exports o f the Six to the EEC came to represent from 
30,1 to 39,7 % of EEC total exports. The share of exports to the USA and EFTA 
remained more or less stable, while the share to the rest o f the world decreased from
40,8 to 31,1%.
T ab ic  6 E E C  ex p o rts  by  a r e a  o f  destination  in %  o f  to ta l
01958 
01960 
I □  1962
area of destination
source: D irection O f Trade Statistics H istorical. 1948-1980 (W ashington. D.C.: International M onetary
rund. 2002).
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Table 7 concerns the source of imports o f the Six as share of the total. In 1958, 
29,6% of EEC imports came from the EEC itself, while this share had increased to 37,5 
by 1962. The share o f imports from the USA was stable, while the share from the EFTA 
decreased slightly. Along with exports, imports also dramatically decreased from the 
rest of the world: while in 1958 they represented 42,5%, by 1962 they decreased to 
34,6%.
T a b le  7 EEC  im ports by  a re a  o f o rig in  in  %  o f  to ta l
The setting up of the customs union, together wit the establishment of a common 
agricultural policy, was the single most important undertaking of the EEC. To be 
operative it required an effective common external policy. The different conceptions the 
Six had regarding the relationship between the EEC and third countries emerged with 
the implementation of the customs union which necessitated the dismantling o f barriers 
to intra-EEC trade, and a common external tariff (CET) imports from third countries. 
From 1959 onwards the six started removing quota restrictions to intra-EEC trade, and 
in May 1960 they decided to remove all quotas in the industrial sector by the end of 
1961. For tariff barriers, the customs union required the elimination of duties applied on 
intra-EEC trade on 1 January 1957 according to a fixed schedule agreed in the Treaty 
which established a three-phase calendar for dismantling them by the end of the 
transitional period (31 December 1969). The dismantling process was based on across- 
the-board cuts, with the exception of some products for which other methods were 
retained. The first stage would take place from 1 January 1958 to 31 December 1961 
during which internal duties had to be reduced by 30%.
The Treaty of Rome also established the general rule of the arithmetic average o f 
duties applied in 1958 in the four customs unions of the EEC. In fact, the CET was 
formed by averaging the high tariffs of France and Italy with the much lower tariffs o f 
Germany and Benelux (see table 8). As a result, low Benelux and German duties were 
raised while high French and Italian duties were lowered. A list of products, 
representing 15,7% of imports from third countries, were excluded from this general
81
rule and put on a list -  List G -  for which the CET was negotiated by the Six by March
I960.9
T ab le  8: A v erag e  ad valorem p e rc e n ta g e  inc id en ce  o f  im p o rts  d u tie s  o f th e  Six in 1958
SITC Products Benelux France Germany Italy CET
5 AH Chemicals 7 16 8 17 12
61 Leather manufactures 11 11 12 18 12
62 Rubber manufactures 17 17 10 19 18
63 Wood and cork manufactures, except furniture 11 19 7 22 16
64 Paper and Board manufactures 14 16 8 18 15
65 Textile, except clothing 14 19 11 20 16
66 Non -metallic mineral manufactures 12 16 6 21 13
67 Silver, platinum, gems, jewellery 5 13 3 7 6
681 Iron and steel 5 13 7 17 10
6841 Primary aluminium 0 20 0 25 9
691 Ordnance 9 14 7 17 11
699 Manufactures of metal 11 20 10 23 16
71 Machinery other than electric 8 18 5 20 13
72 Electric machinery 11 19 6 21 15
73 Transport equipment 17 29 12 34 22
81 Building parts and fittings 15 19 8 25 17
821 Furniture 13 23 8 21 17
84 Clothing 20 26 13 25 21
851 Footwear 20 21 10 21 19
86 Instruments 13 25 8 20 16
Source: P olitical and  E conom ic Planning: A tlantic T ariffs  and  Trade (London: George Allen and Unwin.
1962)
The Treaty then established the schedule for the implementation of the CET. In 
cases where the difference between the CET and the national tariffs was not higher than 
15%, the CET had to be established by the end of 1961. In the other cases the Treaty 
required a progressive rapprochement o f the national tariffs and the CET according to 
the three phases o f  the transitional period: the margin o f difference between national 
tariffs and the CET had to be reduced by 30% at the end of 1961, by a further 30% at 
the end o f 1965 and by 40% at the end of 1969.
After the first reduction o f 10% on intra-EEC tariffs of January 1959, the intra- 
EEC volume of trade increased by 20% and this led the Commission to consider an 
acceleration of the implementation of the customs union. France supported the 
Commission’s proposal, but hinted that if  intra-EEC trade barriers were dismantled 
ahead o f schedule, it was also necessary to accelerate the implementation o f the CET. 
The Federal Republic, and in particular Erhard, as well as the Benelux countries, did not 
oppose acceleration for reducing internal barriers, but they resisted the acceleration of 
the CET as they were against increasing discriminatory effects on third countries since 
joining o f the CET for them implied a rise o f their duties. Moreover, they wanted any 
step towards the implementation o f the CET to be accompanied by reduction in the 
level of the CET itself in order to reduce discrimination against third countries. The 
Netherlands also wanted the acceleration o f  the dismantling o f intra-EEC barriers to 
take place for agricultural products, but they encountered the tough opposition of the 
Germans (see next section). In the end, after tough bargaining, a compromise between
For a more in-depth discussion of List G and the implementation of the CET see Nême, Nême, C. Economie 
Européenne, (Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1970), pp.58-61.
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those who gave priority to the EEC internal market and those other who considered 
extra-EEC trade was found. In May 1960 the Council of Ministers decided on a further 
reduction of 10% on internal tariffs for non-agricultural products at the end of the first 
stage on 31 December 1961. The first step towards the CET would take place on 31 
December 1961, a year ahead o f the original schedule, but the CET had to be reduced -  
following a Dutch suggestion -  by 20% in order to lessen discriminatory effects on third 
countries, contingent on reciprocal concessions by the GATT members in the Dillon 
Round. As for agricultural products, it was decided that, by 1 January 1961, progress 
also had to be made in this sector. In May 1962, the Council decided on a further 
decrease of 10% on internal tariffs on 1 July 1962, with the result that by 1 July 1962 
EEC internal tariffs on non-agricultural products were reduced by 50%, while a 5% 
further reduction was scheduled for agricultural products by 1 July 1962.10 Thus the Six 
had different positions regarding the pace of the implementation of the different 
elements of the customs union, but were in any case able to find an agreement that 
balanced these different interests.
3.2 The EEC regionalism in agriculture: the Common Agricultural 
Policy
As noted, one of the most fundamental undertakings of the Treaty of Rome, in 
addition to the customs union, was the elaboration of a common policy for agriculture. 
It is worthwhile describing the interest o f the Six in setting up a common policy in this 
sector. In fact, Washington had made it crystal clear that it wanted agriculture to be 
included in the new Round and, as will be shown in the following chapters, the Round 
was influenced by the pace of the CAP’s elaboration and, at the end of the negotiations 
in 1967, it was indeed disagreement on this issue that almost caused negotiations to 
collapse in a welter o f acrimony between the two sides of the Atlantic.
Agricultural protection and the preservation of an adequate level of income in 
agriculture had become essential policy goals of all the European governments. They 
pursued interventionist policies aimed at improving the living standard o f farmers 
through instruments that protected them against competition from third countries and 
world price instability. At the same time, however, support for agricultural income also 
meant support for agricultural output which, consequently, led to food surpluses and 
higher prices compared to those outside Europe . Already in 1950, attempts were made 
to create a common European framework to regulate agriculture as it appeared that a 
solution which was broader than the national framework was required if  domestic 
policies in support of farmers were to be maintained. In view of the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Rome, there was no possibility that the regulation of agriculture would remain 
outside the scope o f the EEC. In particular, agricultural exports were crucial to Dutch 
export earnings, and to a lesser extent for Italian earnings, while France, in order to 
achieve economic progress, had made expensive efforts since 1945 to favour 
agricultural exports for which it wanted a guaranteed outlet in 1957 and aimed at
10 The pace of elimination of intra-EEC duties and of the definition and implementation of the CET is described, with 
useful tables, by Néme, J., Néme, C. Economié Européenne, p. 48-86. See, in particular, p.53 for a list of products 
which were excluded for the linear reduction at different time. For an account of the implementation of the customs 
unions throught the 1960s see Ranieri, R. "The Origins and achievements if the EEC Customs Union (1958-1968) in 
Varsori, A. (ed) Inside the European Community. Actors ad Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972 (Baden- 
Baden, Nomos, 2006). See also Gerbet P La Construction De L'Europe. Paris: Imprimerie Nationales Benoit Europe at 
Sixes and Sevens : the Free Trade Asssociabon and the United States New York : Columbia U P, 1961 and (Willis 1968 
#2304), pp. 282-287. For Erhard's opposition to the acceleration see W. Kaiser "Challenge to the Community: The 
creation, Crisis and Consolidation of the European Free Trade Association, 1958-1972" in Journal of European 
Integration History, 3 ,1 (1997) pp. 7-33.
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sharing the financial burden of supporting its farmers.11 In fact, the establishment of a 
common market for farm and food products and of a common agricultural policy were 
among the aims o f the Treaty o f Rome, and were considered by the Six as a measure to 
improve incomes in the agricultural sector or, as Milward notes, a kind o f “extended 
public welfare” .1“ Hence, the all Six were interested in setting up a common policy to 
regulate agriculture at the regional level o f the EEC with the result that this sector was 
included in the Treaty of Rome, and the establishment o f a customs union for farm and 
food products, and o f a common policy, became one the major aims of the EEC .13
Creating a common market for agriculture was much more difficult than for 
manufactured goods. It was not only a question of liberalize exchanges, but also 
required the replacement of the separate respective policies of the Six with a common 
policy. In addition, the Six had to reconcile their conflicting interests inside and outside 
the EEC, as differences existed regarding how to organize this common policy and 
relations with third countries. Among the Six, the stronger supporters of the CAP were 
the two exporting countries of the Netherlands and France. The Dutch, with an efficient 
agricultural sector, above all for dairy and livestock products, aimed at liberalising intra- 
EEC exchanges, and wanted low support prices and moderate external protection in 
order not to alter its trade with markets outside the EEC. France, a larger and more 
efficient producer o f most agricultural products than the other member states, claimed 
that given the fact that it opened its industrial market to the exports of the five members, 
it had to be recompensed with outlets in the EEC and above all Germany. Paris aimed at 
moderate prices and high protection from overseas exporters. The big difference 
between France and The Netherlands, however, was that The Hague favoured a CAP 
embracing the “regulations in common o f outputs, prices and sales” while Paris would 
have satisfied “with preferences for its wheat, sugar, dairy and meat exports[...]. It was 
the primacy of the industrial common market that finally forced France to cede to the 
wishes o f its partners for a genuine supranational regulation of agricultural outputs and 
sales rather than merely a preferential scheme” .14 Italy was a relatively efficient 
producer o f fruits and vegetables and hoped to increase exports to the Five and gain 
access to structural funds to support its agriculture. At the same time Italy longed for a 
CAP that allowed them to maintain its meat and grains imports from outside the EEC, 
and in particular from Argentina.15
With a highly protected and inefficient agricultural industry, Bonn wanted to 
maintain its high prices and the bilateral arrangements it had with its five partners and 
with third countries and aimed hoped to maintain its cheap food imports from outside 
the EEC. Thus, Bonn was never particularly enthusiastic about the establishment of a
1 Milward A.S. T lie European rescue of the nation-state, pp. 224-225. See chapter 5 of this book for a description of 
the attempts made at European level to organize agriculture and the origin o f the CAP. On the attempts made to 
organize agriculture see also Griffiths, T.R., Brian Girvin, G.,(eds.) The green pool and the origins of the common 
agricultural policy (London: LP, 1995).
12 Milward, A.S. The reconstruction of Western Europe, p. 229.
13 The most recent and complete account of the negotiations leading to the CAP from 1958 to 1964 is Knudsen, A .G  
Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study (ELU PH.D thesis, Florence 2001). By the 
same author see also "Creating the Common Agricultural Policy. Story of Cereals Prices" in Loth W. Crises and 
Compromises : the European Project 1963-1969. Baden-Baden/Bruxelles : Nomos Verlag; Bruyant 2001., pp. 131-154, 
The following account is based above all on these two works. See also T. K. Wariey "Western Trade in Agricultural 
Products" in Shonfield, A. International economic relations o f the Western World, 1959-1971 Vol.l, Politics and trade 
(London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1976), p.287-402; Pearce J. "The 
Common Agricultural: The Accumulation of Special Interests" in Wallace, H. Wallace, W. and Webb, C. (eds) Policy­
making in the European Community (Wallace Policy-Making in the European Community Chichester; New York: Wiley, 
1983) 2nd edition; Tracy, M. Government and Agriculture in Western Europe (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989).
14 Milward A.S. The European rescue of the nation-state, pp. 283-284.
15 On Italy and the CAP see Galli, R., Torcasio, S. La partecpazione italiana alia political agricola comunitaria (Roma, 
Bologna: IAI, II Mulino, 1976).
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comprehensive common agricultural policy that could run contrary to its commercial 
interests outside the EEC. In the end, it reluctantly accepted to push forward with in the 
setting up of this policy in order not to cause problems within the EEC and in relations 
with France, the country whose participation in the EEC was essential. However, as 
shown in the next chapter, by 1963 Germany started to increasingly challenge the 
CAP.16
During 1956-1957 negotiations leading to the Treaty of Rome, the Six 
governments could not reach an agreement on the specific elements of the CAP and to 
successfully conclude the negotiations they simply agreed that a common market for 
agriculture had to be created together with the common market for manufactures, 
without entering into details, thus postponing the formulation and establishment of CAP 
to the transitional period. The job of shaping a specific policy from the rather vague 
Treaty of Rome mandate was left to the Commission. Yet it soon became apparent that 
formulating an agricultural policy acceptable to all of the six member nations would be 
a formidable task, as the Six had rival interests that had to be conciliated within a 
common policy.
Negotiations began in 1958 with the Stresa conference at a very slow pace. On 
30 June 1960, the European Commission put forward to the Council of Ministers the 
adoption of a common agricultural policy based on free circulation of products, central 
market organization for products with prices to be progressively unified and guaranteed 
in order to stabilize the agricultural market at the EEC level and regulating imports, a 
variable levy system to protect European products from competition from third 
countries to replace the old system of tariff and quota protection, as well as a financial 
support system.
The implementation of this program was strongly supported by the Commission, 
the French, the Italians and the Dutch, while the Germans were opposed. As a common 
market organisation meant common prices for their products, the Six had to set up 
unified target prices, starting from the basic commodity of grains. The focus of the 
negotiations became the common price o f grains, which turned out to be a particularly 
thorny issue, which also had consequences also on for the GATT negotiations, until 
December 1964 when it was eventually set. France, the largest and most efficient 
producer among the Six, had the lowest prices, the Federal Republic had the highest 
one, while the other four were somewhere in the middle. France and the Netherlands 
asked for a timetable to agree on a common price level, while Germany refused to 
commit itself. The Federal Republic maintained an inefficient and greatly protected 
agricultural sector and argued that it would be difficult to agree on a common price 
level within a short time, if this implied lowering the grain price and consequently, 
claimed the Germans, the level of income of fanners. For this same reason, Bonn also 
opposed the shortening of the transition period for the agricultural sector. The situation 
was made worse by a tense domestic political situation in which the German 
government was scared of loosing political support if it were to allow the grain price to 
fall. German farmers were well organised and able to influence the Christian Democrats 
governments of Adenauer and Erhard by controlling the Minister of Agriculture. Under 
this control, the Federal Republic vigorously opposed a reduction of grain prices and 
claimed that the common price had to be set at the German level. This position was 
categorically refused by France which indicated that only an agreement moving the 
price about one quarter of the way towards the German level would be acceptable. This 
level could encourage French agriculture to develop unexploited capacity, thus enabling
16 Ludlow, N.P., The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge' (London: 
Routledge, 2006), chapter I.
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France to increase production. But if  the common price was set at too high a level, other 
less efficient EEC farmers would have an incentive to increase their production, thus 
operating against French interests. High prices would also generate inflation, creating a 
burden on the French industry's competitiveness.17
As stated above, the decision taken on 12 May 1960 to accelerate the 
implementation o f the customs union for industrial products was linked to progress to 
be made on the common agricultural policy by 1 January 1961. Hence in December 
1960, the Council of Ministers adopted the principles o f free circulation and common 
prices and the Commission started working on these principles to adopt the first 
regulations. In May 1961, the Commission proposed common market organisation for 
cereals together with a mechanism for target prices which included a framework but did 
not mention an exact level. The Commission proposal was rejected by the German 
Minister of Agriculture, Schwarz, who maintained this opposition, and even hinted that 
the decision taken in May 1960 by the Council of Ministers to accelerate the 
implementation o f the Treaty of Rome did not concern the agricultural sector but merely 
the industrial one. The German declarations were badly received in the capitals o f the 
Five and the French repeatedly warned against what was perceived as a German attempt 
to delay the implementation o f the CAP. The French and the Dutch strongly pushed to 
make progress, but no agreement could be reached. At the end of 1961 a major clash 
seemed around the comer: France made it clear that it would block moving to the 
second stage o f  the transitional period, supposed to start on 1 January 1962, if  progress 
towards a common agricultural policy was not accomplished.
At the end of December 1961, no decision had yet been taken and the Six 
decided to pretend it was still 31 December and to negotiate until an agreement could be 
reached, which eventually happened on 14 January 1962. The Council adopted the first 
regulations for cereals, pork, eggs and poultry that would come into force on 1 July 
1962. A schedule was agreed upon for the regulations for daily products, meat and 
sugar. It created of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, with a 
financial regulation valid until June 1965. Farms incomes were to be ensured by a price 
support policy, excess of supply above demand would be bought by Community agents 
and a preferential system of levies protecting products of the Six at the EEC frontiers 
would be established. Third countries’ products entering the EEC were subjected to a 
variable levy system aimed at guarantying that they would enter at a price level higher 
than the prices set for EEC products. Consequently, third countries’ products would 
inevitably end up being more expensive than the Six’s products that, therefore, did not 
need to fear external competition. By the same token, when EEC products were 
exported, the gap between lower world market and artificially higher EEC prices was 
filled by subsidies. In this way price stability could be guaranteed, competition from 
third countries was undercut, and EEC products could compete in the international 
markets thanks to subsidies. However, no decision on common prices was taken. It was 
merely agreed that for the time being prices would be frozen at their current level and 
harmonisation o f  prices would begin in 1963. Another part o f the CAP had been added, 
but other issues had still to be agreed on in order to implement the CAP: regulations for 
other products, the definitive financing system and the level of common prices starting 
from grain.
As noted, the issue o f  grain prices was critical. In 1962 France set its average 
grain price at $ 2.09 per bushel, Germany at 2.85 and the United States at 1.91. The
17 Hendriks, G. "The creation of the Common agricultural policy" in Deighton, A, Milward, A. S. Widening, Deepening 
and Acceleration, pp. 143-148 and "Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II" Staff Study prepared for the use of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. (Washington 1968), pp. 35-41.
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United States and the other big exporters looked with apprehension at the quarrel over 
grain prices. The United States had a clear interest to see the EEC common price fixed 
at the lowest price level possible, near to the French one. A high price would represent 
an incentive to increase EEC production and surplus, consequently reducing American 
exports, and illustrated the implementation of a definitively protectionist CAP. A 
relatively low price could enable the USA, which in 1962 was the EEC leading grain 
supplier, and other low cost producers, like Canada and Australia, to compete.18 The 
level o f the common price, however, was only one aspect o f the consequences that this 
common policy could have on third countries. Through common prices higher than 
world prices, and the levy system which guaranteed that no imports could compete with 
EEC goods, the CAP was developed in tension with international trade: the Six were 
setting up an EEC market for food and farm products, the cost of which was passed on 
to third countries’ suppliers. The Dutch and the Germans claimed that the CAP had to 
take into account the consequences for third countries: obviously these positions were 
not merely influenced by the willingness to take into consideration the impact o f the 
CAP but also by mercantilist reasons. Germany had bilateral quota agreements with 
third countries to import cheaper food and hoped to retain them. The possibility of 
guaranteeing quantitative assurance to third countries was categorically opposed by 
France on the grounds that they were in conflict with the entire CAP, although, in 
reality, it was because such assurances would retain third country competition which the 
French wanted to exclude. The Netherlands claimed that the price policy of the EEC 
had to take into account third countries and be lowered in case of disruptive 
consequences, but this option was opposed by Bonn who had the highest prices among 
the Six.19 As a result, the CAP promised to be more protectionist than the six national 
policies of the EEC member states because it represented the sum of all the protectionist 
requirements o f the Six. At the same time, the CAP promised to be a very tricky 
negotiating issue in Geneva where the various interests o f the Six had to be reconciled 
with the interests of the USA.
3.3 A new Round but on French terms: French reaction to 
Kennedy trade program
When, at the end o f November 1962, Ball met French Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Maurice Couve de Murville, to inform him that Herter had been appointed as American 
negotiator for the future GATT conference, Couve de Murville replied: “Vous vous y 
prenez longtemps a l’avance” .20 This piece of conversation anticipated and set the tone 
for French and American behaviour regarding the new Round: the Americans were 
dreadfully concerned about putting forward the trade program they had elaborated, the 
French had not the same concern.
In explaining the French reaction to the American initiative it is necessary to 
bear in mind the broader context o f Franco-American relations. In elaborating his policy 
towards Europe, President Kennedy had to deal with the charismatic figure of Charles 
de Gaulle who, unfortunately for Washington, had a different conception of the Atlantic 
Alliance and its policies, and of the position of the EEC and France in the Alliance. As
18 "Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II", pp. 35-41 and Memorandum from D. Gale Johnson to Governor 
Herter on "Trade negotiations issues involving agriculture -  some preliminary comments and questions", 17 January 
1963 Herter's papers, Box 2, JFKL
19 CM2 1963/540 Extrait du PV de la réunion restreinte, tenue à l'occasion de la 117*™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 2- 
3 December 1963 R / l 123/63.
20 HAEC, MAEF Secrétariat Général, Entretiens et Messages, Vol 17 Reel 208, Réunion chez 1e Ministre entre Couve de 
Murville and George Bail, 26 November 1962.
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has been described by the many scholars who have written on Franco-American 
relations in the 1960s, along with the critical issue o f  decision-sharing within the 
Alliance, “Kennedy and de Gaulle disagreed over the governance and structure of the 
West’s nuclear deterrent, the response to the Berlin crisis, policy on Germany and 
Vietnam, the nuclear test ban treaty, long-range cold war strategy, and monetary 
affairs.”21. Together with all these issues that already put under considerable strain 
Franco-American relations, another one was to be added to the list: the commercial 
policy of the Atlantic alliance. De Gaulle did not support the liberalisation o f  trade as 
suggested by Kennedy and had every intention of preserving the EEC as an independent 
and regional trading unit.
The French government kept a close eye on Kennedy’s trade initiative, and 
following the presentation of the TEA to Congress it attentively examined the impact it 
could have both on the EEC and the Brussels negotiations with the British. In February 
1962, French ambassador in Washington, Hervé Alphand, expressed to George Ball his 
appreciation for a law that increased the authority of the American government to 
negotiate in Geneva. However, together with this appreciation, which also represented a 
criticism regarding the lack o f authority to negotiate in the undergoing Dillon Round, 
Alphand spelled out his reservations. The bill put the United States in a more 
advantageous position compared to Europe: the escape clause and the peril point 
procedure allowed Washington to use a system of protection other countries did not 
have, while, concerning tropical products, it was easy for Washington to offer 
eliminations o f  duties it did not itself apply. Thus a GATT Round along the TEA could 
have a negative effect on the EEC, which would lose much o f its tariff protection, while 
the Americans would retain their protective safeguards. But most importantly, Alphand 
claimed, some o f the TEA provisions and, in particular, the dominant supplier clause 
could hurt the regional dimension o f the EEC, and could be misused affect the Brussels 
talks..22 The clause envisaged the implementation o f an Atlantic free trade area whose 
effects were opposed in Paris. France had supported the regional dimension o f the EEC 
for its economic development, thus the same reasons that had led de Gaulle to put to an 
end the FTA negotiations with the British, in 1958, pushed France in 1962 to 
categorically refuse an Atlantic free trade area in which the regional dimension of the 
EEC would be watered down and French products would have to struggle with more 
competitive American ones. Moreover, the possibility o f the dominant supplier clause 
being applied even if the United Kingdom did not join the EEC bothered Paris, and in 
particular Olivier Wormser, Director o f Economic and Financial Affairs at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, one of the people responsible for French policy towards the EEC 
who was also to have a crucial role in formulating the French stance towards the 
proposed Round. Without becoming a member of the Common Market, the United 
Kingdom could attend the suggested Round, the result o f which could potentially be the 
same as joining the Community, namely reducing tariffs to zero on a wide range of 
manufactures and reducing discrimination coming from the EEC. In this way the British 
would accomplish what they sought in 1958 when they advanced the FTA proposal, 
which excluded agriculture and which did not question trade relations with the
21 Costigliola, F. "Kennedy, De Gaulle, and the Challenge of Consultation" in Paxton, R.O. and Wahl, N. (eds) De Gaulle 
and the United States. A Centennial Reappraisal (Oxford; Providence, R.I: Berg, 1994), p. 169. For de Gaulle's foreign 
policy I have also relied on Bozo, F. Two strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), Costigliola, F. France and the United States, the Cold War Since World War II 
(New York: Twayne, 1992), Vaisse, Maurice 1998
22 MAEF, DE/CE 1961-1966 GATT 949 Alphand to Quai d'Orsay, Telegram 1061/64, 3 February 1962, p.91. The 
telegram reported «Les indications suivantes one été recueillies concernent les risques d'une exploitation détournée de 
certaines disposition du projet de loi sur la politique commerciale». PRO T  312/325 UK delegation to EFTA, Telegram 95 
Cohen to Foreign Office, 31 October 1962.
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Commonwealth. A further advantage could be attained by the British thanks to the 
opening of the American market, the United Kingdom would become the only country 
whose products could enjoy the duty-free treatment of the EEC, the United States and 
the Commonwealth. Therefore France had enough good reasons to look with 
apprehension and suspicion at Kennedy’s trade policy.21
Ball tried to reassure the French that the general aim of the TEA was to give the 
American negotiators full authority to bargain in Geneva. In order to gain Congress’ 
approval, the American executive had to show that the bill gave more advantages to the 
United States than to the Europeans. In previous negotiations, the United States had to 
bargain with partners less powerful than it, and this had led to American tolerance 
towards discrimination. But in 1962 Washington faced an economic unit as strong as 
the United States, the EEC, and consequently a different approach was needed: if 
Congress was to be convinced to follow a liberal trade policy, provisions like the escape 
clause, the peril point and the exclusion of some categories of products from the 
negotiations had to be maintained in order to reassure the legislative body. As regards 
the British and the dominant supplier clause. Ball made clear to Alphand that the 
possibility o f reducing tariffs by more than 50 percent could be applied only to 
negotiations with the EEC and only if the United Kingdom became a member. It was 
categorically out of the question to use the clause if the United Kingdom did not join 
Ball underlined that the aim of the provision was to push London to join the Community 
thanks to the fact that, through the MFN rule, it could simplify the problems o f the 
EFTA members not entering the EEC for which the United Kingdom felt to be 
responsible. The aim was to avoid giving a non-EEC United Kingdom the opportunity 
to take advantages of the effects of a free trade area.21
No matter what the American aims were in putting forward the dominant 
supplier clause, the fact is that it stunned the French, who opposed the elimination of 
tariffs across the Atlantic. On 20 February, speaking at the American Club in Paris, 
Couve de Murville claimed that the EEC would be willing to reduce its tariffs in a 
bargain with the United States on the basis of complete reciprocity but, hinted the 
French Minister, the EEC would be reluctant to eliminate tariffs with the USA 
altogether for an important range of manufactures. Even if the EEC had to be open to 
the outside world and avoid tending towards autarky, it had to preserve its essential 
European character and therefore needed a common external tariff against the outside 
world to maintain its unity. Couve de Murville made clear that complete free trade was 
incompatible with the Common Market whose aim was to build up a political union: the 
customs and the economic union were means to attain this end.2<
The Minister of Finance Valéry Giscard D’Estaing shared the view of the Quai 
D ’Orsay Giscard D’Estaing felt that the American initiative was “précipitée", dictated 
by developments in Europe and wrongly timed: the American economy was 
predominant, while France was already reducing barriers at the regional level o f the 
EEC and it was not possible to think about further drastically reducing barriers in the 
wider context of GATT, which would thus expose French goods to their more 
competitive American counterparts.26 However, Giscard D'Estaing, while perhaps less
J MAEF, DE/CE 1961-1966 GATT 949 Telegram 2220/2226 Wormser to Alphand, 8 February 1962. Wormser was 
worried also because ”11 me revient de bonne source que M. George Ball était, in fine, hostie à la formule qui à été 
finalement retenue par le President Kennedy contre son avis » The contrast between Ball and Kennedy shows that, 
as written in chapter three, the way the "dominant supplier“ clause was elaborated is not clear.
24 MAEF, DE/CE 1961-1966 GATT 949, Telegram 1061/64 Alphand to Quai d'Orsay, 3 February 1962 and Telegram 
1146/54 from Alphand to Quai d'Orsay, 15 February 1962.
25 The New York Times, 21 February 1962, “Common Market Held Cool to Kennedy Tanff View* p. 9.
26 Interview of the author with Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, Florence, 27 October 2004.
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than enthusiastic, did not go as far as opposing the setting up of a new Round, to prove 
that France favoured a liberal commercial policy, and to boost French exports. In effect, 
foreign trade had not previously played much role in the French economy, but in 1962 it 
was doing so at an increasing rapid pace, as the rise o f French exports and imports in 
those years demonstrated. What Giscard D ’Estaing categorically opposed was the 
dominant supplier clause and the consequent implementation of an Atlantic free trade 
area, as the CET had a fundamental role in preserving the regional dimension o f the 
EEC. Moreover the TEA, through the safeguards measures, gave the US negotiator 
advantages the other governments did not enjoy and allowed Washington to withdraw a 
concession made in Geneva, so causing an uncertainty around reductions made by the 
Americans and an unbalanced situation with the GATT contracting parties. The same 
was true for American non-tariff barriers like the customs valuation system of the 
American Selling Price which allowed American governments to considerably raise 
duty on a given product and precluded European exports. Hence, the new Round had to 
be an opportunity to harmonise commercial rules at the international level so to give all 
countries the same advantages. Giscard D ’Estaing did not oppose the suggestion o f a 
new Round, considered similar to the FTA British initiative, but what mattered to him 
was to be wary in responding to the American move, and protecting EEC and French 
interests.2"
For Paris “en fait sous l’invocation d’un partnership atlantique, il s’agit de la 
riposte américaine au succès du marché commun et à la constitution en Europe de ce qui 
pourrait devenir un bloc concurrent”. The aim of the United States was to place 
American and the European industry into the same conditions o f competition in order to 
allow American industries to benefit from their great competitiveness, to favour 
American exports to the EEC and find a remedy for the problem of the balance-of- 
payments deficit. And it was to these American goals that the French had to find an 
answer.28
Following the TEA’S approval, the French decided on the line to be presented in 
Brussels to the five partners and in Geneva to GATT members. The French noted that 
the liberal provisions of the TEA -  general authority to reduce tariffs by 50 percent, 
dominant supplier clause, elimination o f duties for tropical products and of duties 
inferior to 5 percent -  were part o f a more protectionist framework characterised by the 
peril point and escape clause provisions, and customs valuations system. As a result, the 
TEA was not a balanced act, for it would cause a reduction o f  CET of the EEC, which 
lacked the protectionist devices o f  the TEA, while leaving intact most American 
protectionist tools. In this way, the United States would increase its exports to the Six, 
while the Six would continue to face US non-tariff barriers. In the context o f this 
situation, two courses of action could be formulated. The first consisted in testing 
Washington’s actual cutting zeal by making a counter-proposal more radical than the 
American one and suggesting the total elimination of tariffs, extending the Treaty of 
Rome to the Atlantic area. The second course o f action consisted in considering the 
American proposal for what it simply was; an offer to reduce barriers just like, the one 
presented in 1959 that led to the Dillon Round, even if broader in its aim this time. In 
this case, the Six had to keep in mind two goals; to point out the weak and unbalanced 
aspects of the TEA and to obtain the appropriate modifications. The first course of
NA State Department CDF 1960-1963 box 720 Memorandum of Conversation between Ball, Schaetzel and Giscard 
D'Estaing, 30 March 1962 and ibidem Telegram 4599 from Paris to State Department, 30 March 1962 reporting Giscard 
D'Estaing speech to American Club.
28 MAEF GATT 930 Note du Quai D'Orsay "Kennedy Round" undated document but surely written after 1 April and 
before 8 May 1963.
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action was dismissed because totally unrealistic: it implied the total abandoning of the 
Treaty o f Rome, a route that no-one in France wanted to pursue, and it would be seen in 
Geneva, Brussels and Washington for what it really was, a way of obstructing the 
Kennedy program. Therefore, the only suitable possibility was the second course of 
action, which required the modification of the unequal aspects that existed between the 
means of action of the Six and those the TEA gave the American negotiators.29
It is worth noting that the French did not consider a third alternative: rejecting 
the Round altogether. A French refusal would have increased the strain within the 
Atlantic Alliance between France and the United States, and would also have caused a 
tough reaction from the Federal Republic and the Netherlands, who wanted the EEC to 
attend the new Round, thereby provoking a serious crisis among the Six. Moreover if 
the new Round could be brought within precise limits and reduced in its scope, if  it 
could simply be a trade negotiation rather than a challenge to the Treaty of Rome and a 
way of implementing an Atlantic free trade area, Paris had every reason to attend in 
order to boost exports to EFT A countries and to the United States, above after the years 
1959-1962 had proved that French products could compete in wider context than the 
national one. Therefore, the French were not opposed to the initiative for a new Round. 
The EEC had to participate, but the TEA had to be corrected to lead to a balanced trade 
conference and to preserve EEC regionalism.
By December, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has set out the French position 
towards the American initiative. It is worth dealing in detail with this stance since it was 
subsequently adopted by the EEC in Brussels. Paris felt that with the invocation of 
Atlantic partnership, the Americans produced a solution similar to the British answer to 
the Treaty of Rome with in the guise of the suggestion o f the FTA. For the time being 
the American trade law could not be treated as a normal proposal for tariff bargaining, 
merely considering effects that reduction of duties could have on imports and exports. 
In fact, trade negotiations such as those which could develop from the TEA had a much 
broader impact and concerned the positions of the EEC in world trade. The hypothesis 
o f completely free exchange under the dominant supplier clause together with the 
prospect of reducing tariffs by 50 percent could be enough to radically alter the 
competition between European and American products. At the same time, Paris doubted 
that, under the pressure of domestic economic sectors, the American government could 
really propose such drastic tariff cuts in Geneva, as were allowed by the TEA, However, 
even if it was likely that the plan for tariff disarmament suggested by Kennedy, just as 
with other initiatives launched with the same solemnity -  Alliance for Progress, Years 
of the United Nations for development -  would, in practice, be considerably reduced in 
content, for the time being the TEA had to be considered for what it presented itself as 
being, a “revolutionary” answer to the “challenge” to the United States represented by 
the success of the Common Market and, above all, by its future development and 
enlargement.30
Paris accepted to continue with the preliminary explorative work requested by 
the Americans to set up the Round, as the relevance Washington attached to the 
envisaged Round clearly suggested that it should do so. But, during this preliminary
29 MAEF, DE/CE 1961-1966 GATT 949 Direction des Affaires Economiques et Rnancières. Note 174/CE Loi américaine 
sur le commerce et les future négociations tarifaires, 17 October 1962.
30 For the élaboration of the French position see MAEF, DE/CE 1961-1966 GATT 930, Direction des Affaires 
Economiques et Financière, Note 217/CE 19 Novembre 1962; ibidem GATT 949 Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Financières, Note 238/CE Les Etats-Unis et la Communauté Economique Européenne, 10 December 1962; Ibidem GATT 
930 Aide-mémoire à l'attention de M. le Secrétaire Général 1962; ibidem GATT 930, Direction des Affaires Economiques 
et Financière -Service de Coopération Economique, Note 14/CE Offre américaine de négociation tarifaires, 18 January 
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phase, and prior to any start of the Round, the Six had to let the Americans know what 
conditions had to be granted in order to have a large, but equitable and balanced 
negotiation. The first condition identified by the French concerned an issue which 
would turn out have centre-stage in the Kennedy Round, the disparity problem. In the 
American tariffs structure there were some very low duties and other extremely 
elevated, sometimes even prohibitive ad valorem duties o f 100 and even 200 percent. 
On the contrary the CET, being already an average, was more uniform and moderate. 
The United States had suggested the reduction of all duties by a uniform percentage, but 
a uniform reduction would clearly have different effects on low and high duties 
respectively: a reduction o f 50 percent on a duty o f 200 percent or 100 percent would 
maintain a very high duty a high level, while would meaningfully reduce moderate 
ones, and almost bring to zero low duties. A solution had to be devised to lop off the 
peaks in the American tariffs and to  harmonise tariffs across the Atlantic. The second 
condition was the necessity to also negotiate on some American non-tariff barriers, such 
as customs valuation systems and sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations whose 
existence reduced the magnitude and meaningful ness of tariff cuts.
The French government then underlined the necessity of harmonisation of 
competitive conditions: Paris doubted whether the drastic tariff reductions put forward 
by Washington could be achieved without being accompanied by a certain degree of 
coordination o f economic and social policies across the Atlantic. The example of the 
Common Market, and the failure o f the FTA, illustrated that this request for 
coordination reflected a genuinely fundamental principle o f French policy, rather than 
dubious or phony argumentation. I f  this idea was not shared by the American 
government, then such a sweeping reduction of tariffs needed a safeguard clause to 
correct negative consequences o f tariff concessions, allowing their withdrawal or the 
implementation of quantitative restrictions.
As for the crucial issue o f agriculture, the United States had not yet indicated 
how it wished to include agriculture in the Round, but a basic point was clear in Paris: 
one of the France ‘s aims in signing the Treaty o f Rome had been to ensure outlets for 
its agricultural products, above all Germany, hence no negotiation in Geneva should 
impede this fundamental goal. France had many agricultural products which were 
uncompetitive on the world market, such as cereals, but competitive on EEC markets. 
Therefore, it was unsafe to negotiate on agriculture in Geneva while the CAP was not 
yet fully agreed in Brussels. Only once the CAP had been fully approved could 
negotiations in Geneva begin. With this fundamental position in mind, the French did 
not oppose the inclusion o f agriculture in the Round. On the contraiy, the Round could 
constitute an opportunity to  deal with problems affecting world trade in the agricultural 
sector, and to consider the impact on world trade of the domestic policies of the big 
exporting countries.
The conditions indicated by the French, aiming at a more balanced negotiations, 
widened the scope of the Round, making it more complex and articulated. French 
conditions required the modification o f GATT rules on the safeguards clause and, above 
all, o f the TEA, which did not authorize the American government to negotiate on the 
non-tariff barriers.
Paris then went on to consider the link between the new Round and the Brussels 
negotiations. If all the conditions which were advanced in order to have a balanced 
Round could be met, it would be necessary to determine, bearing in mind the result of 
talks with the British, the extent to which trade negotiations would be economically and 
politically desirable. The concrete American offer to negotiate would be conditioned by 
the result o f the Brussels negotiations. The accession o f the United Kingdom would
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make a new reduction of tariffs necessary, in order to reduce discrimination coming 
from the enlarged EEC; at the same time, in the case o f the negotiations’ failure, it 
would be the case that a broad tariff disarmament would become an indispensable 
replacement. As such, Paris questioned the usefulness of discussing a new Round 
without knowing whether concessions would replace membership or accompany it. The 
timing was in this respect unfortunate, and it seemed reasonable not to further 
complicate the membership talks with an early start to the new Round; the conclusions 
of the Brussels talks should be known first.
Paris did not oppose the American move to have a new GATT Round, on the 
contrary it was perceived as an opportunity to boost French exports. However, at the 
same time, it wanted negotiations on French terms, not simply a Round following the 
lines o f the TEA which, after all, was an American law. European participation was 
made conditional on the acceptance by the United States of precise demands and on 
bringing the Round into precise limits which would make the reductions o f trade 
barriers more bearable. The regionalism of the EEC had to be protected and the 
implementation of an Atlantic free trade area was out of the question. Hence, the 
dominant supplier clause had to be made harmless, in a way or another. Then, once the 
results of the negotiations with the British were known, a new Round could begin.
3.4 The Six’s reaction: EEC regionalism against US Atlanticism
On 8 January 1962, Erhard met Kennedy and Ball in Washington and conveyed 
his full support to the Americans. The German Minister defined the Kennedy trade 
program as “well designed to cope with the dangers of discriminatory actions such as 
threaten to grow out of, for instance, UK membership in the Common Market”. Erhard 
promised to do everything in his power to support a reduction in world discrimination 
and claimed that a liberalisation of international trade would be the only way to keep the 
EEC from becoming inbred. The German Minister shared Kennedy’s aims in launching 
a new Round and understood the role that a large reduction in tariffs at multilateral level 
could have keeping the EEC outward-looking. With the EEC setting up its customs 
union, there would be “bickering with third nations who feel discriminated against” 
claimed Erhard. Therefore, it was necessary for the EEC to listen to grievances, seeking 
to appease and reach compromises. The only way to improve the situation “was to 
follow the lead indicated by President Kennedy by adopting an extremely liberal policy 
which would place the entire no-Communist world on one and the same footing” 
concluded the German Minister. 31 In September 1962 Erhard again expressed his 
support for Kennedy’s trade policy, defining it “a fine development”, and advocated a 
rapid start for the new Round.32
Erhard’s complete endorsement for the American initiative, which seemed to 
also include support for the dominant supplier clause, came as no surprise. The German 
minister was a convinced free trader who liked to repeat that he had reduced German 
tariffs unilaterally in the 1950s. He had opposed the Treaty of Rome, considered too 
small for the Federal Republic, had supported the FTA initiative of 1958 and, after the 
creation of the EFTA, had favoured a wider trade arrangement between the EEC and the 
EFTA to reduce discrimination in Europe. Then, in 1961, Erhard fully supported British
31 FRUS 1961-1963, XIII, Section Economic and Political Integration, 26. Memorandum of Conversation. Meeting at the 
White House Between President Kennedy and Professor Erhard, German Minster for Economic Affairs, 8 January 1962.
32 FRUS 1961-1963, XIII, Section Economic and Political Integration, 49. Memorandum of Conversation. Meeting with 
Vice Chancellor Erhard 14 September 1962.
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membership, considered a means to achieve a more open EEC.33 Against this 
background, Erhard’s full backing for a new GATT Round to liberalise European and 
international trade was coherent and predictable.
However, together with Erhard’s enthusiasm a general hesitation existed in the 
Federal Republic about the effects that a GATT Round following the TEA’s lines could 
have on the German economy and on the EEC. Chancellor Adenauer looked with 
apprehension at the dominant supplier clause, and maintained a reserved stance on the 
whole Kennedy trade program which seemed to have as a goal the invasion o f Western 
Europe by more competitive American goods. Adenauer’s fears were shared by German 
industry which, by 1962, “came to appreciate the blessings o f the EEC both in terms of 
increased protection against other European competitors and in terms o f increased 
exports opportunities to France and Italy”. Those negative effects on trade between 
Germany and EFTA counties which had been predicted by Erhard had failed to 
materialise. German exports to EFTA increased from $2,649 million o f dollars in 1959 
to $3,967 million in 1963. What is more, the same industrial sectors that had opposed 
the FT A also opposed the idea of an Atlantic free trade area and a drastic reduction of 
duties across the Atlantic.34 Therefore, even if  the need to keep the EEC open to world 
trade and to solve the economic divisions o f Western Europe were still seen as 
important in Germany, by 1962 the regional dimension o f the EEC had come to be 
appreciated by German industry, and the idea o f an Atlantic free trade area raised 
distrust. One thing was to alleviate the effects o f the division of Europe and to create 
opportunities to boost German exports to the United States, to achieve these objectives 
by such a radical solution as drastic reduction o f tariffs worldwide that could cause an 
invasion o f Germany and to Europe by American products was quite another.35 Hence, 
Bonn not could support the idea o f eliminating barriers between the two sides o f the 
Atlantic, because the regional bloc o f  the EEC was now also fundamental for German 
trade as well. A new GATT Round w as supported as a means to reduce discrimination 
worldwide and in Europe but, apart from Erhard, no-one backed the far-reaching 
eliminations o f tariffs envisaged by the TEA, which would lead to the dilution of the 
regional dimension of the EEC which, by 1962, had clearly shown itself to bring trade 
advantages to the Federal Republic.
The Dutch stance was not very different. A reduction of barriers in Geneva was 
seen as a means of keeping the EEC open to world trade and to lower its discrimination. 
The Hague was quick to convey its support for the approval of the TEA, its hope was 
that the American law could contribute to reducing duties o f  developed countries, and it 
wanted the EEC to fully cooperate with the United States.36 However, together with this 
support, there also remained certain worries regarding the most radical provision of the 
TEA: the point was that not even the traditionally liberal Dutch aimed at seeing their 
Community disappear in an Atlantic Free Trade Area. They wished to keep a liberal 
EEC, as this was in conformity with the trade structure o f the Netherlands, but this wish 
did not extend to the point o f dissolving the EEC. It is overly simplistic to think that it
33 The economic policy of Erhard is described in Lappenkueper, U. “ 'Ein Europa der Freien und der Gleichen’. La 
politique européenne de Ludwig Erhard (1963-1966). Loth, W., (ed.). Crisis and Compromises: the European Project 
1963-1969. Nomos Verlag/Baden-Baden: Bruylant7Bruxelles; 2001) pp. 65-91.
34 Schulte, M. "Industrial Interest in West Germany's Decision against the Enlargement of the EEC", pp. 36-37.
35 "Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II", p. 41-45.
36 MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 930 Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières, Note 183/CE Déclaration du 
Conseil sur le Trade Expansion Act, 22 Octobre 1962.
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wa only de Gaulle who refused the idea of an Atlantic free trade area; the Dutch and the 
Germans, traditionally more liberal than France, did not favor it either.37
The Commission’s position was relatively similar. This institution saw the 
participation o f the EEC in the trade negotiations as a way o f affirming the role of the 
EEC in world economics and trade. Above all it saw these negotiations as an 
opportunity to affirm its role as the sole negotiating agent on behalf of the EEC. The 
Treaty of Rome gave this institution the exclusive right to negotiate with third countries 
in respect of common external tariffs, even if with the assistance of a special Committee 
-  article 111 Committee -  appointed by the Council of Ministers. However, as early as 
in the Dillon Round, member states had showed a lack of eagerness to entirely delegate 
the task of negotiating to the Commission. Thus the latter looked at the proposed round 
as an instalment to strengthen its position both internally and externally. However, 
beyond this general aim, doubts existed. The institution studied the consequences that a 
sweeping reduction could have on the CET and on the EEC assuming UK membership. 
The TEA and, above all, the dominant supplier rule were seen with suspicion and 
reservations began to appear regarding the possibility o f across the board negotiations. 
The Commission seemed to be scared about the impact o f a drastic reduction on the 
CET on the EEC customs union, and had doubts whether such a reduction could take 
place without parallel measures dealing with competition, economic cooperation, social 
and transport issues, just as the French had claimed. The question of tariff disparity was 
pointed out, and qualms were raised regarding the possibility that a simple linear 
reduction could lead to a balanced reduction of tariffs, especially if the United States 
retained their discriminatory regulations. On top of this, the Commission did not want 
the CAP, one o f the most important features of the EEC, to be challenged by the GATT 
Round. Thus, agriculture could be included agriculture in the Geneva talks, but without 
putting this common policy at risk. At the same time, the Commission did not object to 
the Round or the new increase in competition or the consequent economic efficiency it 
could bring to the EEC market. What mattered was to harmonise policies across the 
Atlantic, and that the regionalism of the EEC was not challenged.38
The first official reaction o f the EEC to the Kennedy trade program arrived on 
22 February 1962, when the EEC Commission representative in Geneva read to GATT 
Contracting Parties a declaration issued by the EEC Council o f Ministers. Influenced by 
the events of the Dillon Round, the declaration expressed its support for Kennedy’s 
initiative, but was also a not particularly veiled criticism o f the United States for not 
having authority to negotiate in Geneva. The EEC Council “having taken cognisance of 
the statement by President [Kennedy] and having been informed of the status of the 
[Dillon Round] hopes that further progress will be made in the reduction of customs 
duties” . Recalling the conclusion of GATT Council of November 1961, putting forward 
the suggestion to negotiate across the board, the EEC Council expressed its conviction 
that “the essential requirements for the effectiveness of any further multilateral 
endeavour undertaken in the future in the tariff fields is that all the parties concerned 
should have equivalent powers from the legal point of view”. More than an enthusiastic
37 PRO T  312/621 Telegram 3, from United Kingdom Delegation in Brussels to Foreign Office, 21 January 1963. The 
telegram reports a conversation between a Belgian official in the EEC Council of Ministers' Secretariat and Sir A. Tandy 
of the British delegation in Brussels. The Belgian official was described as "the second senior official in the Council of 
Ministers' Secretariat".
38 AECB BAC 118/83 845 EEC Commission -  direction Générale des Relations Extérieurs CPC/I/4/62 rev. 8 mai 1962; 
ibidem BAC 62/1980 49 DG Note de la DG des Relations Extérieurs, 22 October 1962. AECB BAC 62/1980 49 DG 
Relations Extérieurs, Comité de la politique commerciale, PV de la 12ème reunion, 12 December 1962.
welcome of Kennedy’s trade program, the EEC’s reaction seemed a criticism of 
Washington for not having had sufficient bargaining power in the Dillon Round.39
Following the TEA’S approval, a first significant discussion between the Six 
took place at the end of November 1962, and all the concerns that had been expressed at 
national level were brought up. On 30 November 1962, the COREPER sent a note to the 
Council o f Ministers based on reports o f  the 111 Committee and the Commission. The 
document was remarkable for the stance it took -  a trade negotiation along the lines of 
the TEA was dangerous for the regional dimension o f the EEC -  and for its similarity to 
the positions which the French had expressed since February 1962 .40 The note 
suggested that a new Round could in some way influence negotiations for EEC 
membership and association and considered it inopportune for the Community to open a 
new front before knowing the result o f these negotiations. In any case, the note stressed 
the urgency for the Six to reach a common position, necessary to maintain the 
indispensable cohesion in relation to  the United States.
Attention was drawn to economic and political problems that negotiations as 
envisaged by the TEA would create for the EEC, and the main problems on which the 
Six governments had to focus in order to elaborate their common position were 
explained. The Six remarked that the economic and financial potential of the EEC was 
not equal to that of the United States, and that the EEC lacked the natural resources of 
the US. It was wondered what position the EEC could occupy in an industrialised world 
where the potentiality of its internal market could not be achieved because o f a drastic 
reduction o f tariffs. Tariff protection did not have the same meaning on the two sides of 
the Atlantic, since the CET constituted an important element o f cohesion for the Six. 
Moreover the note warned that a drastic reduction in tariffs could not only hamper the 
European integration progress, but could also hinder the development o f the less 
developed regions of the Six.
As for agriculture, the Six agreed to include it, but this agreement did not 
necessarily bode well for Washington or for the conclusion o f the Round. Agreeing to 
deal with agriculture in Geneva did not necessarily mean acquiescing to American 
requests for market access. As noted, the French approved the inclusion o f agriculture in 
order to discuss the policy o f the exporting countries rather than to ensure market 
access, and this position was shared by the COREPER note. Moreover, as noted, for the 
Six, the CAP was a form of welfare, and they were unable to endanger it by accepting 
the US proposals to include agriculture. Therefore, agriculture had to be subject to a 
parallel or successive negotiation, with the aim o f examining all problems affecting 
international trade for temperate agricultural goods, along the lines followed in the 
Brussels negotiations between the EEC and the United Kingdom. In truth, as was to 
become apparent in the course o f the negotiations in Geneva, differences existed among 
the Six. The Germans and the Dutch, and to a less extent Italy, wanted to use the new 
Round to ensure that they could continue to import cheap food from third countries, a 
goal in opposition to French interests. However, in 1962, the Six made clear to 
underline in accepting the inclusion o f agriculture was that the CAP had not to be 
brought into question. As for tropical products, the TEA provision on the elimination of 
duties had the aim of eliminating the preferential system on which the Association 
agreements relied. In fact, the United States had no duties on the most important 
tropical products like coffee and cacao, while sugar was produced in the United States
39 GATT L/1733 26 February 1962, HAEC OECD 134 Annexe TC/M (62) 1 and CM2/1963 32, PV de la réunion restreinte 
tenue à l'occasion de la 61eme session du Conseil de la CEE, 5/6 February 1962, R/95.
4 Û
CM2/1963 946 Note S/628/62 (Corner 17) and annex 2 «Eléments qui pourraient faire l'objet d'etudes ultérieures au 
sein de la Communauté», 30 November 1962.
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and hence was excluded from the provision. However, the EEC could not bring into 
question the Associations agreements.
In addition, the TEA gave the Americans certain advantages over the Six. It 
financially supported firms hit by foreign competition, while the effects of tariff 
concessions were reduced by the protection o f non-tariff barriers, such as the customs 
valuation system of the American Selling Price, the escape clause, and the exclusion of 
some products which amounted to almost 12% of American imports. As such, the 
existence o f a disparity in the tariff structures of the EEC and the USA meant that a 
simple linear reduction would lead to an unbalanced level protection on either side of 
the Atlantic.
The note represented only a first attempt to identify problems the EEC would 
face in having to deal with a sweeping liberalisation along the TEA’s lines, and 
contained all the doubts that had been pointed out by the French. For the Six, it was not 
easy to reach a common position while the outcome of the Brussels negotiations 
remained uncertain, and their representatives were busy in negotiating with London. 
The trade situation was too fluid to allow them to assume a definitive position. 
Nonetheless, certain basic positions were clear: first, the Six agreed to a GATT Round 
to further liberalise international trade on a multilateral basis, but they, and by no means 
only the French, had no intention of eliminating the CET. The CET had to be preserved 
to defend European industry and to give an identity to the EEC. On this aspect there 
existed a unity among the Six.
The Six did not want a Round which worked exclusively to the advantage of the 
USA, and instead aimed at a Round which would allow the EEC to increase its exports 
to the USA. For this reason, they had proposed certain conditions to ensure a certain 
quantum of balance in the negotiations. Given the fact that US tariffs were higher than 
the CET, the disparity issue had to be resolved if  tariffs were to be cut across the board. 
By the same token, American non-tariff barriers which hampered European exports had 
to be eliminated.41
The aim of setting up a balanced set of negotiations was particularly crucial for 
the Six. In fact, as table 9 shows, each of them imported from the USA more than they 
exported in the other direction.
T abic  9 T ra d e  o f  th e  Six w ith  th e  U nited  S ta tes 1954-1963 in  m il lio n s  o f  US d o lla rs
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Germany Exports 295 387 498 601 643 913 897 870 966 1051
Imports 532 764 952 1351 1005 1094 1423 1516 1758 1988
Italy Exports 129 160 202 231 255 345 387 383 441 480
Imports 299 405 522 684 526 373 668 863 884 1028
France Exports 156 210 226 246 304 470 401 417 426 421
Imports 381 458 682 831 563 429 746 737 775 901
The Netherlands Exports 158 159 179 159 181 209 196 192 200 203
Imports 336 435 521 540 410 435 599 566 607 649
BLEU Exports 191 246 304 267 287 444 358 371 414 411
Imports 263 314 409 426 310 325 391 375 451 471
Source: see table 1
The question of the EEC trade deficit with the USA concerned the crucial issue 
of the burden-sharing emphasised by Kennedy. The Six, and not only the French but
41CM2 1963/946 Note Introductive S/24/63. Premières conclusions du Comité spécial de l'Article 111,14 Janvier 1963.
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also the traditionally more liberal and Atlanticist governments of The Hague and Bonn, 
refused to undertake a sweeping liberalization of international trade to receive more 
imports from the other side of the Atlantic in order to rectify the US balance o f  
payments, caused, Kennedy claimed, by US investments and military commitments in 
Europe. While the US president held that responsibility was to be shared, the Europeans 
did not want more responsibility, and felt that they were already helping with the 
American trade deficit. The United States already enjoyed a favourable trade balance 
and US exports to the EEC were growing at a faster rate than US imports. In any case, 
the US balance of payments was not caused by European trade policy, but had a US 
domestic origin, hence solutions had to sought elsewhere and, more specifically, in the 
internal economic policy of the United States and in the monetary system. With this 
refusal to  agree to solving the balance of payments problem through trade, the TEA 
dominant supplier clause came to be looked with particular suspicion. None o f the Six 
wanted to set up an Atlantic free trade area whose purpose appeared to be that o f  
rectifying the US balance of payments. 42 The Six did not wish to see the total 
elimination of tariffs, considered "‘an integral and essential part of the structure of the 
Community [and] did not wish to see their Community dissolved in an Atlantic free 
trade area, the purpose o f  which would be to enable the Americans to rectify the deficit 
in their balance of payments at the expense of Europe ”43
The Six were undoubtedly taken by surprise by the dominant supplier clause. 
They questioned the feasibility o f an Atlantic free trade area without implementing 
harmonising measures, like those applied by the Six in establishing the CET, and a 
safeguards clause. Above all, however, they deemed it a challenge to the existence o f 
EEC, rather than as a device of the Kennedy Administration to get authority from 
Congress to negotiate in Geneva and to push the United Kingdom to join, as Ball had 
explained to Alphand. It was not merely that American products were considered more 
competitive than European ones, that the categories o f products which met the world- 
exports value were the categories where, to a very large extent, the United States 
exported more than it imported from that EEC, and that a drastic reduction or even 
elimination of tariffs could harm European industry. It was also that the CET was seen 
as one o f the element o f European identity and a fundamental and necessary part of the 
Community, still not sufficiently developed that it could afford the loss o f such an 
important feature. Therefore, the clause raised doubts about America’s goals in relation 
to the European integration process, and cause the Six to wonder whether America’s 
intention was to challenge the very existence o f the EEC.44
The Six regarded at the Atlantic partnership to be built up through the new 
Round with suspicion. The United States had not stated with any precision what the 
substance of the proposed “partnership” would be, and this reluctance or incapacity 
caused the Europeans to  fear that what the United States was in reality aiming at was 
some form o f economic supremacy. The slogan of partnership seemed to hide an 
American economic hegemonic design to be implemented through a liberalisation of 
international trade which required the dismantling o f tariffs, but without the 
relinquishing o f other trade barriers, more effective than customs duties in preventing 
European exports to the USA. The TEA was judged more as a mercantilist law to
42 PRO T  312/621 Telegram 3, from British Delegation in Brussels to Foreign Office, 21 January 1963; HAEC, MAEF 
Secretariat Général, Entretiens et Messages, Vol 19, Rencontre entre Pompidou et Erhard, 21 November 1963.
43 PRO T  312/621 Telegram 3, from United Kingdom Delegation in Brussels to Foreign Office, 21 January 1963 
reporting words of Belgian officials to the British. The Belgian official "specifically added" that the Dutch neither wanted 
to see the dissolution of the EEC into an Atlantic free trade area.
44 HAEC- CEAB 5/1169 Lettre de Wehrer, de la Direction des Relations Extérieurs, à Van Kleffens, de la Délégation de la 
Haute Autorité auprès du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, 4 March 1963.
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increase American exports than a law to liberalize international trade. As a result, 
doubts regarding American aims in putting forward the TEA engendered doubts about 
the notion o f an Atlantic partnership between equals. The combination of these factors 
fostered an atmosphere o f distrust and pushed the Europeans to doubt Washington’s 
aims in putting forward its policy o f trade liberalization and its proposal for an Atlantic 
partnership, and to enter the new Round with great caution.45
The reaction of the five partners of France showed that a dichotomy existed 
between their respective security and trade policies. While in the first field they relied 
on Washington and hence supported the Atlantic dimension and NATO, in the trade 
field they preferred the regionalism of the EEC to American Atlanticism. In the security 
filed they supported Washington, but in the trade field they sided with Paris.
To sum up the European reaction to the American initiative, it is worth 
underlining that the Six felt that a drastic reduction of the CET would probably damage 
the cohesion o f the EEC, as it could chip away the cement which bound it together at a 
critical period o f its development. The EEC was grounded on the CET which was a 
solid tie giving endurance and strength to the EEC itself. For the EEC, the CET was like 
a constitution which usually identifies nation states.46 Moreover, the Six’s 
preoccupation with maintaining EEC cohesion and trade regionalism, considered 
essential for their economic growth, corresponded to the American preoccupation with 
trade liberalization and strengthening transatlantic interdependence. Therefore, they 
could not accept the drastic liberalization of trade suggested by the US. Above all, they 
were unable to accept it while they were still negotiating on British entrance which, if 
successful, would have an even larger economic impact than the GATT round. The 
negotiations with the British were already a GATT Round on a European basis, and the 
Six could not accept conducting two rounds at the same time. In concluding this section 
dedicated to the first response of the EEC, it is worth underlying that the six member 
governments o f the EEC shared a common view of the American trade program, hence 
at the end of November 1962, Paris accurately concluded that there existed no 
appreciable divergences with the five partners.47
3.5 The positions of the economic sectors of the EEC towards the 
new GATT Round
When the American suggestion to have a new Round was formulated, it was not 
only the EEC that began to formulate a position in response. With the prospect o f a new 
Round, the European economic sectors also started reacting. They were also asked to do 
so by the European Commission, which felt it necessary to have a clear picture o f the 
state of the different industrial and agricultural sectors.48 The French Patronat, the 
Conseil national du Patronat français (CNPF), accepted in principle the a new trade 
conference, but categorically opposed the Atlantic free trade area, and made it 
conditional on to the elimination o f disparities, o f non-tariff barriers and full reciprocity 
of concessions between the developed contracting parties. The Paris section of the 
French Chamber of Commerce also accepted the principle o f a new GATT liberalization
45 Ibidem
46 For this function of tariffs see Milward, A.S. "Tariffs as Constitutions" in Strange, S., Tooze, R., (eds.) The 
Internationa! politics of surplus capacity: competition for market shares in the world recession (London; Boston: Allen & 
Unwin, 1981), pp.57-66.
47 MAEF DE/CE GATT 930 Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières -  Coopération Economique, Note 113/CE 
The Trade Expansion Act, 26 April 1963. The note reassumed the situation before the French veto the British 
membership.
48 AECB PV 213 20 January 1963.
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which, however, had not to endanger the cohesion of the EEC, and had to be 
subordinated to resolving the problem of disparity and to the removal of American non­
tariff barriers so that equality in import conditions could be achieved before any tariff 
disarmament was undertaken. As such, French industry showed itself to be less 
protectionist than expected, and considered the new GATT Round an opportunity to 
achieve a reduction in American trade barriers. It asked for time to absorb the 
substantial tariff cuts made since the creation of the EEC, and looked with apprehension 
at the suggestion that the CET had to be cut by 50%, while French industry was still 
adjusting to increasingly free trade within the EEC. However, on the whole they did not 
resist the Round root and branch, but wanted to be sure that French interests were 
pursued, and that a fair and reciprocal bargain was to be struck/9 In truth, there were 
also sectors such as the mechanical industries which felt themselves most endangered. 
Automobile builders thought that after the reduction o f duties agreed upon in the Dillon 
Round, no further reductions should be m ade.50
In Germany, the BDI and the Chamber o f Industry and Commerce favoured the 
new GATT talks and the prospect o f opening the EEC to more international trade. 
German industry in general supported the new GATT Round as a means o f  reducing 
tariffs worldwide and, after January 1963, looked upon it as a means of overcoming the 
failure o f the negotiations with the British. However, like the French Patronat, it also 
requested the reduction o f the peaks in the American tariffs and American non-tariff 
barriers. The idea o f some tariff harmonisation was favourably received by German 
industry. The steel industry, for example, held that the reduction o f the relatively low 
German and EEC tariffs by the same percentage as the reduction of the higher rates in 
the US tariffs was unfair.51 The same was also true for the Netherlands, where 
harmonizing tariffs had attracted considerable support from business sectors, while the 
equal linear cut was also considered as biased in favour o f the US.5'
The UNICE (Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne, grouping the 
central industrial organizations o f the Six countries) adopted a favorable position 
towards the American initiative. Success in the negotiations had to be encouraged to 
bring the economics of the EEC closer to those o f remaining industrial countries of the 
Western world, and to demonstrate the liberal attitude o f the EEC. The new Round was 
also considered an instrument to decrease the discrimination in Western Europe and to
49 MAEF GATT 931 Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières -  Coopération Economique, «Note. Préparation de 
la Conférence Kennedy. Opinions des producteur français», 5 February 1964. The note reports a statement of the CNPF 
issued on 18 January 1963; ibidem GATT 930, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financière -  Service de 
Coopération Economique, Rapport adopté par la Chambre de Commerce et d'industrie de Paris, 9 Mai 1963.
50 Na 59 State Department Central file subject numeric, box 3488 Telegram n. A-500 from US embassy in Paris to State 
department, 31 August 1963.
51 Telegram n.A/2422 from Edwin Crank, Minister for Economic Affairs in American Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of 
State, 15 May 1963, Harter's papers, Box 11, JFKL and NARA State Department Central file subject numeric 59-250-5-8- 
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election of 1964 and of the Kennedy Round in order to determine what steps were possible. All the industrialists 
defended the Franco-German treaty. See also "Stellungnatime der deutschen Landesgruppe der Intemationalen 
Handelskammer zu den Dokumenten der IHK Nr. 102/20 betr. Zolldisparitaten und Nr. 102/21 Nichttarifâre 
Handelshemmnisse", January 1964. PA, B53-III-A2, N.276 taken from Dur, A, Protecting exporters: discrimination and 
liberalization in transatlantic trade relations, 1932-2003 (Florence: EUI Ph.D Thesis, 2004).
52 NA Department of State, Central Ries, FT 4 US/TEA Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the 
European Communities signed by Rusk, 17 May 1963. The telegram was also sent to the EEC capitals and Geneva. NA 
59 -250 Airgram 319 from Munich to State Department, 7 February 1964 reporting the declaration of support for the 
Kennedy Round of Ernst Schneider, president o f the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce.
100
reduce trade barriers with the EFTA countries. However, the UNICE also imposed 
conditions. First o f all, it was important to consider the important effect of liberalization 
of trade on the structure o f the EEC, and the limits that such a structure imposed on the 
liberalization. Second, the negotiations had to aim at boosting the exports of the EEC, 
particularly to the United States since the commercial balance of the EEC was in deficit 
with the United States. Third, the disparity issue had to be resolved, finding some 
corrections to the linear method and harmonizing the duties, cutting off the tops of 
American high duties. Fourth, non-tariff barriers were to  be included so as to achieve 
the removal o f the American customs valuation system, and the EEC had to dispose of 
safeguards measures just as the USA already had.. What the UNICE also asked that, 
parallel to the obstacles to imports, the EEC ensured the realization of an economic 
union and the implementation of the common commercial policy in particular towards 
countries producing products at abnormally low cost and towards non-capitalist 
countries. In any case, the UNICE reserved itself the right to refine its position as the 
work progressed in the preparation for the negotiations. Therefore, what the UNICE 
asked was that together with the reduction of the CET, the EEC strengthen should 
commercial policy as a way of offsetting the reduction in tariffs.53 The economic sector 
of the industrial field, broadly speaking, were therefore generally favourable towards a 
new Round, but not all sectors favoured liberalization and, as shown in the following 
chapters, with the progress of the Kennedy Round, the establishment of the negotiation 
rules and the beginning o f bargaining in November 1964, their opposition crystallized.
For the UNICE, trade negotiations along the TEA’S lines would be a mismatch 
between the USA and the EEC, because parallel reductions of tariff duties would not 
have the identical consequences. The UNICE referred in particular to the high level o f 
American duties, which after being cut by 50% would still constitute a high protection 
for the American market. In stark contrast, the CET was already modest and the 50% 
reduction would bring it to a pure symbolic level. For this reason, the Americans had to 
make a unilateral reduction of their very high duties, and it was necessary to find some 
modification to the linear method in order to harmonize duties, by drastically reducing 
unusually high American duties. In short, for the UNICE, the trade negotiations had to 
allow for an increase in exports from the Six to the United States, and only with some 
kind o f harmonization and safeguards measures equal to those which Washington 
reserved for itself would this be possible.
Totally different was the reaction of EEC farmers. French farmers were mainly 
interested in establishing a European common market in order to open up the German 
market, and in keeping out American exports, and were wholeheartedly against the 
reduction granted by the CAP.5“1 The position of their German counterparts, Deutscher 
Bauemverband, (DBV), was along the same lines; they did not want the new Round to 
increase competition in Germany, and a similar position was shared by the farming 
sector at European level.55 The Comité des Oraganisations Professionelles Agricoles de 
la CEE (COPA) was very clear in its opposition to all decisions that could prejudice the 
vital interests of European agriculture. The CAP was not yet defined in terms of its 
principles, nor implemented, and its future development could not be endangered.
53 AECB BAC 62/1980-53 UNICE Premiers observations à la suite de l'adoption par les Etats-Unis du TEA, 18 February 
1963. IA CM 1.824.52 Prise de position du Conseil des Présidents de ITJNICE au sujet des négociations tarifaires 
multilatérales au GATT, 11 December 1963,14 A.4/10 A.4.
54 Na 59 State Department Central file subject numeric, box 3488 Telegram n. A-500 from US embassy in Paris to State 
department, 31 August 1963.
55 Dur, A. Theorizing the Contagious Effect of Regionalism: European Integration and Transatlantic Trade Relations, 
1957-1963. European University Institute Working Paper SPS No. 2003/8, pp. 40-49 and Diir, A. Protecting exporters, 
118.
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Moreover, tariff negotiations were not capable of resolving the problems o f 
international trade in agriculture. The COPA brought attention to “la nécessite de placer 
le problème sur un plan plus large, c’est-à-dire de la confrontation des politiques 
agricoles et de l’assainissement des marché agricoles mondiaux, de façon à assurer aux 
agriculteurs une rémunération équitable”. Hence the position of COPA was clear: i f  the 
inclusion of the agricultural sector in the new Round was unavoiadable, the 
liberalization of the sector was out o f question. Only a coordination o f  domestic policies 
was acceptable.56
3.6 The UK and the GATT Round: mixed feelings
Washington perceived the TEA as a means of encouraging British entry into the 
EEC, and, at the same time, as a device to alleviate the economic discrimination which 
would result. Because o f the centrality of British entry into the EEC in the American 
trade program, it is necessary to present London’s reaction to the American initiative 
and its interest in a new Round. '
The creation o f the EEC, the failure o f the FTA of 1958, and then the 
establishment o f the EFTA had divided Western Europe in two trading blocs whose 
discriminatory effects had not been alleviated by the meagre results of the Dillon 
Round. When, in 1961, the United Kingdom, followed by Denmark and Ireland sought 
to join the EEC, Western Europe seemed once again to be market in the process o f 
unification. With the American initiative, the United Kingdom found itself involved in 
three commercial negotiations at the same time: with the Six members of EEC, with the 
Commonwealth and EFTA countries to appease their fears about commercial 
consequences o f the British entry, and in the framework o f the GATT, first with the 
Dillon Round and then with preliminary phase o f the new Round which started at the 
end of November 1962.57
Following its presentation to Congress in January 1962, London expressed a 
general welcome and appreciation for the Trade Expansion Act and the powers it gave 
President Kennedy to pursue liberal trade policies. The British assured the Americans 
that they “[would] play their part to the full in any tariff negotiations which [would] 
result from this Act” . 58 London aimed at taking advantage of the fact that the US had 
the power to reduce tariffs on a multilateral basis in order to expand the trade of 
developed countries and prepared to work for the widest possible exchange of 
concessions on tariffs affecting industrial products and for a liberal approach to 
international trade.59
However, these were not the only reasons that pushed London to support the 
American move. A sweeping multilateral reduction of tariffs would lead the Six in the 
direction of outward-looking policies and could reassure the Commonwealth and the
56 CM IA 1.824.52 CEE Conseil, Lettre de Deleau á Calmes (Secrétaire Général du Conseil de Ministres de la CEE), 17 
Mai 1963 R/410/63 (COMER 83) 21 May 1963.
570n the commercial policy of the United Kingdom in the decades preceding the Kennedy Round, and more generally, 
on British attitude towards the European integration process from 1944 to 1958, see A.S. Milward, The European 
Rescue of the Nation-State, chapter 7 "Britain and Europe" pp.345-424. For a fuller investigation, including also the first 
British bid for EEC membership, see Milward, A.S. The United Kingdom and the European Community. The Rise and Fall 
of a National Strategy. On the Brussels negotiations see also Ludlow, N. P. Dealing with Britain. The Six and the First UK 
Application to the EEC (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997); Wilkes G. Britain’s Failure to Enter the European 
Community, 1961-1963: The Enlargement Negotiations and Crisis in European, Atlantic, and Commonwealth Relations. 
(London: Frank Cass: 1977).
58 PRO FO 371/172308, INTEL n. 172, From Foreign Office to certain of Her Majesty's Representative, 2 November 
1962.
59 PRO T312/325 Confidential document of the Treasury, 17 October 1962 and T  312/620 Draft: Trade Expansion and 
the Kennedy Round, undated and unsigned document.
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members o f EFT A which were not applying to the EEC. These countries feared trade 
discrimination that British membership into the regional bloc of the EEC could cause, 
and put pressure on London to ensure favourable treatment for their products. In this 
sense, a new Round heading to the liberalisation o f international trade had the potential 
to ease the relations between the UK and the countries reducing discrimination on a 
multilateral basis, thus helping the British in dealing with the problems UK membership 
would create in the context of the Commonwealth and the EFTA. For the same reason, 
London supported the inclusion o f  agriculture in the new Round, as it was hoped that 
some limitations on the price policies and protective measures o f the EEC would 
reassure the Commonwealth and provide acceptable conditions of access to world 
markets for agricultural products.60
However, after considering the positive impact o f  the new Round, London also 
looked at its negative aspects and revealed itself to have doubts regarding the American 
trade program, and to be annoyed by the timing of the initiative. The British were 
sceptical about the American cutting zeal showed by the dominant supplier clause, and 
felt that it remained to be seen how far the President would be able to use his power 
with any real or significant effects by managing to overcome considerable protectionist 
interests within the United States. The British doubted whether the US government 
would really use the authority o f the dominant supplier clause, as this would create a 
plethora of problems in the relations between the US government and the trade sectors 
on which tariffs were brought to zero.61
Moreover, London found it difficult to adopt a clear stance towards the Kennedy 
program since it could not yet know whether it would be negotiating in the new Round 
in partnership with the other EEC countries on the Common Tariff or whether, in the 
case of failure o f the Brussels negotiations, it would be negotiating separately on its 
existing tariffs. The British attitude regarding coverage and regarding some o f the 
individual items would vary according to whether the United Kingdom was a EEC 
member. On top of this, beginning the Geneva negotiations, before the completion of 
the negotiations with the Six, would embarrass British negotiators in Brussels if  the 
agricultural exporting countries of the Commonwealth attacked the common 
commercial policy of the EEC in Geneva. Thus, the Kennedy Round had not to get 
under way until the Brussels negotiations had been concluded.62 But these were not the 
only reasons which pushed London to think that a new Round before the end of the 
negotiations with the Six could have serious consequences. Since the passage of the 
TEA, France had put pressure on the British, claiming that the position of the London 
government took regarding the American trade program would be examined in Paris to 
test British sincerity in seeking to joint the EEC, that is to say whether the British were 
good Europeans. 63
However, even if the Geneva trade conference began after a much-hoped happy 
ending to the Brussels negotiations, the Round could be harmful to British interests, 
since it could affect the Community’s behaviour in the membership talks: if, on the one
60 PRO T312/325 Confidential document of the Treasury, 17 October 1962 and T  312/620 Draft: Trade Expansion and 
the Kennedy Round, undated and unsigned document and FO 371/172308, INTEL n. 172, From Foreign Office to 
certain of Her Majesty's Representative, 2 November 1962.
61 Ibidem.
62 Ibidem; T  312/620 Draft: Trade Expansion and the Kennedy Round, undated and unsigned document, 1962 and T  
312/621 "The Kennedy Round", February 1963.
63 PRO BT 303/94 "Working Parties on Procedures for Tariff Reduction: Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation" Note 
by the Board of Trade, 4 March 1963. The note was written in March but reported the UK position before the French 
veto. T  312/620 Draft: Trade Expansion and the Kennedy Round, undated and unsigned document, 1962. For the 
pressure that Paris put on the British to show they were "good Europeans" see T  312/610 GATT Policy Committee. 
Proposed informal talks with French officials. Undated document presumably written in October/November 1962.
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hand, negotiations in Geneva could diminish discrimination against the Commonwealth, 
on the other hand the EEC could use them as a reason not to grant special trade 
treatment to the Commonwealth -  as the British sought in Brussels -  and as a 
“justification for short-term rigidity over tariff levels in anticipation of the transatlantic 
bargaining that lay ahead” .64 Given the fact that London could not oppose the new 
Round altogether, the British aimed at least at preventing the Round from beginning 
before the end of the Brussels negotiations. So long as the talks with the Six were in 
progress, discussions in Geneva would be difficult and even dangerous. Thus, the 
British, like the Six, felt that American initiative had arrived at the wrong time. As 
explained below, however, it was de Gaulle who resolved the situation in the middle o f 
January 1963.
3.7 The first R ou n d  of the Kennedy Round: the French veto of 
British membership
While the Europeans started to elaborate their answers to the American 
initiative, as soon as the Trade Expansion Act became law in October 1962, Washington 
moved to put the new trade conference on track. The first task for Washington was to 
formally call for a new Round and to generate a sense o f  purpose and will to succeed 
within the Atlantic Alliance. Because o f the great importance it attached to the trade 
negotiations, the State Department held that the new Round had to be launched at a 
GATT ministerial meeting, also necessary to show to Congress that the authority 
granted was being used, and to the other GATT members that the USA firmly intended 
to reduce tariffs. The State Department timetable consisted in holding a GATT 
Ministerial Meeting by March 1963 and devoting the rest of the year to domestic 
procedures and preparatory discussions with the principal industrial countries in order to 
have a broad ranging agreement on the basic rules to be followed, before launching the 
Round itself in 1964 and concluding it before the start o f the Presidential election 
campaign. In particular, Washington maintained that although the negotiations were 
supposed to be multilateral, there would have to be intensive discussions and broad 
agreement between the two actors that were to play a dominant role, United States and 
the EEC.65
The American move for a new Round became enmeshed with the Canadian 
initiative to deal with EEC enlargement. As a means to cope with problems created by 
the British entrance, Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker proposed, at the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference of London o f October, to set up a general 
trade conference of all countries with an interest in the Brussels negotiations. The 
Canadians were attracted by the idea of combining their initiative with the GATT 
ministerial meeting, envisaged by the Americans, to be held in Ottawa. The Canadian 
plan, however, was not supported by the United States. First, Washington opposed the 
proposal o f holding a conference with all countries affected by the developments of the 
EEC: the only suitable framework to take up trade issues was the multilateral GATT 
forum. Second, in any case, it opposed the idea o f having the Ministerial meeting in 
Ottawa: the only place to launch the new Round was Geneva, so as to underline the link
64 Ludlow, N. P. Dealing with Britain, p. 108.
65 NA, State Department Central Decimal File -  394.41/10-162 -  1960-1963 Box 728, Memorandum of Conversation 
between Morabito (Italian Embassy) and Trezise (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs in State Department), 
16 November 1962; PRO T  312/325 Record of a conversation between American and British officials (among others, P. 
Reilly and Marjoribanks for the British and Schaetzel for the Americans) 19 October 1962 and T  312/325 Document 
without reference dated September 1962 reporting a conversation between British and Canadian officials.
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between the important American initiative and the GATT.66 Faced with Washington’s 
opposition, Diefenbaker could do nothing but endorse the American position and agree 
to circulate at 20th GATT session, held from 23 October to 16 November 1962, a draft 
of a joint proposal for a ministerial meeting to be convened in the last week of 
February.67 At the November GATT session, under pressure from America, the 
contracting parties agreed to hold a ministerial meeting in the early part of 1963 in order 
to consider the liberalization and expansion of trade in both primary and secondary 
products, and to give special attention to the trading problems of the LDCs. A Tariff 
Negotiations Working Party (TNWP) was set up to organize the structure of the 
negotiations and, most importantly, to establish a set o f rules, as, for the first time, 
tariffs were to be reduced across the board.68
However, while the USA moved to quickly start the new Round and the 
Europeans formulated their positions, an event external to the Geneva discussions came 
to have significant consequences on the Kennedy program. After almost fifteen months 
of bargaining in Brussels, de Gaulle held a press conference on 14 January 1963 and 
rebuffed the UK bid for EEC membership, and, further, turned down the US MLF 
initiative. The reasons that led the French president to veto British membership have 
been considered by many authors and are not discussed here. What matters here is that 
the veto did not only bring to an end negotiations with the British, but also had major 
consequences on Kennedy’s Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership, on the relations 
between the Six, on Franco-American relations and on the new Round.69 In his press 
conference de Gaulle declared that an enlarged Community would “apparaître un 
Communauté atlantique colossale sous dépendance et direction américaine et qui aurait 
tôt fait d’absorber la Communauté de l’Europe”. With these words de Gaulle seemed to 
reject not only British membership, but also the American Grand Design and the crucial 
dominant supplier clause which was to set up the Atlantic free trade area and strengthen 
Atlantic interdependence in the trade field. Hence, Kennedy’s trade program was one of 
the casualties o f the French veto, as without British membership the provision could be 
applied only to aircraft and margarine. To be sure, notwithstanding the ineffectiveness 
of the dominant supplier provision, the TEA still contained many liberal provisions, but 
the fact remained that, with the veto, the extent to which tariffs could be eliminated and 
international trade liberalised was reduced and the prospect of an Atlantic free trade 
area, upon which Washington had counted to set up the Atlantic partnership, and which 
had that worried the Six, became dead letter. In this sense, the French veto represented a 
first Round o f the Kennedy Round because it limited the degree of liberalisation that 
could be achieved: the dominant supplier clause was rendered harmless which placed 
the Round within limits which were bearable by the Six.
The veto had not only the consequence o f giving precise limits to the GATT 
Round, it also added a new dimension: in addition to a transatlantic dimension, the
CM2/1963 946 Note d'information S/628/62 (Comer 17), 26 novembre 1962; PRO T 312/325 Record of a 
conversation between American and British officials (among others. P. Reilly and Marjoribanks for the British and 
Schaetzel for the Americans), 19 October 1962 and T  312/325 Documented without reference dated September 1962 
reporting a conversation between British and Canadian officials.
67 PRO T  312/325 Telegram 131 from Edgar Cohen of UK Delegation to EFTA to Foreign Office, 31 October 1962; NA, 
State Department Central Decimal File -  394.41/10-162 -  1960-1963 Box 728 Telegram 914 from Geneva to State 
Department, 19 November 1962. On the Canadian reaction to British bid for EEC membership see Milward, A.S. The 
United Kingdom and the European Community. The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy (London: Portland, OR: Frank 
Cass, 2002). See pp. 361-364 for the request o f the conference.
68 CM2 1963/946 Note d'information du Conseil S/628/62 (Comer 17), 26 novembre, Annex 1 "Décision prise par le 
Parties Contractantes en date du 14 novembre 1962 au sujet de ta réunion ministérielle du G ATT  and ibidem Note 
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69 The consequences of the veto on the relations between the Six are described in the following chapter.
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Round acquired a European one. With Europe again divided, it -  just as the Dillon 
Round had been -  came to be an instrument to reduce discrimination in Europe. The 
GATT forum remained the only framework which facilitated the harmonious expansion 
of trade between the EEC and EFTA.70 The creation of the EEC, the failure of the FTA 
and the creation o f the EFTA had brought about the division of Western Europe into 
two competing regional trading blocs. When de Gaulle rebuffed British membership, 
the United Kingdom and the other EFTA countries could no longer regard EEC 
membership as a means of dealing with discrimination. The regional solution was no 
longer available and, as in 1959-1960, they had to go back to the multilateral platform 
of GATT. The same was true for the Six: if  they wanted to boost their exports to the 
EFTA, they had to rely on the wider and multilateral arena. To fully analyse this aspect, 
it is worthwhile portraying the patterns o f commerce between EFTA and the EEC.
As Table 10 shows, EFTA countries traded more with EEC countries than 
between themselves. From 1958 to 1963, the first trading partner of EFTA was not 
itself, but rather the EEC, a separate regional bloc. It was no surprise that after January 
1963, liberalisation within the GATT became an imperative aim for the EFTA in order 
to reduce EEC trade barriers.
T ab le  lO Total e x p o rts  o f the  E F T A  bv a re a  o f  destination  1958-1963 (in  percen tage)
1958 1960 1962 1963
EEC 23,8 23,9 27 27,7
EFTA 19,5 18,9 20 20,5
USA 10,3 8,8 8,2 7,9
Rest of the World 53,6 48,4 44,7 43,9
Basic Statistics o f fifteen European Countries. Com parison w ith  the United States o f  Am erica 
and wiUi the U nion o f  Socialist Soviet R epublics (Statistical Office o f  the European Communities, 
Brussels, 1958, 1961, 1963 and 1964).
However, trade between the EFTA and the EEC was also meaningful for the Six. 
Table 11 shows that, from 1958 to 1963, EFTA was the first trading partner of the EEC, 
and that exports to this region were much more important than trade with the United 
States. In fact, in 1963, they represented a 21,1% share while exports to the USA stood 
at only 6,8%.
T ab le  11 T otal ex p o rts  o f  th e  E E C  by  a re a  o f  d es tin a tio n  1958-1963 (in  percen tage)
1958 1960 1962 1963
EEC 30,1 34,3 39,7 42,4
EFTA 21,8 21,9 21,9 21,1
USA 7,3 7,5 7,2 6,8
Rest of the World 40,8 36,2 31,3 29,6
Source: see table 10
The British were obviously particularly hit by the veto. With the French move 
their strategy o f overcoming EEC discrimination by joining the Community had failed 
and a new strategy had to be found quickly. At this point, the GATT Round appeared to 
be the last resort to try and reduce discrimination within Europe and worldwide. Hence, 
the French veto changed the British viewpoint towards the Round. London had a 
positive and urgent economic interest in a successful outcome o f the GATT
70 PRO T  312/621 Note of a meeting between the President of the Board of Trade and the United States State 
Department, Washington 4 March 1963. The document can be found also in F0 371/172307.
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negotiations, not only because of the possibility o f expanding trade with the United 
States, but also in order to reduce discrimination in Europe. Some useful results had to 
be achieved in order to attenuate any likely harm to their trade coming from the EEC, 
while they tried to work out more far-reaching solutions, not yet attainable, for the long 
term. London feared that the EEC could turn in on itself, just at the time when it was 
more important than ever for the British to carry forward the liberalisation of European 
and international trade. Therefore, after the veto which confirmed the trade division of 
Western Europe into two trading blocs, Geneva offered an opportunity to reduce 
discrimination against British exports to the Six and, more generally, to alleviate this 
economic division.71
The British government had tried to increase foreign trade by entering the EEC, 
but after the French veto, their main hope of doing so, and the only alternative to 
immediate membership, now came in the form of worldwide tariff reductions through 
the GATT in order to create a low tariff world in which regional groupings would not 
constitute an obstruction to the development of exports. The new situation made it 
imperative for London to try to obtain the maximum results from the Round -  the 
maximum reduction of the CET and o f American tariffs -  which would represent a form 
o f compensation for the failure to form a single free market with the Six. The Brussels 
breakdown made the success o f the GATT Round especially important for London, with 
the latter being perhaps the most interested of all GATT members in a successful 
outcome. If it were to be that the Round would conclude with results less far-reaching 
than hoped, London would have to jum p both the United States and the EEC tariff walls 
to compete with American and European products.72
Along with commercial motivations, London had also political reasons for 
supporting the Round. The British had a major political interest in maintaining, through 
the Kennedy Round, goods relations between the United States and the EEC. A more 
negative outcome would have very serious consequences on the Atlantic Alliance, and 
would place Britain in a very awkward position between the EEC and the United States. 
The Round had to maintain the political cohesion o f the Atlantic Alliance, as any failure 
of the trade negotiations would increase the strain on the Atlantic Alliance. On the 
contrary, a successful Round would prevent too wide a contrast between the USA and 
the EEC.73 Hence, GATT seemed to give an opportunity to reduce economic and 
political harm caused by integration in Europe resulting from the breakdown of the 
Brussels negotiations and was regarded in London as offering the possibility of an 
interim solution, and as an instrument to hold together the Atlantic alliance in a moment 
of considerable strain.7"
London was aware that the major negotiations between the two sides o f the 
Atlantic would take place between the two trade blocs of equal commercial strength, the 
USA and the EEC, while the United Kingdom occupy retain only a secondary position. 
The 1958 GATT negotiations over the Treaty of Rome had already demonstrated where 
the power to dictate GATT lay. Notwithstanding this, London had a crucial interest in a 
successful outcome of the Kennedy Round, underlined, in a debate in the House of 
Commons of 11 February 1963, by Harold Macmillan, who emphasised the importance
71 PRO FO 371/172313 The Kennedy Round and the related problem of the EEC Common Agriculture Policy. Memo of 
the Foreign Office, 4 November 1963.
72 PRO FO 371/173313 Confidential document for Her Majesty, undated and unsigned, 1963.
73 PRO FO 371/178090 "The Kennedy Round. The Position on 31 December 1963’ . Memo of the Economic Relations 
Department of the Foreign Office, 2 January 1964, FO 371/173313 Confidential document for Her Majesty, undated and 
unsigned, 1963 and FO 371/172328 Letter of J.E. Chadwick to Sir Patrick Reilly, 14 May 1963.
74 PRO T  312/621 "The Kennedy Round", February 1963; BT 303/166 "Kennedy Round: Tariff concessions to be offered *’ ‘
by the United Kingdom", 1963; PRO FO 371/172342 Confidential Memo of R. Burges Watson, 16 March 1963. /£>■' -7
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that his government attached to a successful outcome of the Kennedy Round. “We in 
Britain are prepared to play our part fully in reducing our own tariffs if  we get 
comparable benefits for our exports markets. [...] We shall work for close co-operation 
with the Commonwealth, United States, EFTA, and, we hope the Six for the Kennedy 
Round” said the Prime Minister.75
British interest in negotiating in the Kennedy Round can also be explained by 
observing British patterns o f trade from 1953 to 1963. Table 12 and 13 illustrate that, 
for the UK, Western Europe was becoming the largest and most important trading 
partner, and that, within Western Europe, the EEC was more important than EFTA in 
this regard. In 1953, Western Europe imported 27.4% of UK exports (table 12) and 
supplied 23.4% of British imports (table 13). In 1963, these shares increased 
respectively to 37.3% and 30.8%. In 1953, 47% o f United Kingdom exports went to the 
Sterling area; by 1963, this had fallen to 35.6%. Concerning imports, in 1953, Britain’s 
share o f imports from the Sterling area was 42.8%, whereas, in 1963, this share had 
fallen to 34.7%. Thus, the direction of British trade had changed significantly and 
Britain’s trade with Western Europe had rapidly expanded. In 1963, Western Europe 
supplied almost one-third of total British imports.
T a b le  12 UK E x p o rts  by  a re a  o f  d es tin a tio n  1953-1963 in p e rcen tag e
1953 1959 1960 1962 1963
Sterling Area 47 40,3 40,2 35,4 35,6
Western Europe 27,4 27,6 29 35,9 37,3
EEC 13,1 14 14,6 19 20,3
EFTA 11,9 11,5 12,1 13,6 13,6
North America 12,4 17,2 15,2 13,7 12,6
Rest of the world 13,2 15 15,6 14,8 15,1
S o u rce : S o u rc e : E F T A , E F T A  T ra d e  (1 9 6 4 ) , p .8 4
T ab le  13 UK Im p o rts  by  a re a  o f  o rig in  1953-1963 in p e rcen tag e
1953 1959 1960 1962 1963
Sterling Area 42,8 36,2 33,2 33,4 34,7
Western Europe 23,4 28 29,2 30,6 30,8
EEC 10,3 14 14,6 15,8 16
EFTA 11,4 11,8 12,3 12,3 12,5
North America 16,8 17,2 20,7 17,4 18
Rest of the world 17 18,6 16,9 17,6 17,5
S o u rce : S o u rc e : E F T A , E F T A  T r a d e  (1 9 6 4 ) , p .8 6
As for British geographical distribution of trade within Western Europe, between 
1959 and 1963, the share of British exports to the EEC grew from 14.0% to 20.3%, and 
the share to the EFTA increased from 11.5% to 13.6% (Table 12). The geographical 
pattern of imports changed less than that of exports: from 14.0% to 16.0% for the EEC 
and from 11.8% to 12.5% for EFTA (Table 13). Therefore trade with Western Europe 
was becoming increasingly important for Britain, and within this area it was the EEC 
that was become most crucial o f all for Britain’s trade. These trade patterns explain 
why, after de Gaulle’s veto, London was the most interested country in attending a new 
GATT Round, which offered a last resort to try to reduce EEC discrimination.
Another consequence o f the veto is worth mentioning. After the veto, de 
Gaulle’s attitude towards the Round was unclear, and London, Washington and the Five
75 PRO T  312/621 "The Kennedy Round", February 1963 and BT 303/166 "Kennedy Round: Tariff concessions to be 
offered by the United Kingdom”, 1963.
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came to suspect that a veto o f the trade negotiations was also on the General’s agenda. 
After all, in closing the door to the British membership -  on o f the element of the Grand 
Design -  the General had argued that the EEC might drown in an Atlantic free trade 
area should United Kingdom join the EEC, and had also said no to the second element, 
the MLF. By the same token, he could also veto the third element, the GATT Round. 
Doubts persisted until the very end of the round in 1967. Further, during all the 
negotiations, whenever the French opposed an American proposal, the British and the 
Americans, and sometimes also the Five, were unable to discern whether the French 
were placing conditions only to in order to deadlock the Round or whether the French 
were willing to negotiate and were simply trying to improve their position in Geneva.
At the end of January 1963, Herter and his deputy Gosset arrived in Europe for 
their first exploratory mission on the new GATT Round. Herter had planned to start 
presenting his ideas about the trade conference to the European Commission, the 
OECD, the GATT and what were thought to be the key European governments. 
Unfortunately, his plan coincided with the formal closure o f the negotiations with the 
British, after the major blow of the French veto of 14 January 1963. Hence Herter’s 
mission was transformed into a mission to test the French ideas on the Round. Herter 
met Couve de Murville and tried to get a French reassurance that Paris would not cast a 
new veto. Unfortunately, the only thing he could get from the French Minister was that 
“the negotiations would be long-drawn-out”.76
Particularly worried about a new veto were the British. A part of the Foreign 
Office, influenced by memos arriving from the British Embassy in Paris, feared that the 
French would arrange negotiations while, in the meantime, preparing their veto on the 
Round. What counted for the British Embassy was not the attitude of the French 
Patronat towards a reduction in discrimination at the multilateral level. O f much more 
importance in determining the French government’s stance would be de Gaulle’s 
attitude towards American policies generally. It is worthwhile reporting the view of the 
British on the French President, since they give an interesting overview of how he was 
perceived. For Rumbold of the British embassy in Paris,
“General De Gaulle's position [should be restated] since his eccentric 
views must constantly be borne in mind. He is only mildly interested in economics 
and then only insofar as they affect his ability to carry out the foreign policy he 
wishes. His decision will be taken not in the light o f  what is commercially 
advantageous to France but o f  what he regards as politically desirable. In 
considering the common agricultural policy o f  the Community and the Kennedy 
Round he w ill have one broad aim in mind[ how to make Europe separate from  
the United States economically, which he regards as a necessary condition fo r  its 
being separate politically; how to resist what he regards as the American 
economic domination o f  Europe which he imagines is the main purpose o f  the 
Kennedy Round, a part o f  the American grand design fo r  an Atlantic free trade 
area run by the United States; how to ensure therefore that a common 
agricultural policy on French lines is operated by the EEC and how to ensure 
that the Kennedy Round either fa ils  altogether or produces only the most meager 
results. In thinking about these problems he certainly also has in mind that i f  
things go well from his point o f  view American agricultural exports to Europe 
will drastically cut and this w ill mean that it will be more difficult fo r  the 
Americans to keep their troops in Europe. [...]  The correct assessment therefore
76 PRO FO 371/172306 Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Herter at the Foreign Office, 1 February 1963 
and Gosset, W.T. "The Kennedy Round -  Progress and Promise" Department of State Bulletin, 19 August 1963, Herter's 
papers, Box 9, JFKL.
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o f  General de G aulle’s position is that the optimum from  his point o f  view would 
be 100% success o f  the common agricultural policy and the 100% failure o f  the 
Kennedy Round. [...]  ... even i f  the technical negotiations on the common
agricultural policy and the Kennedy Round succeed in bringing matters to a  
point where an agreement is in sight there will always be a risk that General de 
Gaulle will give another press conference atid wreck the whole thing. ”77
In another letter to the Foreign Office, Ramsbotham, number two at the British 
Embassy in Paris, wrote that de Gaulle wished to veto the Kennedy Round “for the 
simple reason that its success would be regarded as a success for the Atlantic policy of 
his adversaries. He might also want to do so, (a) in order to put President Kennedy in a 
difficult position in an election year (b) because it could aggravate American difficulties 
over their balance of payments and this might prompt the United States Government to 
withdraw more troops more quickly from Europe (c) simply because the tariff 
negotiations are called the “Kennedy Round" by other people -  though not by him. 
(For the general this is not a  frivolous point)”
Not all the Americans and British shared this view. Schaetzel claimed that De 
Gaulle considered the GATT Round simply a matter for the technicians, and would cast 
no veto of the Kennedy Round. Some of the British held that while on the Brussels 
negotiations the French answer had to be yes or no, in the case of the GATT Round, de 
Gaulle could simply reduce the importance of the negotiations rather than casting a third 
veto that could dangerously anger the Federal R epublic.79 Although this second view 
was closer to the truth, what matters is that because o f the previous veto of British 
membership, the entire Round was negotiated under the Damocles’ sword o f a new 
French veto, with the result that the atmosphere in Geneva was poisoned, and the 
French were considered trouble-makers and unwilling to negotiate. As we will see in 
the next chapters, the French, who had no interest or intention to casting a veto on a 
reduced GATT Round, fully exploited the fear that de Gaulle could one again say no in 
order to extract concessions from the Five in intemal-EEC bargain and from the GATT 
partners.
Conclusion
This chapter has described the first reaction o f the Six to Kennedy’s move. The 
reaction was only a preliminary one, and it would only be in the course of 1963 that 
they set fully adopted positions and then elaborated a detailed common stance. 
Nevertheless some basic aspects were clear. All o f the Six agreed to a new trade 
conference, which, however, was not to endanger the regionalism of the EEC. Trade 
barriers could be reduced, but an Atlantic free trade area was out of the question. This 
was the stance not only of Gaul list France but also o f those Atl anti cist countries such as 
Italy, and Atlanticist and free-trade governments, such as the Netherlands and West 
Germany. As noted, the six nation states had chosen to strengthen themselves through 
European regionalism and they could not accept an American proposal that weakened 
this regionalism.
Moreover, the Six agreed to a new GATT Round, which they considered an 
opportunity to reduce American tariff and non-tariff barriers in order to boost their 
exports to the United States. The moment had come to attack US trade barriers and to
77 PRO FO 371/172328 Letter from Rumbold from the British Embassy in Paris to Sir Patrick Reilly, 17 August 1963.
78 PRO FO 371/172314 P.E. Ramsbotham from British Embassy in Paris to E.3.W. Barnes in Foreign Office, 15 
November 1963, my italic.
79 Ibidem.
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obtain concessions from Washington. The Six, and by no means only the French, 
wanted a Round on their terms, and not simply a Round dictated by the TEA provisions: 
the Round had to be a commercial negotiation which included all barriers to trade, 
rather than merely a tariff negotiation. This first reaction showed that a common ground 
between the Six existed. They all considered regionalism of the EEC to be more 
important than American Atlanticism, and they all held it to be necessary to enlarge the 
scope of the Round in order that the bargaining be balanced.
The negotiations for the new round started at the GATT Ministerial meeting of 
in May 1963, but, in fact, events that would influence its final outcome were already 
taking place in 1962-1963. The dominant supplier clause was linked to the destiny of 
the Brussels negotiations: casting his veto on British membership, de Gaulle limited the 
American authority to reduce tariffs and therefore the impact that the GATT 
liberalization could have on the EEC. De Gaulle materially altered the prospect of the 
liberal trading world Kennedy had envisaged. After these safe limits established, the 
Round could begin. Therefore, the first phase of the Round ended in January 1963 with 
France having establishing safe limits for the Europeans to bargain within.
The veto did not alter the political and economical importance of the Kennedy 
Round, as, for Washington, the EEC was still a regional trade bloc that had to be 
integrated into the multilateral system and that had to be firmly kept within the Atlantic 
Alliance, above all as de Gaulle seemed to aiming at detaching the EEC from the United 
States. The need to reduce trade barriers did not diminish, on the contrary, the lowering 
of the EEC and EFTA internal barriers made the Americans determined to use the TEA 
to its full extent. As for the European governments, they maintained their desire to 
increase their exports to the United States and, with Western Europe still commercially 
divided, the multilateral framework of GATT was the forum in which lower 
discrimination in Europe was to be achieved. The unification of Western Europe was 
blocked and European countries had to look to the multilateral dimension of GATT to 
keep the split from deepening and to help to heal it. As a result, the Kennedy Round 
turned out to be not only a transatlantic negotiation but also a European one. Thus, after 
the veto, the reasons for launching a new Round were still well-founded and urgent: the 
economic division of Europe and the willingness of the United States and the EEC to 
boost their exports to each other led both sides of the Atlantic to look to the multilateral 
framework of GATT to keep the West together economically.
The veto made the Kennedy Round begin in an atmosphere of distrust between 
the French and the Americans, and between the French and the Five. Between 
Kennedy’s speech of 4 July 1962, invoking cooperation between the two sides o f the 
Ocean and a partnership between equals, and de Gaulle’s veto and the signing of 
Franco-German Treaty, the state of transatlantic relations had clearly changed. 
European cooperation with American policy could not be taken for granted and, worse, 
there was the danger that the Europeans could have develop their own policies, not 
necessarily coinciding with the American ones. Thus, as shown in the next chapter, after 
the veto, the Kennedy administration placed the Atlantic partnership under close 
scrutiny in order to understand whether it still suited American interests.
As for the Six, they had easily agreed in refusing the Atlantic free trade area, but 
they still had to elaborate a common position with which to attend the Round and, after 
the French veto, this common position had to be elaborated in the tense atmosphere of 
mistrust and crisis between France and the Five caused by the veto itself and by the way 
in which it had been put. As shown in the following chapter, it would be the importance 
the EEC had come to have by 1963, and the necessity to preserve it, that led the Five to
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overcome the tensions caused by the de Gaulle, and the Germans to put forward a new 
working method to prevent any other French unilateral moves.
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Chapter Four
Devising the rules of the Kennedy Round
Introduction
The turbulent atmosphere created by the French veto spilled over into the TEA 
negotiations. General de Gaulle’s veto “wrought a direct structural change in the 
character of the [...] negotiations [of the Kennedy Round], converting them from 
Washington’s dream of an Atlantic family party into a transatlantic confrontation with a 
deeply divided Europe.”1 In promoting a new Round, Washington had imagined a 
scenario in which the United Kingdom was a member of the EEC, and where harmony 
existed between the two sides of the Atlantic. A different situation had developed when 
the EEC, the United States and the other GATT contracting parties gathered in Geneva 
in May 1963 for the Ministerial meeting that had to formally decide about the starting o f 
the negotiations: the United Kingdom was not a member o f the EEC, while the Atlantic 
alliance was under the considerable strain created by the French move discussed in the 
previous chapter.
Chapter four is dedicated to the preliminary phase o f the Kennedy Round during 
which the decision to formally launch the Round was taken, and the rules o f the 
negotiations began to be formulated. It describes how the trade conference was set in 
motion in spite o f the mistrust in the Atlantic alliance, and how the need to attend the 
GATT Ministerial meeting pushed the Six to overcome their internal crisis and to reach 
a compromise in order to attend the preliminary phase. The chapter highlights that the 
different visions which the Europeans and the American had regarding the Round led 
them to clash on the rules. The United States gathered in Geneva thinking o f conducting 
the negotiations along the lines o f the TEA and believing that their vision would 
automatically prevail, forgetting that, first, the Europeans had no reason to 
automatically acquiesce to the TEA, and second, the Round, being a series of 
negotiations, by definition required compromise. Therefore when became clear that the 
EEC, even if willing to attend the Round, had no intention o f negotiating along the lines 
of the TEA, clashes inevitably arose. This chapter also draws attention to the puzzle of 
the Five which arose out o f the dichotomy between commercial and foreign aspects of 
their policies. On the one hand, they wanted to oppose de Gaulle and reassure 
Washington regarding their Atlanticism; on the other hand, they wanted to protect their 
commercial interests that coincided with those o f France. Chapter four also deals with 
one o f the key issues dealt with in this thesis, that is the role o f the Commission and the 
Member States in the formulation and handling o f EEC foreign trade policy. Further, it 
illustrates the Commission’s effort to strengthen its role, and the parallel effort o f the 
Member States to maintain their firm control of foreign trade policy.
4.1 The United States: reaffirming the Atlantic partnership and 
moving the Kennedy Round forward
The French veto of British membership was a severe setback for the Kennedy 
Administration that had built the Grand Design for an Atlantic partnership around it,
1 NA 364 Records of US Trade Representatives on Kennedy Round, Box 5, Background paper "Success for KR?" written 
by John W. Evans, 19 October 1965.
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and when it was followed, on 22 January 1963, by the signing of the Franco-German 
Treaty of Cooperation, Washington seemed convinced that de Gaulle’s aim was to put 
an end to the American presence in Europe and to destroy the concept of the Atlantic 
partnership. January’s events led the Kennedy Administration to place under scrutiny its 
policy towards Western Europe in order to examine whether European integration and 
the Atlantic partnership still suited American interests.2 The United States had accepted 
European integration and its subsequent economic discrimination in the hope o f uniting 
Western Europe, both economically and politically. However, as far as America was 
concerned, European integration had not to unite Europe under the leadership o f France, 
thereby destroying the Atlantic alliance. Despite the disappointment, the Kennedy 
Administration came to the conclusion that the reasons to support the Atlantic 
partnership and European integration were still valid and pressing. West Germany had 
to be firmly attached to the West and had to be contained, while, in the Cold War 
context, Western Europe had to be strengthened. At the same time, the Atlantic 
partnership had to be constructed in a way in which Europe was united within the 
Atlantic framework of NATO, GATT and OECD, and in accordance with American 
policy. The Europeans had to fully understand that only on the condition that European 
integration developed within the Atlantic framework would Washington be able to 
maintain its support. As Winand notes, “European integration yes, but controlled by 
American instruments; European unity within the confines of Atlantic partnership”3 
Thus, during the very period in which de Gaulle seemed to want to terminate the 
American presence in Europe, to wipe out the Atlantic partnership, to push the EEC 
outside the Atlantic framework, and in which the EEC could become inward-looking 
and protectionist under de Gaulle’s leadership, Washington reasserted the importance of 
the Atlantic framework in keeping the two sides of the Atlantic together under 
American leadership. As Rusk put it, the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations had 
not to be regarded as the ruin of the Atlantic policy, “On the contrary the main lines of 
that policy have become more than ever valid and urgent” .4
Against this background, it became o f the greatest importance to push ahead 
with those initiatives developed to set up the Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle’s move 
gave urgency to the TEA and MLF negotiations. In particular, the TEA liberalisation 
process became more critical than before in order to prevent the EEC from becoming an 
independent bloc under French leadership. Pushing the new Round steadily forward 
meant challenging de Gaulle’s conception of Europe and the Atlantic alliance, and to 
strengthen the bonds of Atlantic cooperation.5 The trade initiative retained its economic 
importance. De Gaulle’s veto o f British membership, taken on the grounds that it would 
have turned the EEC into an Atlantic area run by the Americans put French support for 
freer trade and an outward looking EEC in question. Once De Gaulle had defended his 
vision o f the EEC, the GATT negotiations had to be successfully concluded so that they
The Kennedy Administration debate over American policy on European integration process and the Atlantic 
partnership can be found in FRUS, 1961-1963 Vol. XIII Western Europe and Canada, Section Economic and Political 
Integration 63-71 documents and NA 59, GRDS, CFPF Box 3415, ECIN 7 EEC, box 3415, Memorandum of Ball to 
President Kennedy, 1 March 1963; Winand, P. Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1993).p. 331-341; Lundestad, G. The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From "Empire" by 
Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.120-126.
3
Winand, P. Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, p. 338.
4
Rusk's speech in Los Angeles in February 1963, reported in PRO FO 317/172311 As/Pol (15) 32.
5
Preliminary Draft of the report "Components of a Strategy for the Kennedy Round" written by Bali, 10 December 
1963, Herter's papers, Box 2, JFKL.
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would to favour the implementation of an outward-looking EEC fully integrated in the 
multilateral context.6
In the new context created by the French veto, President Kennedy stressed to his 
administration the high importance he continued to attach to the trade negotiations, and 
the need to bring them “to a fruitful conclusion” . Ball was instructed to assume personal 
responsibility for the State Department activities in the trade negotiations and of 
providing Herter broad foreign policy guidance, and to “be continuously aware o f the 
need for putting these negotiations in their proper relation to our other ongoing 
negotiations in Europe in the military, monetary and political spheres”.7 All relations 
with Europe in different fields had to be carried out in a unified way and according to a 
central strategy aimed at the advancement of US interests. Herter had to be “the point of 
coordination for all important statements and actions bearing on relations with Europe”. 
Thus, the GATT Round, which, by this time, the Europeans had started calling the 
Kennedy Round, came to have a central and crucial place in the activities of the 
Kennedy Administration, which went beyond the significance of a set of trade 
negotiations.8
The French veto made the dominant supplier clause ineffective, but, in any case, 
the TEA retained its provision to reduce duties by 50%. Even if frustrated in terms of its 
liberalising potentialities, the US law was still equipped to provide a far-reaching 
liberalization o f trade. Washington therefore kept its aims of liberalising both the 
industrial and the agricultural sectors. The crucial issue o f the entire Round continued to 
be agriculture, where EEC protectionism was high and the willingness to meaningfully 
reduce discrimination was lacking. For Washington, the inclusion of this sector in the 
Round was so important that it could not foresee any meaningful progress in the 
industrial sector, without similar progress in agriculture. Moreover, the Kennedy 
administration’s aim to use expansion o f trade to reduce the deficit in the balance of 
payments was not affected. On the contrary, there was a continued willingness to boost 
exports, above all in the agricultural sector, where the USA enjoyed a notable surplus, 
to reduce the deficit.9
In bringing the new Round to a fruitful conclusion, the main difficulties lay in 
the situation of uncertainty that prevailed in Brussels. A meaningful Round could be set 
up only if the EEC fully and effectively attended, not blocked by the same 
obstructionism that the French had employed in the talks with the British, and were 
employing in NATO over the MLF.10 The strategy to deal with France was devised by 
the State Department and, above all, Ball. The Under Secretary felt that the United 
States lacked leverage over France, but did have leverage over the EEC framework
® PRO T 312/621 Letter from Cohen to Marjoribanks (FO), 25 February 1963
7 FRUS 1961-1963, IX, Section 13/263. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary o f State Rusk and the 
Under Secretary of State Ball, 28 February 1963.g
Memorandum of President Kennedy for the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor Governor, Herter, the 
Secretary of State, 4 March 1963, Herter's papers, Box 15A, JFKL. It is not dear who named the Round after Kennedy. 
Reading the archives, the first to use this expression is by the British as early as in December 1962. See NA State CDF 
box 729 telegram 2414 from US Embassy in London to State Department reporting conversation with Richard Powell, 
Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade.
9
FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. IX Section 12/256 Report by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President 
Kennedy "Program for Expansion of U.S. Commercial Exports" 24 January 1963; PRO FO 371/172307 Note of a meeting 
between the president of the Board of Trade and the United States State Department, 4 March 1963 and NA 364 
Records of US Trade Representative on the Kennedy Round, Box 6, Note of Courtenay Worthington "Agriculture and the 
Trade Negotiations", 2 August 1963. The importance of agricultural exports for the balance of payments is also 
highlighted by Ball in the report "Components of a Strategy for the Kennedy Round", 10 December 1963, Herter papers, 
Box 7, JFKL.
^  PRO FO 371/172306 Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Herter at the Foreign Office, 1 February 1963.
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because Italy, Germany and the Benelux countries, for economic or political reasons, or 
both, all desired successful negotiations. Pressure was to be brought on the Five in order 
to get them to resist any French attempt to cause the GATT negotiations to breakdown. 
The major US task consisted, therefore, in bringing the French to accept a meaningful 
set o f negotiations through pressure exerted on the Five.11
Among the Five, the Germans had a decisive position for the United States. 
Bonn was the only country to have the political and economic strength to face up to de 
Gaulle, and had to take the lead in the Five’s opposition to France. However, before 
relying on Germany, changes were required. Strongly disappointed by Adenauer, the 
Kennedy Administration became more positive regarding Erhard. The German Minister 
had been considered a weak figure in Washington, too favourable towards a European 
free trade area at the expense o f  the EEC. With the frustrations caused by the 
Chancellor, Erhard, who had always emphasized the Atlantic framework, became 
Washington’s choice.12 Moreover, disappointed by the Franco-German Treaty, 
Kennedy felt American that opposition to the Treaty had to be made clear to the 
Germans, who had to choose “between working with the French or working with [the 
United States]” .13 Bonn had to be convinced to ‘hurry back’ into the Atlantic 
framework and to amend the Franco-German Treaty, linking it to NATO and, 
implicitly, weakening it. Erhard, and other people angered by Adenauer’s decision, such 
as Foreign Minister Schroeder and the chairman of the Bundestag von Brentano, had to 
be encouraged to make the Bundestag’s ratification o f the Treaty conditional on German 
reaffirmation o f the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance. American pressures were not vain. 
Along with the discontent within the German government, they led, on 16 May 1963, 
the Bundestag to ratify the Franco-German Treaty proceeded by a preamble which 
reaffirmed the close partnership between Europe and the United States, favoured the 
enlargement o f the EEC to the United Kingdom, and supported “the elimination o f trade 
barriers by negotiations between the European Economic Community, Great Britain and 
the United States in the framework o f  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.” 14
To push the TEA negotiations forward, Washington also relied on the European 
Commission, considered an ally in strengthening the front o f the Five against the 
French, and to achieve the broader American aims in the Kennedy Round. Washington 
counted on what Tuthill believed to be the strong preference on the part o f the 
Commission for the GATT forum: under the Treaty o f Rome the Commission was 
empowered to negotiate on behalf o f the EEC and it saw GATT negotiations as a means 
of establishing its representational role on behalf of the member states and its 
international personality. This situation was of particular relevance to the United States, 
since the Commission, according to Tuthill, favoured a liberal policy, and its influence 
in shaping EEC decision was never greater that in the context of GATT.15 Washington
Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State Bail to President Kennedy, 8 March 1963, National Security Files, 
Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, JFKL; NA State Department Central file subject numeric 59 Box 3489, 
FT 4 US/TEA, Memorandum from Stanley Cleveland to Schaetzel, 27 February 1963.
12
FRUS, 1961-1963 Vol. XIII Western Europe and Canada, Section Economic and Political Integration 63-71 documents. 
See also Lundestad, G., The United States and Western Europe Since 1945,pp. 125-126.
13 FRUS, 1961-1963 Vol. XIII Western Europe and Canada, Section Economic and Political Integration, 69. Summary 
records of NSC Executive Committee Meeting n. 40, 5 February 1963.
14
Winand, P. Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, pp-334-335; the quotation of the preamble is 
taken from p. 335. FRUS, 1961-1963 Vol. XIII Western Europe and Canada, Section Economic and Political Integration, 
69. Summary records of NSC Executive Committee Meeting n. 40, 5 February 1963 and ibidem 74. Memorandum of 
Conversation between Rusk, Ball and von Brentano and Knappstein of the German Embassy, 22 March 1963.
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seemed to wish the Six, that is to say the Five plus the Commission, to set up a common 
front against the French in order to prevent a new veto and to ensure a fruitful 
conclusion to the new Round. When he met Hall stein on 4 March, Kennedy not only 
underlined the importance he attached to the TEA negotiations, but also stressed the 
importance of the role of the Commission in successfully concluding the trade talks. By 
the same token, in meeting Commissioners, Robert MaijoIin,Vice President o f the 
Commission and the person responsible for economic and financial policy, and Jean 
Rey, in charge of the Community's External Relations, Kennedy restated the importance 
o f the new Round -  also as an instrument to rectify the US deficit in the balance of 
payments -  and the crucial role of the Commission.16
Washington also sought the collaboration o f the other GATT members, and in 
particularly of the United Kingdom. Both London and Washington were particularly 
concerned to reduce discrimination worldwide and feared French obstructionism. The 
Americans and the British agreed to maintain close contact and to collaborate to 
conclude the Round. However, as they were soon to discover, the fear o f a new French 
veto was not sufficient to keep them united. While Herter made it clear that the United 
States would have to pull out o f the Round if  agricultural protectionism was not 
reduced, the British were more interested in the industrial negotiations, and were 
concerned by the possibility that progress in this sector could be held up by an emphasis 
on agriculture.17 By the same token, the USA was soon to discover that the Commission 
and the Five were along the lines which Washington desired. Mistrust of the French was 
not, in fact, sufficient to reconcile different trade interests.
4.2 The EEC: from crisis to synchronization
The French rejection of British membership, and the way it had been handled, 
placed the EEC in a crisis situation that also regarded the preparations for the Kennedy 
Round. The Five reacted with anger and concern to the French move. Fifteen months of 
negotiations were brutally interrupted and the process o f enlargement indefinitely 
postponed by a sole member and a press conference, showing that such a fundamental 
topic could be decided upon by French unilateralism rather than by a collective EEC 
decision. The mutual confidence upon which the very existence of the EEC depended 
was badly shaken, and French move left the EEC in a phase of crisis, which had the 
potential to put at risk its survival. Moreover, de Gaulle’s rejection of the American 
MLF and the Atlantic partnership, and the signing o f the Franco-German Treaty seemed 
to show the Five that the French President had every intention of imposing his own 
vision of the European Community and relations with the United States. At the same 
time, in this atmosphere of anger and concern, a certain level caution was also apparent. 
The economic and political reasons that had led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome 
were still very relevant among the Five. The EEC was vital and no-one wished to 
sacrifice it for the British. Notwithstanding the bitterness caused by de Gaulle’s move, it 
was not worth risking the existence of the EEC for the sake of the UK. These common 
interests prompted a common determination to move ahead with the integration process
For the meeting with Hallstein see AECB PV 220 6 March 1963. For the meeting with Marjolin and Rey see FRUS 
1961-1964, Vol. IX: Foreign Economic Policy 276. Memorandum for the Record, reporting meeting between Kennedy, 
Ball, Herter and the two commissioners, 2 May 1963.
17 PRO FO 371/172307 Note of a meeting between the president of the Board of Trade and the United States State 
Department, 4 March 1963 and ibidem Note of a meeting between the president of the Board o f Trade and Governor 
Christian Herter, 5 March 1963,
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and led the Five to give priority to overcoming the crisis and setting the Community 
back in motion.18
The main problem that the Five faced was how to resume normal work within 
the Community and prevent any other French unilateral decision, getting the EEC to 
work for in the interest o f all Six and not only o f France. The EEC was undergoing a 
crisis of confidence, as the Five no longer trusted the French’s basic intentions, and 
wanted guarantees. As the Dutch government put it to Hallstein, de Gaulle’s veto had 
created a problem of confidence between the French and the Five, as the mutual trust 
that had characterized the working o f EEC until that time had been seriously shaken.19 
The need to prevent a new French unilateral move was particularly needed in the 
context of the Kennedy Round. De Gaulle’s veto and the strong anti-American tone of 
this rejection pushed the Five to wonder whether a new veto in the TEA negotiations, 
which, together with the British EEC membership and the MLF, constituted the 
founding elements of Kennedy Grand Design, would follow. The Five were not 
reassured by the fact that, at the GATT session in the middle of February, the French 
agreed to set the date of the Ministerial Meeting for the following May. A veto could 
always be held later, and France had to be convinced to meaningfully negotiate in 
Geneva and not simply to obstruct the new Round with dilatory conditions. Thus, the 
main problem was how to bring the French along to the TEA negotiations while making 
sure they would not cast a veto at the very last moment, and ensuring that, after 
concessions had been made to the French in the CAP or the Association agreement, 
Paris would not jeopardize talks in Geneva.20
For the Five, the EEC participation at the Kennedy Round was o f foremost 
importance. The participation was in line with their trade interests in reducing 
discrimination in Europe and diminishing American trade barriers, but they had also to 
show themselves to be loyal allies to Washington, not led by the anti-American French, 
and with the every intention of putting in place a liberal EEC.21 Among the Five, the 
Federal Republic was particularly determined to conclude the GATT negotiations. With 
the EEC enlargement process interrupted, and the confirmation of the economic 
division of Western Europe, for Bonn it was essential to push forward the negotiations 
in Geneva so as to smooth such division and, at the same time, put in place an open 
Community. This corresponded with German economic interests: with 27,2 %  of its 
exports going to EFTA countries in 1963, and with growing export rates to the United 
States in 1959-1963, the Federal Republic had to defend its trade interest beyond the 
confines of the EEC.22 Moreover, after the resentment created in Europe and across the 
Atlantic for the bilateral Franco-German Treaty, the Germans had to demonstrate their
18
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commitment to European integration, and their loyalty to American Atlanticism, and 
could not risk the American wrath they would face if  they consented to a French 
nullification o f the Kennedy Round.23
Bonn also had the need to direct the working agenda on the EEC in order to 
prevent French interests from dictating Community policy. The EEC had to avoid 
concentrating only on the CAP and evolving into a protectionist bloc led by Paris, and 
the best way to achieve these goals was to attend the GATT Round with the French on 
board, willing to meaningfully negotiate in Geneva. The Federal Republic came to play 
a crucial role in setting the Community in motion again. Bonn was aware of being the 
only country among the Five to have the political and economic strength to counter de 
Gaulle. As explained below, all these considerations, led the German Foreign Minister 
Schroeder to take the initiative of putting forward an Action Plan in Brussels with the 
aim of defending and achieving German goals within the Community, preventing any 
other unilateral move by the French, and setting up a working agenda for the 
Community that made the accomplishment of French objectives dependent on the 
realization of German aims.24
In France, the elaboration and implementation of the CAP and the signing o f the 
Association agreement remained major priorities. As for the Kennedy Round, after the 
crisis provoked by the veto, the French aim was to avoid the appearance of new and 
serious difficulties. Given the importance the Five, above all Germany and the 
Netherlands, attached to the Round, the French trying to wreck it would prove too much 
for them and would provoke a far more serious crisis within the EEC. Moreover, with 
the Kennedy round frustrated in its liberalizing potential there was no reason for de 
Gaulle to cast a French veto and cause a major clash with the European partners. 
Further, France was also interested in attending the GATT negotiations in order to 
decrease discrimination in Europe and attack American barriers. However, French 
acquiescence to the new Round was not unconditional. The EEC could attend, provided 
the Treaty of Rome was fully put in place, which meant, among the other things, full 
implementation of the CAP. The EEC represented a sole unit and it was not possible to 
envisage progress in the tariff policy if  there was no progress in other sectors.25 What 
mattered before the negotiations in Geneva could begin, was “le bon fonctionnement du 
marché commun et notamment l’approbation des règlements de politique agricole 
commune actuellement à l’étude”. The French adopted the attitude that, given the 
unsettled state of relations among the EEC members, it would be harmful to the cause 
o f European unification if the EEC concentrated on its relations with third countries at 
the expanses of its internal issues. As de Gaulle put it, “l’essentiel, avant toute 
association avec l’Angleterre et avant la négociation tarifaire avec les Etats-Unis c’est 
de mettre le Marché commun debout. Quand sera fait, on verra à passer des accords 
avec d’autres”.27 This position corresponded to French European policy in the economic
23
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sector, first building up and consolidating the EEC, then let it participate to the 
development of world trade on the same footing as other countries, but conserving the 
European character o f the EEC and without any dilution.28
The implementation o f the CAP was not merely a French political exigency, but 
also a logical requirement. The Six could not negotiate in Geneva over agriculture if  
they lacked a common agricultural policy. As Washington maintained that the GATT 
Round had to include agriculture, the final adoption o f the CAP represented the 
essential basis.29 However, for Paris, this was also a way to put pressure on the 
recalcitrant Germans, not only to fully implement the CAP as established by the Treaty 
of Rome, but also to accelerate it in time for the Geneva talks. Bonn had to approve the 
CAP if  it wanted to attend the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, Paris was resolute in 
exploiting the fear of a new veto o f the Kennedy Round in order to extract concessions, 
trading its participation in Geneva for concessions by the Five on other EEC matters. In 
short, Paris wanted to be recompensed for attending negotiations in which it was 
interested in in any case. As such, Paris did not look to the TEA negotiations as another 
element of the Kennedy Grand Design to be vetoed, but rather as an opportunity to 
reduce trade barriers, above all in Europe, and as an instrument to extract concessions 
from the Five, and from Germany in particular.
Therefore while the Five spoke strongly about the serious situation within the 
EEC and the need to make a success out o f the Kennedy Round, the French 
representative Boegner warned that his government did not oppose EEC participation to 
the Geneva Round and the EEC adopting outward looking policy, but however the 
outstanding elements of the agricultural regulations had to be agreed, and the 
Association convention had to be signed, the accelerated tariffs change envisaged for 1 
July 1963 had to take place. Without these conditions being met, France would have 
difficulty agreeing to the EEC taking a accommodating line in Geneva.30 This link was 
also made clear by Wormser to German Secretary o f State, Ralph Lahr. The Frenchman 
reasserted quite uncompromisingly that France wanted the signing of the Association 
Agreement and the implementation o f  the CAP, indicating that with these conditions 
met his government was ready to constructively attend the GATT Round.31
Among the Five, differences existed regarding how to react to the French. While 
Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg seemed more ready to adopt a 
confrontational pose towards France, the Germans aimed at elaborating a way to take 
the EEC out o f the crisis and make it resume activities and, after having initially showed 
their anger at French unilateralism, were reluctant to openly confront and challenge the 
French, as this could slow the resumption of EEC activities. These different attitudes 
became evident at the 111 Committee meeting of 7 March. Here, the French delegates, 
Jean Wahl and Bernard Clappier, warned that the resolution of the internal EEC 
problems had to precede TEA negotiations, and that the inclusion of agriculture in the 
new GATT Round required the preliminary implementation o f the CAP. At any rate,
from Stanley Cleveland to Schaetzel, 27 February 1963 where it is written “According the view of the American Embassy 
in Paris, a backgrounder by the French of Minster o f Information Peyrefitte was the source for press stories to the effect 
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France had not yet taken a decision at the political level regarding the basic question of 
the participation in the TEA negotiations. The Belgian De Smet reacted strongly to this 
French view, stressing the importance of the EEC taking a positive decision regarding 
the participation in the TEA negotiations. There was no point in beginning negotiations 
with the USA and other GATT members without knowing the basic French position, as 
it was not possible to begin the new Round without the assurance that, at later date, a 
member would, for political reasons, decide not to continue negotiations. There was 
also no point o f approving the CAP unless France took a positive attitude towards the 
Geneva negotiations. The Belgians obtained the support of the Dutch, Italians and 
Luxembourgeois. The Dutch in fact adopted an even stronger stance, and warned that 
internal development of EEC could proceed only after the decision had been reached to 
move forward with TEA negotiations.32
The French did not turn out to be very impressed. Clappier fired back at the 
Belgians and Dutch that de Gaulle was “perfectly willing to torpedo TEA, and, for that 
matter the Common Market” and warned that Belgium should consider these prospects 
“carefully in developing its policies and tactics”. If the Association convention was not 
agreed upon in a reasonable period o f time French would draw logical conclusions as 
regards “desirability continuation o f Common Market”, and if  the 1 July alignment step 
was not taken, France would “not participate in TEA negotiations” warned the French 
officials. The Belgians defined French tactics as “blackmail”, but above all expressed 
particular concern about the German delegate’s silence at the meeting that could 
represent a “conscious Adenauer policy not to oppose French.” In effect the Germans, 
who were trying to develop a way out of the crisis, did not join the rest of the Five in 
condemning French statements and remained comparatively silent.33
It was against this background that, at the meeting of the Council o f Ministers of 
1-2 April, Schroeder held that the time for taking an initiative had arrived, and put 
forward his solution for moving the EEC forward: the synchronization plan.34 The 
German minister claimed that the EEC was going through a period of confidence crisis . 
In the previous years, the distribution of benefits among its members had not been 
equitable, but for the future a working program had to be established to make sure that 
the EEC would advance in a more equitable way. Germany did not demand “préalable”, 
said Schroeder, but for the future, it did expect a “synchronization” of work, in the sense 
that the expectations of individual members would be fulfilled in as even a manner as 
possible. The German minister tabled an Action Plan -  a working program -  for the 
next 18 months in three stages, which responded to the German need to implement a 
liberal EEC that would not concentrate solely on the CAP. Schroeder’s policy was 
directed at overcoming the crisis of confidence through a synchronization of 
concessions that the Six had to make in different areas and which the EEC had to settle, 
including the Kennedy Round. The plan reflected a strong intention not to make 
concessions to the French until as the latter were prepared to agree to specific steps in
32
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the field o f trade negotiations and other areas o f  interest to the Five. The German 
synchronization plan was well received by all five partners. While not all the aspects o f 
the Action Plan received equal support, Couve de Murville, Colombo, Spaak, Schaus 
and Luns welcomed it as a way out o f the crisis, and a means of making the EEC 
advance in an equitable way.35
The acceptance of the synchronization plan did not mean that the Six had settled 
their problems. The plan, in fact, had to be applied, and here troubles rose again. After 
having welcomed the German plan, the Council of Ministers fully analysed the 
problems related to the position o f the EEC at the GATT Ministerial meeting. For 
Erhard, who received the support o f Italy, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, 
the new Round could achieve an improvement o f the conditions needed to expand world 
trade, and represented a landmark in the evolution of the world economy: it could lead 
to an outward-looking EEC and reassure third countries o f its liberal attitude. The 
Community had to be fully aware o f the political and economic importance o f a 
successful Kennedy Round. A reduction in tariffs would reduce the negative effects o f 
the economic division of Europe, and increase the level o f cooperation within the 
Atlantic Alliance. The EEC’s agreement to the Kennedy Round had to be 
comprehensive, and the Six had to avoid attending the round while hoping or working 
for its failure. In concluding, Erhard underlined “ l’influence favorable qu’une politique 
libérale de la Communauté dans ses relations extérieures pourrait avoir sur l’évolution 
de sa conjoncture interne” . At the same time the Dutch de Pous clarified that “un éches 
des futures négociations du GATT [...]  pourrait même compromettre sérieusement 
l’évolution future de la Communauté elle-même”.
Giscard D ’Estaing, supporting Erhard’s opinion that the EEC had to follow a 
liberal commercial policy, underlined how illusory it was to start and carry on 
negotiations in the agricultural sector in Geneva if, on parallel plan, the CAP “ne fait 
pas l ’objet d ’une definition plus precise”, and if the Community lacked marketing 
regulations and agreed prices. The EEC could not negotiate as a unit in Geneva if it 
lacked a common policy. Giscard D ’Estaing, not particularly impressed by Schroeder’s 
synchronization plan, made clear that his government wanted the full approval o f the 
CAP before negotiating over agriculture in the GATT forum. Here lay the French 
answer to German synchronization. As such, American insistence to include agriculture 
in Geneva played into the hands of the French, who could now could reasonably and 
logically require the elaboration o f the CAP as a condition for attending the Round.36
In the end, the Six elaborated a compromise by recognizing the importance of 
the GATT Ministerial meeting and declaring themselves to be, in principle, in favour of 
the EEC attendeding the Round, “dans le cadre d’un développement harmonieux de ses 
activités internes et extems” . The link between the GATT Round and the CAP had, for 
the time being, been resolved with this vague formula, but the issue, as shown in the 
next chapters, dragged on until July 1966. In any case, the Council meeting was the first 
encouraging note since January and a clear sign that the EEC had been set in motion 
again. Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Schaus expressed his optimism, saying “We 
have beaten the crisis”, while Spaak claimed “It is spring again after the winter” .37 
Behind the scenes, however, the situation was more complicated: Schroder’s plan was 
accepted and Couve de Murville gave a polite response, avoiding mentioning any pre-
35 CM2 1963 PV de la lOOème session du Conseil de ta CEE, 1-2 April 1963; AECB PV 224, 3 April 1963. See also NA 59 
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conditions, but when the Kennedy Round was discussed, the French made their support 
conditional on the approval of the CAP. Thus, there were no concessions contained in 
the French position.
4.3 The Commission, 111 Committee and the EEC technical 
preparation for the Round
While the Six tried to find a new basis for setting the the EEC in motion, the fact 
that the GATT Ministerial meeting, fixed for 16-21 May, was fast approaching obliged 
the Six to carry on with the technical preparation of a common position to be presented 
in Geneva. Before describing the EEC discussions leading to the elaboration of the 
common position, it is worthwhile first describing how the Treaty of Rome regulated 
the formulation of the foreign commercial policy. This description helps us to 
understand the decision-making process for the common commercial policy, and the 
respective roles of the Commission and Member States.
As noted, the common commercial policy was one of the main foundations of 
the EEC. If the internal mechanism of the common market was to work efficiently, 
coordinated action in external trade was required. The respective roles of the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission were scarcely defined by the Treaty o f Rome. Article 
111 required member states to coordinate their commercial relations with third countries 
in order to facilitate the setting up of the common commercial policy by the end of the 
transitional period. Article 111 also required the Commission to submit proposals to the 
Council of Ministers for ua common action and [...] a uniform commercial policy” . The 
Commission was also given the exclusive right to negotiate with third countries on the 
CET, but with the assistance of a special Committee -  named article 111 Committee or 
simply 111 Committee -  appointed by the Council of Ministers. However, the article 
did not specify of what nature the assistance should be, and did not prescribe the 
structure of the Committee. It did not state who should sit on the Committee, whether 
the Council collectively should nominate the people to serve on it, or whether this 
should be left to the individual Member States. Unsurprisingly, the latter course was 
followed. Most importantly, the article did not deal in detail with the relations between 
the Commission and the member states' representative in the Committee, the 
procedures for Commission’s consultation with it, what matters should be referred to it, 
or the weight to be attached to it. In 1958, in order for the Commission to start acting as 
the negotiator, the first thing to be done was to set up the 111 Committee. The Member 
States appointed their most senior trade policy officials in order to effectively defend 
their trade interests. The first and decisive battle took place over who should take the 
chair. Starting from its legal role as negotiator, the Commission wanted to treat the 
Committee as an ordinary advisory committee or working group. This meant that the 
Commission would chair it, provided a secretariat and dictate the agenda. The member 
states, led by the inaugural Belgian Presidency, insisted that, under the terms o f the 
Treaty, the Committee was an organ of the Council. Consequently the Presidency 
should take the chair. The Commission tried to seize the initiative by sending 
Commissioner for External Affairs, the Belgian Jean Rey, to early meetings o f the 
committee in the expectation that the member states’ representatives, being officials, 
would defer to his political status. Unfortunately for the Commission, this did not 
happen, as member states seized the Presidency and consolidated their grip on the 
chairmanship. As a result, the 111 Committee became the Committee where the
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representatives of the members controlled the Commission.38 In the Dillon Round, the 
Commission had represented the EEC in the negotiations, however Member States had 
maintained a very active role by attending the bargains with third countries and 
enjoying speaking rights. Thus, in the Kennedy Round, the Commission had every 
intention of getting rid of the presence of member states during the bargain in order to 
fully affirm its role as sole negotiator. As shown below, this was a difficult task for the 
Commission, as member states were reluctant to renounce an active role in GATT.
It was in this context that the Commission and the 111 Committee started 
working on the EEC common position. In the work o f the 111 Committee that took 
place from January to the end of March, the Six and the Commission fully agreed that 
the main aim o f the EEC was to create conditions in they could expand its exports to 
third countries’ markets, above all to  the United States, but that a simple linear cut of 
tariffs of 50% and the limitation o f the negotiations to tariffs would not be sufficient to 
open third countries’ markets. First, a solution had to be found to the disparity problem. 
American tariffs were the result of negotiations, compromises, escape clauses and peril 
points, and were consequently more dispersed, with some very low duties, but also 
some very high ones. In contrast, the CET was, in most cases, an average o f previous 
levels, with a narrower spread between the highest and lowest levels, and more 
moderate and homogeneous compared to the tariff structures of the USA, and also of 
the United Kingdom (see Table 1).
T ab le  1 C om parison  o f  E E C , US a n d  U K  T a r if f  R a te s
EEC United States United Kingdom EEC United States United Kingdom
Rates of duties Number Number Number Percentage Percentage Percentage
Free 298 364 316 7,9 9,7 8.4
1-5% 214 237 17 5,7 6,3 0,5
6-10% 1031 729 1113 27.4 19,5 29,6
11-15% 1290 870 239 34,3 23,1 6,3
16-20% 771 508 920 20,5 13,5 24.5
21-25% 146 275 206 3,9 7,3 5.5
26-30% 6 276 154 0,2 7,3 4,1
31-35% 2 107 725 0,05 2,9 19,3
36-40% 2 69 8 0,05 1,8 0,2
41-45% 0 120 31 0 3,2 0,8
46-50% 0 91 27 0 2,4 0,7
51-55% 0 43 0 0 1,1 0
56-60% 0 8 0 0 0,2 0
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The EEC ’s fear was that it would be placed in a disadvantageous position if all 
duties were cut by an equal percentage of 50%, so reducing the already moderate EEC 
tariffs while leaving some American duties at a still very high level. An equal linear cut 
would give the Americans greater advantages, and reciprocity would not be attained. 
Moreover, because of the low level o f the CET, in future negotiations the EEC would be 
unable to use the CET as a bargaining tool to bring down other countries’ tariffs. It was 
in this Round, therefore, that the EEC had to obtain maximum concessions.39 This
38 Johnson, M. European Community Trade Policy and the Article 113 Committee (London: RUA, 1998).
39 HAEC BAC 506 026/1969 CEE Conseil Rapport du Comité spécial de l'article 111 sur l’attitude de la CEE en ce qui 
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concern was fully shared by the Six as a whole, and by their industries. In particular 
they were shared by the German member of 111 Committee, Reinhardt, who, in January 
1963, proposed to have, as the goal o f the new Round, the putting in place of a ceiling 
of duties, for the respective product categories for all industrialized countries in order to 
harmonize tariffs worldwide, as the French had already advocated. All the Six agreed 
with Reinhardt’s proposition although Italy and the Dutch were worried about whether 
the USA would be able to negotiate along this plan. While for the French, it was 
necessary for the EEC to elaborate its own negotiating plan along its own trade 
interests, and then present it in Geneva to negotiate with third countries and the USA. 
Under the German suggestion, the solution to the disparity problem envisaged by the 
111 Committee was écrêtement, and embodied the unanimously accepted principle that 
the Kennedy Round had to be used to harmonize duties and, in particular, to lop off the 
peaks in the American tariffs. In fact, it advocated more accentuated reductions for very 
high duties, and more moderate reductions for ones which were already relatively low, 
under a negotiating plan for the rapprochement of duties o f the most important countries 
towards target duties for raw material, for semi-manufacturers and finished products. It 
is worth noting, therefore, that the écrêtement was not a plan presented by the French to 
sabotage the Kennedy Round, but was bom out of a German initiative.40
The Six and the Commission easily agreed that non-tariff barriers (NTBs), the 
main obstacles to EEC exports to the United States, had to be included in the 
negotiations, and that the harmonization of the regulations applied by GATT countries 
had to be increased. As for the LDCs, special attention had to be given to the problems 
of this group o f countries in order to keep them within the GATT and prevent them 
from turning to other international organizations to deal with their trade problems. Thus 
the principle of reciprocity was not to be applied too strictly with regard to them.
The elaboration of a common position on agriculture appeared more tricky . The 
Commission and 111 Committee unanimously supported the inclusion o f this sector in 
the Geneva negotiations, and agreed that the EEC had to obtain precise engagements 
from agricultural exporting countries to control and regulate their production, or at least 
their exporting policy. However the way to include it divided 111 Committee. France, 
Germany and the Netherlands distinguished products which were part of common 
agricultural markets under the CAP and products covered only by tariffs. This second 
category had to be subjected to the general rule for reducing duties that the contracting 
parties would agree on, while, regarding the first category, parallel negotiations with 
specific rules had to be held. Germany, moreover, importing large quantities of 
foodstuff from Denmark, wanted to give European countries assurances of access. Italy 
refused this separation. Italian agricultural exports to the EEC were products covered 
worldwide by tariff protection, therefore Italy ran the risk of only seeing protection on 
these products reduced. I f  rules for reducing protection of products subjected to a 
common market organization were not fixed, Italy would not allow subjecting other 
products to normal tariff cuts. Most crucially, for France the attitude of the EEC at the 
GATT Ministerial meeting was made dependent on the solution of some problems that 
affected the EEC internally, since it would be impossible to start a GATT Round if the 
structure of the Community was not sufficiently strengthened and, in particular, if  the
40
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CAP had not made substantial progress. In contrast, the other five delegations deemed it 
particularly important for the EEC to take a favorable stance towards the Round, as after 
the breakdown of the negotiations with the British, the EEC had to avoid giving the 
impression o f  being inward-looking. It is worth noting that despite their position 
regarding the CAP, the French adopted a constructive attitude, making proposals and 
not refusing to actively attend the preparatory work.41
From the outset, the Commission showed itself to have clearer ideas than 
Member States regarding the way to deal with agriculture. This institution considered 
the Round an opportunity to regulate agriculture at world level. It envisaged the setting 
up o f commodity agreements on the principle commodities -  grains, meat, dairy 
products and sugar -  in order to organize agriculture at world level, and improve the 
balance between production and consumption. Exporters would have to intervene in 
production to limit it, while the EEC as an importer could engage in adopting a 
maximum price for its production. For products covered by duties, tariff negotiations 
could be held. At the same time, the EEC had to obtain concessions. The United States 
had to give guarantees regarding the way it applied sanitary regulations, used as 
instrument to  limit imports, and had to renounce the GATT waiver of 1955 which 
allowed quantitative restrictions. Most importantly, the adoption of EEC regulations on 
these products had to take place in order to avoid a delay in the Geneva negotiations. 
For the Commission, the EEC internal work on the CAP had to go hand in hand with 
the elaboration o f the EEC position for the Kennedy Round, so that the EEC could have 
a coherent negotiating position in Geneva. In particular, fixing common cereals prices 
appeared urgent.42
4.4 First skirmishes in Geneva
While Washington sought to bring the EEC to meaningfully negotiate in the 
Round and the Six recovered from the crisis, talks continued in Geneva. At the GATT 
session of 19-21 February 1963, the date of the Ministerial meeting was hurriedly set 
for 16-21 May 1963. The Kennedy administration needed to show its firm intention to 
set up the Round in order to put pressure on the EEC to come to Geneva to negotiate, 
and had to prove to Congress that the legislative authority granted under the TEA was 
being fully used.43 As for the European Community, the Five had to reassure third 
countries, and in particular the United States, about the capacity and willingness of the 
Community to attend the Round, while the French judged wise not to anger the Five by 
further opposing the fixing of the date.44 Moreover, looming beyond the GATT 
Ministerial meeting was the world conference on trade organized for 1964 by the United 
Nations and whose Preparatory Committee would hold its second session from 22 May 
in Geneva. There, it was likely that the Soviet Union would take every opportunity to 
undermine the Western trading structure and the GATT, and to spark a rift between the 
LDCs and the industrialised countries. These letters therefore intended to anticipate the
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United Nations meeting, in order to show that they and the GATT were also active in 
dealing with the LDCs’ problems.45
The Ministerial meeting agenda consisted of adopting a position on the 
principles for the forthcoming negotiations, and in considering rules to reduce or 
eliminate duties and other barriers to exchanges, rules for ensuring access to world 
markets for agricultural and other primary products, and measures for the expansion of 
LDCs* trade. Thus, the first task o f the contracting parties was to agree upon the rules 
of the negotiations, a particularly important process, as for the first time in GATT 
history a Round was to achieve across-the board tariff cuts, and deal with agriculture 
and with the problems of LDCs. And since the rules for playing the game are as 
important as the game itself, it should come as no surprise that governments spent 
almost two years bargaining on the rules, eventually resorting to pragmatic solutions. In 
this phase, the different visions o f the United States and the EEC on the Kennedy 
Round appeared, crystallized around the requests for different rules and inevitably 
clashed.
Washington had clear ideas on the rules. Both agricultural and industrial items 
were to be eligible for the 50% linear cut, keeping exceptions to a minimum and 
defining the linear approach in terms which made impossible the exclusion of any item 
-  above all agricultural products -  a contracting party, and notably the EEC, did not 
wish to discuss. In truth, Herter and the State Department were not totally convinced 
that agriculture could be fully included in the linear cut because of the peculiar qualities 
of this sector. However, they failed to convince the Agriculture Department and decided 
to insist on this line.47 Meat and cereal, in any case, were to be excluded from the linear 
cut, and commodity agreements were to be negotiated along a scheme ensuring access 
to the European markets. While the Round was being negotiated and the CAP was being 
elaborated, the USA requested interim agreements to guarantee access from the EEC. 
As for non-tariff barriers, Washington accepted their inclusion, but as far as the 
valuation procedures were concerned, Herter doubted that Congress could amend it. For 
LDC, the United States wanted to bring duties to zero on tropical products and did not
. * 4«
expect reciprocity.
As for the Six, the Commission and the 111 Committee, in March they started 
work on defining a common position, but no negotiating position had been agreed and 
no mandate had been issued to the Commission by the Council of Ministers. Therefore, 
at the GATT session of 18 to 29 March 1963, the attitude of the EEC remained a great 
uncertainty. The head of the US delegation in Geneva, W. Michael Blumenthal, made 
efforts to get the Europeans down to serious negotiations, but the discussions led
45
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nowhere because, without a mandate, the Dutch Theodorus Hijzen, the head of the 
Commission delegation, was reluctant to express any opinion.49
However, the EEC was not the only source of irritation for the Americans. The 
United Kingdom, on whom Washington counted to move the Round forward, rejected 
American proposals to include agriculture in the linear cut. British agricultural imports 
were covered by duties and in this way London would reduce its duties while other 
countries, using other methods to protect agriculture, would not. The British wanted to 
be free to maintain duties in agriculture, which would allow them to keep their 
preferences. The United Kingdom’s desire to seek a solution on industrial tariffs 
without a solution on agriculture was also a matter of concern for Blumenthal who felt 
that the UK was “sabotaging [American] strategy o f  forcing the Six to come to terms on 
agriculture as integral condition o f Kennedy Round” .50 Edgar Cohen, British 
representative to GATT, did not appreciate Washington’s lack of regard for British 
trade interests and the former’s attitude that “those that are not with us are against us” 
and found the American approach to the Kennedy Round “naive and inherently 
unworkable”.51 According to the British, from the way Washington had structured its 
position, the fate of the Kennedy Round depended on whether and to what extent the 
French wish for guaranteed agricultural markets in the EEC could be reconciled with 
third countries’ request for continued access. Given its m ajor interest in the industrial 
sector, London did not wish to see reductions o f  protectionism in this sector made 
irreversibly dependent on the Six’s acceptance for a deal in agriculture. Pressure existed 
within the Community to make a success of the Kennedy Round on industrial tariffs, 
but in agriculture the Five were as protectionist as the French, and they would not put 
pressure on Paris to make concessions to the USA. As such, Washington lacked the 
necessary bargaining power, as it did not have enough to offer to the EEC to break 
down European protectionism. The Americans were asking the EEC the same access 
guarantees that had been refused to the Commonwealth during the enlargement 
negotiations. As a result, the inflexible American approach had the potential to cause 
the break down of the Kennedy Round. Cohen was aware that a British refusal to clash 
with the EEC would cause major conflict not only with the Americans but also with 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, who were relying on Washington to prise open the 
EEC. However, the British considered the industrial sector far more important than the 
agricultural one, and the fate of the Kennedy Round could not be endangered by the US 
intransigence over agriculture.52
Thanks to the 1-2 April Council o f Ministers meeting and the 111 Committee 
report, a more active role o f Hijzen, even if  no mandate had been issued, became 
possible. At the GATT session of end o f April, which had the aim o f elaborating a 
report to be presented to the GATT Ministerial meeting, for the first time, Hijzen took 
an active stance a key issue for the EEC: disparities. The Commission representative put 
forward the 111 Committee’s target-duties plan, suggesting 0% for raw material, 5% for
49
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semi-manufacturers and 10% on manufactured products; then, considering the 
legislative limits which the USA were under due to the TEA, rates in excess of these 
levels were to be reduced by half the difference between present and target levels. No 
exceptions would be necessary. As for agriculture, it was to be dealt with separately.53 
In truth, Hijzen had not been authorised to present the écrêtement in the name o f the 
EEC. Under the initiative o f German representative, the 111 Committee authorized the 
Commission to informally put the plan forward, and in particular to float it bilaterally to 
the United States to test the latter’s reaction.54
Informally or otehrwise, the écrêtement plan was presented, and received the 
approval of only Japan and Sweden.55 The Americans were simply shocked by the EEC 
proposal. Blumenthal reminded Hijzen that since the GATT session of November 1961, 
all contracting parties agreed that the item-by-item tariff bargaining was inadequate to 
reduce tariffs. Then, in the Dillon Round, the EEC criticized the United States for being 
blocking international liberalization because it lacked authority to reduce tariffs across 
the board. An opportunity to change the situation had come in the guise o f the TEA, and 
throughout 1962 the American intention to make linear reductions had been clear and 
widely and enthusiastically supported by other countries. Blumenthal replied to the 
European plan with a categorical refusal. For political, legislative and practical reasons, 
Washington could accept only a linear reduction to be uniformly applied to all duties 
with limited exceptions.56 America’s strong reaction was logical. From December 1962 
onwards, the EEC had adopted a passive stance, while Washington reiterated its support 
for equal linear reductions. Then, at the end of April, and with the GATT Ministerial 
Meeting of May drawing closer, Hijzen appeared with a proposal for unequal linear 
reductions of tariffs, which had nothing to do with the American plan. Predictably, 
Blumenthal labeled the plan as unacceptable, and reacted with anger.
Neither did the British support the écrêtement proposal, which they referred to as 
a French proposal, for it would result in less drastic tariffs cuts, which were, as such, 
smaller in their compensatory nature for the failure of the accession negotiations.57 In 
truth, they were not totally opposed to the proposal. In fact, Patrick Reilly of the 
Foreign Office claimed that the French plan made sense, while the Americans 
“seem[ed] to be tied hand and foot by the terms of the TEA and their own tariff
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theology”.58 However, the British decided to support the American plan not only 
because it could lead to a greater reduction o f trade discrimination but also because they 
felt it wise to side with Washington rather than with the French who were still seen as 
potentially capable of destroying the Round. After the confrontation between Cohen and 
Blumenthal, the British preferred to patch things with the Americans in order to avoid 
further clashes.59
The parties’ respective positions regarding agriculture were not much closer. 
The USA, the EEC and the UK agreed to set up international commodity agreements for 
cereal and meat, but they differed on the rules for agricultural products not covered by 
these agreements. The USA advocated a two-ties approach along which products 
protected only by tariffs were to be included in the linear reduction rule, while products 
covered by other kinds of protection would be subjected to a reduction in the level of 
protectionism comparable to the linear tariff cut. The American approach was opposed 
by the United Kingdom, as it represented an early commitment to reduce protectionism 
on products covered by tariffs without any precise commitment regarding other 
products. London suggested a system under which concessions would be offered, 
bearing in mind trade in the previous years, in order to ensure fair and acceptable 
opportunities for access compared to with the targets set for the linear reduction. The 
EEC was not in a position to have a constructive role, as the Six had not even started 
elaborating a stance for agriculture in the GATT. Thus the session terminated with no 
agreement on the negotiating rules, and with the United States furious at the EEC.60
Blumenthal’s tough opposition to écrêtement plan was shared in Washington. 
Ball maintained that US trade partners had to be interested in reducing high US tariffs 
and not in harmonizing them. In any case, the TEA granted no authority to the US 
government to negotiate under the écrêtement plan since, having higher duties, the USA 
would implement larger reductions than the than EEC to in order to reach the target 
rates. In effect, the basic problem was that the EEC, having lower and more compact 
tariffs, aimed at harmonizing duties worldwide in order to bring US duties down to the 
CET level. In contrast, the USA, having higher duties, aimed at simple tariff cuts.61 On 
top o f this, for the United States, the European proposal lacked credibility not only for 
the scant returns it would generate, but also for the way in which it had been presented. 
First, Hijzen had claimed that with this plan the EEC would renounce all exceptions, if
58
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other countries did the same. As it was well known that under the TEA exceptions were 
mandatory, Washington wondered whether Hijzen was serious.62 Second, the fact that 
the EEC plan had been presented only in April, that it had nothing to do with equal 
linear reduction, and that the US would have to implement more reductions than the 
EEC led Washington to wonder whether the EEC had the intention of meaningfully and 
constructively attending the GATT Round, or if  they were merely wasting time. 
Moreover, the general atmosphere o f  mistrust towards the French worked against the 
plan. The Americans were convinced that the écrêtement was a French proposal and, 
being French, it was an attempt to put roadblocks in place, and turn attention away from 
the central issue -  the linear tariff cut -  by emphasizing the disparity matter, and to 
cause the Round the Round to break down without having to formally veto it. The 
écrêtement was merely a “smoke screen put up by the French in order to avoid serious 
tariff cut”, a tactic developed by the French and sold to the Germans to strengthen their 
position against the Unites States. The French were maneuvering to wreck another 
element of Kennedy Grand Design, to destroy the Atlantic alliance and to get rid o f the 
American presence in Europe with the use of the problem of the deficit in the balance of 
payments. Paris was digging in its heels, and the Five were blind and naïve enough to 
follow.63
In assessing its strategy for the Kennedy Round, Washington had hoped above 
all that the Germans would bring get the French onboard. However, if the Germans 
were toeing the French line, the American strategy would collapse. The internal EEC 
situation was therefore developing in a direction that upset the Americans: the common 
anti-French front did not exist, the French were not isolated, and the Five followed the 
French line. The Commission was o f no more help. Not only did it fully support the 
écrêtement, but, at the beginning o f May, Hallstein spoke at the European Parliament 
and openly claimed that the EEC had to defend itself against attempts to dilute it in 
larger area “comme le sucre dans le thé”.64 The Five had trade interests similar to the 
French, rather than akin to those of the Americans, and this led them to side with Paris 
and not with Washington, impeding the setting up of that common front with which the 
Americans hoped to push the Kennedy Round forward. The mistrust the Five had for de 
Gaulle was not enough to cause them to forget their trade interests and side with the 
Americans.
The American perception that the écrêtement was merely a French move to 
breakdown the GATT conference was misplaced. The disparity issue was considered a 
problem to be resolved also by the Five, who felt that the TEA obviously favoured 
American exports and had consequently embraced the plan in order to correct the
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American law.65 As Maas, Dutch member of 111 Committee, made clear to Tuthill, the 
disparity problem was a general worry for the Six, not just a French maneuver, and the 
écrêtement had received support because it dealt with a problem that was much resented 
in Europe, including by the British. The Dutch appreciated the advantages o f the plan 
which, they believed, remained within the bounds o f the authority granted by the TEA, 
making it difficult for the Americans to refuse it. As for France, their aim was not to 
wreck the Round but rather to direct it according its own vision, which required the 
harmonization of duties. And, for Paris, the Americans had to come to terms with its 
vision of the Round.66
The meager results that écrêtement would bring, the perception that it was 
merely a French obstructionist move and the irritation for the Five’s support led 
Washington to react strongly against it, and the Americans toughened their attitude 
towards the Six to let them understand their had to be dropped. Washington elevated the 
question of the cutting formula to the political level in order to push the Six to give up 
their plan and accept the American one, if  they did not want to cause the collapse of the 
GATT Ministerial meeting with all the resulting political consequences. For Herter, the 
American strategy had to consist in making clear that Washington would only accept an 
equal linear cut and work together with the Commission and the Five to keep “pressure 
on the French”, so to overcome French obstructionism.67
To get rid of the European plan, Washington counted on its influence on Bonn 
and The Hague, and on the desire o f these two governments to find a genuine solution. 
In particularly, Tuthill felt that it was urgent to speak clearly to the traditionally liberal 
and Atlanticist Dutch who needed to be “worked on with respect to the écrêtement 
problem”. At the end of April, the American Ambassador met with the Dutch 
Ambassador to the COREPER Spierenburg and flatly stated US opposition. As is 
explained further, below, American pressure was effective. While initially sympathetic 
to the écrêtement, Spierenburg was ready to accept the American explanation as to why 
Washington could not accept it, and openly claimed that, given the US objections, the 
EEC had to agree to negotiate on the basis of equal, linear tariff reductions with, 
however, explicit reservations for disparities cases. Thus, in light of the categorical US 
refusal, The Hague changed its attitude. The risk o f seeing the Round collapse pushed
65
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the latter to assume a reserved attitude towards écrêtement and to favour a stance 
acceptable to the Americans, based on equal linear reductions.68
Washington plainly spelled out its disappointment to the French too. Reinstein, 
from the US Embassy in Paris, met Olivier Wormser to emphasize his government’s 
disappointment and even questioned whether the EEC position was serious. Wormser 
tried to reassure Reinstein that the EEC was really willing to negotiate with the United 
States, but he flatly refused the American approach of insisting that the GATT Round to 
take place along TEA lines, otherwise the negotiations would not take place at all. The 
TEA was an American law representing American interests and views on international 
trade and unilaterally elaborated that suited only Washington. Therefore, even if for 
Washington the écrêtement would not substantially reduce tariffs, it would be during the 
GATT sessions that the contracting parties would agree on the rules. However, in 
refusing to consider the EEC proposal, Washington appeared to be preparing for the 
new GATT Round without a desire to elaborate an equitable solution to all problems.69
The mood of the French was clear. The TEA was merely an American law, and 
the EEC and new Round could not be conditioned by it. As Wormser put it, if the 
Americans wanted to write the TEA into the GATT, they were heading for trouble. The 
French were annoyed by what they considered to be the American propaganda which 
misrepresented the EEC position and diffused the notion that the écrêtement plan had 
been elaborated by the French and forced the Five to break off the Round. France did 
not refuse to negotiate, but simply wanted to discuss the rules of the negotiations. On 
9 May, the French Ambassador in Washington Alphand met Assistant Secretary 
William Tyler to reduce the tension, and to try to convince his counterpart that 
écrêtement was not a French attempt to water down the Kennedy Round and destroy the 
Atlantic alliance. Differences on the rules were to be seen for what they were, and not 
be allowed to give rise to a political controversy. However, for Tyler, an alternative 
formula at this stage of the negotiations was seen as a political maneuver.71 Alphand 
also met Rusk to stress that what mattered was not to “politicize” the problem and to 
leave the tariff cutting rule to technicians. Nevertheless, for Rusk, the écrêtement plan 
reflected an unwillingness to reduce tariffs. Moreover, trade negotiations were a test of 
the attitude of the Community: the United States had only two major Atlantic initiatives, 
the MLF and the GATT Round, and it was important for Washington that the two 
initiatives worked. The basic problem with the French was that, after the veto o f British 
entrance, they were not in a position to be able to reassure anyone about their intentions.
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Thus, as the Ministerial meeting approached, positions across the Atlantic remained far 
apart.72
4.5 The setting of the EEC common position: the EEC Ministerial 
Meeting of 8-9 May 1963
America’s uncompromising refusal to consider the écrêtement pushed the 
Europeans to weaken their support for this plan. In light o f US opposition, the Five and, 
in particular Bonn and The Hague, softened their backing o f the plan and geared up to 
find a compromise between this and the equal linear reduction.73 The Germans feared 
that obstinate US support for the equal linear cut could cause German industry to move 
into the same camp as the French protectionists, a development that had to be 
prevented, therefore they moved to elaborate a compromise that could be accepted in 
Washington and that would be supported by German industry.74 Paris did not oppose 
the plan; even the Quai D ’Orsay realized that it had to insert some flexibility into its 
position to avoid a deadlock. The Six, the French included, could not ignore the fact that 
Washington had no intention of considering their plan.
However, the setting up o f an EEC common position to attend the Ministerial 
meeting depended not only on an agreement regarding the to tariff cut formula or how 
to deal with agriculture, but was also linked to the agreement between the Six on the 
EEC agenda, and in particular on the timetable to approve the CAP, an issue that 
concerned above all the French and the Germans given the fact that it was Paris that 
could block the Round and it was Bonn that could block the CAP. At the beginning of 
May, the issue of the EEC common position was dealt with by the French Clappier and 
Wormser and the German Lahr. The French noted that France and Germany had an 
almost identical point of view regarding the interests which the EEC had to defend in 
Geneva, but important differences appeared when the trade negotiations were 
considered in its broader context. Clappier and Wormers felt that Lahr was too ready to 
abandon the EEC position as Washington persisted in negotiating only along the TEA: 
“ [...] le Gouvernement de Bonn a, avant tout, le souci de faire plaisir au Gouvernement 
américain,” claimed the French. But Lahr was very clear: Germany was above all 
interested in exporting industrial products, while France was interested in exporting 
agricultural products. This meant that if  France tried to deadlock the Kennedy Round, 
Germany would do the same for the CAP. Wormser found Lahr’s position dangerous 
for the Kennedy Round, and for the EEC itself. H e felt it inadmissible to link 
negotiations with third countries to the dealings regarding the CAP, which the EEC had 
already agreed upon in January 1962. In fact, if an agreement on the Kennedy Round 
were precluded by the disagreement with Washington, any progress within the EEC 
would be stopped.75
This bilateral Franco-German confrontation was moved to the EEC level when, 
from 8 to 9 May, the Council of Ministers, together with the Commission, met to finally 
decide on the stance to be adopted at the Kennedy Round and finally set the agenda of 
the Community. For Rey, in order to obtain to a successful conclusion to the GATT 
Ministerial meeting, the EEC had to take a flexible stance, insisting on the agreement of
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principles that existed between the USA and the EEC, and suggested dealing with the 
rules o f the negotiations later on. The USA had to recognize the existence of a disparity 
problem and a solution was to be found after the Ministerial meeting. Therefore, the 
EEC had not to engage itself with the method of tariff reduction. The same had to be 
done for agriculture for which experts had to be given the task of developing a way of 
negotiating. Maijolin highlighted the impossibility of negotiating over agriculture with 
Washington if the CAP was not entirely adopted, and if common prices were not 
adopted by the end of the year.76
For the German Mueller-Armack, the EEC had to be realistic, not 
overemphasize its own interests, and bear in mind the American stance. Picking up 
Rey’s suggestion, he put forward the compromise for the tariff reductions. In order to 
avoid the breakdown of negotiations, in Geneva the EEC would unequivocally state its 
full intention to attend the Round, based on a linear and automatic system of reduction 
of tariffs in order to substantially reduce duties and disparities, and would suggest the 
setting up o f a working group to study the tariff structure of Kennedy Round 
participants and the implication o f the two systems under discussion, and then elaborate 
a solution. The five partners quickly adopted the German solution, even if Giscard 
D’Estaing stressed that the EEC had to obtain the elimination of disparities through 
formula similar to the écrêtement.
The positions of the Six were rather close. They all agreed that disparities issue 
had to be resolved, and felt that, after having accepted the principle of a new GATT 
Round, further study would be needed. Where they differed was the degree of 
flexibility: the Five underlined that the American reaction had to be considered, while 
Giscard D’Estaing preferred to express his support for the écrêtement, but without 
insisting that it be made the formal position of the EEC in Geneva. However, this did 
not stop the elaboration o f a mandate for the EEC representatives. The EEC accepted 
the principle o f a new GATT conference, to actively attend it and to negotiate across the 
board in order to reduce duties and disparities, renouncing its as formal EEC position. 
The key to the agreement, the price for French acquiescence, consisted in leaving open 
the rules of the negotiations and in proposing the establishment of the working group 
that would report to GATT by 15 o f August 1963. The French had made a clear step 
towards a compromise: they had not accepted the American formula as the fixed rule to 
reduce tariffs, but they had budged from insisting that the écrêtement plan be the formal 
EEC position as a condition for EEC participation in Geneva.
More problematic was the elaboration of a common position for agriculture, as it 
touched upon the internal affairs o f the EEC and its agenda. For Giscard d’Estaing, 
negotiating in Geneva over this sector required “ la definition préalable de l’ensemble de 
la politique agricole commune” . Commissioner for Agriculture Mansholt fully 
supported the French minister as he felt it impossible to elaborate a EEC common 
position in the negotiations with the USA over agricultural products, if the common 
agricultural policy on these products had not been not adopted. In effect, the level of 
EEC protectionism was determined by the level of common prices, thus, without the 
setting of these prices, the EEC could not bargain in Geneva. Supported by Mansholt’s 
declaration, Giscard D ’Estaing made it clear that negotiations in GATT could not deal 
with agricultural products “tant que la politique agricole commune ne sera pas au 
préalable arrêtée”, and proposed to insert into the mandate to the EEC representatives a 
statement pleadging that the EEC would agree to include agriculture in the Round as 
soon as the CAP “aura été définie dans son ensable”.
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Giscard D ’Estaing’s proposal provoked a tough reaction on the part o f Schroeder 
and Lahr. The Germans considered it obvious that the EEC could not negotiate over 
agriculture in Geneva if  an agreement between the Six had not been reached in Brussels, 
but “ l’application de ce principe ne peut pas impliquer [...] que l’ensemble de la 
politique agricole commune doit être arrêté préalablement à l’ouverture des 
négociations commerciales”. Lahr also recalled that article 40 of Treaty of Rome 
required the establishment of the CAP by the end o f the transitional period, on 1 
January 1970 and this period could not be shortened in view of the GATT Round. 
Against Lahr’s point of view, Mansholt reaffirmed that the EEC could not negotiate in 
Geneva over agricultural products i f  its own policy was unknown. The full adoption o f 
the CAP was not necessary, for the moment it was sufficient that, in October 1963, the 
Council adopt regulations for rice, meat and dairy products in order to allow the EEC to 
elaborate the conditions under which the GATT negotiations over agriculture could take 
place. The Dutch Prime Minister Marijnen made a distinction between “les 
mécanismes” and “la mise en oeuvre de la politique agricole commune” and argued that 
international negotiations over agricultural products would be difficult to carry out if the 
Six had different agricultural policies. As such, a harmonization was necessary. This did 
not imply that, in order to negotiate with the Americans, the entire CAP had to be 
defined and, in this way, he categorically refused to link the opening of the Geneva 
negotiations on agriculture to the preliminary adoption o f the entire CAP.
Mansholt tried to find a way out o f the impasse, making a distinction between 
adopter and entrer en vigeur. The adoption [adoption] o f  the common regulations was 
indispensable for the opening of negotiations with third countries, but their preliminary 
implementation [leur mise en vigueur préalable] was not. For Luns and Schroeder, 
negotiations with third countries had to take place simultaneously to the elaboration o f 
the regulations of the CAP. If  EEC started negotiations with third countries only after 
the adoption o f these regulations, negotiations in Geneva would take too much time and 
would place the EEC in a difficult position. For Mansholt, this kind of problem could be 
avoided if the Six had the political willingness to make progress on both the CAP and 
negotiations with third countries. Giscard D ’Estaing argued that no matter how it was 
formulated, the mandate for agriculture had not to be too general in nature so as to 
create the impression that negotiations could start even if, internally, regulations on 
meat, dairy products and rice were not adopted. Couve de Murville even added that if 
the mandate was drafted without any mention of the need to further elaborate CAP 
rules, third countries could think that the Six would be ready to discuss with them in 
Geneva the adoption of the rules of the CAP, which was out o f the question.
Given these positions, Colombo and Spaak suggested the setting up o f  a link 
between the GATT negotiations and the EEC internal action program, since all Six 
seemed to agree that, in order to go on with the negotiations in Geneva, progress had to 
be made in the elaboration of the CAP. Schaus suggested the final compromise in which 
which the Council concluded that the EEC was prepared to take part in the GATT 
negotiations on agricultural products, where again a working group was to be 
established. Then, during the session, it was stated that “Le Conseil constate qu 77 va de 
soi qu *il n ’est pas dérogé au principe que des négociations agricoles ne pourront être 
abordées, quant au fond, que dans la mesure où la Communauté aura arrêté ses 
position communes”.
As for the EEC working agenda, the Six agreed to implement the first part of the 
synchronization plan by adopting the next lot of the CAP by 31 December 1963 -  
regulations for meat, rice and dairy products, decision for the unify cereal prices for 
1964/1965 -  and to elaborate a mandate to negotiate in the Kennedy Round before that
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date. The Five clearly wanted the Kennedy Round mandate to be adopted before the 
CAP lot in order to prevent a “French maneuver” in this regard.77 In truth, this decision 
was not painless. Germany and The Netherlands wanted the Council only to elaborate 
the three regulations by the end o f the year, postponing their implementation to ensure 
that a satisfactory position would also be adopted for the Kennedy Round. This was the 
real meaning o f synchronization. This proposal raised the tough opposition of Couve de 
Murville, supported by Colombo, Spaak and the Commission. For the French Minister, 
the German position was inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome, and against the 
commitment given in January 1962, and, in any case, a further elaboration of the CAP 
was necessary to have a negotiating position in Geneva. Therefore, decisions were to be 
taken without further delay. In the end, the German-Dutch position did not prevail, the 
Six agreeing to take decisions by the end of the year, with Couve de Murville accepting 
the postponement the deadline to 31 December, rather than 1 July as previously 
agreed. As such, the elaboration of the EEC common position in Geneva enmeshed 
with the bargain among the Six over the EEC agenda, and a clear synchronization was 
established between the achievements in the area of the CAP and those for the Kennedy 
Round, as this was considered by the Five as the only means of preventing the French 
from stalling the Round. As shown in the next chapter, the quarrel over the EEC agenda 
was not over. In fact, after it had been approved it also had to be implemented, and here 
the German obstructionism of the CAP resurfaced, putting at risk the Kennedy Round. 
However, for the time being, the EEC could attend the GATT Ministerial meeting.
The last issue to be settled concerned EEC representation in Geneva. The 
Commission had every intention of being the sole negotiator, not only in the industrial 
sector negotiations but also for agriculture, for which it lacked authority under the 
Treaty of Rome, given that the latter authorised the Commission to negotiate only on 
tariffs. The Commission felt it impossible to separate tariffs from the other issues, thus a 
sole negotiator had to be in place, thus allowing the Commission to also negotiate for 
agriculture and NTBs in general. Member states had often asserted that Commission 
had not to negotiate in agriculture because it lacked authority.79 However, interestingly 
enough, this issue was never openly raised in the Council of Ministers with the result 
that the Commission, step by step, gained authority also for agriculture. For the GATT 
Ministerial meeting, the Six decided to have the EEC represented by the delegation of 
the country holding the presidency of the EEC Council, Luxembourg, and Rey, 
Maijolin and Mansholt for the Commission. Schaus would give the speech at the 
opening session of the ministerial meeting to present the EEC position. In the 
negotiations with the other contracting parties, Luxembourg and the Commission would 
represent the EEC, while coordinating meetings between the EEC negotiating team and 
the six governments would take place in Geneva between the GATT sessions. In short, 
this meant that the EEC negotiating team, with the mandate received from the 
governments, would meet the delegations of the other contracting parties. If an
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agreement could not be reached immediately within the received mandate’s terms, the 
EEC negotiating team would meet the representatives o f the six governments in the 
coordinating meetings to set up a new common position and to issue a new mandate. 
The procedure would continue until the agreement was eventually reached. Obviously, 
this was a time-consuming procedure, but it was the only way the EEC could work.80
The Six considered the May session as a convalescence meeting in which the 
EEC, after the internal crisis, returned to an almost normal working situation. They 
were aware o f the political and economic importance o f the GATT negotiations, and 
that the outcome of the new Round could, for good or for ill, affect EEC trade policy, 
US-EEC relations, the future of NATO, and the fundamental unity and strength of the 
Western World. The need for the Six to elaborate a common position to attend the 
Ministerial Meeting in Geneva helped to get the EEC back to work in a climate that, as 
Erhard had recounted, was not particularly bad.81
When informed by the Dutch and the Germans on the developments o f the EEC 
Council, Washington stated its dissatisfaction and made clear it that the GATT 
ministerial meeting had to accept equal linear cuts as the basis for the negotiations. The 
Dutch advised the State Department that in order to persuade the EEC, the US had to 
convincingly present the case for linear cuts, and to be sufficiently flexible to take into 
account the disparity problem. In this way, the Germans and Dutch would be able to 
harden their positions within the EEC and favour the American formula. With 
Washington and Paris taking extreme polarised positions, Bonn was fully aware of its 
crucial role in the elaboration o f a proposal acceptable by both parties. Germany 
favoured a compromised basic tariff reduction plan, under which the US proposal for a 
50% linear cut would be accepted, but arrangements for dealing with disparities would 
be elaborated at outset and not merely at end o f negotiations as hinted by Washington. 
Erhard hoped to reconcile the respective American and French stances, and it was with 
this goal in mind that he arrived in Geneva where he hoped to take it up with Giscard 
D ’Estaing and Herter and seek to formulate a compromise.82
4.6 The GATT Ministerial meeting of 16-21 May 1963: “The 
Shell of an Egg”
On 16 May, the representatives o f the contracting parties gathered in Geneva and 
the tough bargaining began. The EEC and the USA were aware that the Ministerial 
meeting had to be successfully concluded in order to put the new round back on track, 
but reaching an agreement did not prove to be easy. Herter and Blumenthal, 
accompanied by Ball, arrived in Geneva with the firm intention of imposing their point 
o f view and o f putting pressure on GATT members in order to push them to adopt the 
American standpoint and isolate the EEC from the outset. However, they soon 
discovered that this was not enough, as the EEC toughly bargained and was not willing 
to back down from its position without concessions.
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As noted, the Ministerial meeting had to deal with three main questions: the 
formula to reduce tariffs, rules to deal with agriculture and measures to favour trade of 
LDCs. In spite o f the declared intentions, the commercial problems of the LDCs 
received scarce attention from the industrialised countries who focused on agriculture 
and, above all, on reductions of tariffs. Twenty-one LDCs presented an Action Program 
which would lead to complete free trade for their exports. The proposal was an open 
attack on the Association agreement of the EEC, and created a fracture between the 
EEC and the eighteen African countries of the AOC on the one hand and the rest of the 
contracting parties on the other. The latter were ready to accept the Action Program, 
with some exceptions from the United Kingdom for its preferential system, by contrast 
the EEC maintained that the LDCs had to arrive at liberalism through an organization of 
international markets for their products, and flatly stated that the Association agreement 
could not be removed. The associated African countries, willing to defend their 
Agreement, refused to criticize the EEC, so causing bitterness on the part of the other 
African countries, in particular the Commonwealth ones. In any case, the EEC 
representatives refused to negotiate on this issue as they lacked the mandate.84
In agriculture, the American proposal consisted of agreeing that the rules 
guiding the negotiations lead to a meaningful liberalization of international trade of 
agricultural products. In contrast, anticipating the future quarrel about agriculture, for 
the Six, the organization of agricultural markers was far more important than 
liberalization. They supported the proposal to negotiate commodity agreements for 
meat, cereal and diary products, but opposed interim agreements, and refused to take a 
position on the American two-tier approach. After long discussions, in response to the 
EEC’s suggestion, the contracting parties agreed that, rather than liberalization, the 
negotiations would lead to the creation of “acceptable condition o f access” to world 
markets for agricultural products and accepted the setting up of a working group to deal 
with the methods and means of the negotiations in this sector. The clash over agriculture 
was thus postponed.85
More awkward was the reaching of an agreement on tariff reduction, on which 
the Ministerial meeting almost totally focused. Indeed, only at the last moment was 
compromise, or better a truce, reached. From the outset, the negotiation was dominated 
by the conflict between the USA and the EEC, with the result that the plenary session 
was abandoned and the bargain continued bilaterally with exchanges of notes and 
meetings between Brasseur, the porte-parole o f the EEC member states, Rey and 
Marjolin for the Commission, and Blumenthal and Herter for the American delegation, 
with the mediation of the Swiss Hans Schaffner, the Chairman of the GATT Ministerial 
Meeting, who, during the entire conference, played a key reconciling role. These 
negotiations are fully described here, more than necessary in order to understand the 
final compromise reached, in order to illustrate the cumbersome EEC decision-making 
process that heavily influenced the path of the negotiations and often frustrated the 
American negotiators.
The EEC found the American proposal for approving the uniform linear cut 
method unacceptable as the only way of reducing tariffs, and maintained its position 
whereby a working group had to be established to consider the reduction formula. By 
contrast, Herter wanted the Ministerial meeting to adopt equal linear reductions as the
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negotiating rule. On 18 May, he officially handed Brasseur and Rey the American 
proposal: the contracting parties would decide over the cutting formula in the course o f 
the Ministerial meeting, the equal linear cut would be the only principle retained, but in 
a second phase, during which procedures would be discussed in detail, the EEC worries 
over disparities, a subsidiary problem, would be considered.86
Given that the EEC representatives could not decide on the American proposal, 
as they lacked a mandate, a coordination meeting took place. Brasseur and the 
Commission found the American proposal unacceptable for it merely reproduced the 
American point of view, while the concession to discuss EEC preoccupations during a 
second phase was too small to be accepted. The equal linear reduction would represent 
the basic principle, whereas the disparity issue would be considered only as a matter of 
procedure, placing the EEC in a weak position. Giscard D ’Estaing and Rey found it 
inopportune and premature to decide about the negotiating rules and wanted to stick to 
the 8-9 May directive, while the other Five, while refusing the American proposal, 
agreed to negotiate over it, and to prepare amendments so as to facilitate the reaching of 
an agreement with Herter. The Dutch Minister van den Berghe even claimed that the 
Americans had already made a step towards the EEC position in presenting a new 
proposal, and as all the EEC Ministers were in Geneva, the 8-9 May directive could be 
changed. For van den Berghe, supported by the Germans, the EEC could even accept 
that the respective American and EEC priorities would not be, formally, o f the same 
importance. In the end, Marjolin and Brasseur suggested trying to convince the 
American delegation to set up a working group. Only i f  the Americans rejected this 
proposal, would the EEC have to make amendments to the American proposals in order 
to place the disparity matters and the equal linear cut on the same formal basis.87
In the meantime, the Germans spoke with the Americans behind the scenes. 
Erhard, Lahr and State Secretary Westrick met with Herter and expressed their concern 
that the ministerial meeting could end in failure, and urged the United States to act in a 
sprit of compromise, to make concessions and not to press too strongly for the equal 
linear principle. Erhard was convinced that, with patience, the difficulties in the area of 
the tariff formula cold be resolved. For this reason he would remain in Geneva in order 
to “play his role in trying to modify intransigent attitude o f the French” and to find a 
compromise within the EEC.88
When the bargaining restarted, Rey refused the American proposal and again 
demanded that the whole matter be referred to a working group. The Commissioner 
also expressed his dismay at the pressure being put on the EEC. For him, “when the 
EEC was put under pressure no decisions were ever made and this was borne out of 
experience”. Herter strongly restated the US position and in the light of Rey’s firm 
position, he assumed an even tougher stance, claiming that, as he felt that most of the 
contracting parties would approve US formula, he would reserve the right to present the 
US solution in open GATT session and put it to a vote.89 The bargaining took place in 
nervous atmosphere, and the frayed relations between the US and the EEC delegations 
did not make the reaching o f an agreement any easier. The Americans “claimed that the
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Six were masters in delaying tactics and Maijolin replied that he had neither come to 
say or to hear disagreeable things.”90
In light o f the impossibility o f achieving a conciliation, the Six gathered for a 
new coordination meeting. Erhard, underlining that the EEC was running the risk of 
being isolated and placed in undesirable position at the international level if the GATT 
Ministerial meeting collapsed, suggested to amend the American proposal in order to 
place the disparity issue and the equal linear cut at the same formal level. The tariff 
negotiations were to be based on substantial linear tariff reductions. If substantial 
disparities, that is those obstructive to trade, did not exist, the reduction would be linear; 
if substantial disparities did exist, reductions would be based on special and automatic 
rules for the elimination the disparity. Rey judged Erhard’s formal a as "une bonne 
proposition de compromit'. Giscard D’Estaing also supported the Erhard formula, 
defined as “très positive” but, supported by Rey, the Benelux countries and Italy, 
obtained the modification that the definition of disparity as able to obstruct trade 
exchanges be eliminated otherwise the EEC would be obliged to prove that the disparity 
had negative effects.91
In response to the EEC proposal, Herter produced with a counterproposal: only 
the equal linear cut was accepted as a general principle, while the disparity problem 
should be considered as a reason for an exception to the linear cut, provided that the 
EEC could prove that the disparity represented an obstruction to trade exchanges, so 
putting on the EEC the burden of proof in proving negative effects of the disparities. As 
the counterproposal ignored the automatic rule for reducing disparities, the EEC 
representatives did not have the authority to decide on it, and, consequently, another 
coordinating meeting took place.
Rey refused the American counterproposal. The EEC had already made 
considerable concessions and no more yielding was to be done, otherwise the EEC 
would lose its credibility. Moreover, for the first time in five years, noted Rey, the 
Commission negotiated with the United States in the GATT framework “devant une 
position américaine particulièrement intransigeante et désagréable". Rey stated that 
actions were being taken by the American delegation to isolate the EEC and that “cette 
attitude ne correspond guère à la conception d'une partnership a tla n tiq u e 92
Rey’s opposition to make further concessions was not shared by Erhard and van 
den Berghe. For the German Minister, the Americans had also made concessions and 
the EEC could not simply refuse the American counterproposal, because if the 
Ministerial meeting collapsed, the Six would be blamed. For van den Berghe, Rey was 
over-dramatizing the situation, the Americans had made concessions, and the EEC had
90
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not, assuming a rigid position, and blocking the route to a final compromise. The 
Commission was totally supported by Giscard D ’Estaing. Given the 8-9 May directive, 
the proposal of the EEC represented the maximum concession that the Six could grant. 
Moreover, the French minister shared Rey’s remark regarding the pressure put on the 
EEC, and argued that, considering the Round had to begin in May 1964, it was not a 
disaster i f  the GATT session did not decide on all the problems of the negotiating rules. 
In any case, Giscard D ’Estaing agreed to discuss the formula. What the EEC could do 
was to elaborate its own position in a way Washington could more easily accept it.
To find a compromise, Erhard, supported by van den Berghe, proposed to 
establish a weak link between the existence of disparities and distortions in trade 
exchanges, in order to take a step towards the Americans but without putting the EEC 
under the condition of proving the negative effects of disparities. Giscard D ’Estaing, the 
Belgian Minister Fayat, the Italian Director General for Foreign Trade at the Ministry o f 
Foreign Affairs Ferlesch and Maijolin refused this solution, for no allusion to  distortion 
to trade was to be made. The EEC had to identify the very existence o f disparities 
caused by the difference in the levels of duties, not to prove their consequences. After 
tense exchanges of recriminations between the Dutch and the French on how flexible 
the EEC had to be with Washington, a compromise was reached. The EEC agreed to 
found the tariff negotiations on equal and substantial linear cuts with limited exceptions. 
In case of sensible disparities in the level of tariffs, the tariff reduction would be based 
upon special rules of general and automatic application. Criteria were to be approved to 
determine significant disparities in tariff levels and the special rules applicable for tariff 
reduction in these cases. Upon reaching the compromise, Giscard D’Estaing made clear 
that it was the last concession that he would allow, otherwise the EEC would be placed 
in a position o f inferiority, allowing third countries to continue to demand concessions. 
Meanwhile, Van den Berghe replied that the last formula elaborated by the EEC was not 
considered by his delegation as a definitive position of the Community.
After the compromise had been reached, van den Berghe and Erhard advised 
that, given the importance of the next meeting with the Americans, a representative o f 
each member state should be present at the talks. Under the justification that the 
representatives of the member states were to carefully report to their governments on 
the GATT session, they claimed that their presence at the meeting was also useful from 
a practical point o f view, as it would avoid the shuttle diplomacy that slowed the 
negotiations. With the representatives of member states present, the bargain could 
continue until an agreement was reached without the need to interrupt the discussion in 
order to let the EEC representatives meet with the member states. This suggestion had 
not to be interpreted by the EEC representatives as a sign of mistrust; instead, it was a 
proposal to make the task o f negotiators easier. Erhard underlined that the GATT 
Ministerial session had, above all, a political dimension and this allowed the departure 
from the procedures of the Treaty o f  Rome.
The Dutch-German suggestion, which highlighted that frictions existed with the 
Commission, provoked the tough opposition of Rey and Giscard D ’Estaing. Rey, 
jealous of the Commission’s prerogatives under the Treaty, wanted to stick to the Treaty 
of Rome, and observed that in the negotiations with the Americans the EEC 
representatives had defended the EEC position in a moderate and flexible manner, but at 
the same time in a tough way, and no EEC governments could oppose what they were 
doing. On top o f this, if the EEC delegation were composed of the six Ministers and of 
the two members of the Commission and each of them would speak, the differences that 
existed between within the EEC would inevitably appear and be exploited by the 
Americans. Giscard D’Estaing, who did not want the members o f the American
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delegation to put pressure on those EEC members most sensitive to American influence, 
spelled out that he had no intention of attending the next meeting with the Americans. 
Brasseur, supporting Rey, pointed out the bad atmosphere that the US created in order 
to put pressure on the EEC, and underlined the efficiency with which Rey and Maijolin 
had defended the EEC position. Because of the tough French opposition, the proposal 
was eventually refused.93
Few hours before the end o f the ministerial meeting, the EEC delegation 
submitted its new proposal to Schaffner. Blumenthal and Herter, who, until that time 
had had a rather rigid attitude, realized that US position could not be defended and that 
a compromise had to be sought in order to conclude the meeting. The Americans replied 
with a request to clarify that the word sensib/e/significant meant sensible significant in 
trade terms with an interpretation made by Schaffner. As the EEC representatives 
lacked authority to respond, a new coordinating meeting took place.94 Germany, The 
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy immediately accepted the American request. The US 
and EEC positions had become very close, and a refusal was difficult to justify. In 
contrast, for Giscard D’Estaing and the Commission, the US proposal could be 
accepted, but the amendment had to be presented directly by the Americans and not by 
Schaffner, since the interpretation was American. The difference was slight but 
important: an interpretation given by the President concerned all contracting parties, 
while an interpretation given by the USA concerned only the USA. Because o f the 
refusal of the o f the Five to toe this line, Giscard D’Estaing agree to give up and a 
compromise was suggested by the French minister himself: the EEC would accept the 
interpretation given by Schaffner, but making clear that, in accepting it, the EEC kept its 
own position on the way to indicate a disparity, which could also exist in case the 
difference of tariffs was of only a few points.95
On 21 May at 23.30, the agreement was reached. The Ministers agreed that a 
significant liberalization o f world trade was desirable, and, to that purpose, a 
multilateral trade conference based on the MFN rule would begin in Geneva on 4 May 
1964. Both industrial and agricultural sectors would be considered, both tariff and non- 
tariff barriers would be dealt with. Equal and substantial linear tariff cuts with limited 
exceptions submitted to justification and confrontation would be made. In case of 
significant disparities, tariff reductions would be made on the basis of special rules of 
automatic and general application. According to the Chairman’s statement, significant 
meant “meaningful in terms of trade”. A Committee for Trade Negotiations (TNC) 
made of representatives of contracting parties was set up and charged with agreeing on a 
negotiating plan to reduce tariffs by the 1 August 1963, and to complete its task by 
November 1963. In particular, the TNC had to establish the degree of the tariffs cuts 
and rules for exceptions, to determine disparities and the general and automatic rule for 
reducing them, how to deal with NTBs and agriculture and, under the initiative o f the 
United States, and in spite o f the opposition of the EEC, with the problem of countries 
with economic or trade structures with peculiarities -  the developing countries -  or
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exporting predominantly agricultural products -  the major part of the Commonwealth 
countries -  that, because o f this problem, would not negotiate according to the linear 
rule principle. As a result, only the United States, the EEC, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the other EFT A countries would negotiate along the linear rule. The Round had to 
create acceptable conditions o f access to world markets for agricultural products and all 
forms of protection had to be included. The special working groups on meat and cereal, 
already set up, would continue their work and a special working group for dairy 
products was established.96
The GATT Ministerial M eeting was successful in that it avoided a breakdown, 
but it produced merely a framework agreement, not a detailed settlement. As Evans 
notes, “the ministers achieved the semblance o f a truce by a judicious mixture of those 
two most valuable instruments o f diplomacy: postponement and ambiguity” .97 Rules 
remained to be elaborated, and the confrontation between the two sides of the Atlantic 
was shifted to the TNC. The compromise on the reduction of tariffs was so ambiguous 
and full o f loopholes that each party could point to the part it liked more, and turn a 
blind eye to other part. For the United States, the interpretation o f Schaffner was 
binding and allowed them to maintain their basic position on the tariff disparity 
problem.98 For the French, the interpretation had no substantive content; Geneva had 
settled nothing and the chairman’s interpretation was a meaningless “clause de style” 
accepted because it could mean anything.99 Rightly, Erhard commented: “We are 
agreed on the shell of an egg. What will be in the egg, we don’t know”.100
The first GATT Ministerial meeting of what was to be the Atlantic partnership 
era took place in a negative atmosphere, that had little to do with that cooperation 
advocated by Kennedy. The US tactics shocked the Six. The Americans conducted a 
tough campaign against the EEC -  above all against the French, claimed Paris -  and put 
pressure on third countries to isolate the EEC. Pressure was also put on the 
representatives o f the Six in order to divide them .101 The American position towards the 
EEC had changed, compared to the 1958 GATT article XXIV and Dillon Round 
negotiations, and the US was now taking a harder line. Washington wanted the EEC to 
be liberal and fully integrated in the multilateral system, and therefore wanted it to 
attend the Round to drastically reduce tariffs. Moreover, with the balance o f payments 
in a poor condition, Washington was less inclined to accommodate the Europeans. 
However, American hardness was also created by the “de Gaulle factor”. Washington 
feared that Paris was not willing to  negotiate in Geneva, and that with its insistence on 
disparities was merely trying to deadlock or delay the Round, and that the Five would 
bow to essentially French interests in order to keep the Community intact. American 
stiffness was therefore created by the determination to push the Five to oppose French 
position if they did not want the collapse of the Ministerial meeting and the Kennedy
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Round. For this same reason, Washington stressed the enormous political importance of 
the Ministerial meeting in order to put further pressure on the EEC. However, the bad 
atmosphere created by the Americans was also due to the working procedure o f the 
EEC. The Ministerial meeting demonstrated that negotiations with the EEC presented 
challenging technical problems. The Six were achieving a common outlook and were 
endowing the EEC Commission with negotiating authority, a long and difficult process, 
since EEC decisions were hammered out only after prolonged discussions, and tended 
to come very late in the day. The Six’s slowness put a brake on progress, thus Herter 
felt the responsibility for moving steadily forward with the negotiations.102
Essential in finding a compromise was the diplomatic action of Erhard, who 
played an active role in putting forward proposals acceptable to the Americans and the 
French alike. Herter saw Erhard’s negotiating tactics as very helpful for achieving the 
final results.103 According to the British, Erhard’s role of was also made crucial by, the 
“total absence o f any affective contact between the American and the French 
delegations. [...] Long hours were wasted while intermediaries attempted to bring the 
two sides together on what seemed in essence trifling points of interpretation o f the 
American formula for a Conference resolution. What was significantly lacking was any 
real attempt by Americans and French officials to iron out points at issues between 
them.” 104
By contrast, Paris did not appreciate Erhard’s action. The French felt that a 
Franco-German agreement was crucial for finding a compromise on the negotiating 
rules, and such an agreement could be easily attained since France and Germany held a 
common view on various important issues. The relative similarity of the structure of 
German and French industry, and the progressive harmonization of their production 
conditions pushed the two countries to have analogous positions on the EEC tariff 
structure which aimed to protect their industries, and to share the same positions on 
disparities, non-tariff barriers, the full and active participation of the EFTA and the 
Commonwealth countries, and the defense of the Association agreement. France even 
claimed that on the link between the industrial and the agricultural negotiations there 
was less divergence “que cette relation est reconnue de façon plus générale et 
indépendamment de toute modalité concrete”. However, the similarity could not hide a 
general and fundamental difference regarding the conducting of negotiations, capable of 
disrupting them; the degree of firmness with which the EEC should maintain its 
positions before a harsh American opposition. At the Ministerial meeting, the French 
found the Germans too sensitive to American pressures. Bonn, in front of a tough 
American reaction, was more inclined to compromise than seemed necessary. If  this 
German tendency continued, so held Paris, it could place the EEC in a position of 
radical weakness. Concession after concession, the EEC would be pushed to 
compromise on an essential element, namely the level and forms of protection it wished 
to retain in order to facilitate the fusion of the economics o f the Six, and the affirmation
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of the economic entity established by the Treaty o f Rome. For the French, the 
agreement between France and Germany had to include a broader agreement on the 
political meaning of the negotiations and on the maximum level of concessions which 
could be made, so that the rapprochement o f the Atlantic economics would not take 
place at the expense of the identity-building of the EEC.105
As for the relations among the Six, the Ministerial meeting showed that France 
was not isolated, and that a common front against it did not exist. France was constantly 
supported by the Commission, and often by Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. Moreover, 
France did not play an obstructionist role, while it did bargain hard to defend its trade 
interests, but Giscard D ’Estaing agreed to depart from the negotiating position of the 
EEC established on 8-9 May and to accept equal linear cut as the basis for 
negotiations.106 In spite o f external pressures, the American attempt to divide them and 
different internal positions, the Six were able to attend the negotiations as a single unit, 
capable o f defending their point o f view and obtaining concessions from Washington. 
This was thanks to their agreements on some basic aspects of the negotiations. The 
solidarity among the Six was perceived also by the Quai d’Orsay, which only 
complained about a Dutch shift towards American positions.107
It is also worth noting that, within the EEC, the Commission, France, Germany, 
The Netherlands and to some extent Luxembourg, who was chairing the Presidency, 
played an active part in shaping the EEC common position. These countries were 
represented at ministerial level -  France and Germany even with top rank ministers like 
Giscard d’Estaing and Erhard -  during the entire GATT session, and vigorously 
defended their trade interests. On the contrary, Italy and Belgium for the moment took a 
more passive stance, limiting their role to supporting proposals elaborated by other 
countries. And Italy, with much at stake in the reduction o f tariffs, being a high-tariff 
countiy, was not even represented at ministerial level. As for the Commission, Rey and 
Marjolin played an important role, both in shaping the EEC common position and in the 
bargaining with the USA. However, its role as sole negotiating agent was far from 
having been established and, as the Dutch and the German request to be present at the 
talks with Herter and Blumenthal showed, challenges to the establishment o f this role 
could also come from those member states that overtly supported the supranational 
aspects of the Treaty of Rome.
The GATT Ministerial meeting plainly showed Washington that the sweeping 
liberalization o f international trade would not be an easy objective to achieve. This 
worried Kennedy, who saw his program endangered by the attitude o f the Europeans. 
For this reason, when meeting the French and the Germans in the aftermath of the 
GATT session, he felt the need to lecture them on the importance of the Kennedy
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Round, the link that existed between trade, security and monetary issues, and the 
necessity of collaborating with the United States. When he met French Foreign Minister 
Couve de Murville in Washington at the end o f May 1963, Kennedy stressed the 
relevance which his Administration attached to GATT Round and noted that the United 
States had a deficit in its balance o f payments because o f US expenditure for military 
and foreign aid programs. However, Couve saw things differently: Washington was 
dealing with “the problem o f the balance of payments piecemeal”, while the West 
countries were “to have sound monetary policy”. In any case, the United States did not 
have a genuine deficit, it having a foreign trade surplus, and exporting too much US 
capital abroad.108
The meeting with the Germans was no more positive. With Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and Erhard in June 1963 in Bonn, Kennedy mentioned the valuable 
contribution o f the Germans to the Geneva GATT negotiation. The US President also 
wondered “why this was called the Kennedy Round and why it should not be called the 
Adenauer Round or the de Gaulle Round”, but, in any case, he claimed, the important 
thing was that it turned out to be a success. Kennedy hinted that economic relations 
“including such matters as monetary policy, offset arrangements and the Kennedy 
Round o f trade negotiations [...] were possibly even more important to us now than 
nuclear matters”, since the West was strong enough to deter any attack, while huge 
unresolved problems remained in the economic field. Foreign trade was important for 
the United States as “it played a key role in enabling us to earn enough to maintain our 
overseas commitments”. Thus, it was to be conducted at the highest level, involving 
heads o f governments and foreign and defense ministers, and not left to technical 
specialists, such as agricultural experts and tariff commissioners. “We must conduct 
these negotiations at the top level -  otherwise we'll be ruined by bookkeepers”, claimed 
Kennedy. And the United States, while counting on the cooperation o f all countries, 
relied above all on the Germans. However, Adenauer did not seem to be very impressed 
by Kennedy’s words. In his view, Germany had economic problems too and its “export 
balances were gone. German exports were coming down close to imports and the 
German trade balance was delicate” . Thus, despite German good will for the successful 
conclusion of the negotiations, “[...] it should be remembered that the Germans were 
not as rich as some people believed” .109
At the end of June 1963, Kennedy toured Western Europe and reaffirmed the 
importance of the Atlantic partnership. In his speech on 25 June in St. Paul’s Church in 
Frankfurt, Kennedy stressed his support for the Atlantic partnership and the political 
significance o f the Kennedy Round: “These negotiations are a test of our unity. While 
each nation must naturally look out for its own interests, each nation must also look out 
for the common interest, the need for greater markets on both sides of the Atlantic, the 
need to reduce the imbalance between developed and developing nations and the need 
to stimulate the Atlantic economy to higher levels o f production rather than to stifle it 
by higher level o f protection”11 Kennedy therefore pushed the GATT negotiations 
forward, but after the stormy Ministerial meeting that had illustrated the difficulty in
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moving the talks forward, his irritation that this fought Round bore his name 
remained.111
Conclusion
The first stage o f the Kennedy Round was complex and dominated by the 
conflict between the USA and the EEC over the rules o f the negotiations. Washington 
had started the negotiations thinking o f imposing its vision of the Kennedy Round along 
the TEA’s lines. Once in Geneva, it became clear, however, that this was not possible. 
The EEC, and above all the French, had their own vision of the Kennedy Round, which 
did not correspond to the American one. The Ministerial meeting showed that the EEC 
would not accept a Kennedy Round according to the TEA, and that the USA was 
obliged to find a middle ground between its vision of the Round and the EEC one.
The clash was the result o f different postures: The EEC considered US demands 
for concessions in agriculture as contrary to the CAP, and the US request for industrial 
cuts as excessive. Moreover, they held that they had not gathered in Geneva to please 
the United States and to redress the US balance o f payments deficit, but rather to boost 
their exports across the Atlantic and within Europe. The USA wanted the Kennedy 
Round to follow the TEA’s line, and felt the EEC request for harmonization of duties to 
be an anathema. The different aims which the respective parties wished to achieve in the 
Round led to clashes on the rules. However, the cumbersome EEC decision-making 
machinery, not made to hastily conduct international negotiations, made the 
negotiations in Geneva even more complex, as did the mistrust created by the French 
veto. The attitude of the French over-shadowed the work done because, again, no-one 
seemed to fully understand the intention of the French and whether they were merely 
defending their trade interests or seeking to wreck the Round with delaying tactics.
The negotiations over the rules demonstrated that the EEC, spurred by the 
French, who did not fear a showdown with Washington, had the ability to bargain as an 
equal partner with the United States in order to defend its trade interests. Moreover from 
this first phase of the negotiations onwards, the Round was a bilateral confrontation 
between the USA and the EEC, while other countries such as the United Kingdom, the 
small EFTA countries and Japan were relegated to a secondary status while the two big 
players hammered out their differences.
The preparation for the GATT Round helped the Six to overcome the crisis 
provoked by de Gaulle’s veto, and to regain some cohesion. Internal differences existed, 
but they were smaller than Washington believed, and, in any case, did not impede the 
formulation o f common position. In fact, differences existed above all regarding the 
degree of flexibility to grant in dealings with the United States. While The Netherlands 
and Germany were more willing to compromise, France wanted to stick to its vision of 
the Round. This aspect also seems to illustrate that while the United States and France 
had their own vision of the trade negotiations, the other four members o f the EEC 
reacted to these two visions, some o f  them actively -  Germany and The Netherlands -  
some others more passively -  Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg.




The launch of the Kennedy Round
Introduction
The previous chapter described the setting up o f the Kennedy Round, and 
concluded that, from the beginning, it proved to be a difficult set of negotiations, as well 
as a major confrontation between the USA and the EEC. It also explained that the need 
to attend the GATT conference helped the Six to find a quantum of unity and a shared 
position. After the GATT Ministerial Meeting, a great deal o f hard work remained to be 
done to put in place the rules of the negotiations and then launch the Round. In this 
chapter, we shall describe how the negotiations on the rules continued, but failed to 
make much progress, as the EEC and USA positions appeared irreconcilable. As a result 
when the Kennedy Round was formally opened in May 1964, only a framework o f rules 
had been agreed upon for the industrial sector, and no rules at all had been formulated 
for agriculture. This chapter also focuses on the internal preparation of EEC for Round 
and highlights that it became inextricably linked to the elaboration of the CAP on which 
a serious disagreement persisted in Brussels.
5.1 The GATT work July- November 1963: total impasse
As had been agreed at the GATT Ministerial meeting of May 1963, the 
contracting parties had to come to an agreement regarding the system of tariff 
reductions by 1 August, and had further agreed and to elaborate the rest of the 
negotiating plan by November 1963. A series of meetings occurred between June and 
November 1963 but fundamental differences persisted between the USA and the EEC 
regarding how to deal with disparities, and no progress at all was achieved in the areas 
of agriculture, non-tariff barriers or LDCs. On top of this, the persistent disagreement 
among the Six about the agenda of the EEC stalled the formulation of an EEC common 
position, and influenced the pace o f discussions in Geneva with the result that, by the 
end of the year, very little progress had been achieved in terms of the rules to govern the 
Round.
The Committee on Trade Negotiations met for its first session on 27 June and 
established three sub-committees to deal with the Tariff negotiating plan, Agriculture 
and Non-tariff barriers respectively. The subcommittee on tariff negotiations met for the 
first session from 2 to 4 July 1963 and criteria began to be elaborated, first to identify 
disparities and then to deal with them. A British proposal to identify disparities, under 
which there had to be a minimum level -  if  a tariff rate was above this level then prima 
facie  a disparity existed -  but secondly there had to also exist a minimum gap between 
this high tariff and low tariff elsewhere, and in these cases countries with the lower duty 
were required to cut it by less than the linear amount, and this plan was retained as the 
basis of further discussion. It soon became clear, however, that no further progress
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could be made since the Six had not discussed the figures for the minimum level and the 
minimum gap among themselves.1
It was only at the end o f July that the head o f the Commission delegation, 
Hijzen, put forward the EEC formula for identifying disparities, under which the 50% 
tariff cut should not be applied to duties which were over 30% ad valorem and in which 
the spread of the USA, UK and EEC tariffs was greater than 10% (30:10 formula). The 
United Kingdom found the EEC proposal a constructive starting point even if  it 
preferred a 20% gap, while the United States preferred a 60:20 formula in order to avoid 
a considerable watering down of the linear cut principle, caused by the many disparities 
caught by the EEC formula. A hard, confused and prolonged bargaining process took 
place over which figures should be inserted in the tariff disparity formula, with both the 
EEC and the USA sticking to their position. As a result, Wyndham White stated that no 
agreement could be reached, and postponed the negotiations until September.2
The EEC soon discovered that the 30:10 rule was incapable of solving the issue 
o f disparities. The main problem was that the disparities caught by the 30:10 rule, in the 
large majority of cases, concerned products imported predominantly from EFTA 
countries. The EEC risked of keeping discrimination with the EFTA countries because 
o f a disparity with the USA. Therefore, the 111 Committee and the Commission 
decided that more time was needed to allow an investigation by the experts o f the Six in 
order to select from the list of disparities under the 30:10 formula those cases where the 
EEC had the biggest interest in claiming tariff disparities treatment and making a 
reduction inferior to 50%. Once this selection had been carried out, the Six would be 
able to agree to a formula.3
When the Tariff Negotiating Plan Sub-Committee met at the end of September, 
Hijzen, “who this time was flanked by the French and the German delegates”, claimed 
that the detailed study undertaken by the Six on tariff disparities had not been 
completed and refused to discuss the disparity issues. Predictably, such a refusal 
disturbed the USA and the United Kingdom who had hoped to rapidly elaborate a 
solution. It above all annoyed the Americans who were becoming impatient with the 
cumbersome procedures by which the Six reached decisions. A new lengthy, and at 
times confused, discussion followed, complicated by the brusqueness with which the 
American delegation tried to advance its point o f view and with “from time to time the 
French Delegate [whispering] fiercely in Hijzen’s ear.”4 At the end it was decided, 
following a British proposal, to give time to the Commission to complete its internal 
study and return to Geneva fully prepared to reach an agreement by the end o f 
November 1963.5
1 PRO FO 371/172309 Telegram 89 from Cohen to Foreign Office, 2 July 1963; PRO FO 371/172310 Confidential note 
on the Kennedy Round, undated but written in July 1963; PRO FO 371/172310 GATT Trade Negotiations Committee, 
TN.64/W/1, 27 June 1963.
2 For the EEC decision to submit the 30:10 formula see CM2 1964/305 PV de la 49ème reunion du Comité 111, 19 July 
1963. For the discussion in Geneva PRO F0 371/172310 Note for meeting with Herter written by Mason, 23 July 1963; 
ibidem Telegram 107 from Cohen to Foreign Office, 29 July 1963; Note for President Johnson "The Trade Negotiations", 
undated by presumably written at the beginning o f December 1963, Herter's papers, Box 2, JFKL.
 ̂CM2 1963/305 PV de la 50ème réunion du Comité 111, 12 September 1964. PRO FO 371/172311 Telegram 124 from 
Cohen to Foreign Office, 20 September 1963 reporting a conversation between Denman and Horn, the German 
Delegate to GATT,
4 PRO FO 172311 Telegram 129 from Cohen to Foreign Office, 27 September 1963. See also BAC 506 026/1969 Note 
d'information, 1 October 1963; NA 59 Central Files Subject numeric 1963, box 3491, Telegram 1446 from Blumenthal to 
Herter, 2 October 1963.5
PRO FO 371/172311 Cabinet GATT Policy Committee, Item 1 Meeting of the GATTTNC September 19-20, note by 
Mason, 30 September 1963; AECB PV 247 30 October 1963 Annex "Négociations Tarifaires dans le cadre du GATT". The 
British noted that Americans' position was "not improved by the fact that the chief of the Commissions spokesman in 
Geneva is not of the caliber required for such a difficult negotiations. On the other hand the chief American negotiator
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During October, the Commission and the 111 Committee continued to study the 
disparity problem but no compromise could be reached among the Six. France insisted 
on the need to harmonise the CET and the US tariffs, while Germany and The 
Netherlands kept in mind American opposition to harmonization, and stressed that the 
number of disparities caught under the 30:10 formula had to be curbed, as it hit EEC 
exporting interests in Europe. Moreover, while for the Dutch, the Germans and the 
Italians, the EEC had to quickly elaborate its position on the negotiating plan in order to 
respect the deadline fixed in Geneva and not be blamed for any delay, for the 
Commission, the French and the Belgians, the EEC had to take all the time necessary to 
adopt a stance which corresponded to its interests.6 As a result, the Commission 
appeared in Geneva in November having achieved nothing concrete in this regard and, 
consequently, the Sub-committee adjourned to 1964 February in order to await the 
result o f the internal wrangling within the EEC on the mandate to be given to the 
Commission scheduled, according to the agreement reached in May, for December 
1963.7
In light o f the French refusal to find a hasty solution to disparities, the Germans 
became pessimistic regarding the Round’s prospects. For them, the disparity problem 
could be solved at the technical level, as long as a genuine desire to resolve the question 
existed. However, French tactics brought back memories of the FTA and Brussels 
negotiations: with technical work under way and the possibility of a solution on the 
horizon, the French seemed to be preparing a sabotage. The Germans felt Paris had 
displayed a quantum of flexibility at the beginning of July, but, by October, it had 
“reverted to their normal delaying tactics” and the former could not understand whether 
this reflected a desire to postpone decisions on the Kennedy Round until the end o f the 
year when the argument with the Germans on the CAP could possibly have been 
reached a conclusion, or rather a signal of a plan to “wreck the Kennedy Round” .8 In 
truth, France was not preparing to torpedo the negotiations, but, like the Commission, 
wanted to elaborate a formula to effectively defend its trade interests. Moreover, with 
the Germans still dragging their feet on the elaboration of the CAP, they felt in no hurry 
to reach an agreement in Geneva.
Work in the other sub-committees and working groups proceeded at an even 
slower pace. A first discussion took place on the identification of non-tariff barriers, but 
because of the stalemate over disparities, the sub-committee merely decided to adjourn. 
Very little progress was made in agriculture. Having not yet worked out the CAP’s 
structure for basic products, the EEC representatives were reluctant to take any active
has an arrogant and legalistic approach which is not fruitful for negotiating in Europe." PRO FO 371/172313 Note "The 
Kennedy Round", Situation and Prospects at 1 November 1963. According to the British "the lack of subtlety in [the 
Americans'] tactics in dealing with the Six does not always advance their cause". PRO BT 241/840 Confidential note on 
the Kennedy Round by the BT, 9 October 1963.
6 CM2 1963/305 PV de la 51*™ réunion du Comité 111, 3 October 1963; ibidem PV de la 53*™ réunion du Comité 111,5 
November 1963. PRO 241/840 Telegram 314 from Roberts of the British Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Office, 25 October 
1963, reporting a conversation between Horn and Denman on 3-4 October 111 Committee meeting; CM2 1963/539 PV 
de la 114ème session du Conseil de la CEE, 4-5 November 1963.
7 PRO 241/840 Telegram 175 from Cohen to Foreign Office, 26 November 1963; PRO FO 371/172316 Note on the 
Kennedy Round by Mason, 16 December 1963.
® PRO 241/840 Telegram 314 from Roberts of the British Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Office, 25 October 1963, 
reporting a conversation between Horn and Denman and ibidem Confidential note on the Kennedy Round by the BT, 9 
October 1963. For the British the Kennedy Round was in clear trouble. The main problem was it was not possible to say 
whether the French, with their delaying tactics were waiting "until the agriculture dog-fight in the Community is settled 
[...] or engaged in a holding operation until the General decided whether he is going to torpedo the Kennedy Round". 
PRO 241/840 Telegram 175 from Cohen to Foreign Office, 26 November 1963.
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part, and, consequently, other countries were not willing to put their cards on the table.9 
At the end o f November, negotiations in Geneva were at a total impasse. With the EEC 
lacking a negotiating position, and the attention o f the Six focused squarely on the 
wrangling over the CAP to take place at the end o f the year, GATT works were 
adjourned to 1964, by which time it was hoped that the EEC would finally show up with 
a negotiable common position.10
5.2 Challenges to the European Commission
For the Commission, the Kennedy Round represented an opportunity for it to 
affirm its role as negotiator agent o f  the EEC. From the outset, however, this aim was 
not easy to accomplish. The Dutch-German proposal made during the GATT 
Ministerial meeting to allow the Member States to attend the negotiation with the 
Americans, Franco-German surveillance of Hijzen at the discussions over disparities, 
and the very fact that Hijzen attended discussions with third countries flanked by 
Member States’ representatives and, as the British put it, looked as though he was under 
arrest, showed a clear willingness on the part of Member States to control the 
Commission, and a certain lack o f confidence in this institution. GATT talks would 
have great impact on EEC trade policy and the Six were not particularly eager to 
relinquish negotiating authority to the Commission.11
The EEC decision-making process also revealed a similar attitude on the part o f 
Member States. Under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission, together with 111 
Committee, was to make recommendations to the Council regarding trade negotiations. 
Both in the Dillon Round and then in this preliminary phase o f the Kennedy Round, the 
commission took a considerable amount of time in formulating these proposals, having 
to balance the different positions o f  the commissioners, the interest of the EEC as a 
whole, and the respective interests o f the individual Member States. However, after a 
proposal was sent to the Council, the latter, instead o f considering its recommendations, 
set about analysing the issue again from the start. After numerous meetings, studies and 
papers, the Council often came to realise that the Commission’s proposals were, in fact, 
reasonable and balanced. Furthermore, in its work, the Commission had to confront a 
rather hostile 111 Committee, which instead of performing its task of helping the 
Commission to complete its task, was eager to hamper the work of this institution, as 
well as an antagonistic COREPER. The mistrust o f COREPER and the 111 Committee 
caused a great deal of time to be wasted. Whenever the Commission presented a 
proposal to the Council, this issue was then studied from the outset by the COREPER 
and the 111 Committee, with the result that these institutions were dealing with the 
same subject at the same time; the Commission was also asked to attend the work of 
these two bodies, which took place contemporaneously, with the consequence that 
Commission officials did not know with whom to m eet.12 In the end, the Council would 
approve the proposal of the Commission. Hence, the internal procedures of the EEC 
were particularly cumbersome, because Member States displayed a lack of confidence
CM2/1963 558 Note ¿Information, S/449/63, 3 July 1963. PRO FO 371/172310 "Guidance for Ministers", n.13 
Preparation for the Kennedy Round: a Progress report, 25 October 1963; NA 364 Records of US Trade Representative 
on the Kennedy Round, Box 6, Note of Worthington "Agriculture and the Trade Negotiations", 2 August 1963.
10 PRO FO 371/172316 Note on the Kennedy Round by Mason, 16 December 1963.
11 For British comment see Johnson, pp.X
12 Confidential letter from Commissioner Rey to Ambassador J, Van Der Meulen, (Belgian member of COREPER), 20 
June 1963. Jean Rey's papers -  Box 34, Archives of the ULB, Brussels.
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in the Commission as a negotiator, and a strong willingness to control every detail, and, 
in so doing, reducing the Commission’s role in trade negotiations.
Problems for the Commission also came also from Washington and Geneva. The 
Americans had counted on the Commission’s liberalism and willingness to attend the 
Round as a factor which would counter French obstructionism, but after the Ministerial 
meeting they felt aggrieved by the actions of the Brussels institution, as well as the fact 
that it often lacked instructions to meaningfully negotiate. First, the Americans felt that 
the Commission’s previous enthusiasm for the Kennedy Round was becoming watered 
down. Second, with the French taking a hard line, the Commission emphasized that 
negotiating rules were a technical matter to be treated as such, thereby attempting to 
reduce the political implications of the Kennedy Round, and minimize the consequences 
on the EEC in case the negotiations were a failure. Tuthill emphasised this point at great 
length to Hallstein: the Kennedy Round was a political issue involving the entire 
Atlantic Alliance and a key test for the EEC and there was nothing the Commission 
could do to “remove the political fuse from this bomb” .13 Third, what most annoyed the 
Americans was that the Commission tended to be more protectionist than some of the 
member states. As Ball put it to Hallstein, the “Commission was [not] playing its proper 
role, and [...] it appeared all too often to be siding with the most restrictive French view 
in any showdown” .14
For the Americans, however, and with the support o f the British, the problem 
was not simply related to the posturing o f the Commission. The EEC was also unable to 
efficiently attend the Round because this institution was inadequately represented in 
Geneva. Hijzen proved to be lacking in the authority, experience and technical skills 
required to effectively represent the EEC. As a result, according to Blumenthal, the 
Commission lacked clear positions and policy direction.15 As such, the EEC needed a 
senior and adequate representative, possibly Rey or Maijolin, who could be present at 
least at the most important meetings. 6
British and American unhappiness with Hijzen led Wyndham White, who had 
often repeated that the EEC had to be represented in Geneva by top-level people, also 
therefore implying that Hijzen was not top-level,17 to take an astonishing initiative. At 
the end of November 1963, the French member of 111 Committee Jean Wahl informed 
his colleagues and the Commission that Wyndham White had approached the French, 
suggesting the implementation of a small, informal committee to discuss the major 
issues of the Kennedy round and speed it up. The most pertinent aspect of the proposal 
was the composition of the committee, which would be made up of France, Germany,
HAEC, JMAS 95, Memorandum of Conversation between Hallstein and Tuthill, 20 May 1963.
14
HAEC, JMAS 95 Letter from Hinton, Director of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs Office in State Department, to 
Tuthill, 26 June 1963, reporting a conversation between Hallstein, Narjes, Ball and Blumenthal. See also Preliminary 
Draft of the report "Components of a Strategy for the Kennedy Round" by Ball, 10 December 1963, Herter's papers, Box 
2, JFKL.
15
To the British, Blumenthal "commented with some acerbity on the inadequacy of Hijzen to the task and responsibility 
of leading the EEC Delegation. Cohen's answer to Blumenthal is revealing: "we [the British] had suffered much longer 
than he had on this account and we had learned from hard experience in the Dillon round that the practical way of 
coming to grips with the Community on tariff questions was to sort them out and get agreement first with the French; 
once the French agreed, it was remarkable how quickly the Commission came round to the same idea". PRO ET 
241/389 Telegram 8S from Cohen to Foreign Office, 3 July 1963. British negative appraisal of Hijzen and the 
Commission was parallel to an opinion of the French who, both inside and outside the Commission "are often of a 
higher caliber than those of the Five". The French officials folly understood the discussions taking place in Geneva, were 
very competent and able to deal with technical issues. None of the Five's representatives in Geneva were as competent 
as the French, and apart from the German official in Geneva [Horn] "the others can be written off", PRO FO 
371/172310 Letter from Cohen to O'Neill of the UK delegation to the EEC, 7 August 1963.
16 HAEC, JMAS 95, Letter of Ball to Tuthill, 8 November 1963.
17 AECB BAC 17 122/1991 Note pour Monsieur le Ministre Rey (from Hijzen), 19 November 1963.
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the United States and the United Kingdom, “avec la proposition formelle de laisser la 
Commission dehors”. The French government had resolutely rejected the suggestion, 
claimed Wahl. In fact, the French had no reason to weaken the unity of the EEC, which 
gave strength to the Six, and in having the Germans, too receptive to American pressure 
for French liking, negotiating in Geneva on behalf of the EEC. Moreover, the French 
had no interest in speeding up the Kennedy Round. Unsurprisingly, Hijzen was irritated 
by the proposal, which he labeled “stupide ou [...] extrêmement insolente”. The 
Benelux countries, Italy and France rebuffed Wyndham White’s move on the ground 
that it was not up to him to decide who had to represent the EEC. Benelux and Italy had 
no reason to support a proposal that brought into question their own decision-making 
power in the EEC and in Geneva, and the unity o f the EEC, thereby reducing its and 
their strength. Thus, these five governments decided that an immediate answer was to 
be given by the Commission itself, asking Wyndham White to withdraw his suggestion 
and keep up appearances. What was remarkable was the German reaction to Wyndham 
White’s suggestion. German 111 Committee representative Reinhardt fully shared the 
stance of the other five, but he could not take a position, because the proposal was being 
discussed in Bonn. Nevertheless, as the proposal was an administrative one, in his view, 
the 111 Committee could decide by majority decision.18 Therefore whereas the French 
firmly and rapidly rejected it, the Germans took time to discuss it, with the result that 
Reinhardt could not even sign the response to be given to the GATT Director General. 
Wyndham W hite’s proposal showed that the Commission was far from having 
established its negotiating role and that, as already noted, challenges did not necessarily 
come from those governments which overtly refused supranationalism, such as France, 
but also from those that professed to support it, like Germany. It also showed that the 
necessity to promote their trade interests, rather then a theoretical approach towards 
supranationalism, pushed the position o f the Six towards that of the Commission.
It is worth underlining, however, that in spite o f the disappointment with the 
position of the Commission and how the institution was represented in Geneva, 
Washington had no intention of writing it off. According to Ball, American policy 
required that the Commission be build up in order to strengthen European integration. It 
was also for this reason that Ball wanted the Commission to be represented at a high- 
level in Geneva.19 Moreover, even if  this institution had not always been helpful, the 
fact remained that “the Commission is a genuine force in Community”, claimed Tuthill. 
It could not force Six to agree but, conversely, little progress was possible without the 
Commission onside. Because o f the internal workings o f the EEC, even if Washington 
attempted to bypass the Commission and negotiate directly with governments, this 
would be doomed to failure. In fact, Mansholt remained the best hope for a constructive 
attitude on the part of the Community regarding the issue o f  agriculture in the Kennedy 
Round. “If we are even to escape from impasse stemming from German unwillingness 
to lower grain prices and French unwillingness negotiate with outsiders in absence of 
internal agreement, it is safe bet Mansholt’s assistance will be needed.” At the same 
time, the political objective o f strengthening the Commission had to be compromised 
because the successful conclusion o f  the Kennedy Round needed the United States to 
work with the national governments as well. Washington had to continue to maintain 
contact with the governments, while also insisting on the involvement of the
18
For Hijzen "même si cette construction n'était pas très logique, tout le monde a bien compris ce qu'il [ Reinhardt] 
voulait dire". AECB BAC 122/1991 17 Note pour Monsieur le Ministre Rey (from Hijzen), 19 November 1963.
19
Preliminary Draft o f the report "Components o f a Strategy for the Kennedy Round" by Ball, 10 December 1963, 
Hertels papers, Box 2, JFKL.
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Commission,20 this instead o f Erhard’s suggestion to Herter that Washington should 
concentrate on negotiating with the member states and “play down” the Commission, by 
dealing with governments over the Commission’s head. 1
5.3 The end of the Poultry War
To make the transatlantic relations and the preparation for the Kennedy Round 
more difficult there remained the unresolved issue o f the Poultry War. By mid-1963, not 
only had the issue not yet been resolved, but it had also become the subject of 
newspaper headlines. As noted in chapter two, what was relevant in the Poultry War 
was not only the quantity of poultry that the USA exported to the EEC, but also the 
political implication that lay behind the issue, and notably the impact of the CAP and 
trade policy principles and practices.22 Moreover, the Americans seemed to be 
convinced that behind this trade war lay a willingness on the part of de Gaulle’s to pull 
American agricultural products out o f the EEC, and to set up an inward-looking EEC. 
For this reason, the war had to be won.23 In this context it came as no surprise that the 
Poultry War increased in political significance, and that the future of the Atlantic 
alliance seemed to be dependent on chicken: “ ‘Is the Atlantic Alliance going to founder 
on chickens’ [Kennedy] asked one day in mock despair?”.24
In April 1963, Mansholt visited Washington to discuss the state of transatlantic 
relations with the Kennedy Administration. When the conversation turned to the poultry 
issue, Mansholt adopted the stance that, in light o f the increased production in the 
United States and in Europe, Washington could not to expect to find increased markets 
for poultry in the EEC. Herter made clear that if  the principles the EEC applied to 
poultry were to be applied across the board, there would be no international trade, as 
such, he asked the EEC to reduce the levy or to offer equivalent compensation to offset 
damages to US poultry exports.25 Herter and Ball even warned Rey and Maijolin that 
the United States could retaliate if the EEC maintained the levy on poultry, while the 
US Embassy in Bonn exerted pressure on the German government to give serious 
consideration to supporting a settlement.26
Against the European unwillingness to follow any o f the solution indicated, 
Washington sought to draw attention to the GATT bilateral Standstill agreement, signed 
by the EEC and the USA at the Dillon Round, under which the USA claimed to have 
the right o f access to the European poultry market for the 1960 level or 46 million 
dollars. At this point, the European Commission suggested to the EEC Council o f 
Ministers to reduce the levy on poultry by 1.2 cents a pound. During the course o f the 
trade war, the Commission, along with Hallstein, Mansholt and Rey, urged Members
20 Letter from Blumenthal to Herter, 16 October 1963, Herter Papers box 1, JFKL. Preliminary Draft of the report 
"Components o f a Strategy for the Kennedy Round" by Ball, 10 December 1963, Heller's papers, Box 2, JFKL.
21
NA 59 State Department Central file subject numeric Box 3488, ECIN 3 EEC, Telegram n. ECOBUS 140 from Tuthill 
to Secretary of State, 1 August 1963.
22 HAEC JMAS/95 Tuthill to Ball "Discussion with Hallstein", 8 November 1963.
23 Eckes, A. E. Revisiting U.S. Trade Policy. Decisions in Perspective, p. 68.
24
Quoted in Sorensen, T. Kennedy (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965), p. 412.
25 Memorandum of Conversation. Participants: Herter, Tuthill, Gosset and Mansholt, Washington 8 April 1963, Herter 
papers, Box 10, JFKL and Memorandum for the President from Herter on Herter's meeting with Mansholt on 8 April 
1963, Herter's papers, Box 10, JFKL. FRUS, 1961-1963 Vol. XIII Economic and Political Integration, 75 . Memorandum 
of Conversation between Kennedy, Ball, Freeman, Tuthill, Kaysen, Mansholt Mozer 9 April 1963.
26
Office of the SRTN Rey-Marjolin talks, 2-3 May 1963, Principal issue in trade negotiations, Herter papers, Box 8A, 
JFKL; HAEC JMAS/95 Aide-Mémoire dated 5 July 1963 from the US Embassy in Bonn to German government.
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States to take action in order to give the United States some relief, and elimination the 
hostilities that poultry was causing in transatlantic relations. However, for Couve de 
Murville and Lahr, that is to say Paris and Bonn, the Commission was over dramatizing 
the issue, and the importance the USA actually gave it, and deemed that little needed to 
be done. Notwithstanding Hallstein’s warning that the poultry matter had been raised 
with him by all o f the high US officials -  including Kennedy -  the French and Germans 
were not ready to compromise.27
With the refusal o f the Council to follow the advice of the Commission, at the 
beginning o f August, the USA notified the EEC that it would raise tariffs on EEC 
imports to the value of 46 million o f  dollars if, by 16 October 1963, the EEC had not 
reduced the levy or granted adequate compensation.28 Until August 1963, the EEC 
underestimated US willingness to see its trade rights respected. As Tuthill wrote “The 
Europeans had been mistaken not to take us seriously from the beginning and realize 
that we [the United States] were neither bluffing nor trying to make a mountain out of 
the mole hill” .29 Having witnessed the American ability to retaliate, however, the EEC 
decided to grant the USA a compensation o f 19 million of dollars, which was, however, 
very far from the amount requested. However, at this time the Poultry war had become 
such a hot issue in US-EEC relations, potentially damaging to the entire Kennedy 
Round, that both sides deemed it wise to reduce the temperature caused by the crisis. 
Moreover, the EEC concluded that further tension regarding poultry would risk an 
explosive debate in Geneva on the legality o f the entire CAP system. For this reason, an 
end has to be put to the trade war.30
Following the suggestion o f  the USA, an impartial panel o f the Council o f 
Representatives of GATT was set up to elaborate an advisory opinion on the level o f 
retaliatory measures Washington could take. In November 1963, the panel calculated 
that the amount should be 26 million dollars. Because of the willingness of both sides to 
quickly conclude the trade war, the figure was accepted. It was then up to President 
Johnson to indicate which EEC products the reprisal should be taken against. Products 
were carefully chosen in order to hit the EEC countries involved: France, Germany and 
the Netherlands. On 4 December, Johnson announced that the USA would increase 
duties on light panels, dextrin and trucks to hit Germany, potato starch to hit The 
Netherlands and brandy to hit France. The trade war was officially over.
The poultiy war demonstrated to the United States that it could not sit and wait 
for the CAP to be finally established, and that it needed to pre-emptively exert pressure 
in this regard, in particular using the Kennedy Round to prevent the CAP from 
damaging its interests. At the same time, the Poultry war illustrated that there was little 
the US could do, apart from retaliate, to prevent the implementation of a CAP it did not 
like. Yet the State Department had no intention of challenging the existence of the CAP 
as it held that effective unity within the EEC implied a common agricultural policy.31 
This attitude was also shown by the fact that in appealing to the GATT, the Americans 
never questioned the legality o f CAP. Thus, the poultry affair anticipated the struggle
27
CM2 1963/40 PV de la 1076me session du Conseil de la CEE, 10-11 July 963. HAEC JMAS/95 Memorandum of 
conversation between Hallstein and Tuthill on poultry, 13 July 1963.
28 FRUS 1961-1963, XIII, Economic and Political Integration, 77. Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission 
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over agriculture that would occur in Geneva between the USA and the EEC, but also the 
difficult position faced by Washington, who did not wish to question the CAP’s 
existence.
5.4 Problems in the synchronization plan: German feet dragging
In the July-November discussions, the EEC had showed a manifest unreadiness 
to sit down in Geneva with a set position and adopt rules to negotiate. This lack of 
readiness on the part of the EEC stemmed not only from the difficulty in elaborating a 
disparity formula that responded to its trade interests, but also from internal difficulties 
in developing a synchronized decision on the Kennedy Round and the CAP. The EEC’s 
elaboration of a negotiating position for Geneva was strictly linked to progress in the 
CAP since, as had been decided on 9 May, by the end o f 1963, the Six had to add 
another piece in the building of the CAP, with the adoption o f regulations for rice, dairy 
products and meat and the definition o f common cereal prices, and had to elaborate a 
mandate for the Commission to attend the Kennedy Round. However, despite the 
synchronization agreement, at the Council of Ministers at the end of May, the German 
Minister o f Agriculture, Schwarz, who within the German government strongly opposed 
the reduction in cereals prices, declared that Germany was not able to set a UGP, so 
obstructing progress in the CAP. The Five got the clear impression that the Germans 
had every intention of dragging their feet until after the German election o f September 
1965, and not respect the synchronization plan which they had themselves had 
proposed,32
France was determined to proceed with the approval o f the CAP in spite of 
German resistance. As de Gaulle made clear to the Adenauer, Schroeder and Erhard, 
France wanted the engagement made on 9 May to be respected.33 And in his press 
conference of the end of July, along with the need for the EEC to be self-sufficient in 
agriculture, de Gaulle even stated that without substantial progress in the CAP by the 
end of December, “le développement de l’ensemble [of the EEC] serait arêté” .34
Despite this warning, the Germans tended not to take de Gaulle seriously. They 
considered the advantages accorded to France by the EEC, and deemed that the French 
threat would not be implemented.35 Thus they demurred. In truth, German stance did 
not lack a certain element of contradiction. For Bonn, the adoption of the new CAP lot 
was linked to the adoption of an EEC common position for the Kennedy Round, as the 
synchronization principle dictated. But the establishment of the CAP imposed sacrifices 
on Germany; hence it refused to proceed quickly, above all with the common price for 
cereals. Therefore, on the one hand, Bonn yearned for synchronization between the 
CAP and the GATT Round, but on the other it also desired a slower pace in the 
development the CAP. On top of this, in elaborating the CAP, Bonn wanted German 
trade with third countries to be considered. Erhard pointed out that that while French 
agricultural exports to the EEC had increased since 1958, German traditional
32
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agricultural imports from Poland, Sweden and Denmark were being drastically hit 
because of the CAP. Therefore, he wanted the adoption of the new three agricultural 
regulations for meat, rice and dairy products to be accompanied by contingents to keep 
constant the flux of trade between the above mentioned markets and Germany. Only 
beyond these contingents, would CAP rules be applied. By the same token, the adoption 
of the common price for cereals had to maintain the level of German cereals imports 
from outside the EEC by ensuring third countries contingents, and not by keeping prices 
low, as this ran counter to  German interests. Thus, Germany formally accepted the 
CAP, but it displayed hesitations in its elaboration and implementation, and asked for 
measures, such as contingents, that ran contrary to the CAP principles which were based 
on price levels.36
German dissatisfaction with the CAP was so deeply felt that at the middle of 
October, Lahr and Secretary of State in the Ministry o f  Agriculture, Huttebrauker, 
openly called it into question not only by claiming that it was causing a sharp decrease 
in German imports from outside the EEC, thereby hurting German trade, but also 
implied that progress had to be slowed down, and that modifications were indispensable 
in order to take into account the interests o f third countries.37 Then, at the meeting with 
the British at the Western Europe Union, while Mansholt claimed that to attend the 
GATT negotiations the EEC needed the three regulations and the setting up o f common 
prices for grains, Schroeder claimed that it was impossible to adopt the CAP before the 
opening of the Kennedy Round, and that, in any case, it was not even necessary. 
Moreover, the agricultural regulations had to be elaborated taking into consideration 
third countries’ interests and be negotiable in Geneva.38 The problem with the German 
position was that while they claimed that the adoption of the new CAP lot was 
dependent on progress in the Kennedy Round; when the French agreed with this, the 
Germans started saying that in any case they had qualms with the CAP lot. The 
Germans were questioning the synchronization plan which they themselves had 
elaborated, and were running the risk o f being seen as the stumbling block of the GATT 
negotiations.
By contrast, France wanted agriculture to be organized according to the CAP, as 
this was a necessity for the French economy. For de Gaulle, the adoption of the three 
regulations had to be undertaken before the Kennedy Round started. What was 
necessary “c’est de régler les problèmes du Marché Commun avant l’ouverture de 
négociations avec les Américains, puis se tenir à la position que nous aurons adoptée” 
maintained the General.39 For Couve de Murville, even if the Six did not agree to set the 
common price by 31 December 1963, a fixed policy over price was required to attend 
the GATT Round, since prices marked the degree of protectionism of the EEC. 
Moreover, for France, a common agricultural market implied common prices and free 
trade among the Six, thus, as the French Foreign Minster put it, the quantitative
36
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assurances proposed by Erhard represented “la négation même d’un marché commun 
agricole”.40
The preparation for the Kennedy Round got caught up in this dispute going on 
within the EEC, above all between France and Germany, over the two aspects o f the 
CAP. First, the pace with which this policy was being defined and implemented, too 
hastily for the Germans, not hastily enough for the French. Second, the impact o f the 
CAP on third countries and therefore on EEC external trade relations.41 Germany, 
supported in this case by The Netherlands, wanted to ensure that third countries could 
keep exporting to the EEC, in order to import cheap food from outside the EEC and not 
put create a tension between the CAP and third countries, while France wanted to 
exports its more expensive foodstuffs to EEC members without external competition. 
However, no alliance was built between The Netherlands and Germany against France. 
Just like France and the Commission, the Netherlands supported the CAP system and 
aimed at keeping out access for third countries through low unified prices. This solution 
was categorically refused by Germany who, with the highest prices in the EEC, 
preferred to give third countries quantitative assurances.42 The Commission, and 
Mansholt in particular, hoped to reconcile the CAP with third countries’ interests by 
maintaining EEC imports from third countries through low unified prices and 
international commodity agreements to be negotiated in the Kennedy Round. Against 
the firm German request to fix high prices, it seemed difficult to do so.43 Thus, different 
commercial interests within the EEC complicated the preparation for the Kennedy 
Round. At the same, it was indeed the GATT negotiations that obliged the Six to adopt 
a common position that could reconcile these different interests.
5.5 Conciliating the CAP and GATT: the montant de soutien plan
The envisaged start o f the new Round, scheduled for May 1964, compelled the 
Six to adopt a common position on agriculture. Washington had made clear that it 
required agriculture to be fully included in the Round. Therefore, while the Germans 
demurred on the CAP, in November, the Commission sent its two plans for agriculture 
to the Council o f Ministers. Mansholt’s Plan I dealt with the unified grains prices 
(UGP), and set unified prices for 1964/1965 at half-way between the French and the 
German levels, with compensation for German, Luxembouregois and Italian farmers, 
who had higher national prices. According to Mansholt’s calculation, such a price level 
would maintain imports requirement at then million ton level.44
Mansholt’s Plan II elaborated the EEC negotiating position in Geneva regarding 
agriculture for all commodities. It is worth describing this plan, as it would be adopted 
by the Council of Ministers as the negotiating position of the EEC in Geneva, and 
because it represented a breakthrough in the way of negotiating over agriculture in the
40
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GATT forum. In developing this plan, the Commissioner emphasised how the GATT 
Ministerial meeting resolution, calling for an expansion o f agricultural exports, had to 
be reconciled with the improvement o f welfare of farmers. Mansholt refused the 
approach of exporters for which it was up to importers to create conditions to ensure 
market access. This conception left the latter only the duty to compromise between 
exigencies of national farmers and external trade. Thus, the EEC had to put forward 
proposals foreseeing obligations for exporters and importers which would put the EEC 
in a not too defensive position in Geneva, and would allow the CAP to be preserved.
Believing that tariffs were not relevant obstacles to trade in agriculture, 
Mansholt deemed it necessary to deal with non-tariff barriers, and especially with the 
national regulations of both importers and exporters. Mansholt’s idea consisted in 
identifying the support received by each item, defined by the difference between the 
world price -  an international price o f reference to be established -and the remuneration 
obtained by national producers, and to  consolidate, that is to say to bind, this margin of 
support or montant de soutien (MDS). In Geneva the contracting parties would engage 
in respecting the level of support agreed in the negotiations, being free to decide on the 
instruments to keep it. Every three years, mandatory meetings would take place in 
GATT to adapt the measures taken according to the evolution of trade. If, in the future, 
a more effective protection were needed, compensation would be given according 
GATT rules. For the EEC, the plan had two implications: The approval of the essential 
elements of the CAP was necessary, and, in particular, the level of common prices on 
which the level of support depended. Given the state of European agriculture, 
characterized by growing production, and continued low income, it was unlikely that 
the EEC, except in certain cases, could do more than consolidate the level of protection 
which would arise out of the establishment of the CAP. Therefore, maintained the 
Commission, this consolidation was a concession from the EEC in the Kennedy 
Round.45
In presenting the Commission plan for the Kennedy Round to the Council o f 
Ministers o f 4-5 November, Mansholt emphasised that negotiations in Geneva had to 
deal with all elements of agricultural protection, and consequently its basic element, 
prices, had to be known. Hence “il sera [...] indispensable que la politique agricole de la 
Communauté soit établie préalablement à Fouverture des négociations multilatérales du 
GATT”. The Six would first agree on the remainder of the CAP, then the EEC would 
offer to bind the existing level of support in Geneva, if  the other contracting parties 
were prepared to do the same.46
The Commission proposals were a breakthrough. They represented a major 
attempt to organize agriculture at world level and focused negotiations in GATT not on 
measures applied at the border, but on all measures having a protectionist effect, 
including domestic direct and indirect support o f all kinds. For Mansholt, with his 
approach dealing with all instruments o f  protection, for the first time in GATT history, 
trade in agricultural products would be subjected to realistic rules. Mansholt looked to 
the Kennedy Round as a major opportunity to regulate agriculture at world level, and 
felt that his plan well responded to this aim. Mansholt was convinced that the future 
trend would be an increase in national agricultural protection, especially in Europe, and 
he conceived the Kennedy Round as a way o f controlling and moderating the
45
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protectionist effects of the CAP on third countries. For this reason, his plan to negotiate 
and bind the margin of support appeared to be of particular value.
The Commission proposed a plan that was fully compatible with the CAP. 
Within the EEC, the degree o f protection depended on the level of support prices. 
Coherently, the Commission suggested a plan to negotiate in Geneva that was also 
based on the level o f prices. As a result, the EEC could negotiate in GATT without 
fearing disruptive affects on its common policy -  such as the requests for quantitative 
assurance -  and could even terminate the Round with a general recognition of the CAP. 
Another aspect is worth noting: The Commission plan necessitated the fixing of EEC 
internal prices. The setting o f UGPs was the starting point of the bargaining in Geneva 
because the price level would determine the future level of production and, 
consequently, market access for third countries. Thus, the link between UGP and the 
Kennedy Round was clearly established, and was considered as a clear advantage, as the 
only way to get Bonn to agree a UGP was through external pressure, in this case the 
pressure stemming from the Kennedy Round.
Even before the EEC had started discussing the Commission proposals, the USA 
reacted unfavourably to them. Washington recognised the EEC need for a uniform 
agricultural policy, but wanted this policy to maintain trade with third countries and, at 
the same time, wanted the EEC to discuss the main feature of the CAP with Washington 
itself. Without the CAP, the EEC could not negotiate in Geneva, but once the Six had 
secured their agricultural policy, amid great difficulties, among themselves they would 
be unwilling to change it. For this reason, Washington wanted consultations with third 
countries to take place so to include arrangements to protect their exports, before the 
EEC adopted its CAP,.47 By contrast, Mansholt’s proposals did not consider external 
interests. Washington found the level o f the unified prices sufficient to encourage a 
sharp increase in French production, able, in a relatively short period, to cause EEC 
imports from outside to fall, with the result that the USA would become a residual 
supplier. Access arrangements in the form of low duty quotas or other means were 
essential to maintain imports at the price levels proposed by Mansholt.48 As for 
Mansholt’s Plan II, the Americans had many reasons to oppose it. They feared that the 
level of protection the EEC would propose to consolidate would be significant higher 
than the existing level, so removing without compensation the current level of binding 
and wiping out GATT rules. The plan did not contain reference to the vital American 
request for access assurances, and in general removed any possibility of significant 
reductions in agricultural trade restrictions and was, consequently, incompatible with 
the May GATT resolution. Thus, the United States interpreted the Mansholt proposals 
as a sign of EEC unwillingness to hold meaningful negotiations on agricultural products 
across the whole field.49
The decisions the Six were taking in December regarding the mandate for the 
Kennedy Round and the new CAP batch would crucially affect the outcome of the trade 
negotiations. For this reason, Washington made its disappointment crystal clear. 
Blumenthal quite brusquely told Hijzen that if the preliminary assessment of the 
Mansholt plans made by the US government turned to be right, the American
47
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negotiators would be obliged to ask President Kennedy whether the Round should 
continue.50 By the same token, Tuthill claimed that under the Mansholt plan, UGPs 
were set at too high a level, whereas Mansholt II simply removed agriculture from the 
Kennedy Round and gave the United States serious problems in its relations with the 
European Community.51
The United States took every opportunity to spell out its opposition to the 
Mansholt Plans to the Germans in the hope o f influencing the final settlement o f the 
CAP and the negotiating position o f the EEC in Geneva. Erhard was urged “not to 
determine the German Government’s final position on these issues until after his 
meeting with [President Johnson]” at the end of the year.52 Ball even told Erhard that 
given that the cereal price decision affected third countries, before any decision was 
reached in Brussels the USA wanted to discuss the subject with the Europeans.53 
Moreover, the Americans did not want the Germans to find themselves with all major 
elements of the CAP implemented before France had given final approval to the 
outcome of the trade negotiations.54 W ith this request, the Americans seemed to have 
every intention of being the seventh -  even if external -  member of the EEC. German 
Foreign Office State Secretary Lahr tried to reassure the Americans by claiming that 
Germany would represent US concerns in EEC circles, but, in the meantime, the United 
States had to refrain from all out attack on the Commission plans and, above all, on the 
issue o f price level, for this would make constructive action inside the EEC difficult for 
Germany. However, Blumenthal was perplexed by Lahr’s suggestion that the USA 
should not state its concerns as this hit the “recurring dilemma in which the EEC claims 
that it cannot negotiate until it has a common position, but after it has reached a 
common position there is nothing left to negotiate”.55
5.6 Setting the line of EEC participation to the Kennedy Round: 
the 23 December mandate
With the presentation o f the Mansholt proposals, the time to take a decision over 
the EEC mandate had surely arrived for the Six. Due to its importance in world trade, 
the decisions the EEC had to take were crucial in determining the further progress o f the 
Kennedy Round. The mandate to be given to the Commission, and the adoption o f the 
new CAP lot, were discussed bilaterally by France and Germany, the two countries 
most heavily involved in the negotiations from a tactical point o f view. In fact, the final 
agreement was made difficult not only due to its content, but also by the feeling of 
doubts that existed between France and the Five -  above all Germany -  regarding the 
willingness of the French to attend the Kennedy Round in good faith, not casting a veto 
once the new batch of the CAP had been taken, and, similarly, regarding German
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reluctance to approve the CAP. For the French, if the plan laid down on 9 May on the 
CAP was respected and a negotiating position that would defend the trade interests of 
the Six -  and not o f London, Washington and the EFTA countries -  could be reached, 
they would attend the Kennedy Round in a constructive mood.56 Unfortunately, German 
resistance in the field o f the CAP kept France and German poles apart.
In the Franco-German meeting at the end of November, French Prime Minister, 
Georges Pompidou, and the newly appointed Chancellor Erhard expressed an identity of 
views with regard to the EEC aims in the Kennedy Round. Both parties agreed on the 
importance of successfully concluding the trade negotiations, and the need to keep the 
EEC open to world trade. Both parties agreed that the Round had to be used to increase 
EEC exports, and should not merely develop into a means of dosing the deficit in the 
US balance of payments. On the contrary, the negotiations had to favour trade 
exchanges between both sides o f the Atlantic. Erhard noted that the USA had a positive 
balance of trade with Germany, and even claimed that the “US balance of payments 
could not be a major element of European economic policy towards the USA”. But the 
issue of CAP continued to divide France and Germany. With de Gaulle, Erhard claimed 
that the approval o f the three CAP regulations should be considered together with the 
final decision on the adoption of a common position in the Kennedy Round, and 
measures to avoid distortions to trade with third countries. German approval of the CAP 
would be facilitated if the latter were given the assurance that it would continue to 
import from third countries, in particular some 12-13 million of tons of cereals. 
Moreover, the Chancellor avowed that, because of internal difficulties, Germany could 
not fix UGPs by the end of the year, but left unanswered de Gaulle’s question on how 
the EEC could attend the Kennedy Round without having common prices. At the end of 
the meeting, the German Chancellor asserted his willingness to adopt the next lot o f the 
CAP by the end o f the year, and the French president recognized that the success of the 
Geneva negotiations was a common EEC objective. This general agreement could be 
sufficed to guarantee the elaboration of a mandate and the adoption of the new batch of 
the CAP, but the crucial question of the cereals prices remained unsolved.57
It was in this context that the EEC Council of Ministers marathon from 19-23 
December finally adopted the mandate for the Kennedy Round, for both the industrial 
and the agricultural sectors, having as their basis the earlier Commission proposals. The 
elaboration of the common position for the industrial sector was a long process because 
o f its technicalities, but was not particularly difficult as the positions of the Six were 
relatively close and they all possessed a manifest willingness to succeed. In this context, 
the Commission’s proposal satisfied everybody. The Commission ruled out the 30:10 
formula, which did not consider the economic consequences on other European 
countries, and put forward a brand new formula that defined disparities simultaneously 
by arithmetical and qualitative criteria along a double écart which was, at the same 
time, relative and absolute: a disparity existed when there was a ten point difference 
between the high and the low duty, and the high duty was at least the double of the low 
one. For the Commission the double écart formula had the advantage of catching 
relevant disparities that were excluded by the 30% limit, without hurting EFTA 
countries. In fact, the Commission proposed additional qualitative criteria according to 
which the EEC would renounce the ability to claim a disparity when the item was not
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produced in Europe, and was not imported by the EEC, and would enter into bilateral 
relations with the EFTA countries in order to take into consideration their trade 
interests.58 The Commission also proposed that, in case o f  disparities, duties would be 
reduced by a percentage not higher than 25% of the average. This rule, suggested by the 
Commission, was approved thanks to the support Giscard d’Estaing, the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Trade Brasseur, the Italian Minister o f Foreign Trade Matterella, 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg Schaus, and despite the opposition o f 
Dutch Foreign Minister Andriessen and German Secretary of State Lahr, who only in 
the end gave up their reservations. Germany and the Netherlands were reluctant to table 
a negotiating formula for disparities in Geneva that had nothing to do with the technical 
work done up to then, as the USA could see it as an obstructionist move, rather than a 
suitable negotiating basis. Moreover, they would have preferred disparities to be 
reduced by a higher percentage.59 Differences also existed regarding the rate o f the 
linear reduction. Germany aimed at establishing a 50% reduction as an objective o f the 
Round, but the EEC kept this as a mere working hypothesis. However, despite the tough 
insistence of Germany, who wanted to be sure that the EEC would effectively start 
internal preparation for the Round, the Six agreed that the Commission would start 
working on the EEC exceptions list in February 1964. In the discussion leading to the 
compromise, with Italy, France, Belgium and Luxembourg generally supportive o f the 
Commission point of view, and Germany and The Netherlands more confrontational, 
often questioning the Commission’s positions and tended to push for the approval of 
measures that would be easily accepted in Geneva by the Americans. Maijolin and Rey 
appeared to master all the technical details, and often saw their points of view prevail. 
Moreover, even if a constant, clear-cut united front did not develop during the 
negotiations, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Commission were often on 
one side, and Germany and The Netherlands on the other.
The definition of the common position for agriculture was more difficult and 
time-consuming as it touched upon the critical issue of UGPs and, in general, the 
elaboration o f the CAP. France, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg approved of the 
Commission plan to negotiate in Geneva. They found it compatible with principles of 
the CAP and, as it did not suggest a reduction of protectionism, also in line with their 
trade interests. In particular, Italy supported it because as it did not distinguish between 
products covered by tariffs and products covered by NTBs, just as it had always 
requested. In contrast. The Netherlands and Germany had difficulties with the proposal. 
The Dutch M inster of Agriculture Biesheuvel supported the MDS plan, but wanted the 
EEC to formally undertake that the CAP would be implemented in accordance with 
third countries’ interests. Within the GATT framework, the EEC had to guarantee that, 
in case of strong increases in its level o f cereal production, and in case its imports 
decreased below 90% of imports in a given period, the EEC would negotiate on its 
unified prices and on the other elements o f the margin of support in order to defend the 
interests of third countries.60 The Dutch proposal was in line with Dutch interests to 
import cereals from third countries, but was ruled out by the other five governments on 
the ground that it was unwise, in the negotiating mandate, to insert clauses in favour of
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third countries, and by France as it had no intention o f giving such an assurance, as well 
as by Germany, as it had no intention o f becoming involved in reducing EEC prices.
The toughest opposition came from Bonn. Germany opposed the Mansholt plan 
as it presupposed the approval o f a large part of the CAP, the price of cereals included. 
Even if it would, in the end, accept this under pressure from the five partners and the 
Commission, Lahr refused to consider the establishment of a margin of support, which 
as noted, required the setting o f unified prices, as a préalable for the negotiations in 
GATT. Therefore, in those areas where unified prices had not yet been approved, the 
bargain had to take place along interim agreements that would pragmatically cause the 
EEC to refrain from diminishing third countries’ access to its markets. In this way, 
Germany could hope of not being forced to set UGPs as a condition of negotiating in 
Geneva under the MDS plan. Moreover, while the other five and the Commission 
estimated that, in consolidating its support, the EEC could not go beyond the 
consolidation of the CAP, and saw this as a concession to the other contracting parties, 
Lahr doubted that it did, in reality, constitute a concession, and was not fully confident 
that third countries would agree to reduce tariffs in the industrial sector, and to assume 
obligations in the agricultural sector without proper EEC concessions in the agricultural 
sector. Therefore, Germany insisted that third countries be given quantitative assurances 
with interim agreements.61
Mansholt, reiterating his view that the MDS approach did represent genuine 
concessions, defined German support for interim agreements o f quantitative assurance 
as dangerous: third countries, once the CAP had been finally approved, would seek for 
to maintain these agreements, which were clearly inconsistent with the CAP principles. 
The only way to respect third countries’ commercial interest, maintained Mansholt, was 
to establish reasonable prices. Lahr was not convinced of Mansholt’s reasons, however. 
He admitted that, in order to be effective in Geneva, the MDS plan required a degree o f 
elaboration of the CAP that the German government was not ready to allow. Under the 
Treaty of Rome, the CAP only had to be established at the end o f the transitional period, 
and Germany felt that it needed this whole period to adapt its agriculture. German 
opposition give rise to a strong reaction from Colombo. The Italian Minister 
emphasized that only the application o f the CAP had to take place at the end of 1969, 
not its definition or elaboration. Lahr did not share Colombo’s distinction between 
definition and application, however, and stated that the Treaty of Rome stated that the 
CAP had to be established at the end of the transitional period. Germany had no 
intention of delaying it until 31 December 1969, but they felt that it was impossible for 
the CAP to be established by the beginning of the Kennedy Round. Mansholt was clear 
in his view of Lahr’s position,: the point was not juridical but political, as without a 
sufficiently elaborated CAP, the EEC would be in a weak negotiating position in 
Geneva. It would not be able to specify the concessions it would make, and the risk 
existed that the CAP would result not from negotiations among the Six in Brussels, but 
rather from the concessions that the EEC would make in Geneva. As such, important 
decisions had to be taken before the start of the Round.62
In the content of the discussion on the Kennedy Round, the link between the 
adoption of negotiating position for the Round and progress on CAP one again 
emerged, a link the Germans tried to resist notwithstanding the synchronization plan.
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Facing this German resistance, Wormser warned that if  Germany did not respect the 9 
May calendar, France would leave the EEC. It was not a question of merely assuming, 
as the Germans did, that due to the trade benefits which France received from eEC 
membership they would never leave, and consequently must be bluffing. The point was 
to understand whether France would continue to consider itself bound by the Treaty of 
Rome if its major partner -  Germany -  kept on bargaining on engagement freely taken 
on the CAP. The problem was therefore Bonn’s reliability.63
After a prolonged discussion, the Mansholt plan was accepted as the negotiating 
plan of the EEC. However, to  counter German resistance, modifications were inserted. 
The setting o f  the UGP level, as well as that of the entire CAP were not longer made a 
formal precondition of the Community’s ability to negotiate in Geneva under the MDS. 
Under Mansholt’s proposal, in the case o f those items on which not all the elements of 
the margin o f  support had been approved, the EEC would negotiate on a fictitious 
margin of support. It was only on this condition that Lahr agreed to MDS being the 
negotiating position of the EEC. As shown in next chapter, however, this clause did not 
save the Germans from pressure to rapidly adopt UGP in order to negotiate in Geneva 
over agriculture. In fact, the Commission made it clear that grains were a basic 
commodity, upon which the prices o f meat and dairy products depended, therefore it 
was impossible for the EEC to negotiate in Geneva unless it had approved UGP and 
showed the level of protection it wanted to give grains. In any case, the Germans were 
satisfied, as, formally speaking, the adoption of the MDS plan as the EEC negotiating 
position did not require the UGP. For the moment they had escaped unwanted decisions 
but, as shown in next chapter, their satisfaction was short-lived.
The Council o f Ministers also agreed that because of the situation in the 
European agriculture sector, only in few cases could the EEC offer a reduction in the 
margin of support resulting from the adoption of the CAP. At the same time, despite 
German and Dutch insistence, the Council recognized the need to consider the 
promotion o f world trade and the principle of continuing access from imports from third 
countries, but no special clause was adopted in favor o f these issues.
The regulations for meat, rice and diary products were also adopted. Even if  the 
description o f these regulations is out o f the scope o f this chapter, what is relevant here 
is that, for Lahr, the commercial interests of third countries were to be taken into 
account in the different agricultural regulations. He suggested including a clause on 
external trade in the agricultural regulations, stating that these instruments had not 
altered the flow of imports from outside the EEC. The German request met with 
opposition from the Commission, France and Italy on the ground that it was 
incompatible with CAP rules.64 The Council o f Ministers did not agree with Mansholt’s 
plan to harmonize cereal prices, postponed to April 1964. The Commission decided not 
to insist on the need to approve UGP, in order to avoid a serious crisis within the EEC. 
The Commission insisted however that such a decision, strictly linked to the agricultural 
part of the GATT negotiations, should be adopted in the first months o f 1964. For the 
time being, however, the Germans were highly satisfied with the postponement of the 
UGP.65
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In the end, after a marathon which has gone on throughout December, and had 
intensified in the Council of Ministers o f the end of the month, and thanks to a package 
deal tabled by the Commission at the last moment of the Council of Ministers on 22 
December and containing the compromises described above regarding both the CAP 
and the Kennedy Round, an agreement was finally reached. As a result, the Commission 
was able to show up in Geneva with a negotiating mandate. With their December 
mandate to the Commission, the Six reaffirmed the need to harmonize duties, not 
merely to reduce them, and, with the adoption o f the MDS plan, they showed their 
intention to regulate world trade in agriculture rather than liberalize it, as Washington 
had requested. The December mandate, therefore, set the tone for the EEC participation 
in the Kennedy Round, a line that would inevitably clash with American views in 
Geneva.
The Commission had played an important and construction role, being the 
source of key proposals, and the line o f the EEC in Geneva, for the industrial sector, but 
above all for the agricultural sector, owed at least as much to it as to national 
governments. In fact, the Commission came out of negotiations with a considerably 
enhanced level of prestige. In the discussions about agriculture, the big confrontation 
took place between Lahr and Mansholt, with the other Five, and notably the French, in 
the background. Despite de Gaulle’s opposition to supranationalism, French support for 
the Commission proposals tended to reinforce the Commission’s standing and its role in 
the EEC system.
The December marathon showed that, after the crisis in January caused by the 
French veto of the British membership, the Six were again able to take substantial and 
important decisions to advance with the construction of the EEC in the two crucial 
fields of the CAP and the international commercial policy. Moreover, the Six showed a 
willingness to succeed in reaching a final compromise, which pushed them to make 
concessions and reconcile their different commercial interests. At the same time, even if 
a major accomplishment had been achieved, and French threats to leave the EEC were 
withdrawn, the agreement within the EEC remained fragile because the Germans, given 
their refusal to set UGP, continued to question the CAP. In this sense, a major 
confrontation seemed only to have been postponed.
5.7 Johnson’s take over in the Kennedy Round
After Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas on 22 November 1963, the task of 
continuing the Kennedy Round was shifted to the Johnson administration. President 
Johnson pledged to maintain the policy and the goals pinpointed by the Kennedy 
administration towards Europe, and the support for the trade negotiations. This 
corresponded to his support for freer trade as a means to pursue security and economic 
growth domestically and internationally. In his first address to Congress, the new 
President expressed his support for trade expansion “as a safeguard against depression, 
an integral part of allied cooperation, and a bulwark against communism” but also 
stressed the need for the USA to protect its trade interests, particularly in the 
agricultural sector, where European protectionism was more marked, to integrate the
cadre du GATT. Position de la CEE et les directives pour la Commission», T/76/64 (CoS), 31 January 1964. For the 
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two European trading blocs in the multilateral system, and to open up wider 
opportunities for the developing countries 66
The Johnson administration also maintained Kennedy’s link between the 
agricultural and industrial sectors, making the conclusion of the Round conditional on 
satisfactory guarantees for US agricultural exports, as also kept Kennedy’s policy o f 
regarding expansion of US exports as a means o f helping to reduce the deficit in the 
balance of payments. The EEC was the single biggest cash market for agricultural 
products, and it was seen as important for the balance o f payments.67 With Johnson, the 
trade negotiations remained “a measure o f the vitality o f the Atlantic Partnership” to be 
approached on the broadest political basis in the perspective of the Atlantic 
partnership.68 As a result, Johnson’s taking over went almost unnoticed in Geneva, also 
because the officials responsible for the trade negotiations remained in place both in 
Washington and in Geneva.
However, with the passing o f time, a major difference between the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations developed in their perspective approaches to the EEC. Support 
for European integration, developed in the framework o f the Atlantic alliance and in 
harmony with US interest, remained and continued to be strong. However, the Johnson 
administration displayed a benign neglect policy and a detached attitude towards the 
development o f the process o f European integration, in order to avoid being accused of 
interfering with it, as had happened to the Kennedy Administration regarding the British 
bid to join the EEC in 1961-1963.69
The first opportunity for the new administration to discuss the Kennedy Round 
came in on the occasion o f Chancellor Erhard’s visit to Texas at the end of December 
1963, where the results of the Brussels marathon were to be discussed. The Americans 
were satisfied that the Six had avoided a serious crisis, and had finally provided the 
Commission with a mandate. However they were not so pleased with the content o f the 
mandate, which did not pin the EEC down to a position that would tend towards the 
results which Washington aimed at. The EEC disparity plan jeopardized the goal of a 
50% linear tariff reduction, as it substantially increased the number o f possible 
disparities and could cause the negotiations to fragment into an item-by-item system of 
bargaining. The Johnson administration had every intention of emphasising its 
discontent to Erhard, who had to be made clear that the EEC plan had to be modified.70
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As for agriculture, the Americans found the MDS approach incompatible with 
GATT principles, and with May 1963’s ministerial resolution to include agriculture in 
the negotiations, and if seriously pursued it could endanger the prospects for the 
Kennedy Round. For Herter, the plan was not adequate in order to maintain access for 
temperate agricultural in the EEC, as it excluded reductions of trade barriers and could 
impair the existing tariff bindings, while the prov ision that dealt with trade with third 
countries was too vague to be able to provide firm assurance of access arrangements. 
Together with the three regulations for rice, meat and dairy, it displayed scarce 
consideration of third courtiers' interests. On top of this, Washington doubted w hether 
the compromised reached left any margin of negotiation in Geneva, with the result that 
the contracting parties would be facing a “leave it or take it position”. As such the 
Americans had to insist to Erhard that the USA would be given access assurances.71 
Washington were also unimpressed by the Mansholt plan on UGP. The quantitative 
assurances at aimed Washington had to be accompanied by as low prices as possible, 
since high prices would encourage an increase in production and an agricultural surplus 
which would make it very difficult for the EEC to live up to quantitative access 
commitments for imports. However, if EEC unified prices were set at the level proposed 
by Mansholt, for Washington it became more crucial than ever to obtain quantitative 
assurance, above all for cereals. In any case, the USA had to continue to seek EEC 
agreement to negotiate on grain price levels in Geneva.72
To the Americans’ great surprise, Erhard and Schrocder arrived in Texas 
satisfied with the agreement reached in Brussels and with what they considered the 
positive role of their government in obtaining an adequate agreement in preparation for 
the Kennedy Round, an agreement that also considered third countries’ interests. In the 
discussions over the Brussels package deal, during which the Americans revealed 
themselves to be more informed than the Germans, Schröder and Erhard informed 
Johnson, Rusk, Herter and Ball that, in the November 1963 meeting between de Gaulle 
and Erhard, the Germans had been able to convince the French President that the 
Kennedy Round was as important as to Germany as the agricultural regulations, if not 
more so. The French President had stated that he considered the Kennedy Round to be 
“an Anglo-Saxon matter”, but because of the German interest, France would assume a 
different attitude. This had led to the achievement of what Schrocder considered 
“reasonable compromises” both on agriculture and the Kennedy Round at the Brussels 
talks in December. The German government had been able to bring about agreement on 
the new disparity formula, which would significantly reduce the numbers of disparities, 
as well as a clause in the mandate which made agricultural policy more negotiable. 
Herter appreciated the German effort to ensure consideration for third parties, but also 
stressed that the new formula for disparities complicated the situation as it caught more 
disparities than the 30:10 formula, In response to the US position, Schroeder simply 
stated that he was unable to go into the details of the compromise, and that it was 
unfortunate that Lahr, who had actually negotiated the Brussels agreement, was not 
present, while Erhard pointed out that on matters about the United States had serious 
reservations “it would not hurt his feelings if in Geneva there appeared concerted
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opposition to some of those matters which the Germans themselves did not like which 
would force a reconsideration by the [EEC].” 73
From the way the Germans presented the result of the Brussels marathon to the 
Americans, it seemed that they achieved a lot, had been able to influence the French and 
the outcome o f  the marathon in a way which was also favourable to themselves. For 
Herter, the Germans’ satisfaction was astounding: they ‘'thought that the agreement on 
disparities was a great step forward, with which we ought to be delighted”. Worst, they 
could not master the consequences o f the new formula for disparities, and did not even 
know its exact content, meaning that any discussion was useless.74 The United States 
had counted on the Germans, and in particular on Erhard, to carry forward preparations 
for the Kennedy Round, but their inability to influence the Brussels talks had meant that 
this help had been minimal. On top o f this, the German position regarding agriculture 
made it unlikely that this help would materialise. Bonn’s desire to cooperate in the 
Kennedy Round was in head-on conflict with its domestic agricultural policies, and 
made it a weak ally to push the Kennedy Round ahead. On the agricultural sector, 
Erhard, who saw himself as a liberal, was “content to say that ‘all nations are sinners’” . 
Thus Bonn did not seem able to help the USA in the very sector in which the US had 
required most help.75
5.8 No agreement on the rules
In view of the formal launching of the Kennedy Round in May 1964, an 
agreement on the negotiating rules was essential to effectively start negotiating. With 
the establishment of the EEC mandate, the negotiations in Geneva over rules restarted. 
Washington, supported by the United Kingdom and the other EFT A countries, gave a 
hostile welcome to the EEC December 1963 mandate, perceived as a plan largely 
inspired by a combination of the French of the Commission. Even before the Mansholt 
plan was formally presented in Geneva, the Johnson administration had found it 
unacceptable due to its failure to put into practice the goals decided upon in May 1963. 
With the opening of the new the GATT sessions on rules, Herter specified his 
opposition to the plan. He felt its implementation would be difficult because o f the 
complexities in measuring the support governments provided to agricultural items. 
Since much o f the Community’s system of support, and hence of protection, was 
grounded on the level of unified prices, Washington saw the Mansholt plan as tailored 
to the EEC’s special goals. The scheme extended the system of variable levies and
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minimum import prices which the EEC had adopted for all commodities and for all 
countries, with the consequence that the MDS approach extended the CAP to world 
trade, wiping out all existing GATT rules and concessions, and giving international 
acceptance to the variable levy system. And on top o f this, it was an approach not based 
on comparative advantages and producer efficiency. Even worse from the US point o f 
view was the fact that it extended negotiations from frontier protection measures to the 
agricultural and trade policies of the contracting parties, with the result that domestic 
policies were subjected to international negotiations. There was, however, another 
fundamental reason that led Washington to oppose the MDS plan as the general rule for 
agriculture: The Commission plan would not reduce the level of protection and favour 
expansion of trade, but simply bind it. For all these reasons, Herter labelled the
m s-
Mansholt Plan as “neither acceptable nor workable as a general negotiating formula” .
The pace and the content o f negotiations in Geneva over agriculture up to 
November 1963, and the result of the Brussels marathon, all led Washington to modify 
its approach to agriculture. Until February 1964, in order to make agriculture and 
industry advance along the same path, Washington had insisted that rules for the two 
sectors had to be the same. However, in February, Ball, Herter and Secretary of 
Agriculture Freeman, who had insisted on equal treatment of the industrial and 
agricultural sectors, reached the conclusion that this position was no longer tenable 
since the other contracting parties, the United Kingdom included, had objected to it. The 
USA’s shifted its position towards the recognition o f the unique nature of agriculture, 
which the EEC had always advocated, and adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach, 
adapting it to the circumstances of each major product or commodity group.77
In February, the negotiations on the rules resumed in Geneva. The European 
Commission, represented by the Director General of DG Agriculture, the French Rabot, 
put forward the MDS Plan to be applied to all agricultural products, including those 
covered by commodity agreements and tariffs. Tabling the MDS plan, Rabot shattered 
the habits of GATT, where, until that moment, negotiations had taken place only on 
tariffs and, exceptionally, on contingents. The plan got a negative reception. The 
contracting parties agreed to discuss it, but eventually rejected it as the basic rule o f the 
negotiations on the ground that it did not facilitate the establishment of acceptable 
conditions for access to world market.78
In opposition, Blumenthal suggested a flexible and pragmatic approach under 
which rules were to be formulated according to the protection given to products. The 
contracting parties had to examine major product categories in a case-by-case manner to 
discern how liberalisation could be achieved, therefore negotiating in a pragmatic way 
with regard to this sector. Blumenthal pinpointed five groups o f products: Zero duty 
products for which zero duty binding would be maintained; fixed-duty products, to be 
subjected to linear cut where possible, with exceptions where necessary; products 
subject to non-tariff barriers, for which negotiations had to lead to the removal or
76
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reduction o f protectionist effects; in the case of cereal, meat and dairy products, which 
were covered by variable levies, for which international commodity arrangements had 
to ensure market access and the opportunity to share in market growth, the EEC 
approach could be useful and explored on a case-by-case basis, but only provided that 
importing countries gave quantitative assurances. In theory this could have represented 
a concession to the EEC, however the request for quantitative assurance ran contrary to 
the principles o f the MDS scheme, making EEC acceptance unlikely. Under this 
pragmatic approach, each country had to make offers according to the nature o f form of 
protection on 10 September 1964, together with the lists o f exceptions for the industrial 
sector. Washington did not back down from the previously stated policy that without a 
satisfactory negotiation for trade in agriculture there could be no agreement. They were 
prepared to agree that agriculture was different in nature, and had to be dealt with 
separately from the non-agricultural products, but the sector had to remain an integral 
part of the Kennedy Round. Predictably, Mansholt rejected the pragmatic approach and 
maintained the validness o f his plan, the only one that made both exporters and 
importers make concessions, that ensured regulation of agriculture at world level and 
that could treat agriculture in a unified way.79
Very little progress was made on disparities. At the end of January, Hijzen 
presented the double-écart proposal, underlining that even if the EEC was not 
responsible for the consequences on third countries of the existence o f disparities, it 
would in any case search for adequate solutions with third countries.80 However, the 
EEC formula was rejected by a common front of opposition: The United States and the 
United Kingdom pointed out that it maximised the number o f disparity cases to a degree 
that threatened the linear cut of 50%, and created problems for other European 
countries.81 Blumenthal put forward alternatives in order to limit the number o f 
disparities and maintain the 50% rule on a wider scale, hoping, in this way, to favour an 
agreement. Unfortunately, the Commission made no such concession, claiming that it 
had no reason to modify its position.82
In the context o f this outcome, the Americans awaited the result o f the meeting 
of the EEC Council o f Ministers on 14 April to see whether the Six would modify their 
position.83. Instead, the Six decided to confirm the content of the December 1963 
mandate. In fact, the Dutch and the Germans wanted the EEC to be more flexible and
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favoured changes in the mandate which would meet the requests of third countries both 
for agriculture and disparities. In particular, the Dutch, while approving the MDS plan, 
felt that the EEC would have a stronger bargaining position if it could take a step 
towards the American position, approving the proposal the Dutch Minister for 
agriculture, Biesheuvel, had made in December 1963, which provided that if imports 
from third countries diminished considerably, the EEC would be ready to negotiate on 
price and the other elements of the margin of support. By the same token, to take a 
further step towards Washington, Bonn suggested granting the USA quantitative 
guarantees. Bonn and The Hague’s proposals, while fully compatible with their trade 
interests, represented an effort to compromise with the USA, and to avoid the failure of 
the agricultural negotiations. However, they met with the opposition of the other four 
and of the Commission, according to which the mandate already allowed enough room 
to bargain. France, supported by the Commission, Italy and Belgium, warned against 
any modification of the 1963 mandate, and held that the best way to contribute to the 
success of the Kennedy Round was to fix the UGP.84
At the same time, the persistent issue of grain price popped up. According to the 
agreement reached in December 1963, UGPs were due by April 1964, but despite this 
agreement, Bonn continued to drag its feet. According to Mansholt, without a common 
price, the EEC would be placed in a difficult bargaining position in Geneva as the other 
contracting parties could not appreciate the economic impact of the MDS method, and 
would insist on quantitative guarantees.83 The Commission also enjoyed the support of 
France. By the end of January 1964, de Gaulle had made clear that the EEC would not 
be able to negotiate with other countries, and in particular with the United States, unless 
the agricultural regulations adopted in December were first implemented, and common 
agricultural prices agreed upon.86 On top of this, France, like the Commission, 
supported the MDS scheme to avoid granting third countries quantitative assurances. In 
the context of German obstructionism, shared by Rome who was unwilling to decrease 
its wheat prices, the French government was becoming irritated. It found that “les 
gouvernements allemand et italien ne paraissent pas davantage disposés à accepter le 
prix unique dès 1964-1965, pour de motifs de politique intérieure et pour aller au devant 
de certain désir anglo-saxon sur les accords intérimaires quantitatifs”.87
In any case, at the Council of Ministers meeting in mid-April, the Germans 
refused to set unified prices or respect the commitment undertaken in previous years. 
Thus, on the one hand, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Commission 
refused to modify the mandate to meet American requests, and, on the other, Germany 
refused to fix UGPs. As a result, the EEC gathered in Geneva for the formal opening of 
the Round with its mandate reaffirmed, and an important feature of the CAP not yet 
established, casting doubt on its capacity to meaningfully negotiate.88
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Despite the reaffirmation o f the December mandate, Washington doubted 
whether the Six would be able to maintain the agreement, which it continued to believe 
was a Commission- and French-inspired mandate. Thus, it displayed strong opposition 
to the mandate, hoping, in this way, to push Germany and The Netherlands to move to 
modify it. France looked with apprehension at the German and Dutch stances over the 
Kennedy Round. Bonn and The Hague openly stated that the 23 December mandate 
represented a working base that had to be modified during the course o f the negotiations 
to take into account third countries’ positions. Paris feared that Washington and London 
could exploit this stance, and wait for the common EEC position to fall apart under the 
pressure o f the Germans and the Dutch, without making concessions in Geneva. 
However, i f  a reciprocal advantageous agreement with the Americans was to be 
reached, it was of paramount importance that the Dutch and the Germans firmly 
supported the EEC positions and tried to extract concessions from Washington.89 
Paris’s wariness in this regard about its EEC colleagues reflected Wormser had stated 
after the May 1963 Ministerial meeting: the Germans were too ready to give in to US 
opposition. For this reason, France refused any modifications to the mandate at this 
stage of the negotiations.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the EEC’s refusal to change its mandate yielded 
a positive outcome, that o f  putting to an end the controversy of disparities that had 
engulfed the preparation o f the Round since March 1963. In spite o f the number and 
variety of proposals suggested since April 1963, no compromise had be reached. In this 
context, for Blumenthal the only way out of the impasse was to agree to disagree. In 
short, the United States and the EEC eventually realized that the issue was to complex 
to be resolved through an automatic rule, and decided to stop discussing the question. 
As shown in the following chapters, this did not mean that the EEC would forget the 
problem.
After almost one year o f discussions on the rules, the Trade Negotiating 
Committee drew conclusions achieved in view of the May GATT Ministerial Meeting 
that had to formally launch the negotiations. The TNC adopted the following draft 
Ministerial decisions. The negotiations on tariffs had to start on the basis o f offers of 
50% linear reduction, qualified to the extent that the rules to be established in respect of 
significant disparities permitted offers of less than 50%. An exceptions list had to be 
tabled on 10 September 1964. By the same token, the Committee on Agriculture drew 
its conclusion by stating its inability to adopt common rules to negotiate over 
agriculture, and presented no rule to the Ministerial meeting of May 1964.90
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5.9 GATT Ministerial meeting of May 1964: the formal opening of 
the Kennedy Round
After almost a year and a half o f strenuous and dragged out negotiations, no final 
decision on the rules had been reached, and this was the context within which the the 
Round would have to be launched. Because of the difficulty in agreeing on the rules, a 
divergence appeared regarding the organization o f the May gathering. In spite o f the 
deadlock, the Americans wanted it to be a proper conference at ministerial level, in 
order to keep up pressure on the EEC and to get the 50% linear cut approved as the 
basis of the negotiations, rather than a mere working hypothesis, and to finally retain 10 
September 1964 as the date for tabling exceptions. For agriculture, rules were to be 
finally approved along the lines already illustrated in March/April.91 The EEC opposed 
the holding of the meeting at ministerial level, as an eventual disagreement would have 
a hard impact on public opinion, and would get negotiations off to a very bad start. 
Instead, the conference had to be a ceremony to solemnly mark the formal opening of 
the Kennedy Round, and to underline the importance of the enterprise as well as the 
contracting parties’ willingness to successfully conclude it.92 In the end, the 
compromised reached consisted in dividing the GATT meeting of 4-6 May into two 
parts: a solemn, public and inaugural session during which ministers pronounced their 
general declarations on behalf of their governments, then a closed working session of 
the TNC would take place. The Ministerial meeting would take note of the progress 
made in developing the rules and, where possible, would refine some o f the general 
principles agreed upon at the Ministerial meeting of May 1963, thus no real negotiation 
should occur.93
The nature of the meeting was of crucial importance for the Commission. The 
representation of the EEC in Geneva depended on the negotiating nature of the meeting 
and thus touched the crucial issue of the role of the Commission in the international 
framework. On the ground that the May session had merely a ceremonial nature, Rey 
wanted Member States to strictly respect the Treaty o f Rome, and urged Ministers not to 
attend the GATT session, and to merely send representatives. In any case, only the 
Commission would negotiate on behalf of the EEC, while representatives of Member 
States, even if present at the opening session to underline the importance they attached 
to the Round, would not attend the working session.94
Several ministers, and in particular the German Minister for Economics, 
Schmuecker, the Italian Minister of Commerce, Matterella, and the Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Andriessen, anxious to show their governments’ support for the Round, 
did not support Rey’s request of not showing up in Geneva. For Giscard D ’Estaing, the 
EEC had to be represented by the Commission and he was disposed to attend
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Ministerial meeting without speaking rights. The Six ministers agreed on the French 
position, and decided to attend the inaugural session to demonstrate the importance they 
attached to the Round. The Commission would conduct discussions together with the 
111 Committee which would side in Geneva. On the suggestion of the Belgian 
Brasseur, Ministers decided that the President o f the EEC Council of Ministers would 
make a brief declaration in Geneva at the opening session. For the Commission, this 
was a reasonable compromise, as it confirmed its prominent role at the Ministerial
95meeting.
The Kennedy Round was formally inaugurated at the Geneva Ministerial 
meeting held from 4 to 6 May 1964. At the opening session, Herter read a message from 
President Johnson that emphasized the importance the USA attached to the Kennedy 
Round as an instrument to expand world trade and “as an important opening to a better 
world”.96 For the EEC, the Belgian Brasseur, President of the EEC Council of 
Ministers, and Rey underlined the importance the EEC also attached to the Round, but 
then, contrary to what had been agreed in Brussels, Schmuecker, Mattarella and 
Andriessen also made declarations on behalf o f their governments. As a result, the only 
ministers not to speak were the one from Luxembourg and Giscard D’Estaing.97
In spite o f the agreement reached before 4 May not to press for new decisions of 
substance, Blumenthal and Herter tried to commit the EEC to accept the 50% linear cut 
as formal basis of the negotiations, rather than as a working hypothesis, and to enter a 
reserve in the 10 September 1964 date to table exceptions, linking it to progress on 
agriculture. Feeling that such positions would have better chances of being approved if 
they were presented by Wyndham White, Herter convinced the Director General to 
present a US draft for the final Ministerial resolution as his own proposals.98 When the 
TNC discussions began, this draft provoked surprise on the part o f the Commission as it 
contained proposals to continue the negotiations. At any rate, the Commission opposed 
it on the ground that the 50% linear had to be kept as a working hypothesis, to be 
reviewed in the light of what could be achieved overall in the negotiations, and the 10 
September date had to be an absolute date, not linked to progress made in agriculture.99
Lacking a mandate to discuss the new proposals, Rey and Marjolin were 
compelled to report to the 111 Committee to obtain instructions. Despite of the fact that 
the US document overtook the commitments already undertaken, the Dutch and the 
Germans held that, with some modifications, it could be accepted in order to move the 
Round ahead. By contrast, the other four delegations refused the American draft. 
Particularly upset was France. The French Wahl, supported by Italy, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, strongly opposed the approval of the 50% level as a general rule, and the
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qualification of the 10 September date, on the ground that the two positions went 
beyond the EEC mandate for the Ministerial meeting, and did not reflect EEC trade 
interests.100 Believing it to be impossible to negotiate on the basis of the US document, 
Wahl, together with Guindey and Wormser, all of them in Geneva, put forward a new' 
draft, quickly adopted by the other five, which defined the 50% level as a working 
hypothesis, dependent on the solutions found for the other problems in the negotiations 
-  non-tariff barriers, agriculture and disparities -  and defined 10 September 1964 as an 
unconditional date. With the French proposal, the EEC would cease to insist on an 
agreement for generally applicable rules for the treatment of disparities before detailed 
negotiations could began, and the proposal suggested getting negotiations started with 
the tabling of the exceptions lists: in this way the Americans’ exception list could be 
seen, and the EEC could press them on other issues, trying to exploit the wider 
opportunities of a package deal, notably non-tariff barriers, agriculture and 
disparities.101
The Americans fought hard over the EEC drafting, but failed to secure 
amendments on the main points of substance, the definition of the 50% linear cut as 
general rule, and the link between the tabling of exceptions and progress in agriculture. 
They had wanted the GATT Ministerial meeting to maintain pressure on the Six to 
make concessions, but they found themselves not to be in a position to oblige the EEC 
to accept any particular changes. By presenting a package deal, and insisting on parallel 
progress on other matters, such as non-tariff barriers where the Americans were most 
vulnerable, the Six were able to maintain the pressure on the US and “turned the tables 
on the Americans” . Herter and Blumenthal did not receive the support of the British, 
who found the EEC draft an acceptable basis for starting negotiations and, in any case, 
did not want to engage in a showdown with the Six, endangering the beginning of the 
Kennedy Round.10
With the firm stance of the EEC and the lack of British support, on the final day 
Herter accepted the EEC draft, which in any case contained the positive elements of 
establishing a date for exceptions lists and the basic position of the 50% linear cut, 
although the latter remained a working hypothesis. Ministers also called for rules on 
agriculture to be established at an early date and instructed the TNC to draw up the 
procedures necessary to negotiate on non-tariff barriers, and reaffirmed that every effort 
had to be made to reduce barriers to exports of less developed countries.m  The final 
draft of the resolution of the Ministerial meeting did not go further than the EEC was 
prepared to accept, even if Herter made clear that, without an agreement on agriculture.
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the United States would not prepared to negotiate in the industrial sector. At this point, 
the Kennedy Round was formally opened, with, at least in the industrial sector, a date 
set for the commencement o f bargaining.104
Conclusion
Despite the difficulties and the haggling over the rules, the Kennedy Round was 
launched in May 1964. The July 1963- May 1964 confirmed to Washington that the 
Round would be turn out to be a thorny negotiation as the EEC and the USA had 
different commercial interests which proved to be difficult to reconcile. Washington had 
counted heavily on Bonn to push the Round forward. However, the German government 
did not seem able to adopt a coherent policy. German Minister, Schröder, had proposed 
synchronization but, then, because o f the opposition o f the Minister of Agriculture, 
Germany refused to synchronize. As explained in more depth in next chapter, the 
inability of the Germans to respect deadlines placed them in a weak bargaining position 
that precluded any pressure on the French, and blocked progress in the Kennedy Round. 
In short, the Germans were heading for troubles. The attitude of the German 
government should also be considered next to attitudes o f France and The Netherlands, 
who had more active, sound, united and coherent policies.
The Commission was having problems in affirming its role as sole negotiator in 
Geneva, but, at the same time, it was playing an essential role in defining the EEC 
position for the Round in Brussels. Indeed, it would be exactly this key role that would 
allow the Commission to affirm its negotiating role in Geneva in the final phase o f the 
Round in 1967.
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The discussions over agriculture illustrate two key issues: first, with the mandate 
o f the Kennedy Round to be defined, the differing conceptions of the Six regarding the 
CAP surfaced. Although all the Six wanted the CAP, it is also true that they did not long 
for the same CAP. In fact, The Netherlands and Germany, and to less extend Italy, 
wanted to retain their flux of trade with third countries, in contrast to French interests. 
For the moment the Six had accepted the Mansholt plan to negotiate in Geneva, but 
these differences would resurface when the EEC, during the course of the bargaining in 
Geneva, would have to specify their position in agriculture. For the Six to have a 
common agricultural policy to negotiate in Geneva required them to reconcile their 
diverging interests, a difficult task by definition. Second, it shows that the CAP was not 
an isolated phenomenon. As the Poultry War showed, the Cold War context led the US 
State Department not to utterly oppose this discriminatory common policy, considered 
essential to strengthen the EEC, but rather to try to moderate and influence it. 
Washington accepted the CAP as a unifying factor o f the EEC. At the same time, the 
United States wanted a CAP designed to preserve the opportunity for efficient suppliers 
to compete in the EEC, and wanted the CAP to be negotiable in Geneva, aims that the 
first year o f bargaining in Geneva proved very difficult to achieve. Thus, the fate o f the 
Kennedy Round seemed to depend on the possibility of finding a solution for the 
agricultural problem, both within the EEC and across the Atlantic.
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Chapter Six
Cereals puzzle across the Atlantic
Introduction
The previous chapter described the difficulties in reaching an agreement 
regarding the rules of the forthcoming Kennedy Round. The differing conceptions the 
USA and the EEC had regarding the issues that should be dealt with, and the objectives 
to be pursued, in the trade negotiations caused them the clash over the formulation of 
the rules. As a result, at the Ministerial Meeting of May 1964, only a basic set of laws 
had been agreed for the industrial sector, and 10 September 1964 was identified as the 
date to exchange exceptions lists. This basic agreement was enough to put industrial 
negotiations on track. By contrast, no rules at all had been elaborated for agriculture, 
due to the persistent disagreement between the USA and the EEC.
Chapter six deals with the preparations for the negotiations. The entire period 
was dominated by the internal EEC quarrel over grain prices, which complicated the 
industrial part o f the GATT talks and frustrated progress in agriculture. In fact, the 
stalemate over agriculture was not only linked to the lack o f agreement between the 
USA and the EEC over the rules, but also to the persistent EEC internal quarrel over 
grains, which came to also involve the United States, thus becoming a transatlantic 
puzzle. It was only when, in December 1964, the Germans eventually agreed to set the 
UGP that the way was opened for progress to resume in agriculture. This chapter seeks 
to explain how the Kennedy Round and the EEC influenced each other. The internal 
development o f  the EEC dictated the rate and timing of progress at the Kennedy Round 
and, at the same time, the necessity to  move ahead the GATT talks led to developments 
in Brussels.
6.1 An intricate puzzle: exceptions lists, agriculture and cereals 
prices
The GATT Ministerial meeting o f  May 1964 had set 10 September 1964 as the 
date for tabling exceptions lists for manufactures, and, thereby, opening the bargaining 
process in this sector. This target proved to be short-lived. Washington began to hesitate 
about tabling its list before the Presidential election at the beginning o f November, 
given all the opportunities that so doing could give the US lobbies to harass Herter. In 
response to American concerns, at the end of May, the Trade Negotiating Committee 
(TNC) postponed the date for tabling exceptions to 16 November 1964. With this date 
set, the core o f  the negotiations for the industrial sector became the formulation of the 
lists, a process that took place domestically for the linear bargainers.1
In spite o f what had been formally agreed at the Ministerial meeting regarding 
the unconditional acceptance of 16 November for tabling exceptions lists, at the end of 
May, Herter, by a unilateral position, stated that the US government would not table its 
exceptions list as scheduled if  further progress were not made on agriculture by that 
date. Washington was under strong political pressure from the agricultural lobbies of the
1 Telegram 1911 from Ball to US mission Geneva-GATT, 27 May 1964, NSF -  Subject files, Trade: Kennedy Round, Box 
48, LBJL. PRO FO 371/178092 Meeting between the Secretary of States and Governor Herter at the Board of Trade, 22 
May 1964.
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Mid-West and had to stick rigidly to the line that the final outcome of the Kennedy 
Round had to encompass acceptable content concerning agriculture. Moreover, Herter 
had to take into account the position o f the Department o f Agriculture which had 
demanded a tough bargaining position against the EEC. By establishing a link between 
agriculture and exceptions lis t Herter hoped to push the EEC to agree to some rules for 
this sector.2
The Commission, predictably, rejected the American unilateral link between 
agriculture and exceptions lists on the ground that the May Ministerial meeting had 
unconditionally set the date.3 Yet, despite the Commission’s refusal to accept the link, 
the American move could not go unnoticed, and, in fact, it came to interfere with the 
EEC discussions about the treatment o f agriculture in GATT. In Geneva, the EEC 
championed the MDS, but without the fixing of prices, the other contracting parties 
could not assess the protectionism of the EEC, and the Commission could not negotiate 
over agriculture under the MDS and defend the validity of this approach. However, the 
Germans had already shown their resistance to UGP and had every intention of 
postponing the price-setting to after the legislative election o f September 1965. At the 
same time, the French had already made it clear that they would not negotiate on 
agriculture in Geneva, if grain prices were not set in Brussels. Hence, France and the 
Commission refused to budge prior to German agreement on UGP. Erhard, in turn, 
refused to agree on UGP before the German election due to worries about the farming 
vote. The USA did not want to negotiate on industrial policy unless progress was made 
on agriculture, and expressly linked the 16 November date for tabling exceptions to 
progress in agriculture. As a result, the fate of the Kennedy Round seemed to be 
floundering on the price of cereals.
After the deadline of 15 April 1964 for setting UGP had passed in vain, the EEC 
deferred the decisions until 15 December 1964. However, because o f German resolve to 
delay the commitment until after the German election, it seemed unlikely that a decision 
would be able to be taken. The German government so firmly refused to set UGP that 
doubts increased about its commitment to the CAP.4 Erhard, a convinced free trader, 
wanted a successful Kennedy Round, and assured the EEC members and the Americans 
that he would not let it fail because o f  German attitude on UGP. For the moment, 
however, he could not take the decision because of the opposition of the German 
minister of Agriculture Schwarz, the farm sector and the Bundestag. In any case, for 
Erhard, the UGP remained an internal EEC issue, and no direct link existed with the 
GATT talks, for the agreement on prices would not remove all the obstacles to the 
agricultural part of negotiations. Germany would not agree to a price level lower than 
that suggested by the Commission, which in turn was unacceptable to the Americans on 
the ground that it would increase production within the EEC and thus fill the import 
gap. For the Germans, it was necessary to negotiate on other solutions in the GATT 
forum, and they tried to resolve the contradiction between their request that prices 
should remain high and a CAP open to world imports, granting quantitative assurances
2
Telegram 2167 from Tubby to Secretary of State reporting Blumenthal's statement to the 13 July TNC meeting, 15 
July 1964, NSF -  Subject files, Trade General Vol. 1, Box 47, LBJL; CM2/1964 1441 GATT TN.64/AGR/4 Déclaration de 
la délégation des Etats-Unis concernant sa position à l'égard de la proposition faite par la CEE au sujet des produits 
agricoles dans les négociations Kennedy, 17 June 1964; AECB BAC 122/1991 2, Rapport n.17 NCG(64)14, de la 
Délégation de la Commission pour le Négociations du GATT, 7 July 1964.
3 AECB BAC38/194 309 Mansholt cabinet papers, Note personnelle de Rabot à Mansholt, 17 June 1964;
4
Ludlow, N.P., The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s, p. 61; Vanke, J. "The European Collaborations of 
France and Germany 1963-1966", pp. 93-108.
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to third countries.5 In October 1963, Bonn, and in particular the Ministry of Agriculture, 
had identified quantitative guarantees o f access as a negotiating basis for the Round, but 
given that this option was considered in Brussels “as the sin against the Holy Ghost”, as 
the Germans put it, Bonn would have to wait, hoping that pressures from Geneva would 
push the EEC in this direction.6 This stance clearly demonstrated that the Germans’ 
support for the MDS was ambivalent: formally, they had approved it in December 1963, 
but in practice they often questioned it, stating that quantitative assurances were to be 
granted to third countries or, as German Foreign Ministers Schroder put it, that the 
MDS was merely a working basis, and that other formulae were to be elaborated if  the 
MDS ended up being unfeasible. As such, the Germans were formally committed to the 
MDS, but had not, in reality, accepted the implications thereof, and conducted both their 
internal debate and conversations with third parties as i f  much more was still open to 
negotiation than was really the case. To be sure, this corresponded to German 
commercial interests in continuing to import from outside the EEC, but made the 
German position in Brussels wavering and incoherent.7
Unfortunately the quantitative solution was not available because it was in stark 
opposition with the CAP system based on price, which determined the level of EEC 
production and, indirectly, the level o f imports. In fact, France and the Commission did 
not hesitate to label this approach the negation of the CAP. On top of this, Paris’ 
opposition to quantitative assurances as the basis for negotiations in Geneva and its 
interest in negotiating under the MDS, which imposed constrains on both importers and 
exporters, were well known. For Paris, it was not, however, only a matter o f 
incompatibility with the CAP and support for the MDS. Negotiating with the Americans 
on the basis of quantitative assurances, rather than on MDS, which presupposed EEC 
common prices, removed the pressure on the Germans to get down to finally resolving 
the issue o f UGP. And Paris had no intention o f easing the domestic position of the 
German government, postponing the fixing of prices and, consequently, the 
establishment of the CAP. In June 1963, the French had asked Herter to put pressure on 
Erhard to set UGP and, in the middle o f 1964, they had every intention of exploiting the 
link, imposed by the Americans on the 16 November date, to push Bonn to agree. The 
Kennedy Round had to be used to convince the Germans: either they agreed to UGP or 
the GATT Round would fail.8 Thus, while Paris openly claimed that no connection 
existed between the date for tabling the exception lists and progress in agriculture 
because the Americans had no right to attach these conditions, at the same time the
5 CM2 1964/86, PV de la 1344"" session du Conseil de la CEE, 1-3 June 1964. PRO BT 241/842 The Secretary of State's 
meeting with Herr Lahr, Bonn 25 May 1964 and FRUS, 1964-1968 Vol. XIII, Section Western Europe Region 26. Circular 
Telegram From the Department of State (Rusk) to Certain Posts, 15 June 1964. The telegram reports conversation 
between Herter, Blumenthal, Roth, McGhee Erhard, Schroeder and Westrick. Telcon Dillon-Ball, 25 May 1964 reporting 
the conversation between US secretary of Treasury Dillon and Lahr, Ball papers, box 4, LBJL On, the opposition in 
Germany to the setting of UGP and how this conditioned Erhard's attitude in Brussels, see Knudsen's work already 
mentioned.
6 PRO BT 303/167 Note "German Agriculture-Talks in Bonn, October, 30-31, 1963" reporting conversation between 
British officials and German officials o f the Ministry o f Agriculture.
7 On German ambivalence towards MDS see Schroeder's declarations in Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF) 
1964, Doc. 48, reporting the WEO Council of 27 January 1964. Emile Noel claimed that he could not imagine why the 
Germans had accepted the MDS plan and he even "assumed that they had simply not understood what was involved." 
Memorandum of conversation between Emile Noel (Executive Secretary of the Commission) and Thomas Rna of US 
mission to EEC, 14 October 1964.
O
MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Premier Ministre, Secrétariat Général, Note CE/6450 «Conseil des Ministres des 
29 et 30 juillet 1964», 24 July 1964.
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American move increased pressure on the Germans and played in the hands o f the 
French, which came to have an additional lever on Bonn 9
The Commission did not oppose quantitative assurances only because of their 
incompatibility with the CAP system.10 For Mansholt, the setting of UGP was a 
fundamental step in establishing the CAP and in terms of the negotiations in Geneva 
under MDS, which would reinforce the CAP, considered by the Commission to be the 
policy that would definitively ensure the supranational aspect of the EEC, and the EEC 
itself. Moreover, the impasse in which the EEC found itself in the agricultural sector 
would inevitably find a solution with the passing of the time, and would inevitably 
cause an impasse in Geneva too. The Commission therefore had every intention to keep 
pressure on the member states, and the Germans in particular, to let them understand the 
danger of this situation and the political consequences that it had the potential to 
unleash.11
In order to convince the Germans, the Commission openly linked the Kennedy 
Round to UGP, holding that refraining from taking this decision would render 
negotiation according to the MDS plan unfeasible, and no progress would be possible in 
Geneva in agriculture. Further, Mansholt reminded the Germans that Washington firmly 
wanted this sector to be included in the GATT talks, and that, with their foot-dragging, 
they were causing a stalemate in the Kennedy negotiations. On top of this, for the 
Commission, the Germans had to accept the lowering o f grain prices so not to 
disproportionately artificially increase EEC production, causing a hostile American 
reaction in GATT. “Le problème de la fixation des prix des céréales est donc 
incontestablement un problème international” Mansholt made clear to the recalcitrant 
Germans.12 Thus the Commission tactics, like those of Paris, made UGP a key element 
in GATT agriculture negotiations, and used the Kennedy Round, which the Germans 
considered of paramount importance, to be a lever to persuade Bonn to agree to fix 
prices, exploiting the link established by Herter on agriculture and the exceptions list.13
The Commission also counted on the pressure which the Americans could put on 
Erhard. Washington had to make crystal clear to the Germans that, with their refusal to 
set common prices, they were holding up progress in Geneva. To press the Americans 
to convince the Germans, Mansholt even employed, when meeting with US
9
PRO BT 241/843 Telegram 155 from Cohen to Foreign Office, 27 July 1964, reporting a conversation in Paris between 
Blumenthal, Guindey Wormser, Bizard, Wahl and Wyndham White. PRO FO 371/178092 Telegram 130 from Dixon to 
Foreign Office, reporting a conversation with Bizard, Guindey and Wahl, 16 July 1964; MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 
932 Note 184/CE « Négociation tarifaire au GATT», 5 November 1964 and ibidem Note «Négociation tarifaire au 
GATT», 20 November 1964.
10
This Commission stance against all quantitative access guarantees had already been fully elaborated in the course of 
the 1961-3 British membership negotiations in the course of which the UK had sought to obtain guaranteed access for 
Commonwealth exporters. On the issue, see Milward, A.S, The United Kingdom and the European Community The Rise 
and Fall of a National Strategy (London : Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2002) and Ludlow, P.N. Dealing with Britain: the six 
and the first UK application to the EEC (Cambridge, U.K; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
11 AECB, PV 269 15 April 1964 and PV 275, 2 June 1964; HAEC BAC 26/1966 511, Note d'information du Conseil, 
S/543/64 (CoS 80), 16 July 1964; AECB BAC38/194 309 Mansholt cabinet papers, Note d'information de la Commission, 
19 June 1964; HAEC -  JMAS/95 Memorandum of conversation between Hallstein and Tuthill in Brussels, 23 June 1964. 
CM2 1964/389 PV de la 62ème réunion du Comité 111, 23 July 1964.
12 CM2 1964/70, PV de la 129*"* session du Conseil de la CEE, 13-15 April 1964. At this EEC Council of Ministers, 
Mansholt pinpointed to the Germans their incoherent attitude, professing to support the Kennedy Round on the one 
hand, but blocking progress in agriculture, which the Americans and the Commonwealth countries considered to be 
essential to conclude the Round. The same argument was repeated by Mansholt at the Council of Ministers of the 
beginning of June. CM2 1964/86, PV de la 134*’“  session du Conseil de la CEE, 1-3 June 1964. See also AECB PV 268 8 
April 1964.
13
AECB BAC38/194 309 Mansholt cabinet papers, Note personnelle de Hijzen à Messieurs Rey, Margolin, Mansholt, 24 
June 1964 and HAEC -  MK 40, Note "Le prix de blé et le Kennedy Round", 5 June 1964, reporting a conversation 
between Konhnstamn, Tuthill, and McGhee.
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Ambassador to the EEC, Tuthill, the argument that if  the MLF went through, de Gaulle 
would certainly try to act in some way against NATO, and above all the EEC, especially 
if by the end o f the year, Germany was still unable to agree on grain prices, an essential 
step for progress towards European unity.14
The other four members, Italy and the Benelux countries, also held that UGP 
was necessary to negotiate over agriculture in Geneva. The Belgian Spaak and the 
Dutch Luns underlined the importance which they attached to the Kennedy Round and 
emphasised the contradiction that existed in the German position of support for the 
industrial part o f the GATT negotiations and the obstructive position they had adopted 
towards the agricultural part. The Italians, with high domestic prices for soft wheat, had 
the same problems as the Germans in fixing UGP, but they had no intention of allying 
themselves with the Germans in stalling the implementation o f the CAP, for which, by 
mid-1964, they still hoped to gain access for their fruits and vegetables, and, in this 
way, causing troubles to the Kennedy Round. In any case, Italian Minister of 
Agriculture, Mario Ferrari-Aggradi, was aware that even if  Italian farmers complained 
about the reduction in soft wheat prices, such reduction was necessary, from an 
economic point o f view, in order not to further increase the EEC surplus in production. 
Moreover, as the EEC had a deficit in production o f feedgrains, the Commission had 
proposed to raise their prices in order to increase EEC production. The Italian Minister 
was particularly opposed to such an increase as it would damage Italian meat producers 
in a period the Italian government was promoting its development.15
Contrary to the expectations o f the French and the Commission, the Americans 
were unwilling to press the Germans on UGP. They saw themselves as an “outsider in 
the middle” and did not want to have the responsibility o f exerting strong pressure on 
Bonn, unless all the Five did likewise, something that the Five were not doing 
sufficiently. They contested the Commission link between UGP and the Kennedy 
Round on the ground that the decision was important, but not decisive, as what mattered 
were quantitative assurances, while the link led the Commission to insist on the MDS as 
negotiating plan, a plan Washington refused to consider. Furthermore, the United States 
opposed putting pressure on the Germans, as it deemed the Commission prices too high 
to give any promise of maintaining the EEC market for US grain exports. Washington 
wanted the assurance of access for imported grains before it would publicly press for 
EEC price unification, which would operate against US interests. Herter reproached the 
Commission and the French for using the grain price to hold up the negotiations in 
Geneva, and expressed his concern for the consequences this situation could have on the 
tabling of US list o f exceptions, and for the entire Kennedy Round.16
Therefore, when Erhard and Schroeder visited Washington in June 1964 and 
openly asked whether the United States required UGP to move ahead with the Kennedy
14
PRO FO 371/178091 Confidential note on the Kennedy Round, undated, 1964; HAEC MK40 Conversation with 
Spierenburg (Dutch PERMDEL), 10 April 1964; and ibidem JMAS 94, Memorandum of conversation between Mansholt 
and Tuthill, 19 October 1964.
^  CM2 1964/86, PV de la 134e™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 1-3 June 1964. For the Italian position see ACS, PCM 
1962-1964, b.667 Lettera del Présidente del Consiglio Moro al Présidente della Commissione della CEE Hallstein, 6 June 
1964 taken from Ballini, P.L., Verson, A. (eds) L lta lia  e fEuropa (1947-1979), Vol.II, pp. 630-632.
Telegram 4400 from McGhee to State Department 1 May 1964, NSF -  Subject files, Trade: Kennedy Round, Box 48, 
LBJL. HAEC -  MK 40, Note "Le prix de blé et le Kennedy Round", 5 June 1964, reporting a conversation between 
Kohnstamm, Tuthill, and McGhee. AECB BAC 38/194 309 Mansholt cabinet papers, Note d'information de la 
Commission, 19 June 1964; AECB -  PV 282, 22 July 1964; MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Conversation avec 
Herter, Washington 29 September 1964. At the conversation attended Blumenthal, Roth, Hedges (USDA), Cleveland 
(USSD), Guindey, Gavoty, de Wilde and Morizet. "Erhard Background Paper, Kennedy Round", draft written by 
Auchincloss, 3 June 1964, Herter Papers, Box 8, JF K l. For the definition of "outsider in the middle", see NA 59 -  250 
box 976 Telegram 254 from Blumenthal to Herter, 30 May 1964.
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Round, Herter took the view that a UGP decision, during period during which the rules 
were negotiated, was not an essential pre-condition for GATT. The problem of grain 
prices existed in Brussels, and a decision could become indispensable for progress in 
Geneva only if internal developments within the EEC made it so. What was essential 
was that the EEC abandoned its rigid and general application o f MDS, so that progress 
could be made and meaningful negotiations could proceed by tabling and exchanging 
exceptions lists for the agricultural and industrial sectors. In turn, Erhard maintained 
with Herter that prices alone would be insufficient as a regulator of imports: access 
assurances were necessary, and the German government would continue to press in this 
direction in Brussels. Herter, obviously, expressed full agreement on the need for access 
assurances, since unified prices would not possibly be low enough to ensure access. The 
United States wanted the lowest possible price along with assurances o f access. Neither 
on its own would do.17
Thus, contrary to what the French and the Commission had hoped, Washington 
made it known that an immediate decision on this issue was not indispensable, and told 
Erhard that it did not require of him any definitive action on cereal prices in the short 
term. This was of course very welcome to Erhard: the American link between 
agriculture and 16 November had put pressure on him, but the meeting with Herter and 
the American refusal to negotiate under the MDS approach, and instead on quantitative 
assurance, took the pressure to take early decisions away, and eased the German 
position.18
At the end o f June, the German and the French members of 111 Committee, 
Reinhardt and Wahl, met to discuss the treatment of agriculture in the Kennedy Round. 
Made bold by the American stance, Reinhardt took the line that UGP were not 
necessary to negotiate in Geneva. Wahl therefore asked how Reinhardt thought 
negotiations should be pursued, choosing between three methods: to approve UGP and 
negotiate along the MDS plan; to agree to give the Americans quantitative guarantees, 
which the French government would not do; while the third solution “ne peut que 
correspondre que á une ‘solution miracle1 á laquelle songe peut-être le Dr. Reinhardt” . 
And, indeed, Reinhardt did have the miracle solution: for the next three or four years the 
agricultural policies of the Six would remain national both within the EEC and for 
negotiations with third countries, and each EEC member would negotiate on its own in 
Geneva. Against this miraculous solution “M. Wahl demande au Dr. Reinhardt s’il 
apprécie la porté de sa suggestion: le Traité de Rome n ’a été ratifié en France qu’au prix 
de promesses précises faites á F agriculture [...] II est exclu, si la politique agricole 
commune est reportée, de voir se poursuivre le Marché Commun industriel.” 19 
Germany once again displaced its antagonism towards the CAP, and, to be sure, in light 
o f these German declarations, some o f the extremism of French tactics, discussed 
below, make a great deal more sense, as the German threat to the CAP was not just a 
figment of de Gaulle’s imagination.
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XIII, Section Western Europe Region 26. Circular Telegram From the Department of State 
(Rusk) to Certain Posts, 15 June 1963. The telegram reports a conversation between Herter, Blumenthal, Roth, McGhee 
Erhard, Schroeder and Westrick. Minutes of the conversation can be found also in "Erhard-Herter discussion, June 13 , 
1964" Herter Papers, Box8, JFKL. See also PRO BT 241/842 Telegram 3498 from UK Embassy in Washington to Foreign 
Office, 30 June 1964 and PRO FO 371/178092 Confidential Note "The Kennedy Round", by Mason, 6 July 1964.
18
PRO BT 241/948 Telegram 1028 from Roberts (UK Embassy in Bonn) to Foreign Office, 23 October 1964, reporting a 
conversation between Lahrand Roberts,
19
MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Entretien de M. Wahl avec Dr. Reinhardt et le Dr. Sachs, Bonn 23 June 1964. 
By the same token, when, at the end of June, Hallstein and von der Groeben met Erhard to stress the need fix UGP, 
Erhard could reply that there was no need to hurry given that the Americans did not consider UGP necessary to move 
ahead the agricultural negotiations in Geneva. AECB PV 279,1 July 1964.
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By influencing the German position on the need to fix UGP, the American 
position had affected the EEC internal discussions over the course of action regarding 
agriculture in GATT. Not only did the Germans firmly claim that UGP were not 
necessary for the time being, in order to ensure progress was made in the Kennedy 
Round, but the Dutch also came to share this stance. In July, the Dutch industiy became 
impatient about the slowdown in Geneva and pressed the government to move the 
Kennedy Round forward. This led the Dutch Minister, Andriessen, to drop the links 
between UGP and Kennedy Round, hoping, in this way, to favour movement in 
GATT.20
As a result, at the Council o f Ministers meeting at the end of July 1964, whereas 
Rey resolutely claimed that it was impossible to make progress in GATT until 
agreement on common prices for cereals had put the EEC in the position to negotiate 
under the MDS, in response, Andriessen, even if underlining the importance his 
government attached to UGP, expressed his astonishment at the attention given to UGP 
given that the Americans did not consider it a necessary condition. The Dutch minister 
asked the Commission to assume a flexible approach, and to read the December 1963 
mandate with flexibility: progress could be made in Geneva even without UGP through 
American suggestions based on quantitative assurance, and applying the MDS in a 
flexible way. Even if quantitative assurances were difficult to reconcile with the CAP, a 
compromise-based formula, requiring consultations with third countries, in case imports 
fell below a given level, could be elaborated. The Dutch therefore again invoked the 
suggestion put forward by the Dutch Minister of Agriculture, Biesheuvel, at the end of 
1963. Unsurprisingly, Lahr fully supported Andriessen and asked the Commission to 
adopt a more flexible stance in Geneva. Only once the discussion on the method of 
negotiations had reached an advance level, would the EEC internal prices policy assume 
a position of priority.21
Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg reaffirmed the need to set UGP and the value of 
the MDS as a general rule, and claimed that the position of the EEC in Geneva could, in 
effect, improved if  its price policy had been adopted. For these countries, the German 
delegation could not indefinitely postpone the moment when it had to reconcile its 
willingness to successfully contribute to the Kennedy Round with its reluctance towards 
the adoption o f the UGP. However, they too asked the Commission to adopt a flexible 
position. Surprisingly, Giscard d ’Estaing adopted a rather quiet attitude, merely noting 
it was not the right moment to modify 23 December 1963, and then remained silent 
during most o f the Council meeting, maybe leaving the task of defending French 
position to the Commission.22
To the rescue of Rey came Mansholt, who made it clear that it was rather 
difficult to negotiate under the access guarantee approach, given that third countries’ 
requests would depend on the EEC level o f prices, while it would be not reasonable to
20
NA 59 1964-1966, box 450, Telegram from Howe of the American Embassy in The Hague, 22 July 1964. During the 
whole of July's discussions over agriculture, the Dutch had called for more flexibility. They wanted the Commission to 
read in a more flexible way the 1963 mandate and even suggested negotiating in Geneva with fictitious cereal prices so 
to overcome German opposition to UGP. CM2 1964/102, R/814/64 PV de la 139*"* session du Conseil de la CEE, 7 July 
1964; CM2 1964/389 PV de la 62ème réunion du Comité 111, 23 July 1964. AAPD 1964 doc 207 Aufzeichnung des 
Staatssekretärs Lahr. Deutch-franzosische Konsultation; Gespräch mit Generaldirektor Wormser, 24 July 1964.
On the German request of flexibility in the way to read the December 1963 mandate, see also CM2 1964/389 PV de 
la 6 lèm e réunion du Comité 111, 30 June 1964 and ibidem PV de la 62ème réunion du Comité 111, 23 July 1964. At 
this last meeting o f 111 Committee the German representative had claimed that UGP were not necessary to conduct 
negotiations in Geneva given that GATT members had refused to negotiate under the MDS.
22
The Belgian Ambassador Rothschild "found French behaviour puzzling, but considered Giscard's non-committal 
attitude a possible indication of French flexibility". NA 59, 1964-1966 Ecin 3 Box 795, telegram TAGG 2263 from Evens 
to Herter, 11 August 1964, reporting a conversation between Evans and Rothschild.
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assume import obligations when the future EEC volume of production was not 
measurable at the moment, and guarantees did not exist among the Six In any case, 
Mansholt acknowledged that, given that EEC and US positions on the rules were still 
far apart, the discussion in Geneva had not yet arrived to the point where a UGP 
decision had become an urgent factor, but the EEC would find itself in a difficult 
position if this decision was not taken by the end of the year.23
After the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Lahr took the view that all the 
Six, and notably including the French and the Italians, supported the notion that UGP 
was not urgent in terms of being able to continue discussing agriculture in Geneva, and 
that the Council’s consensus was that there was no need for the Commission to limit 
itself to MDS. Though it did not receive their words with enthusiasm, Lahr felt that the 
Commission would take note of them. For Lahr, the grain issue "had been unmasked as 
a Commission maneuver against the Germans”, but the Council discussion would have 
a salutary effect on the Commission’s conduct in Geneva. Thus, at the end of July, Lahr 
seemed optimistic that the agricultural rules could be established even without grain 
prices, and that the 16 November deadline could be met both for agriculture and 
industry.24
In contrast, the French seemed to read the result of the Council of Ministers in a 
totally different way. For Boegner, the positions taken by the Dutch and the Germans 
were the result o f American pressure which suggested that, without progress in 
agriculture, Washington would not table its exception list. However, it had not been 
difficult for Rey and Mansholt to claim the futility of the German position and the firm 
position assumed by Mansholt made it clear that, if progress was to be made in Geneva, 
common prices had to be established in Brussels by the end of the year.25
As is shown in the following section, the Council of Ministers’ July meeting 
actually pushed the Commission to adopt a more flexible attitude towards the MDS 
approach in Geneva. However, French determination over the setting of UGP remained, 
and it soon came to awaken the Germans from their illusion that the decision could be 
postponed to after the September 1965 election. During October, with the 15 December 
date for setting UGP approaching, the German remained adamant in their resistance . 
Discussing the future work of the EEC with Wormser, Lahr suggested accelerating the 
implementation of the CET and the dismantling of intra-EEC tariffs, without taking 
precise commitments on the CAP, and in particular, on the unified prices. To
23
CM2 1964/11 PV de la 141*™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 28-30 July 1964. For a more detailed discussion among 
the Six on the state of the agricultural negotiations see CM2 1964/389 PV de la 62ème réunion du Comité 111, 23 July 
1964.
24
Telegram 414 from McGhee to State Department 1 August 1964, NSF -  Subject files, Trade: Kennedy Round, Box 
48, LBJL, reporting conversation between McGhee and Lahr. Lahr was so optimistic that McGhee wrote "euphoric is the 
word that best describes Lahris mood on his return from the Council of Ministers. He betrays no sense of ensts, or even 
o f anything very dramatic, about the present status of the Kennedy Round negotiation, and is confident that the 
November 16 date can be met without any need to change the Commission's negotiating mandate". According to 
Rothschild, Belgian Ambassador, with the Council of Ministers meeting of 29 July a re-interpretation of the 23 December 
mandate took place and the Commission would be more flexible and the MDS would not apply to all agricultural items. 
NA 59, 1964-1966 Erin 3 Box 795, telegram TAGG 2263 from Evens to Herter, 11 August 1964, reporting a 
conversation between Evans and Rothschild.
25
For the French member of the COREPER, “les interventions à la fois pressantes et embarrassées de Mr. Andnessen 
et de Mr Lahr étaient, bien évidement, le résultat de démarches faites récemment par les Améncams aux termes 
desquelles le gouvernement de Washington ne déposerait pas ses listes d'exception pour les produits industriels à la 
date du 16 novembre si, dlci-là, aucun progrès n'avait été enregistré dans le domaine des produits agneofes." MAEF, 
DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Telegram 903/06 from Boegner to Quai dOrsay, 31 July 1964; PRO BT 241/843 
Telegram 185 from Galsworthy (UK Delegation in Brussels) to Foreign Office, 7 August 1964. Erhard had received a 
letter from Herter in which the American Ambassador urged the Commission to act more flexibiy so as to permit a 
satisfactory solution for agriculture. (Letter from Herter to Erhard, 20 July 1964, Bator Papers Box 1, LBJ). But the 
German attitude was the result of the German need to postpone the settlement of the UGP and avoid the issue 
preventing progress in the agricultural part in Geneva.
187
Wormser’s remark that the German plan envisaged progress in one sector but left 
behind others, Lahr candidly answered that synchronization was no longer necessary.26
On 20 October, after the meeting of Ministers o f  Agriculture in Brussels had 
again unsuccessfully discussed the issue of price, the French Minister, Pisani, returned 
to Paris with no agreement because o f Germany’s persistent refusal. At this point, de 
Gaulle concluded the time had come to have a tough policy towards Bonn in order to 
make the Germans understand that the French government required the CAP as a price 
for French participation to the EEC.27 On 21 October, Alain Peyrefitte, the French 
government spokesman, declared not only that France would not negotiate with the 
Americans as long as the EEC -  including agriculture -  was not fully organized, and 
therefore grain prices established, but also that “la France cesserait de participer à la 
Communauté économique européenne si le Marché commun agricole ne s’organisait 
pas common il avait été convenue qu’il s’organiserait” .28
The French had hoped that the need to negotiate on agriculture in Geneva would 
push the Germans to fix UGP, but the Americans had made it known that an immediate 
decision was not necessary, so the Germans did not feel pressed. In a situation o f 
continued postponement due to German feet dragging and challenges to the CAP, that 
raised serious doubts on the possibility of eventually setting up this common policy, the 
French position hardened to  underline all the seriousness of the situation. French 
toughness was caused by German ambivalence.29 In order to appreciate de Gaulle’s 
firmness, it is necessary to emphasize that, for Paris, the CAP was not only needed for 
French economic development, but was also a means to tie Germany to the EEC. For de 
Gaulle, Bonn was not impeded from agreeing UGP not simply because of the domestic 
problem with Germans farmers, but also because of its relations with the United States. 
Bonn’s policy was favourable to the United States, did not want to oppose them, and 
aimed at leaving open the conditions o f the CAP until advantages had been given to the 
United States in the Kennedy Round. France could have waited until September 1965, if  
it had had the feeling that the Germans wanted the CAP and that, in the meantime, 
concessions, which could have impeded the common market’s existence and 
development, would not be made to the Americans. Thus, the main issue was the 
German attitude towards this common policy.'30 As de Gaulle put it to Adenauer in 
November 1964, France needed the UGP and the CAP not only because, if  French 
agriculture remained outside the EEC, France would be obliged to finance its farmers 
with the consequence o f burdening industry and making it less competitive than 
German industry, but also because, i f  a solution was not found for agriculture and the 
CAP was not established, each country would look for its own solution and the
26
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Germans would look to relations with the United States, to a European free trade area 
and to the British.31
German reaction to De Gaulle’s tough declaration was a mixture of disdainful 
irritation for the constant repletion of French pressure and of calmness regarding the 
substance o f the matter. For Erhard, this “menace (threat) has nearly made [a reappraisal 
of German policy] impossible”, while for Lahr, with the German election approaching, 
it was out o f question for Bonn to take unpopular decisions due to French threats32 At 
the same time, the German chancellor did not appear to be much impressed by de 
Gaulle’s threat about a French withdrawal from the EEC, and judged it to be a mere 
bluff. France had no good alternative market for its agricultural surplus other than the 
EEC countries and, contrary to expectations, French industry had done extremely well 
out of the EEC. Indeed, France was perhaps the main beneficiary from the EEC, and the 
advantages o f belonging to the EEC were so great that de Gaulle would have to think 
several times before leaving. Therefore, there was no chance the German government 
would modify its position, except in the by reacting even more firmly against the 
pressure from either the French or the Commission.31
Even if the Germans did not take de Gaulle’s threat to leaving the EEC 
seriously, they were, in any case, afraid that de Gaulle would block the Kennedy Round, 
for which he had always displayed limited interest, if not opposition Despite 
combination of the anger and calmness on Bonn’s part, the reality was that even if the 
French government did not cease to participate to the EEC, it could well block progress 
on agriculture in Geneva, and if this was not enough to push the Germans to agree to 
UGP, block the entire trade negotiations, a fact that even Erhard and Lahr could not 
afford to ignore.34
In Washington, French declarations were received with concern. The State 
Department held that de Gaulle could link UGP and MLF, and be ready to jeopardize 
the EEC. As Mansholt had warned, if MLF succeed, de Gaulle would surely try to 
torpedo NATO, and above all the EEC, especially if, by the end of the year, Germany 
had not agreed on UGP.35 Not everybody in the US government was prepared to think 
that the French President was ready to jeopardize the EEC. White House Assistant 
Bator, for example, doubted this: “Abstracting from grandeur and all that, the two year
HAEC- MAEF 21 reel 209, Secrétariat General, Entretiens et Message, Entretien entre de Gaulle et le docteur 
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delay, in and o f itself, would hardly justify a French threat to throw out the baby” . 
However, he went on, “Even discounting for their [of the French] standard ploy of 
having Peyrefitte overdramatize for balloon floating purposes”, and doubting that the 
French president would jeopardize the EEC for two years’ delay in grain price, the point 
was that the French would be perfectly willing to endanger the Kennedy Round even for 
the two year gain. The French declaration made the grain price a necessary condition for 
proceeding with the agricultural part o f the Kennedy Round and, given the German 
attitude, it blocked progress in Geneva. The Americans decided to keep silent on the 
issue, so not to  be accused of interfering with EEC matters, but also concluded -  as 
shown in section 3 -  that the German dithering acted to slow the Kennedy Round down, 
and that the time had arrived to lend the Germans a hand in fixing UGP levels, and to 
finally move forward with the GATT negotiations. The cereals issue had to be ended.36
6.2 The last effort to set up rules for agriculture and the French 
halt
In this situation o f stalling progress over the CAP in Brussels, talks over 
agriculture carried on in Geneva. In September, meetings between the Commission, 
represented by Hijzen and Rabot, and Blumenthal intensified in an effort to work out 
some mutually acceptable plan for handling the agricultural negotiations, and flexibility 
appeared from both sides.37
The American side seemed ready to renounce their insistence that the access 
guarantees for major agricultural commodities be a condition for agreeing on the rules, 
and it also agreed to include the different elements o f its domestic policy in the 
negotiations.38 On the Commission side, the internal EEC discussion o f the end of July 
pushed this institution to be more flexible regarding the application of MDS in Geneva. 
Moreover, in May 1964, the Commission, while maintaining its commitment to the 
MDS, had started to recognize that it was too complicated to apply this approach to all 
products, and started considering that the traditional method of negotiating could be 
applied to products not so relevant in world trade.39 On top o f this, for the Commission, 
it became urgent to reach a vague agreement with the Americans allowing them to 
declare themselves satisfied and thus comply with 16 November date, so that the EEC 
could not be blamed for a breakdown in the agricultural negotiations. The EEC had to 
be ready to table on the scheduled date, and the responsibility of any refusal to table had 
to be squarely placed on the United States. Moreover, the Commission was working on 
the EEC exceptions list and Rey wanted the 16 November to be firmly respected, in 
order to be able to force the Six to face up to the unpleasant exceptions list exercise. In 
fact, the French, pointing out that the Americans would certainly not present their list,
36
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began to loudly interject that the EEC had no reason to start elaborating its own list. In 
short, for the Commission, the moment had arrived to move ahead. It therefore accepted 
that the MDS approach could be reduced in its application, applying it only to key 
countries -  the EEC, the USA and the UK, leaving out important exporters and Canada 
and Australia -  and to key commodities. For products covered only by tariffs, the 
negotiations would take place on tariffs.40
Maybe to try to put Member States up against a fa it accompli and push them to 
reach an agreement in Geneva, the Commission only loosely informed the former of the 
content and developments of the discussions with the Americans. With just the vague 
information, it received the support of the Dutch and the Germans, and uncertainty from 
the Italians and the French, according to whom more details were needed before the 
Commission could definitely commit itself in Geneva.41 The French were, in any case, 
annoyed and, at the 111 Committee meeting in mid-September, Wahl displayed 
irritation at the fact that the EEC officials had to seek out press report and Blumenthal’s 
public declarations to find out what was going on in Geneva. In truth, at the end of the 
meeting, in an informal gathering, he “apologized for the unpleasantness during meeting 
and stated he was ‘forced’ take such a position”. In fact ‘matters were building up to 
explosion’ in high level French government, and Couve was outspokenly irritated over 
the Community’s ‘marking time’, as well as over the fact that information as to what 
was going on in Geneva reached French Government in ‘bits and pieces’.”42
When an agreement seemed within reach in this context, on 9 October the 
Americans toughened their position, again asking access guarantees as a condition o f 
agreeing on the rules, and rejected the Commission proposals on the basis that they did 
not correspond to a requisite degree with American positions. Blumenthal in particular 
wanted the EEC to agree to subject products covered by tariffs to substantial 
liberalization efforts and not merely to a binding of the level o f protection. In response 
to the refusal of the Commission to change its proposals, Blumenthal declared that no 
agreement on the negotiating rules for agriculture could be reached, and interrupted the 
talks.43 The breakdown came as a surprise for the Commission. According to Rey and 
Mansholt, the US toughness was caused by internal factors: with the Presidential 
election drawing closer, the American delegation had problems in undertaking 
obligations on the support measures. In fact, the Commission’s approach included the 
domestic agricultural policies, and the United States had problems accepting it.44
On 10 October, the EEC member states learned about the suspension of the 
discussions and learned from the American delegation, and not the Commission, the 
content of the discussions.45 When informed about the content o f the negotiations by the 
Commission at the meeting o f the Council of Ministers on 13 October, the Dutch and
40
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the Germans w ere supportive of the Commission’s effort to reach an agreement with 
Blumenthaf and even claimed that the 23 December mandate could be modified if this 
would help to reach a compromise with the Americans. By contrast, the revealing of 
content of the discussion, and the way in which negotiations were being conducted by 
the Commission, enraged the French. Boegner reproached the Commission for not 
having informed Member States o f  the content of its proposals in Geneva and 
questioned whether those proposals, which introduced the notion of key countries and 
distinguished between categories o f products, remained within the limit of the mandate 
which the Commission had been given. France was not the only Member State to be 
annoyed, Italy also had much to reproach to the Commission for, and not only for the 
way in which the negotiations had been conducted. According to Mattarella, the Italian 
Minister of Commerce, the Commission had interpreted its mandate in too flexible a 
way, and agreed to reduce tariffs on products covered by this kind of protection, mostly 
fruits, vegetables and tobacco - of interest to Italy -  deviating from the principle of 
unity, along which the EEC was supposed to negotiate under MDS for all products. The 
Italian government would not accept, above all with regard to  products of great interest 
to the south o f  Italy, to depart from this principle and to  sacrifice them for sake of 
agreement with the United States, stated Matterella.46 The Commission’s conduct in 
Geneva was also criticized by the Belgians Spaak and Brasseur who strongly 
complained about “des obscurités que la Commission laissait planer autour des 
conversations de Genève sur les produits agricoles” .47 In the end, the Commission was 
invited to pursue the discussion in the framework o f the 1963 mandate, but to keep 
Member States fully informed.48
The way in which the Commission had conducted its discussions with the 
Americans was fiercely criticized by Paris. The French had not seen a single sentence of 
the Commission’s proposals, with information only coming from American sources. 
Worse, the Commission’s proposals seemed to question the full applicability of MDS, 
which the French had no intention o f bringing into question. MDS had the advantage of 
forcing both importers and exporters to discuss their domestic policies and put pressure 
on the Germans to get down to setting UGP.49 To better analyse French position, it is 
worth noting that French anger was so strongly felt because Paris had not expected the 
Commission’s attempt to reach a compromise agreement with the United States over 
agriculture. France and the Commission had always seen eye to eye on concessions and 
their timing, when it came to the Americans, however, on this occasion, their positions 
parted ways. The French wanted to delay the discussions on agriculture in Geneva, as
46
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the Germans were refraining from setting UGP, while the Commission was trying to 
push ahead with negotiations, in order to reach a vague agreement with Blumenthal that 
would allow Washington to table exceptions on 16 November.
After the 9 October deadlock, the discussion between Blumenthal, Rabot and 
Hijzen resumed in Geneva on 20 October, on the basis of a document called “points o f 
agreement and disagreement”, which picked up the discussion at where they had left 
off. Despite Member States’ instruction to be kept informed, and Boegner’s warning 
about the worries that existed in the French government about the stances the 
Commission would take in Geneva and the necessity to consult the 111 Committee, the 
Commission continued discussions with the Americans without promptly informing 
Member States o f their progress, and without agreeing on the proposals it could make 
with them in advance.50 This came right after Peyrefitte’s warning on France’s stance 
regarding the Kennedy Round and the EEC. Unsurprisingly, the Commission’s 
behaviour infuriated the French and, for the first and only time in the whole Kennedy 
Round, caused them to clash very seriously with the Brussels institution. For Wormser 
“Il n’est ni convenable ni conforme à l’intérêt de la Communauté que dans une 
négociation de cette importance la Commission n’arrête pas avec les Représentants des 
Etats membres, qui sont ses mandants, le position qu’elle devra adopter dans la suite des 
discussions avec les autres partenaires au GATT.” 1 Given Payrefitte’s déclaration and 
the obstacles which existed to the development o f European cooperation at that 
moment, Wormser found essential that “la Commission et ses représentants ne se 
méprennes en aucune manière sur les suites que le Gouvernement français donnerait, 
même au prix d’un grand éclat, sur les règles de négociation en matière agricole qui ne 
serait pas strictement conforme au mandat de décembre 1963” .52
The Commission’s determination to reach an agreement, and the small amount 
information it gave the member states, led the French government to take a striking 
move. Wormser instructed Boegner to hand in Hallstein a no-confidence note to the 
Commission, emphasizing that the future of the EEC was at stake, and that the 
Commission would bear a heavy responsibility in looking for an agreement with the 
Americans at any price. The French government informed not only the Five, but also 
the American, of the no-confidence note, who were warned that the Commission was 
running the risk o f being disavowed.53 On 28 October, Boegner informed Hallstein of 
France’s disappointment: “Il est tout à fait anormal” declared Boegner “que des affaires 
de cette importance soient traitées dans des conciliabules plus au moins improvisés et 
selon de pratiques purement empiriques qui peuvent peut-être convenir aux anglo-saxon 
mais que nous n ’approuvons pas.”54 In the “no confidence” note, the French 
government expressed its doubts concerning the way in which the Commission was 
conducting negotiations with the Americans, and found it difficult to understand how, in 
such a delicate issue as agriculture, the Commission would seek to commit itself 
without having previously submitting the text of the agreement to the EEC Ministers. If 
any commitment with the Americans were to be undertaken without respecting the 
mandate, the French government would openly reject the agreement and publicly
50 AECB PV 290, 21 October 1964 and AECB PV 291, 28 October 1964.
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disown the Commission action.55 Boegner also made it crystal clear to Hallstein that 
any further talks between the Commission and the Americans had to take place either in 
the presence o f  observers from all six governments, or had to be conducted by the 
Commission in a way that each step the Commission wished to take was cleared in 
advance with the representatives o f the Six in Geneva.56
Germany, The Netherlands and Luxembourg firmly sided with the Commission, 
while the Italians reproached the Commission for having failed to maintain the unity of 
the treatment o f the agricultural sector. Because of the internal EEC disagreement, the 
Commission informed the American delegation in Geneva that the EEC was not able to 
pursue discussions over agriculture.57
As such, the bilateral meetings between the Commission and the American 
delegations ended in late October with no agreement on the rules to deal with 
agriculture. At any rate, these autumn discussions were not vain. They convinced GATT 
general director, Wyndham White, that negotiations on the rules was fruitless, and that 
it would be better to move directly to the exchanges of offers among the contracting 
parties. Inn fact the discussions turned out to be the last efforts made in the Kennedy 
Round to reach agreement on the rules for dealing with agriculture, but for the moment 
no such rules existed.
6.3 US decision to table the exceptions list
With the failure to agree on rules for agriculture, at the end of October, the 
United States was faced with the reality of having no agricultural negotiating rules by 
16 November. After the May GATT Ministerial meeting, Washington had feared that, 
both because of a questionable willingness on the part o f the EEC to reduce 
protectionism in this sector and the EEC internal problems over the CAP, negotiations 
over agriculture would never begin. Thus it had linked the 16 November date for tabling 
exceptions to progress in agriculture, in order to prevent the latter sector from being left 
behind. In particular, this was the position of the US Department of Agriculture, which 
hoped that the link would cause the EEC to agree to make progress. After October’s 
failure, the most urgent matter Washington had to resolve was whether to table an 
exceptions list as scheduled, and drop its unilateral link between agriculture and 
industry.
A tense debate took place within the Johnson administration. At the end of 
September, the State Department had started thinking that, with the impasse over 
agriculture, a US decision to proceed with the exception list, at least temporarily, was 
necessary to maintain the momentum of the Round. 8 At the end of October, the State 
Department, together with National Security Affairs assistants, Bator and Bundy, 
remained convinced of the need to go ahead with the industrial negotiations. While it
^  MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932 "Note remise à la Commission", 27 October 1964. For the full text of the note j
see HAEC -  MAEF OW 36 R132, Télégramme 2304/07 Wormser à Boegner, 27 October, •
56 f
AECB PV 291, 28 October 1964 and MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Télégramme 1176/81 Boegner au Quai 1
d'Orsay, 28 October 1964. Boegner informed also Marjolin of French disapproval. Against this stance, Maijolin claimed [
that he would make any effort to lead the Commission to stop conversation with the Americans and to a new draft of 
agreement, even if this would not be an easy task: Hallstein, Rey and Mansholt wanted to start up discussions with the 1
Americans so not to give them any pretext not to table exceptions. MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Télégramme 
1176/81 Boegner au Quai d'Orsay, 28 October 1964.
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appeared clear that further efforts to get the agricultural negotiations under wav would 
be futile until the EEC agreed upon UGP, the tabling of the exception list could bring 
the intangible benefits of retain a quantum of impetus in the Kennedy Round. ‘ f
This conviction about the need to table exceptions list was reinforced by the 
French attitude. Not respecting the 16 November date gave Paris a reason not to prepare 
the EEC list. With the American refusal to table exceptions without progress in 
agriculture, the French started insisting on the need to wait for the Americans to be 
ready to table before engaging in the elaboration of the EEC exceptions list, so further 
slowing the EEC preparation for the Round. France, “not convinced of the desirability 
o f meaningful tariff cuts” could seize upon the postponements as an excuse for inaction, 
and the United States could be held responsible for the stalemate. The State 
Department’s conviction to table was strengthened by the declaration made by 
Peyrefitte on 21 October, which raised additional doubts about the French willingness to 
table the list of exceptions and move forward with the Kennedy Round. The Americans 
had to avoid the situation whereby their own intransigence could be used by de Gaulle 
to put the blame on the Americans for the break down of negotiations. If they decided to 
table, in contrast, the burden responsibility for any postponement would be placed 
squarely on France’s shoulders, who would be unable to use either US insistence on 
rules for agriculture or German intransigence over grain prices as an excuse, and could 
be  deprived of any convenient justification for not pushing ahead with talks in Geneva. 
In this way, the Americans could direct post-16 November pressure “precisely where it 
belongs: on the Germans in regard to grain price, and on the French and the 
Commission for insisting on the grain price as a sine qua non for getting on with the 
negotiations” .60
But for Bundy and Ball, the issue at stake was not merely that of trade relations, 
but also transatlantic relations generally, European unity and the German bargaining 
position. German leadership, an indispensable tenet in the stability of Europe, and 
crucial for the development of the EEC, had been seriously eroded by Erhard’s failure 
to live up to the obligation he undertook to move on UGP by 15 December. France was 
in a strong and legally sound position on an important internal EEC issue, and the 
United States expected de Gaulle to make the most of this situation in terms of 
embarrassing the Germans, the EEC, the Kennedy Round and the USA. In this situation, 
the United States had to table exceptions because, in the context of Western relations at 
that moment, the United States could not afford to see a vital Alliance effort collapse, 
and, as such, Erhard had to be helped out. His unwillingness to move on the grain prices 
could mean a real threat to the EEC, the Atlantic Partnership, and the Kennedy 
Round.61
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As such, it was also for the sake of assisting the German diplomatic position that 
the United States had to table. Erhard’s dithering not only acted to slow the Kennedy 
Round, and but also put the German government, on whom Washington mostly counted 
to make progress in Geneva, in a weak bargaining position in Brussels. Bonn’s position 
on agriculture was politically questionable, since it was periodically tempted to reduce, 
or even escape from altogether, political commitments regarding the CAP into which it 
had entered with its European partners. First, it accepted to fix deadline for setting UCP 
-  December 1963, April 1964, December 1964 -  then it maintained that there was 
nothing in the Treaty of Rome requiring the setting o f the CAP, and hence cereals 
prices, by 15 December 1964, given that the deadline was in 1968. Washington, highly 
annoyed by the German incapability to stick to self-imposed deadline, held that the 
other essential element to definitively escape the impasse consisted in putting pressure 
on the Germans to finally agree to UGP.62
For the Americans, it was essential that Bonn, which was ostensibly fully 
committed to major trade liberalization in the Kennedy Round for the industrial sector, 
could be in a bargaining position to enable the round to move forward. According to 
Herter, the actors that possessed some weight in the EEC were France, Germany and the 
Commission. Until that moment, Bonn had not been particularly successful in having its 
views reflected in the Community negotiating positions for two reasons. First, German 
agriculture enjoyed the highest level o f  protection in the EEC, and, as demonstrated by 
German obstinacy on the grain price issue, Bonn would have great difficulty in agreeing 
to reduce this level of protection. Second, and more importantly, the Germans “lack the 
skill and finesse o f the French and others, and are continually outmaneuvered in the 
complex internal EEC decision-making process”.63 Despite all this, the Germans, with 
their open support for the Kennedy Round, remained essential to making progress in 
Geneva, and had to regain their diplomatic strength in Brussels.
A last consideration brought the State Department, Bator and Bundy to judge it 
necessary to proceed with the industrial negotiations on 16 November. The United 
States could not risk wasting the possibility of reducing protection in the industrial 
sector for an agreement on agriculture. Under the pressure of the USD A, the US 
objective was to maintain and possibly expand US agricultural markets in Europe. 
However, access to these markets was threatened principally by the technological 
agricultural revolution and consequent expansion o f  production in Europe, and not only 
by the CAP. In any case, the greatest gains to the US from a successful Kennedy Round 
would be found in the industrial sector. Concentrating its efforts on the more difficult 
objective of agriculture “at the worst time and with clumsy tactics”, the United States 
ran the risk of losing gains from the industrial sector to force the Europeans to grant 
guaranteed access. The industrial negotiations could not be put at risk by a decision not 
to table the exceptions list.64 Thus, the difficulty over agriculture raised doubts about
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the objective and strategy which ad been employed until that moment and, as shown 
below and in the following chapters, the deadlock of October 1964 led the State 
Department, STR and the White House to consider whether a reappraisal of American 
objectives in the GATT negotiations would be necessary.
By contrast, the Department of Agriculture, not concerned by Western Alliance 
matters and German bargaining position, still considered it necessary to insist upon 
concessions in agriculture being an indispensable condition to concluding the Kennedy 
Round. This department objected to the tabling of the exceptions list in November on 
the ground that the dropping of the link between industry and agriculture would make it 
difficult to push the Europeans to into meaningful discussion over agriculture. US 
Secretary for Agriculture Freeman warned President Johnson o f  the discontent of the 
US farming bloc due to the standoff o f the agricultural negotiations in Geneva, and of 
the trouble this could cause to his Administration. After all, the TEA had also been 
approved thanks to the farmers who had lucrative overseas markets in their sights.65
Heeding the stance of Bundy and the State Department, Johnson adopted the line 
that a postponement of the tabling date would not only inevitably slow progress in the 
Round but would also cause serious trouble in the Atlantic alliance. The best prospect 
for obtaining the greatest possible concessions, both in industry and agriculture, and in 
keeping the Atlantic alliance together, lay in proceeding as scheduled.66 On 2 
November, the American mission in Brussels formally informed the Commission that 
the US delegation in Geneva would unconditionally table its exceptions list on 16 
November. Given, o f the EEC internal problems in the agricultural sector, the United 
States postponed negotiations on this area to the beginning o f 1965. In deciding to 
present its exceptions list, the United Sates emphasized that the tabling was without 
prejudice to the need to continue discussions on agriculture with a view to opening 
negotiations both on industrial and agricultural products early in 1965. The decision to 
proceed on 16 November without agreement on the handling of agriculture did not 
reflect any change in the US’s basic position that the Kennedy Round had to include 
liberalization of agricultural trade.67 As such, for Washington at least, negotiations 
regarding the industrial sector could begin with the exchanges o f the exceptions lists. At 
this point it was up to France to decide whether to go ahead in Geneva notwithstanding 
the lack of UGP.
6.4 The EEC decision to table the exceptions list
Under the mandate received in December 1963, the Commission started working 
on the EEC exceptions list in early 1964. The list was then presented to member states 
by mid-October in order to be finally approved before 16 November. When the Six 
gathered in Brussels for the Council o f Ministers meeting of 10-15 November to
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approve the list, the first problem to be faced was whether they to table it.68 In 
particular, after the Americans had affirmed their intention to table exceptions 
unconditionally, it was up to Paris to state whether it intended to table exceptions 
despite the lack o f UGP.
Despite Peyrefitte’s statement on the Kennedy Round, the French government 
had never considered the option of not tabling the exceptions list and, on the contrary, it 
had every interest in tabling. In this way, it could hope to put pressure on the German 
government: German industry attached great importance to the success o f the Kennedy 
Round and could put pressure on its government to weaken opposition to UGP in order 
to let the Kennedy Round to go ahead. On top o f this, French good will towards the 
Kennedy Round could be rewarded by a German decision over UGP in December The 
French also noted that even if  the lists were tabled, they could always -  at least until 
decisions were taken by unanimity at the end of 1965 -  establish a link between 
continued progress in the industrial part of the Kennedy Round and progress in the 
CAP. Moreover, the French were also interested in reducing protectionism in the 
industrial sector through the GATT talks, and a refusal to table on 16 November could 
cause a serious stalemate the negotiations in Geneva. Lastly, France was aware that in 
such a difficult period for the EEC, it seemed wise not to dangerously exacerbate the 
situation further with a refusal to go ahead in Geneva 69
On top of all these considerations, when meeting de Gaulle on 9 November 
1964, Adenauer reported to the French President that Chancellor Erhard had just 
informed him that he had taken the decision to respect the 15 December deadline to 
adopt UGP. Certainly, Erhard’s words would not have been totally reassuring, as the 
German Chancellor had already demonstrated his incapability to stick to a self-adopted 
deadline. The risk, therefore, existed that after having tabled the exceptions list the 
Germans would refuse to fix UGP. But, with Adenauer’s words, the French could not 
refuse to table the exceptions list and endanger the Kennedy Round and the EEC 
itself.70
When the debate over the exceptions fist began in Brussels between the 
ministers of the Six on 11 November, an opening statement by Spaak, who suggested 
that a decision on cereals prices should be a pre-condition for tabling the exceptions list, 
led Couve de Murville to spell out the French position. The approval of UGP was not 
only a condition for the successful continuation o f the negotiations in Geneva, but also 
the condition de base for further progress within the EEC. To conclude the Kennedy 
Round Paris needed the elaboration o f the CAP, which implied the adoption o f unified 
prices for the principle commodities -  cereals, dairy products and meat -  as it was also 
evident that negotiations in Geneva according to the MDS approach could not take 
place until EEC prices were known, or before the elaboration of regulations for sugar 
and fat and oil, the completion of the market organization for fruits and vegetables, or 
the elaboration o f the financial regulations for the after July 1965 period.
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The French conditions led Lahr to claim that the Kennedy Round could bring 
carry with it the condition of having to elaborate the CAP according to a schedule 
different than that contained in the Treaty of Rome. As such, not all the CAP needed to 
be set in order to attend the Round. In fact, the December 1963 mandate stated that the 
lack of a unified price for a given product did not imply that the product had to be 
excluded from the negotiations in Geneva. Lahr also stated, however, that the German 
government attached great importance to the 15 December date for setting UGP, and 
asked the other delegations to attach equivalent importance to 16 November date to 
table the exceptions list. Given this German stance, Couve de Murville expressed his 
satisfaction with Lahr’s declaration on UGP, and, as such, hoped that negotiations in 
Geneva over agriculture could constructively begin at the beginning of 1965 In the 
meantime, France wished to make no pre-conditions regarding the industrial sector, thus 
the EEC could table its exception list on 16 November, even if it was difficult to 
envisage a conclusion to the Round if the EEC, by the Round’s end, had not been able 
to reach an agreement over the CAP. Couve de Murville’s assertion was crucial in 
pushing the negotiations among the Six towards the content of the exceptions list.71
Couve de Murville’s declaration that the French government did not require 
UGP for tabling the exceptions list demonstrates the French interest in attending the 
Round, and in liberalizing international trade in the industrial sector. Had the French 
been concerned simply with elaborating the details of the CAP and blocking the GATT 
Round, all they needed to do was insist on setting UGP before allowing the EEC to 
table its exceptions list. After all, the synchronization principle had been elaborated by 
Bonn, and it was Bonn who was not respecting it. On the contrary, Paris allowed the 
Kennedy Round to move ahead. The French were very well aware they would have put 
the Kennedy Round at risk with a refusal to table the exceptions list, a risk that their 
interest in moving ahead the GATT negotiations forebode them from taking. The 
French stance at the end of November 1964 proves that despite the many French 
declarations of hostility towards the Kennedy Round which had pushed the Five, the 
British and the Americans to fear a French veto to the trade negotiations, France was 
actually also interested in lowering trade barriers. Thus, with the French decision to 
table, and the final adoption of the list on the night of 15 November, the negotiations in 
Geneva over the industrial sector could begin.
6.5 Cereals prices established
The US decision to table the exceptions list despite the lack of progress in 
agriculture saved the Kennedy Round from a dangerous deadlock, and set off a chain of 
events that markedly improved the atmosphere within the EEC and across the Atlantic. 
The Six negotiated their exceptions list and, on 16 November, the linear countries 
exchanged exceptions lists in Geneva.72 However, the French still considered UGP and 
further progress in agriculture as paramount to achieving progress in Geneva, both for 
the industrial and agricultural sectors.
71 CM2 1964/143, R/1210/64 PV de la 149*™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 10-15 November 1964. At the Council of 
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After the strong stance taken by the French government in October, the United 
States concluded that UGP was indispensable for the success of the Kennedy Round. 
Erhard had to take this decision, in order to regain bargaining power within the EEC, 
and to make a major contribution to the Kennedy Round, European integration and the 
Atlantic partnership.73 As noted, Washington had become exasperated by Erhard’s 
incapacity to assume a position and maintain it, and deemed the fixing o f UGP 
necessary for strengthening the role the Germans who, with their refusal, had placed 
themselves in a weak bargaining position within the EEC, and, from this weak position, 
Bonn could not push the Kennedy Round forward. Washington counted on Bonn in 
making sure the GATT negotiations succeeded, but if  the Germans remained in their 
weak position in the EEC, they could not support the Round. Hence, Erhard could no 
longer escape this decision, and Washington had to help him by “making more palatable 
an unpleasant a difficult German decision through accepting some o f  the 
responsibility” .74 Surely, a German decision on the UGP had to be bargained in light o f 
the best attainable French and EEC commitments on the GATT negotiations, and 
Erhard had to be urged to “obtain ironclad French commitments to the Kennedy Round 
in exchange for his action on grain price” .75 Moreover, American support for the grain 
price decision, which would inevitably set EEC prices at a higher level than Washington 
wished, did not affect the effort o f the American negotiators in Geneva to have 
agriculture included in the liberalizing effort of the Kennedy Round.76
In the middle of November, Ball urged Erhard to take the step of agreeing the 
UGP in the interests of both the Kennedy Round and Atlantic unity. Ball also expressed 
the wish that grain prices be established at the lowest level possible, in order to provide 
grain exporting countries with the opportunity to compete for a share in the EEC 
market. For the United States, the decision on grain would advance the Kennedy Round 
only if  the EEC was able, as a result, to negotiate effective trade liberalization for grains 
and other agricultural products.77 Together with the decision on UGP, the United States 
wanted a change in the EEC mandate in the field o f agriculture, and put pressure on the 
Germans in this regard. Blumenthal urged Lahr to use the agreement on grain price 
unification as a lever at the year-end EEC Council of Ministers session to break the 
deadlock over agriculture in the Kenney Round.78
American pressure to set UGP arrived when Erhard was already changing his 
mind on this issue. At the beginning o f November, the German Chancellor was coming 
to realise that the UGP issue had to be resolved because o f  the delay it was causing to 
the Kennedy Round, and because o f the stalemate it caused in the further development 
of the EEC. Moreover, with its refusal to set UGP, Germany was not merely blocking 
developments but was above all putting itself in a dangerously weak diplomatic 
position, undermining its credibility within the EEC, precluding any German initiative
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or action in Brussels. The German government had postponed the question for too long, 
and had placed itself in a weak position when it came to seeking concessions from the 
EEC partners. No progress could be made in Europe until the UGP issue was settled, 
and Bonn had to rid itself of its stumbling block-identity. On top of this, if the decision 
was further postponed, Germany ran the risk of dragging it on until 1 January 1966, 
when majority vote would apply in the Council of Ministers. If Germany were simply 
outvoted, it would not be able to obtain either quid pro quo concessions with regard to 
the Kennedy Round or various compensatory measures for its farmers.79 For Erhard, 
UGP was to be set this was the only means by which Germany would be able to escape 
the weak position it had placed itself in, and be able to make progress in other fields, 
including the Political Union of the EEC, of which Erhard was very supportive. The 
agreement to set UGP did not merely imply the possibility o f going ahead with the 
Kennedy Round, it above all was to pave the way for a Political Union, in the context of 
Bonn was about to take a new initiative, and, in this field, it would then be the French 
would have to make concessions to the Germans in exchange for the latter’s 
compromise regarding the UGP.80
At the Council of Ministers meeting at the end o f November, the German 
Minister for Economics, Schmücker, announced that the German government was ready 
to set UGP and to accept a reduction in prices. At the same time, the German Minister 
made clear that the conclusion of the Kennedy Round and the achievement o f the CAP 
were “indissolublement liées”.81
At the Council of Ministers meeting of 15 December, the Six agreed to establish 
a common market for grains from 1967 onwards, with support prices fixed part-way 
between the low French and high Germans prices, some 60% above world market 
prices. The decision provided for unification of soft wheat prices at the level suggested 
by the Commission of $ 106.25 (425 DM) per metric ton, roughly midway between 
French and German prices; $ 125 for hard wheat (500 DM); $ 91,25 for barley 
(365DM); $90,65 for maize, (362,5 DM). In order to get the approval of the German 
government, prices were to come into effect only on 1 July 1967, and not on 1 July, 
1966 as requested by the Commission. Compensatory payments to German and 
Luxembourgeois farmers for income-loss resulting from the reduction o f soft wheat 
prices, similarly, to the Italians for changes in hard wheat prices, would be made. It is
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reported on the debate going on in the German government On this point see also Vanke, 3. "The European 
Collaborations of France and Germany 1963-1966", pp.93-108. On the majority vote problem, see Knudsen, A.C. 
Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy, p. 353.
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AAPD 1964 doc 347 Bundesminister Schroeder an Bundeskanzler Erhard, 19 November 1964 and ibidem, doc 364 
Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Carstens 30 November 1964. See also AECB PV 293, 9 November 1964, where 
Hallstein reported his conversation with Erhard and other members o f the German government on the 4-5 November 
1964, saying that from these conversations he got the impression that "le gouvernement et les milieux politiques 
allemandes étaient de plus en plus conscients de la nécessité pour eux d'aboutir à une décision sur le niveau du prix 
des céréales, en raison des répercussions négatives des retards actuels tant sur le développement de la Communauté 
que sur ses relations extérieurs (Kennedy Round)». NA 59 1964-1966 Ecin 3 Box, box 795 Telegram 2041 from US 
Embassy in Bonn to State Department, 25 November 1964. Speaking with officials of the US Embassy in Bonn, Prass, 
official at the Chancellor's, credited de Gaulle 's position as the main reason that had led Erhard to fix prices, while 
Schroeder took the line that Erhard had decided to face up to the decision in order to smooth the way for progress on 
political unification. Telegram 2006 from US Embassy in Bonn to State Department, 21 November 1964 and Telegram 
2036 US Embassy in Bonn to State Department, 25 November 1964,NSF Subject Files: Trade- Kennedy Round, Box 48, 
LB3L. For Erhard's initiative towards on Political Union see, Lappenkuper, U. * 'Bn Europe der Freien und der Gleichen', 
La politique européenne de Ludwig Erhard (1963-1966)*, pp. 65-91 in {Lappenkueper 2001 #2284}, 2001 and Vanke, 
3. "The European Collaborations of France and Germany 1963-1966', pp.93-108 in ibidem.
81
CM2/1964 144 PV de la 146*™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 30 novembre-1 December 1964. For the final adoption 
of UGP see Knudsen's works.
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worth noting that during the discussions, Germany showed great readiness to reach 
agreement and did not impose prior conditions, in particular regarding the Kennedy 
Round. It seemed that Bonn was eager to remove grain prices as a subject of contention 
in its relations with the French in order to move on to other subjects.82
The Commission claimed that, with price set at 425 DM for soft wheat, the EC 
could continue to import 10 million o f  tons of this commodity. However, the level of 
the UGP, 60% higher than world prices, clearly set the tone for EEC levels of 
protectionism. If UGP were set at higher levels than world prices, EEC production 
would be artificially stimulated, and imports from third countries greatly reduced. As 
such, the EEC was entering into the Kennedy Round negotiations with a clear 
manifestation to third countries regarding the direction it was taking in agriculture. In 
any case, after the numerous difficulties which had been encountered in setting the 
UGP, it was unlikely that in Geneva the EEC could reduce grains prices.83
The decision was seen in Brussels as a milestone in the elaboration o f the CAP 
and in the strengthening o f the EEC. Grains had a central position in the CAP system 
and the setting of prices represented a major landmark in the establishment o f this 
policy, leading to agricultural integration among the Six and making the process 
irreversible. Furthermore, the Council’s decision on grain seemed to bring to an end a 
period of tension within the Six, and was euphorically welcomed, as progress that could 
pave the way to important developments.84
In truth, the decision on UGP ended the prolonged period of German 
vulnerability within the EEC, but did not end tensions within the EEC. The Germans 
considered the approval to be big sacrifice for which they had to be recompensed. By 
contrast, the French considered the approval of grain prices as something own to them, 
given that it was an inevitable part o f  the establishment o f the CAP. As a result, as 
shown in the following chapters, when the French started insisting on completing the 
agricultural regulations and approving the financial regulations, without parallel 
progress in areas of special interests to  the Germans, such as political union, tension 
once again resurfaced.
The decision on grain was a victory for the Commission, which had presented 
the original plan in December 1963, and had stuck to it until December 1964. This 
institution welcomed the agreement on grain with enthusiasm, and considered it a 
springboard for further and important progress, and not only limited to the Kennedy 
Round. For Naijes, Hallstein’s chef o f  cabinet, if  the Commission played its cards right, 
1965 had the potential to be a year o f many basic decisions which could have the 
practical effect of bringing the EEC into being in 1967, well ahead of schedule.85 As
2 CM2 1964/168 PV de la 156*™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 12-15 December 1964. AECB PV 297, 9 December 
1964. For a full description of the approval of UGP see Knudsen, A.C. Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, pp. 347-376 and Galli, R., Torcasio, S. La partecpazione italiana alia political agricola comunitaria (Roma, 
Bologna: IAJ, II Mulino, 1976), pp.72-81.
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The importance o f the EEC grain prices for international trade is described in chapter 7, fully dedicated to the
agricultural negotiations, with special attention to grains.
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USDS Intelligence note from Thomas Hughes to the Acting Secretary, "Common market Breakthrough on Grain 
Prices", 16 December 1964, Herter Papers, Box 9, JFKL and Memorandum for the President from Bundy and Bator 
"European Agricultural deal", 16 December 1965, Bator Papers, Box 1, LBJL. Ludlow N.P. The European Community and 
the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge, p.62.
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AECB, PV 298, 16 December 1964. For Narjes, another reason for optimism was the French chairmanship of the 
Council for the first six months of 1965. This could be an advantage for the EEC: although holding the chairmanship 
would not lead the French to change their basic negative postions on key Community issues, the fact was that the 
chairmanship would tend to somewhat neutralize French negativism. In fact, the country in the chair, by the nature of 
things, had to bend over backwards to appear impartial and fair, and had to make efforts to show that was not trying to 
take advantage o f its chairmanship to push national points of view. NA 59-250-57, 1964-1966 Ecin 3 Box 795, Airgram
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shown in next chapters, the Commission, with its optimism, appeared not to have 
understood the tensions existing among the Six and it pushed forward proposals that 
made those tensions explode in a full blown crisis in June 1965. The cereals puzzles had 
been solved, but more serious troubles were just around the comer.
Washington was satisfied with the agreement on grains, which it judged to be a 
clear gain in terms o f Atlantic policy. “For over a year now, the Germans have been put 
in the Common Market doghouse for failure to perform on their promises on 
agriculture”, wrote Bator and Bundy to Johnson. Now the Germans were in a much 
better position to stand up to the French, “buffeting in cooperating with us on NATO 
matters, offset purchases, money arrangements”, and also to take the lead in working for 
a large industrial tariff cut, to which the “protectionist-minded French are distinctly 
cool”. The Germans might even be able to strengthen the US hand on the agricultural 
side. The Americans could not be sure that the Germans would in fact “stand up to the 
French. But we can be sure that before this agreement their bargaining position in 
Europe was hopeless” . Thus, despite the economic problems that the high UGP could 
create for US agriculture, the agreement in Brussels represented a clear ga in /6
However, the setting o f grains prices at such high level provoked a new debate 
within the Johnson Administration on the consequences on US trade and on the 
possibility of the US government obtaining concessions in agriculture. The Department 
of Agriculture considered the decision on UGP, which set EEC price some 60% above 
world market prices, to be a serious threat to US agricultural exports, and was not as 
ready as Bator and Bundy to look at the political advantage o f  such decision and the 
improved standing o f Germany in Europe. By contrast, Bundy and Bator held that the 
USDA was likely to overstate its case. The 1965-1970 prospects for US grains exports 
to the EEC -  but not for agricultural exports as a whole -  had never been good. The 
agreement merely confirmed what was bound to happen in any case. Even if  it 
forecasting such matters constituted an uncertain business, with the EEC agreement, US 
exports could fall by 1970 from $380 million in 1961/1964 to $240 million. In the 
broader context of total US agricultural exports of $5.6 billion in 1963, the estimated 
loss was small, even if it would badly damage a specific sector. The problem 
concerning the EEC was the determination of individual governments to protect their 
farmers’ income, largely through price support, and, at the same time, the technological 
revolution in European agriculture. Thus even if the UGP were set at the French level 
“which would cause a revolution in Germany”, US sales to the EEC would still surely 
shrink. For Bundy and Bator, up until then, the proclaimed US objective had been to 
maintain the US share in the EEC grain market, but the target, set because o f pressure 
from Agriculture, had never been realistic for the two reasons just mentioned. Because 
o f the support prices, politically inevitable in Europe, the target would have required the 
EEC to stockpile or give away huge quantities of grain. The central fact -  in their eyes, 
the USDA tended to ignore -  was that the “US lacks the bargaining power to make the 
EEC grain beyond its needs. With the politics of agriculture just as tough in Western 
Europe as here, our leverage on the grain price deal has been minimal”. The USDA had 
wanted the government to state that it would not negotiate on industry in the Kennedy 
Round unless the internal agricultural arrangements of the EEC were favourable to US 
agriculture. “This threat simply would not work vis-à-vis the French, they are 
protectionist across the board, and they have been in the driver’s seat at Brussels. More 
generally, we do not have the cards to force Europe to keep its farmers poor on our
ECBUS A-512 from Fessenden of US mission to EC to State Department "EEC Commission's bright Prospects for 1965", 
25 January 1965.
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Memorandum for the President from Bundy and Bator, 16 December 1964, Bator Papers, Box 1, LBJL.
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behalf’. The Department o f Agriculture wanted “Herter to dig in his heels and make 
unbargainable demands at Brussels” . The danger was that the USA could push itself 
“into a comer and lose the chance for a really profitable deal on industry without 
making a nickel for agriculture”. According to Bator and Bundy, a more reasonable line 
for the USA consisted in trying to get to some concessions on the way the EEC ran their 
grain scheme, so as to maintain their level of production and maximize their 
consumption: the USA, even if not hoping for great gains, given that the Six had had a 
tough time in getting to the agreement on UGP, and would not have been in a mood to 
hand out concessions, had to firmly pursue this aim. It had also to try to increase exports 
of other farm products and o f grains to non-EEC members.87
The difficulty in agreeing on some common rules had raised doubts in the 
Johnson Administration on the possibility of obtaining meaningful results in this sector. 
And at the end o f 1964, White House assistants and the State Department started to 
believe that their position o f making conditional the conclusion of the Kennedy Round 
on meaningful results for agriculture risked endangering the Kennedy Round itself. 
What the British had told the Americans in March 1963 -  that the subordination o f the 
Kennedy Round to results in agriculture was dangerous because, as the negotiations 
between United Kingdom and the EEC in 1961-1963 demonstrated, the EEC had no 
intention of granting quantitative assurances and that the Americans lacked bargaining 
power to force them, as the Six were not interested in exporting to the USA and 
therefore making concessions in this sector in order to decrease the US protectionism -  
appeared to have been accurate.
While the State Department and White House assistants began to realise that a 
Kennedy Round without a meaningful result in agriculture was an option to be 
considered, even if they had no intention o f abandoning their efforts to include this 
sector in a significant way, the Department of Agriculture strongly objected to such an 
option. The TEA had been passed with bipartisan majority partly thanks to the 
agricultural lobby that had approved the Kennedy Administration’s aim of including 
agriculture in the Round in order to attempt to reduce the protectionism of the CAP. 
Now, the Department o f Agriculture was under the pressure of these agricultural trade 
groups. The agricultural vote always proved to be such a predominant influence on US 
governments because o f the enormous regional importance of agriculture, and this being 
particularly relevant given the emphasis the American Constitution placed on regional 
politics, that the Department of Agriculture could not ignore these voices. Thus this 
Department continued to maintain its initial position that without a meaningful result for 
agriculture no agreement was to be signed. In truth, Orville Freeman recognised that the 
CAP was an important feature o f European integration that could not be endangered by 
US intransigence. However, he was also under the pressure of what Herter’s deputy 
William Roth defined the “hot heads” o f the Department o f Agriculture, who stubbornly 
maintained their positions.
Despite the frustration of the US Department of Agriculture with the setting of 
UGP, what mattered at the end of 1964 was that the Kennedy Round could start also for 
the agricultural sector. However, together with the apparent euphoria for the end of the 
drawn-out quarrel over grains, tensions within the EEC were still tangible, and became 
evident in June 1965 when the Crisis o f the Empty Chair broke out.
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Memorandum for the President from Bundy and Bator, 16 December 1965, Batons Papers, Box 1, LBJL.
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Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the strict connection that existed between 
developments in Geneva and Brussels, how they influenced each other and how an 
internal EEC issue, cereal prices, became a transatlantic puzzle. In 1964, the Kennedy 
Round preparations dragged on with little visible progress, and with tension building up 
both within the EEC and across the Atlantic, until the end of the year, when exceptions 
lists were tabled and UGP established. In reality, tensions remained among the Six. 
France considered the German’s eventual acquiescence to UGP a step towards the 
completion o f the CAP, while the Germans considered it to be a major sacrifice which 
France had offer compensation for in the future. Therefore, everything seemed to be in 
place for the beginning of the Kennedy Round. Actually, another storming crisis, and 
one of greater impact, was just around the comer.
This chapter has confirmed that the CAP was not an isolated phenomenon. It 
was also to push forward the Kennedy Round that Bonn eventually resigned to fixing 
UGP. Further, it was consistently the Kennedy Round factor that caused the Six to 
specify their agricultural policy towards third countries. Germany and The Netherlands, 
and to a lesser extent Italy, wanted to keep open the EEC to third countries’ imports as 
this corresponded to their trade interests, and hoped to use the GATT talks to this aim. 
Germany, however, was in a difficult position. It had a liberal attitude in the industrial 
sector, however, in the agricultural sector, in addition to the aim of keeping the EEC 
open to imports, it had also a very protectionist attitude, as the UGP issue demonstrated, 
and this impeded from moving the Round forward, as Washington had hoped. The USA 
was inclined to attach undue weight to the German political strength within the EEC, 
but the Germans had, up until that moment, been less effective than hoped in 
Washington. For sure, the Germans had large interest at stake, but limited their efforts 
to press for their liberal standpoint to prevail in industrial policy, largely due to their 
difficulties, especially regarding cereals, in curbing their protectionism in agriculture.
As for the United States, under pressure from the Department of Agriculture, 
Herter continued to insist on the need to include agriculture in the liberalizing effort o f 
the Kennedy Round, but doubts began to arise regarding the attainability of this aim. 
The State Department and Bundy felt that the United States had no bargaining power to 
force the EEC in this direction, and started to wonder whether a reappraisal of US aims 
regarding agriculture was necessary in order to avoid endangering gains that could be 
attained in the industrial sector. As such, the difficulty in including agriculture was 
coming out in the open, leading the USA to reflect on the feasibility of its goals. The 
round of negotiations on the rules for agriculture showed the Americans that they had 
less bargaining power than they had expected. Concessions they were ready to make 
were not attractive enough for the EEC to reduce their protections. And, in GATT, there 
was nothing that obliged a contracting party to make tariff concessions beyond the 
extent which it regarded it to be in their interest to do so, a problem with which the USA 
would have to come to terms in the last phase of the Round. At the same time, as 
already noted, American power to reduce European agricultural protectionism was 
reduced by its refusal to challenge the CAP, which represented an important tenet o f 
European unity. In fact, faced with German opposition to UGP, Washington eventually 
settled on putting pressure on the Germans to fix UGP in order to stop progress from 
being blocked, not only in terms of the Kennedy Round, but also in the context o f 
European construction. This phase of GATT talks also showed the Americans that the 
pace of the Round was inexorably dictated by the pace of discussions on the internal 
EEC quarrel, and this led the USA to conclude that further major, but necessary, efforts 
were required in order to conclude the Geneva negotiations.
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Chapter Seven
Trying to negotiate: exceptions lists for industry and 
pragmatism for agriculture
Introduction
The previous chapter described the quarrel over grains that caused the Kennedy Round 
to come to a standstill. This chapter portrays the preparation of the exceptions lists for 
the industrial part of the negotiations that took place in Washington and in Brussels 
while the quarrel over grain was taking place. It first illustrates the Commission’s 
efforts to elaborate a short list that represented the common commercial interests o f the 
EEC; second, it describes the final approval o f the list by the Six and emphasises how 
their interest in attending the Kennedy negotiations as a regional trading area pushed 
them into finding a compromise position between those of them who wanted more 
exceptions and those who wanted fewer, achieved notwithstanding the ,any difficulties 
that existed in the EEC at that time. The Kennedy Round pushed the Six to set up and 
organize their commercial policy. The final list also showed that in the industrial section 
of the Kennedy Round, the Six were prepared to moderately reduce tariffs. As for the 
American list, Herter aimed at arriving in Geneva with a short list so that the United 
States could push third countries to liberalise trade. Herter accomplished his aim, 
however the protectionist mood of the US Congress, partly due to the EEC opposition in 
reducing protectionism in agriculture, started to rear its head. This chapter also 
describes the beginning of the negotiations in the agriculture sector and shows that in 
the context o f the difficulty of dealing with the Six in agriculture, the United States 
adopted pragmatic solution, hoping in this way to move the Kennedy Round ahead.
7.1 The European Commission exceptions list
Because of the pressure and lobbying that came from the trade sectors, the formulation 
of the exceptions list was not an easy to achieve for any country. However it was 
particularly complicated for the EEC, for each government had its own domestic 
industry to protect, but, at the same time, the EEC could not come to in Geneva with a 
particularly long list such a course o f action could potentially endanger the Round. As 
such, compromises were necessary.
From the beginning o f 1963, the Commission had started to consult trade 
associations regarding the effects of the EEC participation to the new GATT talks, and 
held lengthy meetings to improve its knowledge o f  the effects that should be anticipated 
from the eventual tariff reductions.1 In early 1964, the European Commission started 
working on the list of exceptions, setting up consultations with representatives of the 
economic sectors and national officials o f the Member States charged with the GATT 
negotiations, in order to gather information to elaborate a draff list which could achieve 
the broad support of the six governments. The Commission wished to make a list that 
did not merely constitute the sum o f the Six’s requirements, but which, instead,
NA 59 State Department Central file subject numeric, Box 3489, FT 4 US/TEA, telegram ECBUS A-645 from US 
mission to EEC to State Department, 9 April. German was disturbed by this direct contact between the Commission and 
the trade associations. For Bonn, the trade associations would merely conduct lobbying action on the Commission thus 
it was down to Member States to report the national interest to the Commission. AECB PV 213 20 January 1963.
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represented what it judged to be an accurate reflection of EEC commercial interests. 
The broad aim was to transform the requests of the Member States into a common list 
which would constitute t a genuine EEC commercial policy. An indication of this desire 
was also given by consultations with the trade sectors: Their representatives were not 
consulted on a traditional national basis, but were instead approached through their 
sector representatives in Brussels, and only once the trade representatives had been 
heard did the Commission approached national officials.2
The Commission estimated that, in 1963, total EEC imports amounted to $20,2 
billions. Of this total, $5,5 billion were agricultural imports, and $14,7 billion industrial 
ones. The latter was covered by about 2200 tariff lines and, after the elimination of 150 
zero-duty tariffs, which represented around $4,9 billion, exceptions concerned roughly 
2050 tariffs. In the consultations conducted by the Director General for the Internal 
Market, the French Pierre Millet, trade sectors asked for 850 exceptions, o f which 600 
total -  which totally excluded the covered products from the linear cut -  and 250 partial 
-  suggesting a reduction lower than 50% - out of 2050, amounting to around 40% of 
total tariffs and $3,8 billions of imports, and representing 40% o f  industrial imports and 
57% of dutiable imports in the EEC. Exceptions concerned textiles, ferrous and non 
ferrous-metals, paper, wood and ceramics, chemicals and the mechanical sector. 
Requests for exceptions varied. For the chemical sector, trade representatives agreed 
that only very few exceptions would be necessary if the ASP and the other American 
non-tariff barriers were eliminated and the disparity which, as was explained in chapter 
four, hit above the chemical this sector, could be resolved. In contrast, the textile 
industry desired total exceptions for their sector. While the EEC trade sectors demanded 
these exceptions, disagreement remained on automobiles for which the French, Italian 
and Dutch sectors requested exceptions, Belgium wanted the retaining of 8 points o f 
difference between the duty on detached pieces and complete vehicles, while no 
exception request was submitted by the German sector.3 The consultations with the 
national administrations of the Six gave the following results: requests for exceptions 
totaled 600, of which 300 total and 300 partial, representing 30% of tariffs and $2,6 
billion imports, and making up 18% of industrial imports and 27% of dutiable imports. 
Analyzed by sector, the requests of the national administrations were similar to those o f 
trade sectors.4
The Commission considered trade sectors and national experts’ requests to be 
too numerous and not justified by the commercial and competitive strength o f the EEC 
on world markets. The Six could afford a more liberal attitude and had to get in Geneva 
with a short and reasonable list in order to avoid being accused of protectionism.5 In 
any case, Keeping the results o f the consultations in mind, the Commission drafted its 
exceptions list, considerably shorter than what national experts and trade sectors had 
requested, and submitted it on 15 October to the 111 Committee, for a technical 
analysis, to COREPER, for a political analysis, and, finally, to the Council of Ministers, 
who would discuss and approve it in their special session of 11-15 November.6
2 AECB -  PV 274, 27 May 1964; CM2 1964/86 PV de la 134*"* réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 1-3 June 1964. See also 
Coombes, D., Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A portrait of the European Commission (London: 
PEP, 1970), p. 180.
 ̂ AECB BAC 118/83 851 Discussion du 28 février 1964 entre Millet et Reimer, Oorschot et Hoogland (Dutch officiais 
members of 111 Committee); AECB BDT 144/92 Maqolin cabinet papers box 777, Note à l'attention de Monsieur 
Marjolin, 1 June 1964.
4
AECB BDT 144/92 Marjolin cabinet papers box 777, Note à l'attention de Monsieur Marjolin, 1 June 1964.
5 Ibidem; AECB PV 274, 27 May 1964 and PV 275, 2 June 1964.
 ̂AECB BAC 122/1991-24 Rapport du Comité 111 en ce qui concerne la proposition de ta Commission relative à la liste 
d'exception de la Communauté, (CoS/N/1/64), 4 November 1964. MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Télégramme
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The list contained total exceptions and partial exceptions, the latter only partially 
excluding the covered products from the linear cut, suggesting a reduction by a lower 
percentage, as yet unidentified, than the 50% level. Not including ECSC products, for 
which it lacked competence, and paper for which it had been unable to formulate any 
proposal by mid-October, the Commission’s list concerned 250 tariffs, 55 of which 
were total exceptions and 195 partial ones (Table 1). Moreover, the exceptions 
suggested by the Commission represented 11,9% o f EEC total tariffs —  and 13% of 
positive tariffs, that is to say excluding zero duties. However, the exceptions for textiles 
were conditional, and depended on the renewal, in 1967, o f the Long Cotton textile 
Agreement of 1962 (LTA). If  the agreement were not to be renewed, the Commission 
proposals foresaw further exceptions, with increases to 13,2% and 14,5% of total tariffs 
and positive tariffs respectively (table 2).
T ab le  1 N u m b e r  o f ta riffs  excluded , p a r t ia l ly  o r  to ta lly , from  th e  lin ea r cu t, fo r  each  sec to r 
(C om m ission p ro p o sa ls) , in abso lu te  te rm
Sectors Total exceptions Partial exceptions Total
Chemicals 9 66 75
Textile 4 18 22
Mechanical sector 15 44 59
Minerals and metals 23 50 73
Other 4 17 21
Total (excluding E C S C  products and paper) 55 195 250
Source: A ECB 122/1991 -  16. Négociations com m erciales au  GATT, L iste des exceptions (présentée par 
la C om m ission au  Conseil), G /415/64,13 O ctober 1964.
T ab le  2 N u m b e r  o f  ta riffs  excluded , p a r t ia l ly  o r  to ta lly , from  th e  lin ea r c u t, fo r each  sec to r 
(C om m ission p ro p o sa ls ) , in p e rcen tag e  o f  to ta l  n u m b e r  o f  ta riffs
Total exceptions Partial exceptions Total
-  Total Sectors .tariffs







Chemicals 1,1 1,2 8,2 8,6 9,2 9,8
Textile 2,2 2,4 10 10,9 12,2 13,3
Mechanical
sector 3.2 3,2 9,1 9,1 12,2 12,4
Minerals and 
metals 5,5 6.9 12 15,1 17,5 22,1








2,6 2,8 9,2 10,1 11,9 13
textile 13,2 14,5
Source: AECB 122/1991 -  16. Négociations com m erciales au  GATT, L iste des exceptions (présentée par 
la Com m ission au Conseil), G /415/64,13 O ctober 1964.
To give us a more precise idea of the impact o f the Commission proposal, Table 3 
demonstrates the relationship between exceptions and total EEC imports: exceptions 
represented 4.9% of EEC total imports, and 9.1% o f EEC dutiable imports, (excluding
1078/90 Boegner au Quai d'Orsay, 14 October 1964 and MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Note de Wahl, «La 
situation actuelle de la négociation Kennedy: l'agriculture et le dépôt des listes d'exceptions», 20 October 1964.
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paper and ECSC products).7 Including conditional exceptions on textiles, they covered 
6,1% of total EEC industrial imports and 14,4% of EEC industrial dutiable imports.8
T a b le  3 C om m ission 's p roposa l as a sh are  o f E E C  to ta l im ports  by sec to r in 1963
Sectors Total imports Dutiable imports
Chem icals 7 10,5
Textile 2.3 8
Mechanical sector 9,4 9.6
Mineralsand metals 3,8 22,7
Other 2.7 9.1
Total (excluding ECSC products and paper) 4.9 11,5
Total including conditional exceptions on textile 6.1 14.4
Source: AECB 122/1991 -  16, Négociations commerciales au GATT, Liste des exceptions (présentée p a r  
la Com m ission au Conseil), G /415 /64 ,13 O ctober 1964.
To better appreciate the impact of the exceptions list on the EEC imports, table 4 
describes EEC imports by broad categories o f products.
T a b le  4 E E C  im p o rts  by  categories o f p ro d u c ts  in  1963
Product billions $
Oil 2.6




Other (Paper. Cartons. Non-ferrous Metal, Wood, Leather) 1.9
Source: AECB BDT 144/92 M ariolin cabinet papers, box 777 Note a  Tattcntion de M onsieur M ariolin, 1 
Ju n e  1964.
In formulating the draft list, the Commission tried to limit it to a reasonable size, 
while, at the same time, satisfying Member States’ most urgent requests. These efforts 
corresponded to the aims this institution had for the Geneva negotiations, that is 
ensuring a successful Kennedy Round, which required a short EEC list, affirming the 
regional dimension of the EEC in world trade, entailing the defense EEC internal unity, 
and exploiting the Geneva talks as a means to develop a EEC commercial policy. The 
Commission was perfectly aware that, once in the hands of the Member States, the list 
would grow in length, but in starting discussions with the Member States, the 
Commission had adopted the fir, stance that it would not accept list which constituted 
more than 20% of EEC dutiable imports.9
7 CM2 1964/128, R/964/64 Procès-verbal de la réunion restreint tenue à l'occasion de la 144*"“ session du Conseil de la 
CEE, 12-13 octobre 1964. For a description of the Commission' s list see also AECB BDT 144/92 Marjolin cabinet papers, 
box 777, Note "Déroulement des débats au Conseil sur le problème des exceptions", 11 November 1964.
8
AECB 122/1991 -  16, Négociations commerciales au GATT, Liste des exceptions (présentée par la Commission au 
Conseil), G/415/64, 13 October 1964; AECB BAC 122/1991-24 Rapport du Comité i l l  en ce qui concerne la proposition 
de la Commission relatives à la liste d'exception de la Communauté, (CoS/N/1/64), 4 November 1964. 
g
AECB BAC 122/1991-24 Rapport du Comité 111 en ce qui concerne la proposition de la Commission relative à la liste 
d'exception de la Communauté, (CoS/N/1/64), 4 November 1964 and AECB PV 293, 13 November 1964; HAEC -  MAEF 
OW  36 R. 132, Note reporting the Commission attitude towards the settng up of the exception list as described by 
Marjolin, 13 November 1964.
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7.2 Setting the EEC exceptions list: from national commercial 
policies to a common commercial policy
As the Commission had expected, once in the hands of the Member States, 
requests were received to modify the list. In this section, the difficulties which the 
Commission encountered in trying to steer a course between what would be acceptable 
to its partners in Geneva and what could be accepted by the Six are analyzed in the 
context of the three main sectors which came to be discussed. This was a complicated 
process, as, for the Six, formulating the exceptions list meant moving from national 
commercial policies to a common commercial policy: Compromises and sacrifices were 
indispensable. Italy, France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium called for more exceptions, 
while Germany and the Netherlands asked for reductions in the number of exceptions, 
and Luxembourg approved o f the list as it stood. Italy and, above all, France’s requests 
were so numerous that, if  accepted, the list would double in length. They felt that some 
important sectors, such as aluminium, paper, mechanical and transport materials and 
electronic constructions, were subjected to unfavorable competition conditions, as 
foreign competitors enjoyed more natural resources for their production, and had more 
financial and technical power. As such, they demanded a total exclusion from the 
GATT negotiations for these sectors. France and Italy held that it was neither possible 
nor desirable to back down with some of their requests for further exceptions. With the 
process of European economic integration still ongoing, many idiosyncratic national 
interests still existed, and only national government were able to fully appreciate them. 
The EEC was still in its construction phase and had not yet reached the level of 
integration which allowed for the suppression o f the concept of national economies. 
National interests had to be defended, and the national governments still had the 
responsibility o f bearing the consequences of the GATT negotiations. Moreover, Italy 
and France were already reducing their tariffs to join the CET, consequently, additional 
reductions at the multilateral level had to be moderate. In any case, the EEC would be 
prepared to reduce its list if  third countries offered advantages and were ready to lower 
non-tariff barriers, in order to obtain reciprocity. Thus, it was also for tactical reasons 
that the EEC list had to be longer than was, in fact, necessary.10
Germany and The Netherlands were deeply concerned by the French and Italian 
attitudes: holding that the competitive strength o f the EEC was robust enough to allow 
few exceptions, they wanted a short exceptions list, on the understanding that it would 
be further shortened in Geneva as the result o f the negotiations with GATT partners. 
The EEC had to keep a liberal attitude in order to push third countries to do the same, 
and to favour a continued expansion of EEC exports. It was therefore in the EEC’s 
interest to arrive in Geneva with as short an exceptions list as possible, thereby 
demonstrating its constructive attitude towards the negotiations. A long EEC list would 
preclude third countries from making concessions, thereby undermining the liberalizing 
aim o f the Kennedy Round, and running against the interests of the EEC which, given 
its competitive capacity, had to make an effort to favour the expansion of world trade 
and a greater degree of world access. Thus the Six had to reduce the Commission list or, 
as a compromise, Bonn and The Hague could accept the list as it stood, hence without 
the addition o f new exceptions.11
10 AECB BAC 122/1991*24 Rapport du Comité 111 en ce qui concerne la proposition de la Commission relatives à la 
liste d'exception de la Communauté, (CoS/N/1/64), 4  November 1964 and MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Note de 
la Direction des Relations Economiques Extérieurs (DREE) -  Ministre des Finances, 4 November 1964; MAEF, DE/CE 
GATT 932 Note 184/CE « Négociation tarifaire au GATT», 5 November 1964.
11 CM2 1964/112 PV de la 141*"* session du Conseil de la CEE, 28-30 July 1964 and CM2 1964/128, PV de la 144*"* 
session du Conseil de la CEE, 12-13 octobre 1964; AECB BAC 122/1991-24 Rapport du Comité 111 en ce qui concerne
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After preparatory discussions in the 111 Committee and COREPER, the final 
elaboration of the EEC exception list took place between 11 and 15 November when the 
Commission proposals were discussed by the Council of Ministers in a long night-and- 
day marathon. The drawn out nature o f proceedings should come as no surprise. From 
1958 onwards, the most important decisions within the EEC had been the result of long 
marathons, for example the one of the end of December 1961 regarding the CAP. 
Moreover, the major trade interests which the Six had at stake, and the need to find a 
compromise between them, help to explain the marathon proportions of the 
discussions.12
At the beginning of the marathon, Rey expressed his hesitation regarding the requests to 
increase the number of exceptions in an attempt to push Italy and France to relinquish 
their requests. The presentation of a long list in Geneva would provoke, claimed the 
Commissioner, a tough reaction from the GATT members, thereby endangering the 
success o f the Kennedy Round. Rey received the support of Germany and The 
Netherlands. State Secretaries Neef, Lahr and Ministers Andriessen expressed surprise 
at the other delegations inability to accept the Commission's list as it stood, and 
underlined that the economic strength o f the EEC and trade statistical data on internal 
EEC trade both advocated that no protectionism was needed: in fact, French and Italian 
exports had in fact increased since 1958 thanks to the reduction o f internal EEC barriers 
and this result could be repeated on a global scale through liberalization at the 
multilateral level. Lahr and Andriessen asked France and Italy to try to shorten the 
Commission list or, as a compromise, not to oppose the Commission proposals as they 
stood, and to let the EEC turn up in Geneva with a short list, so affirming the liberal 
character and outlook of the EEC. However, France and Italy firmly refused to abandon 
their requests and suggested that the Council of Ministers approve both the Commission 
list and their additional requests. Given such refusal, following a proposal by Rey, the 
Council of Ministers decided to proceed by analyzing the problems by category o f 
product, mainly chemicals, aluminum, paper, automobile and mechanical sectors, so 
that a compromise between the Six could be found for each sector. In order to facilitate 
the description of how the Six reached their final agreement, the discussions between 
the Six and the Commission is divided here into main sectors.13
Chemicals: a challenge to the USA
The first sector worth describing is the chemical one. It not only had a relevant 
importance in terms of trade between the EEC and the USA, but, as shown in the 
following chapters, this sector became the major stumbling block to the conclusion of 
the negotiations in 1967 due to the American Selling Price (ASP). Among the Six, only 
Germany, France and Italy, with their relevant chemical industries, had a genuine 
interest in this sector. However, interests varied, ranging from the Germans, who were 
the most liberal, to the Italians, the most protectionist. Germany had a strong and 
competitive industry and was willing to remove tariffs across Europe and the Atlantic. 
The German chemical industry, and especially the dyestuff industry had important
la proposition de la Commission relative à la liste d'exception de la Communauté, (CoS/N/1/64), 4 November 1954; 
MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Note de la Direction des Relations Economiques Extérieurs (DREE) -  Ministre des 
Finances, 4 November 1964. {Casadio 1973 #1200}, p.56.
12
In addition to CM2 1964/143 PV de la 149*™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 10-15 November 1964, the description of 
the negotiations over the exceptions list is grounded on the references in the following footnotes.
13
MAEF, DE/CE, 1961*1966 GATT 932, Note de la Direction des Relations Economiques Extérieurs (DREE) -  Ministre 
des Finances, 4 November 1964 and ANF 724.70/10, 1964-1967 Kennedy Round, 19850271/248279, Boite 1, Telegram 
1253/63 Boegner ay Quai d ’Orsay, 12 November 1954.
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interests at stake, and saw the Kennedy Round as an opportunity to reduce American 
trade barriers and boost its exports to this market. It attached considerable importance to 
the abolition o f the ASP, and it pushed the German government in this regard to request, 
together with the French chemical industry, to totally exempt organic chemicals from 
the Round, unless the ASP was removed. In fact, Bonn was really willing to bargain 
with the Americans in order to remove the ASP.14 France, too, was firmly convinced of 
the need to make pressure on the Americans to remove the ASP. However, compared to 
the Germans, it had less of an interest at stake, as French chemical industry had only a 
minor interest in the American organic chemicals market. In general, the French 
government was prepared to make moderate cuts in this sector, provided the USA 
removed the ASP. Italy, on the other hand, held that it was already bearing the pressure 
of the increased competition within the EEC, and opposed tariff reductions at the 
multilateral level. Italy was was wary o f bargaining away tariff advantages for its newly 
developed industry. A few o f big firms looked increasingly to market opportunities 
outside the EEC, but, in general, the Italian industry was not yet sufficiently large to 
feel the urgent need for sales outlets beyond the markets offered by the EEC. In fact, the 
Italian chemical industry was desperately opposed to substantial tariff reductions and 
Rome, accordingly, had no intention o f making any meaningful concessions. Italy 
hoped to achieve to this result by exploiting likely American unwillingness to abolish 
the ASP as an excuse not to grant any tariff reductions, or, at most, to only grant small 
concessions. It hoped that the USA did not move on the ASP in the expectation this 
would lead to the withdrawal of all chemicals from negotiations. As a result, within the 
EEC, the Italians had the toughest position regarding the ASP, and even if they had no 
significant economic interest at stake in abolishing it, they insisted even more firmly 
than the Germans.15
All the Six and the Commission agreed that the major aim of the EEC was to 
obtain the abolition of the ASP, and found unity in action in this objective. However, 
differences existed regarding the tactics to be pursued. For the Commission, Italy, 
Germany and the Benelux countries, in Geneva, the EEC had to state that it would 
refuse any reduction of tariffs on organic benzenoid chemicals (chapters 29, 32 and 39 
of Brussels tariff nomenclature, which were subjected to the ASP), if Washington did 
not remove the ASP. In contrast, for France, the EEC had only a meager chance of 
seeing the ASP modified, as the US government would face the opposition of Congress. 
As such, benzenoid chemicals had to be placed on the exceptions lists and the Six had to 
preliminarily see whether and how the United States would give up this NTB, and then 
state whether the EEC agreed to totally or partially give up its exceptions. Germany, 
while agreeing that, if the Americans kept the ASP, then the EEC had to except organic 
chemicals from the negotiations, was reticent in adopting a tough attitude from the 
outset, as it feared that such an attitude would simply push Washington to adopt an
14
MAEF, DE/CE GATT 931, Note «Préparation de la Conférence KENNEDY -  Opinions des producteurs français», 5 
February 1964; PRO FO 371/183386 Letter from Hughes to O'Neill, 18 May 1965 and PRO BT 241/844 Telegram 96 
from Roberts, British Ambassador in Bonn, to Foreign Office, 3 May 1965, reporting conversation between Keiser, 
Stedfeld, Horn of the German Ministry of Economic, and Roberts, Hughes and Denman.
15 NA 59 1964-1966 ECIN 3, box 791, telegram 1086 from Fessenden (US mission to Geneva) to State Department, 15 
June 1966; NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 5, Report of discussions between 
American officials and senior representatives of the Commission, 28 June 1966; PRO FO 371/189598 Telegram 118 
from Melville to Foreign Office, 12 July 1966. On Italian chemical industry see J. Pizzomi, G. J. L'industria chimica 
italiana nel Novecento (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2006).
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equally tough attitude with the result o f deadlock in the talks on chemicals in Geneva, 
and causing this sector to be dropped from the Round.16
Due to the range of various options, the discussions in the Council were 
interrupted, and several meetings between the 111 Committee and the Commission took 
place, before the French line eventually prevailed and organic chemicals were put on the 
exceptions list. In submitting the exception list in Geneva, the EEC would formally 
inform its GATT partners that if  the ASP was not eliminated or if its elimination was 
undermined by the setting up o f other non-tariff barriers, the EEC would refuse any 
tariff reduction for these chemical products. On top of this, in Geneva, the Commission 
would inform GATT partners that the EEC would attend the justification and 
confrontation process for the exceptions in the three chapters, only once a solution had 
been found to the ASP problems. On top of this, an American refusal to remove the 
ASP would led the EEC to withdraw the entire chemical sector from the Round. As 
such, the Six adopted a firm, almost intransigent stance hoping in this way to convince 
the US government to remove the ASP.17
Aluminium: the beginning of a long struggle
More problematic was to reach an agreement on aluminum, paper, mechanical 
and automobile sectors, where the Six did not simply have a disagreement on the tactics 
to be pursued as was the case for chemicals, but, rather, interests more opposed in 
nature. The elaboration of a common position for primary aluminium saw a tough clash 
between France, on the one hand, and the Commission, Germany and Benelux, on the 
other. This item was relevant for the United States, but was so above all for the Nordic 
countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway), and Norway in particular, selling, as it did, 
more than half of its aluminium to the EEC. Within the EEC, France was the largest 
producer, with its leading firm Pechiney, and was trying to establish a regional EEC 
aluminium market in which to export. Thus, the French had no intention of reducing 
protection, and maintained that concessions to third countries had already been made 
when the CET had been set. In effect, the CET had been fixed in February 1960, when 
the G List was negotiated at the 10%. France and Italy had decreased their respective 
duties of 20% and 25%, while Germany and the Benelux countries increased them 
respectively from a 0% and 7% rates. Germany and the Benelux were granted a 5% 
tariff contingent so that they could import at lower tariff level than the CET level. After 
the article XXIV:6 negotiations in Geneva in 1960-1961, the CET was fixed at 9%m 
,with the retention o f the tariff contingents.18
Because of the importance aluminium had for the Scandinavian countries, the 
Commission proposed to reduce tariffs to 7% with the elimination of all contingents, 
but, to big surprise of Rey, only The Netherlands approved this suggestion. Germany, 
Belgium and Luxembourg approved the reduction of duties, but refused to abandon the 
tariff contingents. In contrast, France, quietly supported by Italy, refused to reduce the
® MAEF, DE/CE GATT 932, Entretiens de M.Whal le 23 juin 1964 à Bonn avec le Dr. Reinhardt et le Dr. Sach, 30 June 
1964. CM2 1964/389 PV de la 65ème réunion du Comité 111, 13 October 1964; MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, 
Télégramme 1217/30 Boegner au Quai d'Orsay, 10 November 1964; AECB BAC 122/1991-24 Rapport du Comité 111 en 
ce qui concerne la proposition de la Commission relative à la liste d'exception de la Communauté, (CoS/N/1/64), 4 
November 1964 and ibidem Aide-Mémoire du COREPER (CoS/N/2/64), 10 November 1964.
17 AECB BAC 122/1991-24 Note introductive «Etat des travaux relatifs à l'établissement de la liste d'exceptions de la 
Communauté», (CoS/N/6/64), 14 November 1964; AECB BAC 122/1991-24, Mise en œuvre des décisions prises par le 
Conseil lors de sa session des 11/15 Novembre 1964, (CoS/N/7/64), 16 November 1964.
18
A full description of the interests of the Six in aluminium is given in chapter 10, completely dedicated to this 
commodity.
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duties but agreed to the elimination o f the tariff contingencies. France noted that, with 
the implementation of the CET, French duty had already decreased, thus no further 
concessions were possible. This refusal was received with concern by the Commission. 
For Rey, the total exclusion o f aluminum from the negotiations would cause problems 
in relations with the Scandinavian countries, and above all Norway, thereby 
endangering the possibility o f reducing tariff discrimination in Europe. After long 
discussions within the Council and the 111 Committee, and with the need to elaborate a 
final compromise to be presented in Geneva, the German presidency suggested that 
aluminium should be included on the partial exceptions list. Unless the Council agreed 
on some other solution, the duty o f 9%  would be maintained with a binding in the 
GATT of EEC 5% tariff quota. In tabling its exceptions list, the EEC would simply 
claim that aluminium would be on the partial exceptions list, without specifying the 
content of the partial exception. This solution added to the EEC list and differed greatly 
from the Commission’s original proposal. After much resistance, France managed to 
achieve the inclusion aluminum on the exclusions list, but the hostility with which the 
Commission, Germany and the Benelux countries took the compromise, and the 
condition that this solution would be maintained only if an alternative solution could not 
be negotiated, meant that the battle over aluminium in Brussels was not over.
Paper sector: heading for troubles with the Nordics
Even more troublesome were paper and pulp paper, another area of crucial importance 
for trade relations with the Nordic countries. All the Six maintained that their paper 
industry was incapable of facing the competition o f these countries, traditionally strong 
producers of paper. In the Dillon Round, the Six had refused outright to make any 
reductions and this led Sweden to withdraw from the negotiations. For the new Round, 
the Nordic countries had already made it known that they would withdraw from the 
negotiations if  substantial reductions were not made, a threat that the EEC could not 
ignore given the importance o f the Nordic countries to the Community’s for its exports. 
In elaborating its proposals, the Commission bore in mind that the EEC had to be 
mindful of the Nordics’ reaction regarding this sector, which would condition the entire 
negotiations with these countries. It also considered the economic difficulties that a 
substantial reduction of protectionism on paper could cause for the EEC, whose paper 
sector was less developed, and which did not enjoy the same abundance of raw 
materials as the Nordic countries. However, the need to conclude the Kennedy Round 
required that the EEC made some concessions.19
In searching for a middle course, the Commission suggested to include part of 
this sector in the 50% linear cut and, at same time, to find a broad agreement with this 
group of countries on pricing and marketing conditions, and to give financial aid to the 
EEC industry. It proposed to subject certain paper products which enjoyed strong levels 
of protection to the 50% linear cut, and to limit to two points the reduction on Kraft 
paper and other basic paper on which the CET was at 16%. As for pulp paper and 
newsprint, which represented two thirds o f the EEC imports from the Nordic countries 
for this sector, measures were to be taken in order to maintain the production level of 
the EEC industry so that the Community could make use o f its own supply. In order to 
allow the EEC to table tariff reductions in Geneva on pulp paper and newsprint, a broad
9 AECB BAC 118/83 851 Note de Millet pour M. Verloren van Themaat, 2 April 1964. AECB BAC 118/83 851 Discussion 
du 28 février 1964 entre Millet et Reimer, Oorschot et Hoogland (Dutch officials members of 111 Committee); MAEF, 
DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Note de la Direction des Relations Economiques Extérieurs (DREE) -  Ministre des 
Finances, 4 November 1964.
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agreement with the Nordic countries was required on their producing and marketing 
policy that, the EEC claimed, distorted competition. Then, to meet Nordic requests, the 
Commission suggested subjecting pulp paper to the 50% cut. The EEC had an ad 
valorem duty of 6%, plus a free quota bound in GATT for 2,1 million tons out of a total 
o f 3 million tons of imports in 1964. The growing need for pulp explained the free 
quota, while the 6% duty represented an instrument to promote EEC industry to further 
invest in this sector. The Commission therefore suggested reducing the duty form 6 to 
3% and renouncing tariff contingents. For newsprint, the EEC had a 7% duty 
accompanied by an unbound free quota for France and Germany o f 0,6 million tons (out 
of a total EEC consumption o f 1,8 million), which was insufficient to protect EEC 
production. This protection was accompanied by Member States’ regulations that, being 
very unequal in nature, risked affecting the competitive environment within the EEC. 
The Commission suggested reducing the duty by 50% and giving up contingents. At the 
same time, the Commission suggested setting up a para-fiscal tax on the EEC 
consumption o f paper, and using the collected funds to subsidise the paper industry. 
This subsidy would have the effect o f compensating for the tariff reduction and could be 
deployed to finance measures in the areas of reforestation and technical research. This 
solution would allow the EEC to make tariff reductions and to protect its own interests. 
In truth, the Commission proposals were not based simply on tariff reductions but were 
also concerned with also the industrial policy of the Six, and represented an effort to 
establish a common industrial policy in this sector.
The Six agreed that the interests of the Nordics had to be considered, but 
disagreed on how to do this and protect EEC interests at the same time. Moreover, their 
position was complicated by the opposition of their industries to lowering barriers in 
this sector. Fearing competition from the Nordics and believing that a drastic reduction 
in duties would implement a European free trade area, the French and Italian paper 
sectors asked for a total exception. These industries were particularly annoyed by the 
dumping price policy of the Scandinavians and even demanded an increase in the 
CET.20 The German paper sector did not adopt such a drastic position, but nor did it 
support any meaning reduction in levels of protection.21
Germany and The Netherlands were aware that, in order to enhance their exports to the 
Nordic countries, some concessions had be made in the paper sector and, therefore, did 
not share the drastic position of their industries. In any case, they opposed a solution 
based on para-fiscal tax, on the ground that only national parliaments could impose 
taxes. Moreover, their liberal traditions did not permit a solution based on the 
imposition of tax. For Neef and Andriessen, the Council had merely to agree on the 
principle of tariffs reductions in this sector -  with the intention of submitting pulp paper 
and newsprint to partial exceptions -  in order to allow discussions with the major 
producing countries to start. For Matterella, Wormser and Borschette, the Commission 
had to inform the Nordics of the EEC’s willingness to begin discussions on tariff and 
non-tariff barrier reductions. In the meantime, however, the total exception of the all 
sectors was the best solution. France and Italy sought, in particular, a total exception for 
basic paper -  Kraft paper -  and a partial exception for paper transformed products. 
Moreover, they opposed a 50% cut on pulp paper and newsprint, and wanted only a
20 MAEF, DE/CE GATT 931, Note «Préparation de la Conférence KENNEDY -  Opinions des producteurs français», S 
February 1964.
21
When the FTA proposal was put forward by London 1958, the paper sector took a negative attitude for fear of the 
Scandinavian competition. See Schulte, M. "Industrial Interest in West Germany's Decision against the Enlargement of 
the EEC. The Quantitative Evidence up to 1964" in Journal o f European Integration History, 3, 1 (1997) pp. 35-61.
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partial exception to be applied, provided that an agreement on the marketing policy of 
the Nordic countries was found.
The Commission strongly opposed the proposal to fully except the paper sector 
as this would extend the EEC list and cause problems with the Nordics. Moreover, Rey 
saw a contradiction between the declarations o f Member States that recognized the need 
to have a accommodating approach towards the Nordics, on the one hand, and then to 
papers on the exceptions list, on the other. Once again, protracted discussions took place 
with The Netherlands and Germany on one side and France, Luxembourg and Italy on 
the other. The final compromise was suggested by the Germans, who proposed a 
conditional exception, and was further elaborated by the Commission which, however, 
continued to prefer its own suggestion. Pulp paper and newsprint would be on the 
conditional and partial exceptions lists, the rate o f the partial cut was not specified; 
reduction of duties on basic paper would not be higher than 2 points. In presenting the 
list in Geneva, the EEC would underline that it would state the rate of the partial 
exceptions on the basis of the results o f negotiations with the Nordics regarding 
modifying marketing conditions, an improve in this regard being a condition for the 
tariff cut. Moreover, the tariff reductions were made dependent on the internal financial 
measures the EEC would take in helping its industry to bear these reductions, but no 
mention of fiscal measures was made. In accepting this compromise, Matterella 
specified that it was only in due to o f  the importance o f the trade relations with the 
Nordic countries that had Italy agreed to partial exceptions on pulp paper and newsprint, 
but it would be only if the two conditions were met that Italy would definitively agreed 
to the partial exceptions. The concessions that the EEC was prepared to make, even if  
only provisional in nature, potentially to be improved in the Geneva bargain, were 
considerably far from what the Nordics expected. As such, troubles with these countries 
just around the comer.
Mechanical and transport equipment sector: the toughest 
confrontation
The major stumbling block to the formulation o f the list was represented by the 
mechanical and the transport equipment sector. For its volume of trade across the 
Atlantic and in Europe, and its expansion potential, this sector was crucial for EEC 
trade relations with the United States and the EFTA, and for the entire Kennedy Round. 
The most important actors o f the Kennedy Round, Japan, the United States and the 
European countries, had relevant interests at stake, and different and opposing aims to 
pursue. Different and opposing aims existed also within the EEC, with the result that it 
proved particularly tough to achieve a common position to be presented in Geneva.
Within this sector, automobiles had a particularly relevant role, as all major 
participants were involved in this industry. Within the EEC, the Six had opposing and 
variegated interests that made it difficult the establish a commercial policy and, hence, a 
common position for attending the GATT talks. In setting up the CET in 1958, high 
Italian duties o f  35-45% were averaged with the French duty o f 29%, the German one of 
17-21% and the Benelux level of 24%, at the rate o f 29%. At the end of the Dillon 
Round, the EEC finished with a 22% CET. This meant that France and Italy had to 
reduce their tariff rates, while the Benelux countries and Germany remained at 
approximately their 1958 levels. In addition to the tariff reduction, France and Italy had
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also to face the increase of American investments in Germany in an attempt to avoid the 
CET.22
Unsurprisingly, French automobile builders angrily complained about the Dillon 
Round reductions and saw a new tariff reduction on the automobile as “une menace 
pour T économie de la Communauté Européenne et pour l’industries automobile 
française en particulier”. It could acquiesce to tariff reductions on cars only on the 
condition that equivalent tariff reductions were made by not only the United States and 
the United Kingdom, but also by the EFTA countries and the Commonwealth countries 
of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In truth, the French automobile 
builders doubted was a genuine possibility. EFTA countries were exporters of products 
that the Commission intended to put on the EEC exceptions list -  such as aluminium 
and paper -  and, as a consequence, the EFTA would place cars on their exceptions list 
in response. Commonwealth countries would maintain their restrictive policy towards 
imports of cars. Up against these conditions, the French car builders had many doubts 
whether a genuine reciprocity was obtainable. Therefore, the French builders asked to 
place cars on the exceptions list, considering this only a provisional inclusion, as the 
exceptions could be withdrawn if  a real reciprocity proved to be obtainable, and 
sufficient concessions from GATT partners were attained. On top of this, they held it 
absolutely indispensable to place on the exceptions list small cars of 2,5 tons, together 
with trucks, tractors and buses in order not to open the EEC market to British and EFTA 
competition.23
The French government considered all the requests from its industry to be 
untenable. It expected Germany to ask wish to subject cars to the 50% reduction, a 
request that could not be refused due to the importance Germany attached to this 
request, for the CET was more than double than level of American tariffs, and because 
French car producers would, in any case, face more competition from within the EEC. 
Thus the request on cars could not be accepted. In contrast, the French Minister of 
Industry feared that the French heavy truck industry could not survive the competition 
o f Bedford, the British truck subsidiary of the American General Motors. Therefore 
France accepted reductions in duties on cars, on the condition that full reciprocity was 
granted by the other countries and in particular the EFTA countries, but asked for the 
total exclusion o f trucks and hoped in some way to get also such a concession for buses 
and tractors.
The Italian industry, supported by the Italian government, wanted the whole 
sector -  trucks, cars, buses and tractors -  to be excluded on the ground that it was 
already reducing its duties to the CET level fixed at the Dillon Round, and that 
American multinationals disposed o f greater financial and industrial resources. Thus, 
the Italian government resolutely insisted that no further reductions were possible for 
the moment.
As the French government had predicted, Germany was firmly against the 
inclusion not only of cars, but also o f the whole automobile sector on the list. German 
industiy was strong, half its production was exported, and it had a crucial interest in 
lowering the CET in order to enhance its exports to the EFTA and American markets. In 
Brussels, the German government fully adopted the position advocated by its industry
22
Ramirez Pérez, S.M. "The role of multinational corporations in the foreign trade policy of the European Economic 
Community: the automobile sector between 1959 and 1967" in Actes du Gerpisa, N.38-"Variety of capitalism and 
Diversity of Productive Models". The following account of the automobile sector, in addition to the sources mentioned 
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MAEF, DE/CE GATT 932, Lettre de Erik d'Omhjelm (Vice Président délégué de la Chambre syndacale des 
constructeurs d'automobiles) à Couve de Murville, 7 July 1964.
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and aimed at bargaining down third countries’ tariffs with a reduction of the CET. To 
strengthen their view, the Germans pointed out that the United States could legitimately 
claimed a disparity with the EEC in the automobile sector- the American tariff rate was 
6,5% and the CET 22% - and asserted that the EEC industry was strong enough to face 
competition, And, in any case, an increase in competition within the EEC markets that 
might favour British automobile producers would be balanced by the further opening of 
the EFT A markets. On top o f this, exceptions in this sector were rejected, as they would 
noticeably lengthen the EEC list, a consequence that Bonn strongly opposed. The Dutch 
supported the German position, but wanted the inclusion o f trucks on the list for fear of 
British and Swedish competition with their truck industry.
To further complicate the Commission task of formulating a common position 
for automobiles, there remained Belgian requests. Belgium had an important assembling 
industry and, during the G List negotiations, it was granted a differential o f 8% in 
favour of parts duties compared to those for built-up cars. In terms of the Kennedy 
Round, Belgium generally favoured a reduction of duties, but they opposed the 
converging o f duties on parts and built-up cars, however, as this would weaken the 
competitive strength of its assembly industry. Belgium wanted to ensure the protection 
of this industry, whose development was looked upon with suspiciously by the other 
five, above all with the arrival o f Japanese cars to be assembled in Belgium. 
Automobile builders from all over the world, through Belgium, could install themselves 
in the EEC, thus while France, Italy and Germany had different position on what the 
EEC should do in automobile sector, they all agreed that the 8% difference had to be 
reduced.
The original Commission proposals had consisted in fully including this sector 
in the linear cut, but given the objections presented by some members, the Commission 
proposed to totally except trucks, buses, and their detached and accessories pieces. This 
proposal provoked a negative reaction from the German delegation, which wanted the 
entire sector to be placed under the 50% linear cut, and of the Italian delegation, 
highlighting the repercussions o f extra-EEC competition on Italian employment, and 
demanded total the total exclusion also of cars and all agricultural machines, and the 
reduction o f the difference in duties on cars and parts, while for France any solution had 
to guarantee that the reductions put in place by the EEC had a valuable equivalent 
concession in the reductions made by third countries which produced cars and, in 
particular, by the other European countries. For the Commission, the Italian request to 
totally exclude cars was indefensible as it caused problems both within the EEC and in 
the relations with the other participants in the Round. Belgium could accept the 
Commission proposals, on the condition that the interests of its assembling industries 
were borne in mind, and that a partial exception would be retained for detached pieces 
and accessories in order to maintain the difference between duties applied to 
automobiles and detached pieces. For the Belgian Minister, the multilateral negotiations 
should be a pretext to condemn the assembling industry, which had the same right to 
exist than the automobile industry.
The disagreement between the Six was so profound, and the diverging interests 
of Belgium, Italy, France and Germany so difficult to reconcile that the debate among 
Ministers was repeatedly interrupted and be shifted to the 111 Committee level, where 
the Commission suggested numerous proposals to try to reconcile the different points of 
view on how to deal with this sector. The problem consisted in first reconciling the 
Italian worry regarding the competition of the assembling industry on the automobile 
industry and the request to significantly reduce the difference in duty-levels for 
automobiles and detached pieces, a request supported also by France and Germany with,
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on the other hand, the Belgian need to defend its assembling industry, with Belgian 
Minister of Commerce Fayat strenuously struggling for hours to reach a solution, so to 
avoid what he considered “la condamnation a mort des usines d ’assemblage en 
Belgique”, and also taking into account German opposition to any exceptions for this 
sector. The formulation of the final compromise monopolized the entire final phase o f 
the Council of Ministers, and only at the very last moment did the urgency to formulate 
the list lead the Six to compromise.
The final compromise was a balanced and complicated set of concessions. Cars 
would be subject to the 50% reduction -  as Germany desired and Italy rather weakly 
opposed -  on the condition that true reciprocity o f concessions be attained, above all 
from the European countries- as France had insisted. Then, buses, trucks and their parts, 
because of the insistence o f  Italy and The Netherlands and despite the German 
opposition, would be included on the exceptions list, but limited to trucks heavier than 4 
tons. The inclusion of truck parts on the list was received with great satisfaction in 
Paris, where there existed the fear that Britain might set up truck assembling industry in 
Belgium. Because of the pressure coming from Germany, Italy and the Commission, 
Fayat in the end capitulated and accepted a reduction of duties both on detached pieces 
and built-up cars. In truth, the Belgian 8% demand was difficult to maintain as it stood 
in clear contradiction with the subjection of the 22% duty on cars to the 50% cut. The 
CET on parts was at 14% and, in order to reduce this duty by 50% and maintain the 8% 
difference with built-up cars, the final duty on built-up cars would have to be fixed at 
15% rather than 11%. Belgium accepted the reduction to 4 points so that duties on built- 
up cars and their parts would be reduced to 11 and 7% respectively. During the 
negotiations, the EEC would respect a strict correlation, in the sense that the percentage 
reduction which would be finally applied on the duty for cars would never exceed that 
level be agreed on the duty of unassembled parts, and would assist the Belgians in 
overcoming the difficulties their assembly industry would face because of the reduction.
The rest o f the mechanical and transport equipment sector was as problematic as 
automobiles, and saw the toughest confrontation between France and Germany o f all 
entire discussions in order to formulate the list. In 1958, the low tariffs o f Germany and 
the Benelux countries were averaged with the high Italian and French tariffs. As a 
result, Italy and France had opened their markets to EEC competition and lowered their 
protection against third countries. France was a net importer in this sector and, above 
all, had a major trade deficit with the USA that represented 4/5 of the French total trade 
deficit with that area. French imports from this area grew by 30% in the first six months 
of 1964. Moreover, France wanted to maintain preferential access to the German market 
in the face of competition not only from the USA, but also from the other European 
countries. Therefore, Paris wanted only moderate reductions o f tariffs in order not to 
further increase competition. The French government had received the open request of 
the Paris section o f the French Chamber of Commerce, and of the Ministry of Industry, 
to exclude from the Kennedy Round the mechanical electric and electronic sectors, as 
well as machine tools, aircraft and tractors. For this last item, the Ministry of Industry 
even claimed that the French tractor industry would be destroyed if duties were reduced 
and competition from American multinationals such as Ford or International Harvester 
were to increase. In truth, the Minister of Economics found all these requests for 
exceptions too numerous to be effectively defended in the negotiations in Brussels over 
the setting up of the list but agreed on accepting them as a starting bargaining
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position.24 Italy shared French worries, and it also asked for numerous exceptions to 
protect its mechanical industry and maintain preferential access to the German market. 
By contrast, Germany, who to join the CET had had to increase its tariffs, saw the 
Kennedy Round as an opportunity to reduce protectionism both in Europe and across 
the Atlantic. Germany was a net exporter, exports in this sector represented one third of 
its total exports, had a mechanical industry which was competitive on a global scale, 
and it had a major trade surplus in this sector with the United States. Hence, it had a 
major exporting interest in this sector and saw reductions in the CET as bargaining chip 
to obtain equivalent reductions of EFT A and US tariffs.
Having received the Commission exceptions list, France and Italy requested that 
so many exceptions be added to the point that if all o f them were accepted, the 
exceptions list would be increased a level representing an extra of 2% of EEC imports. 
French requests accounted for 350 million dollars, and a posed problem for the 
Commission, which was not ready to accept more than 280 million of dollars o f further 
exceptions from the entirety of the six governments for this sector.25 Belgium and 
Luxembourg accepted the list as it stood, while The Netherlands and Germany longed 
for the reduction of the Commission list. Boegner and Matterella took the line that the 
financial and technical means that third countries and, notably, the United States’ 
industries possessed did not allow the EEC to lower the existing protection level, which 
was, in any case, already moderate. But Lahr and Andriessen firmly wanted the 
Commission proposals, which represented one quarter o f  all exceptions, to be reduced. 
They did not share Italian and French qualms, and held that the numerous exceptions, in 
a sector in which the EEC industries were robust, were difficult to justify under the 
principle o f high national interest. Moreover, a protectionist attitude in an industrially 
developed sector would surely provoke the disapproval o f  third countries, which would 
not see as justified the protectionist attitude o f those countries who were most 
industrially developed. Thus, the list had to be shortened, and the German and the Dutch 
governments would in no way subscribe the protectionist attitudes o f other Member 
States.
Matterella and Boegner reminded everyone that, by joining the CET, France and 
Italy were already reducing their level o f protection, and as such they needed a time to 
adapt their economic structure to the new situation. For Boegner, the elimination of 
trade obstacles had to be gradual. In his view, the French industry had not yet attained 
the same level o f development as the German one, and a 50% multilateral linear cut 
would result in Germany arriving back at exactly the same tariff level as it enjoyed in 
1958, while the French industiy had to withstand the cumulative reductions o f joining 
the CET and those stemming from the Kennedy Round. France had agreed to expose, in 
the EEC framework, French industries to the competition from the other Member States 
due to the advantages that would result in France’s favour from the integration of other 
sectors, and notably the agricultural one. The fact that French industries were already 
subjected to the competition from the industries of the other Member States could not 
be employed as an argument to accept further competition from third countries and, in 
particular, the United States that, in this sector, possessed strong and competitive 
industries.
24
MAEF DE/CE GATT 930, Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financière -  Service de Coopération Economique, 
Rapport adopté par la Chambre de Commerce et d'industrie de Paris, 9 Mai 1963. MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, 
Note de la Direction des Relations Economiques Extérieurs (DREE) -  Ministre des Finances, 4 November 1964.
25
HAEC -  MAEF OW 36 R. 132, Note reporting the Commission attitude towards the set up o f the exceptions list as 
described by Marjolin, 13 November 1964. For French request see also AECB BDT 144/92 Marjolin cabinet papers, box 
777 Liste d'exceptions Kennedy, 13 November 1964.
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However, Lahr was not ready to accept the French reasoning. The EEC was a 
net exporter in this sector, and it had every interest in adopting a liberal attitude so not 
to push other countries, whose industries were less competitive than the EEC ones, to 
invoke exceptions. Lahr also noted that the worries the French industries had when the 
Treaty of Rome was signed had been shown to be unfounded, as French industry had 
increased its market within the EEC to that extent greater than that which German 
industry had achieved. Lahr also pointed out that French protectionist attitudes in this 
sector could provoke repercussions regarding the German agricultural sector, taking 
advantage of the French attitude to justify a similar form o f protectionism.
For the Commission, it became difficult to find a compromise between the 
Franco-Italian stance, which insisted on the necessity to maintain the level of protection 
for this sector industry in the EEC, and the German-Dutch position, which underlined 
the competitiveness of the EEC sector and the exporting interests of the EEC. After two 
days o f discussions and utter stalemate, and in the context o f the firm German stance, 
Rey made an appeal to France and Italy to withdraw their requests o f exceptions. 
Boegner, realizing that France had to withdraw some requests so to obtain the approval 
of the a majority of them, withdrew 30% of its requests for exceptions.26 By the same 
token, the Italians also withdrew some requests of their own. Germany judged the 
French withdrawals to be insufficient and called for more. In particular, it wanted to 
subject tractors, helicopters and aircraft to the general reductions, while Italy and France 
wanted total exceptions. In the face of Boegner’s firmness, Germany softened its 
position and accepted the 30% of French withdrawals and total exclusion for tractors 
and their parts, one of the firmest French requests. In the end, exceptions covered 
sewing machines, certain machine tools, computers, nuclear reactors, radios, airplanes 
(less than 2000 kilogrammes) and optical equipment.27
The final list
After sitting for nearly four days, the EEC Council agreed on its exceptions 
list.28 The final list covered 19-20% of Community dutiable industrial imports and 9% 
of all EEC industrial imports.29 According to the Commission, the average level o f the 
CET, that, in 1963, was 12%, would be reduced by 33,4% placing it at a new average of 
8%. The EEC list was composed o f three categories of exceptions. Out of 2200 tariffs,
26
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about 1148 were submitted to general linear cuts, 409 tariffs were excepted, of which 
117 totally and 292 partially. 31 tariffs were reduced conditionally. Member States 
added exceptions for a further 4,6% of the EEC dutiable imports compared to what the 
Commission had suggested. Mostly because of the French requests in the mechanical 
sector, a level o f 2,8% of dutiable imports was excepted. Table 5 shows the additional 
exceptions list approved by the Council o f Ministers. 0
T ab le  5  excep tions p roposed  by  th e  C om m ission  and  f u r th e r  exceptions app roved  by th e  C ouncil of 
M inisters« in  m illio n s o f d o lla rs
List proposed by the Commission
List of further exceptions 
Council of Ministers
as approved by the
Sector Sector
Textile conditional list 1 5 6 Textile 10
Textile non conditional list 4 8
Chemicals 91 Chemicals 3
Mechanical sector 2 5 9 Mechanical sector 195
Metals and minerals 2 3 5
Pottery 7
Various 3 8 Various 35
Paper 6 8 Paper 150
Source: M AEF, D E/C E. 1961-1966 G ATT 932, N ote «N égociation tarifaire au GATT». 20 N ovem ber 
1964
As such, many partial and conditional exceptions were necessary in order to reach a 
compromise between those governments that did not want further exceptions to be 
added and those that did. The Commission formula o f dividing the list into three 
categories -  total, partial and conditional exceptions -  without deciding the tariff cut for 
partial exceptions helped the parties to reach the final compromise, but it merely 
postponed these tricky decisions to a future date. Moreover, the Six elaborated their 
exceptions list with the assumption that the problem o f disparities would be given a 
satisfactory solution, along the lines defined by the 23 December 1963 mandate. Thus 
for the EEC, the question o f disparities was not over. Moreover, many conditions were 
attached to the list: a solution for the ASP, an international agreement on anti-dumping, 
and an agreement with the Scandinavians for the marketing conditions of pulp paper 
and paper sector.
The Commission played a central and active role in the elaboration of the list. During 
all the discussions Rey, Maijolin, Hijzen and Millet made great efforts to mediate and 
elaborate acceptable compromises, and, in the end, in addition to their satisfaction 
regarding the dual factors o f keeping the list under the envisaged 20% limit and its 
reflecting overarching EEC interests rather than merely a collection of fragmented 
interests of Member States, it expressed further satisfaction for role that the it had 
played in the formulation o f the list.31 Thanks to its technical skills, it maintained its 
key role of broker in disputes among the Six. This role was important because, in the 
GATT negotiations, technical and economic issues were crucial in determining the final 
result, and the Commission was able to provide the essential technical expertise. Just as 
with the Mansholt plan for agriculture, the Commission, with its technical expertise,
30
AECB, BDT 144/92, Marjolin cabinet papers, Box 144, Répercussion des abaissements prevus par le Kennedy Round 
et des hypothèse adoptées par le Conseil de Ministres du 14.11.1964 and MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Note 
«Négociation tarifaire au GATT», 20 November 1964.
31 AECB PV 294 18 November 1964; AECB BAC 122/1991 17, Eight General Report on the Activities of the 
Communities, 1966, EEC Commission Sec. 275.
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could make suggestions that obviously corresponded to its own vision o f the aims to be 
achieved in the Kennedy Round and, in this way, could influence the final political 
decision of the Member States, even if  the fact remained that the final decision was in 
the hands of the Member States, and the Commission could implement its vision as long 
as it was acceptable to Member States.
Member States also expressed satisfaction, and not only for having reached an 
agreement. Given their export interests, The Netherlands and, above all, Germany were 
the countries most concerned in getting to in Geneva with a short list. Even if they had 
not been able to shorten the Commission’s list, they expressed satisfaction that the list 
had been maintained within reasonable limits, and, in fact, Neef, German Secretary of 
State at the Economic Ministry, emphasized that the EEC “had no protectionist 
aspirations, preferring rather the development o f trade on a multilateral basis” . 
However, they accepted the list with the firm intention of further reducing it during the 
course o f the Geneva bargain.32 France and Italy were satisfied with the result o f the 
negotiations, for they were able to include most of their requests, above all concerning 
the mechanical industry.33
In a tense period for the EEC, dominated by the grains quarrel, the Six were able to 
approve the exceptions list, which, given the importance o f the commercial interests 
involved, was a difficult decision to reach. However, the willingness of the Six to reach 
a final compromise was never in doubt, and all of them showed their eagerness to reach 
an agreement. The capacity of the Six to set up a common list, an exercise that could 
easily have led them to quarrel, and right middle of a difficult period, showed the 
paramount interest they had in attending the Kennedy Round with a view to lowering 
EFTA and US tariffs, and to do so as a regional trading unit. These two interests 
combined pushed them to compromise their commercial policies to form a common 
commercial policy. The Six had enough common interests to have a common trade 
policy, allowing them to overcome difficulties and to take decisions. Trade was able to 
keep the Six together despite all the tensions that existed.
In the aftermath o f the decision over the exceptions list, the Six also decided on the EEC 
working procedure in Geneva. Along the lines of the practice already adopted at the 
Dillon Round, the 111 Committee would meet in Geneva during the negotiations, so 
that the Commission could consult and inform it. One observer for each Member States, 
if  the government wished, could attend the negotiations without speaking rights. 
However, the Commission had the right to set up informal meetings with the other 
Kennedy Round participants, meetings which only the Commission delegation could 
attend. The Commission accepted these procedures. The possibility of setting up 
informal meetings was an opportunity to strengthen its role as sole negotiator and, as 
shown in the rest of the thesis, it made full use of this opportunity to go without the 
Member States. At this point, the EEC was ready to negotiate the industrial part o f the 
Kennedy Round.34
Quote in Le Monde, 17 November 1964 trovare. The German press was particularly enthusiastic about the 
agreement reached on the EEC exceptions list. Not only France had accepted to set up the list but it had also agreed to 
reduced its requests of further exceptions. On 16 November Die Welt welcomed the agreement as "An astonishing 
triumph". Di Zeit worte that "Fear of the break-up of the Common Market had disappeared overnight. [...] France, 
which had previously spoken of a blockage in the Community had surprised everyone by agreeing to a resolution that is 
clearly counter to her own interest [...] Now that de Gaulle had made his concession f irs t agreement on cereal prices is 
unavoidable". Die Zeit, 21 November 1964. Both quotes are taken from {Willis 1968 #2304} , pp.340-341.
33 MAEF, DE/CE, 1961*1966 GATT 932, Télégramme 1274/91 Boegner au Quai d'Orsay, 16 November 1964. For the 
EEC exception list see ibidem Annex I à la note Négociation tarifaire au GATT», 20 November 1964 MAEF, DE/CE, 1961- 
1966 GATT 932, Note «Négociation tarifaire au GATT», 20 November 1964.
34 AECB PV 296 2 December 1964.
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7.3 US exceptions list: trying to keep a liberal posture
For Herter, the elaboration of the US list was not as complicated as for the Six, but for 
him too the process was not trouble free. The elaboration o f the US list has already been 
described by many authors, therefore only little attention is given here.35 Herter held 
that in order to allow the US delegation in Geneva to push the Kennedy Round to a 
successful conclusion, the United States had to limit exceptions to cases o f clear and 
pressing necessity. If Washington gathered in Geneva with a long list of exceptions, 
other countries could seize the opportunity to undermine the scope o f the negotiations, 
placing the blame on the United States. Washington had to play the leading role in 
bringing these negotiations about and moving them forward. “It would be a severe blow 
to the negotiations themselves and to our prestige as a leader in trade liberalization if  we 
were to undercut all we have said by tabling an extensive exceptions list”, claimed 
Herter. As such, the US delegation had to show up in Geneva with a short list to 
maximise the pressure on the other GATT members to also present a small number of 
exceptions and swell the scope of the trade negotiations.36
Herter’s aim, though, was not would not prove easy to achieve. In formulating this short 
list, the American negotiators had to consider not only the predictable lobby action o f 
the trade sectors, but also the opposition of Congress. Since the approval of the TEA in 
1962, the legislative body was going through a protectionist mood which risked 
considerably damaging the liberal stance that Herter wanted the USA to assume. In 
1964, restrictive bills calling for quotas on textiles, meat, shoes, wool, lead, zinc, steel 
containers and electron microscopes reached the Congress. On top o f this, the Tariff 
Commission forced anti-dumping duties to be placed on steel imports from Canada and 
revised, in a more restrictive way, the anti-dumping law. Herter looked with concern at 
these bills which gave the Johnson Administration a protectionist image and 
undermined its liberal posturing in Geneva, however, the continued expansion of US 
exports and the five-year implementation of the tariff cuts helped Herter to be able to 
refuse requests for exceptions.37
In the end, the US lists contained the three types o f exceptions and one kind o f 
exclusion. Economic exceptions, which included articles to be partially or wholly 
omitted from a 50% linear cut, were to be justified in Geneva on the basis of the 
“overriding national interest” . It covered cases where a tariff reduction would threaten 
to impair national security, as well as where a tariff reduction would cause serious 
economic consequences to a domestic industry. The products concerned were sardines, 
sawn timber, wool textile, plywood, ceramics, earthenware, china and glassware, oxide, 
electronic receiving tubes, footwear and leather gloves, electric measuring instruments 
and umbrellas. For this part o f the list, which concerned mostly labour-intensive goods, 
Washington had the intention of negotiating on the basis o f reciprocity, being therefore
35
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ready to withdraw the exceptions i f  third countries reciprocated. On top o f this, 
Washington put cotton textiles on the conditional exceptions list, subject to the renewal 
of the LTA. The second category concerned mandatory exceptions, notably articles on 
which the TEA prohibited the reduction or elimination o f duties, and it covered mostly 
lead, zinc, watch movements and carpets. It also covered oil and titanium, excluded for 
national security reasons. The third category was that of the technical exceptions. They 
resulted from the use of part of the TEA authority to compensate the United Kingdom 
and Japan for US escape clause actions on carpets and glass. Thus, reductions 
permissible under the TEA would not be sufficient to reduce duties by 50%. They also 
resulted from legislation temporarily reducing or suspending rates of duties. They 
included flax yam, silk scarves, fatty alcohols, aluminum, a number of rare metals in 
scrap (or defective unwrought form), for instance, germanium, tantalum, zirconium, 
iron and steel windows frames, motors (1/10 to 200 horsepower) and table tennis and 
lawn tennis balls. For this category, a 50% tariff cut was not possible, and the US 
government would try to offer the maximum reduction permissible.38
As for exclusions, they covered products excluded from linear reductions on the 
ground that countries mainly interested in these products were not taking part in the 
negotiations, Such products would not count as exceptions as they did not affect other 
Kennedy Round participants’ interests. On this ground, the United States claimed 
exclusions on petroleum products, and since, in 1961, they accounted for 11% of US 
total imports this reduced the US exceptions list considerably. Moreover, the United 
States offered the elimination duties on articles covered by duties of 5% or less.
In terms of import value, wool textiles accounted for 46% of US economic 
exceptions, leather footwear for 15%, and crockery and glassware for 7%. O f the 
mandatory exceptions, lead and zinc accounted for 42%, hydrocarbon oil products for 
15%, and carpets and glass for 8%.39 The US list meant that 18% of US industrial 
dutiable imports were included in the exceptions, but 8% were made up of by the 
mandatory TEA exception of oil, a commodity not significant in Geneva, since oil 
exporting countries were not GATT contracting parties. Thus, Washington considered 
the inclusion o f oil to be irrelevant for the justification and confrontation process o f the 
exceptions list. The exceptions list concentrated on a limited number of products, and it 
also contained few partial exceptions and no conditional exceptions at all. Thus the US 
list was shorter than the EEC’s, and seemed to correspond to Johnson’s drive to 
facilitate liberalization of trade in the industrial sector.40
7.4 The beginning of the negotiations in the industrial sector: 
the tabling of the exceptions lists
With the elaboration of the exceptions lists, negotiations in Geneva over the 
industrial sector could finally begin. On 16 November 1964, exceptions lists for 
nonagri cultural products were exchanged between the United States, the EEC, United 
Kingdom, Japan and Finland. The small EFTA countries o f  Austria, Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway and Switzerland declared that, subject to receiving reciprocity, they would not
38
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claim exceptions, though they reserved the right to table exceptions if they if  they did 
not obtain reciprocity. Their course o f action can be explained by tactical reasons rather 
than a real willingness to make 50% cuts across the board. They hoped, in this way, to 
put pressure on the EEC to reduce its list by emphasizing their liberal stance and under 
the threat o f the withdrawal of tariff concessions.
T ab le  6 L in e a r  cou n tries  p a r tic ip a n ts
Countries attending the linear cut w ithout tabling 
exceptions lists





Sweden United K ingdom
Switzerland United Slates
T ab le  7 O th e r  K ennedy  R ound  p a r t ic ip a n ts
Special structure countries:
Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, G reece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand. Portugal, South A frica. 
Spain, Turkey'
Less-Developed countries
Argentina. Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, D om inican Republic. India, Indonesia, Jamaica. South K orea, M alaw i. 
Nicaragua, N igeria, Pakistan, Pern, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and  T obago, Uruguay
Unlike the other EFTA countries, United Kingdom decided to table an 
exceptions list, though a short one which concentrated on few items. It accounted for 
4.7% of total British industrial imports in 1962 on a MFN basis, excluding therefore 
Commonwealth and EFTA preferences. The main items on the list were cotton textiles 
and associated manmade fibre, plastics materials, jute goods, lead and zinc. Cotton 
textile was excepted because o f the decline o f this industry in Lancashire, while 
chemicals were included in the list because of difficulties encountered by the British 
plastic industry. Just as for the EEC, concessions in this sector depended on the 
Americans removing the ASP. In drawing their list up, the British government had 
consulted trade sectors and it found remarkably little resistance to the idea o f a 50% 
linear cut that could be used to reduce European and US tariffs. After the French veto o f 
British entrance into the EEC, London saw the Kennedy Round as the main bridge 
between the trading groups in Europe, and far and away the best hope o f reducing 
barriers to European trade, and as such tabled a short list to attest to its free trade policy 
and to be able to bargain down other countries’ lists.41
In presenting their exceptions lists, the small EFTA countries, the UK and the 
USA preferred to table short lists to push other countries into assuming a liberal attitude 
on the basis that the former had presented a liberal list. The EEC, together with Japan, 
on the other hand, presented a long list, which was partly so formulated for bargaining 
purposes. Therefore, in both cases, lists were not made with the firm intention that they 
remain short or long. Countries had chosen different bargaining tactics to attend the
41 PRO BT 241/842 Note of the Board of Trade "Kennedy Round: List of Exceptions", 29 May 1964. PRO BT 241/843 
Note of the Tariff Division of the Board of Trade written by Neale, 5 November 1964; PRO BT 241/843 Telegram 242 
from Cohen to Foreign Office, 17 November 1964 and ibidem Note "The Kennedy Round -  Progress report" by the 
Tariff Division o f the Board of Trade, 3 December 1964. For the full British list see ibidem "Kennedy Round -  Lists of 
Exceptions, Note by the United Kingdom Delegation", 13 November 1964.
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negotiations. Once the lists were on the table, the problem arose of how to analyse 
them, to see whether reciprocity o f concessions had resulted. No agreement had been 
reached on how to compare lists in order to see whether a balance of concessions 
existed, and, without such agreement, it was objectively impossible to state which 
country had the ‘biggest’ list and had therefore to make further offers to the GATT 
partners. In fact, as soon as the lists were exchanged the quarrelling began: the USA 
stated that the EEC list was longer than its own, and bore heavily on American trade 
interests; the Commission claimed that the US and EEC positions were perfectly 
comparable, the British asserted to be in ‘credit’, both with the EEC and the USA and 
the latter two claimed that a balance existed in this respect; Japan maintained that its list 
was in equilibrium with the others, but no one in Geneva was ready to recognize this, 
while the small EFTA countries claimed that, having tabled no exceptions lists, they 
necessarily had a credit with everyone, but the other GATT members asserted that a 
balance was more or less in existed.
In truth, Washington was dissatisfied with the EEC exceptions list, labeled 
“disappointing at best”. It was severe, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and 
contained conditions -  like on the ASP -  and elements of uncertainty, due to largely 
unspecified partial offers. The whole thing was conditioned on by still unspecified 
disparity claims.42 In order to gain an idea of how Washington saw the situation, Tables 
8 and 9 report the disequilibrium between the US and the EEC lists, according to 
American data.
T ab le  8: Im p ac t o f  E E C  exceptions and exclusions (1961 E E C  im p o rts  in S 000)
EEC imports All third countries US
Total imports 18,691,188 4,053,854
D utiable Imports 11.361,486 3,038.862
Agricultural im ports 4,346.649 911.702
Non-Agricultural im ports 14,346,649 3,142.152
Non-Agricultural im ports, free 6,941.9812 1,069.512
Non-Agricultural im ports, dutiable 
EEC exceptions and  exclusions
6.967,000 2,072.640
Full exceptions 615.003 213,570
Free unbound item s not offered for binding 5.663 2,423
Dutiable 609.340 211,147
Full exceptions as %  o f dutiable non-Agricultural 
imports
8,2% 10,2%
Partial exceptions 1,549.628 329,159
Partial exceptions as %  o f  dutiable non- 
Agricultural im ports
20,9% 15.9%
Total Dutiable exceptions 2,158,968 540,306




Total exceptions and exclusions 2.58.968 540.306
42
NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 4, Memorandum of the Chairman, Country 
Committee I (EEC), 2 December 1964.
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A s %  o f  du tiab le non-Agricultural im ports 29.1%  
EEC  conditional offer on chem icals (B T N  28.32.39)
26.1%
Im ports 338,412 127.402
Exceptions 90.570 40.810
O ffe r sub ject to  withdrawals 247.851 86.592
C hem icals’ o ffe r subject to w ithdraw al as %  o f 
dutiable non-agricultural im ports
3 .3% 4.2%
D ata included also  ECSC im ports. Source: NA 364, Rees, o f  US trade Representatives o n  the K ennedy 
Round, box 4. M em orandum  o f  the Chairm an, Country Com m ittee I (EEC), 23 N ovem ber 1964.
T a b le  9: Im p a c t o f  US exceptions and  exclusions (1961 US im p o rts  in  $ 000)
US im ports All th ird  countries EEC
T otal im ports 13,812,256 2.130.549
D utiable im ports 9.252.677 1.897.416
A gricultural imports 3.292.442 194.065
N on-A gricultural imports 10,519,814 1,936,484
N on-A gricultural imports, free 3.044,653 216.493
N on-A gricultural imports, dutiable 
US exceptions and exclusions
7.475,161 1.719.991
Full exceptions 661.013 128.815
Free unbound items not offered for b inding 20.811 -
D utiable 640,202 128.815
Full exceptions as %  o f  dutiable non-Agricultural 
im ports
8,6% 7.5%
Partial exceptions 91,260 36.552
Partial exceptions as %  o f  dutiable non- 
A gricultural im ports
1.2% 2.1%
T otal du tiab le exceptions 731,462 165.367
Total du tiab le exceptions as %  o f dutiable non- 
agricultural exceptions
9.8% 9,6%
E xclusions 1.460.654 4,085
Exclusions a s  %  o f  dutiable non-Agricultural 
im ports
19,5% 0.2%
T otal exceptions and exclusions 2,192.116 169.452
As %  o f du tiable non-Agricultural im ports 29,3% 9.8%
Source: see tab le  9.
The US offers to the EEC substantially outweighed the EEC linear offer to the 
USA, 90.4% to 73.9% in terms o f dutiable non-agricultural imports. Washington
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asserted that the EEC exceptions hit 29.1% of dutiable non-agricultural imports from 
third countries and 26.1% from the USA (Table 8), which contrasted with the 18.8% 
claimed by the EEC. For the Americans, the latter figures appeared, in fact, to be the 
ratio of EEC exceptions to total dutiable imports, including agricultural products, 
although agricultural exceptions were not included in the EEC exceptions list. In 
contrast, the USA claimed to have excepted only 9,8% of its dutiable imports from third 
countries and 9.6% from the EEC (Table 9). Moreover, the USA made offers to the 
Community, which roughly averaged 45-46% duty reductions on its dutiable non- 
agricultural trade with the United States. EEC offers to the USA averaged somewhere 
between 30% and 40%, depending on whether conditional offers on chemicals were 
included.43
However, Washington was not only worried by the size of the EEC list, but also 
by its content. Almost every sector in which the US had a substantial trade interest was 
severely affected by the EEC exceptions, which hit the most dynamic sectors o f US 
exports, notably machinery and mechanical appliances, motor vehicle and parts, 
electrical machinery and equipment together with paper and pulp, aluminium and other 
non-ferrous metal, iron and steel (non-ECSC), and miscellaneous optical and measuring 
devices (Table 10).44
T a b ic  10: categories o f US im p o rts  affected by E E C  list
BTN Description 
chapter
Volume o f US trade %  o f  US trade
affected (Sm illion- affected
1961)
38 M iscellaneous chem ical Products 24 35
39 Artificial Resins & Plastic 38 55
47 Paper-making material 36 60
48 Paper, pulp, paperboard 35 95
51 Continous man-made fibers 18 65
73 Iron and steel articles 24 15
84 M achinery and M echanical Appliances 150 25
85 Electrical Machinery' and Equipment 46 30
87 Vehicles 43 50
90 M iscellaneous instruments and apparatus 41 40
Source: NA 364, Rees, o f  US trade Representatives on  the Kennedy Round, box 4, M em orandum  o f  the 
Chairm an. Country Committee I (EEC), 2 D ecem ber 1964.
At the same time, the USA recognized that its list caused problems to the EEC, 
as it had varying impacts upon the respective individual Member States. Although the 
impact o f the US list upon the EEC as a whole was generally moderate, American 
exceptions most severely hit the trade interests o f Italy, affecting about 24% o f all 
dutiable exports from that country. The US list concentrated on few sectors, above all 
textile and footwear, areas in which Italy was a major exporter (Table 11). The fact that 
Italy was the Member State facing the most serious economic problems, and a important 
potential ally in successfully concluding the Round because o f its Atlanticism, made
43
NA 364 Rees, of the US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, Box 1, Background paper Negotiations with 
the EEC, written in 1965.
44
NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 4, Memorandum of the Chairman, Country 
Committee I (EEC), 23 November 1964 and ibidem Memorandum of the Chairman, Country Committee I (EEC), 2 
December 1964.
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Washington become wary that its exceptions list could provoke the negative reaction of 
the Italians.45
T ab le  11: Im p a c t o f US E xceptions on  th e  Six (1961 -  US im p o rts  - S000)
(a) Economic T e c h n ic a l. 
m andatory.
and (b) com bined (c) Total
dutiable
imports
U S Ratio a/c Ratio b/c
BLEU 6.148 22.887 29.035 291,065 2% 10%
France 14,272 6,468 20,740 340,710 4% 6%
Germ any 15.487 10,509 25,996 770,188 2% 3%
Italy 73,102 8,396 81,498 341,336 21% 24%
N etherlands 7.259 839 8,098 154,119 5% 5%
EEC 116.268 49.099 165,367 1,897,418 6% 9%
Source: NA 364. Rccs. o f  US trade R epresentatives on the Kennedy Round, box 4. m em orandum  from  
Chairman. Country Committee I (EEC) to Chairman. Trade Staff Com m ittee “Impact o f  U S  Exceptions 
list upon EEC), 27 N ovem ber 1964.
While Washington was busy demonstrating that an imbalance existed between 
the concessions made by the USA and the EEC, the European Commission was 
engaged in seeking to prove the opposite. The latter institution claimed, and not only for 
tactical reasons, that the Americans had not subjected to the linear cut a full category o f 
products and had termed this exclusion rather than exception. If the exclusions list o f the 
USA was included in calculations, as it had to be, the EEC and the US lists were 
perfectly comparable. Thus, a balance of offers existed, so long as the United States 
removed ASP.46
The British took a more positive attitude towards the EEC list. While claiming 
that a certain degree of imbalance existed, and that the EEC had to improve offers in 
some sectors, in particular the mechanical one, London held that the EEC had made a 
considerable effort. It therefore took an optimistic view regarding the achievements the 
Kennedy Round could lead to. The four major trading countries, the USA, EEC, UK 
and Japan, were able to place offers on the table representing a substantial linear cut 
stretching over 80 to 95% of their industrial tariffs, and this offered considerable scope 
for reduction in world trade barriers.47 By contrast, the small EFT A countries reacted 
negatively to the EEC list; due to the overriding importance that these parties attached 
to their imports in particular sectors, the EEC list was perceived as dealing them a bad 
hand. So, Switzerland asked for improvements in textiles, chemicals and the mechanical 
sector, while Sweden asked for improvements in paper, non-ferrous metal, the 
mechanical sector and steel and wood products. The negotiations with Norway were 
going to be particularly difficult because all the products this country was interested in, 
aluminium, ferro-alloys, magnesium, paper all found themselves on the EEC exceptions 
list, with the result that almost 50% of Norwegian exports to the Six were contained in
45
NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 4, Memorandum of the Chairman, Country 
Committee I (EEC), 2 December 1964.
46
AECB BDT 144/92, Marjolin cabinet papers, box 777, Note dInformation "Négociations commerciales multilatérales 
du GATT -  justification des listes d'exceptions", 16 February 1965; AECB PV 345 Annex "Rapport de la Commission au 
Conseil", NCG(66), 19 January 1966.
47
PRO BT 241/844 Telegram 17 from Cohen (UK Delegation to GATT) to Foreign Office, 15 February 1965.
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the EEC exceptions list. As for Denmark, already worried about the EEC’s intentions in 
the agricultural sector, they were also disappointed by the EEC exceptions in the 
mechanical sector. Austria, too, was concerned about the application of CET rates to its 
exports to Germany. However, when the Kennedy Round started, Austria was 
negotiating an association agreement with the EEC in Brussels, and until the situation in 
Brussels became clearer, the negotiations in Geneva did not have a great deal of sense.48
The EEC was aware that it could not afford to ignore the small EFT A countries’ 
complaints. This European partners received a considerable share of exports, above all 
in the case of Germany, and after the French veto o f British membership, the Kennedy 
Round was the only alternative for reducing discrimination in Europe.49 Indeed, the US 
counted on the EEC’s obligation to improve their offers to the EFTA countries as a 
means of reducing the length of the EEC’s list. Washington was willing to introduce 
some flexibility for some o f its exceptions that the EEC wanted to see reduced, and 
counted on the pressure it could bring on the Six by threatening to withdraw its offers. 
However, it was also counting on the exigency of the Six to reduce discrimination in 
Europe through the Kennedy Round.50 The EFTA threat of withdrawals had the 
potential to push the Six to make improvements which would also represent a positive 
development for Washington. As far as Roth saw the matter, one of the things that was 
uppermost in the minds of the Europeans was that the Kennedy Round had an important 
role to play in brining down trade barriers in Western Europe. “This interest in their part 
was of great potential help to us [...] in the effort to strike a fair bargain in the 
negotiations”.51
In truth, despite all the complains the linear countries made about other 
countries’ exceptions, and despite the disagreement over the impact of the lists on other 
countries’ imports, in comparison to the previous GATT talks, the Kennedy Round was 
launched from a starting point of far more liberal initial offers, both in terms o f trade 
coverage and extent of tariff reductions. This offered considerable scope for the 
reduction of world trade barriers. In any case, in the early part of 1965, the linear 
bargainers engaged only in preliminary and slow discussions. In fact, they all wanted to 
see the progress and pace of the agricultural part of the Kennedy Round before engaging 
in serious negotiations.
7.5 Putting agricultural negotiations on their way
While progress was achieved in the industrial sector with the tabling of the 
exceptions lists, progress was eventually also achieved in agriculture through the 
decisions reached in mid-March to start negotiating pragmatically. However, as before, 
such progress in agriculture gave rise to German ambivalence towards the CAP, once 
again putting Bonn in an ambivalent position.
Discussions over agriculture since December 1962 had demonstrated how 
difficult it was to agree on rules, due to of the different views the EEC and the USA
48
AECB -  BAC 122/1991-3 Rapports n.36/40 de la délégation de la Commission pour le négociation du GATT, 6 May 
1965; ibidem Rapport n.51 de la délégation de la Commission pour les négociations du GATT 3 August 1965 ; PRO BT 
241/844 Telegram 17 from Cohen (UK Delegation to GATT) to Foreign Office, 15 February 1965; PRO BT 241/844 
Telegram 28 from Cohen (UK Delegation to GATT) to Foreign Office, 15 February 1965; AECB -  BAC 122/1991-3 
Rapport n.45 de la délégation de la Commission pour les négociations du GATT, 9 July 1965.
49
CM2 1965/314, PV de la 67*"* réunion du Comité 111,14 January 1965 and ibidem PV de la 68e"* réunion du Comité 
111,18 February 1965.
50
NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 2, "Kennedy Round -  Confrontation and 
Justification Sessions", undated, and NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 4, "EEC 
Confrontation: opening Statement".
51 Letter from Roth to TTiomas B. Curtis, 1 April 1965, Roth Papers, box 1, LBJL.
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held regarding the aims to be achieved. In fact, the stalemate had been caused not only 
by the UGP issue but also by these competing visions. Despite all the doubts that 
existed in the State Department and in the White House, Washington still considered it 
important to try and include this sector in the Kennedy Round, and looked with alarm at 
the complete stalemate. Unless steps were taken to get agricultural negotiations under 
way promptly, there was the grave risk that the opportunity to try to achieve significant 
liberalization would go begging, with the consequences this would imply regarding the 
success o f the Kennedy Round.52
In help of the Americans came Wyndham White. For the GATT Director, any 
effort to seek an agreed set of rules with the EEC was doomed to failure, as what the Six 
were prepared to do in agriculture was virtually unacceptable to the other governments. 
Wyndham White made crystal clear to Blumenthal that the best way to move ahead 
consisted in avoiding indefinite wrangling over rules, and in setting a date for tabling 
agricultural offers. Once, and only once, the date had been set, discussions could take 
place to define, to as high a degree as possible, the nature of the offers to be submitted. 
This suggestion aired what the man responsible for agriculture in Herter’s STR team, 
Irwin Hedges, had already suggested in October 1964 in the face o f the deadlock in the 
USA-EEC discussions, that is that the US could try to proceed without any rules.53
Herter and Blumenthal rapidly adopted Wyndham White’s proposal. They had 
insisted on an agreement on rules in order to push the EEC to negotiate, but after almost 
two years o f haggling, they had come to realise that any agreement to get reasonable 
prospects o f liberalization of agricultural trade was simply hopeless and had the only 
tangible result o f stonewalling the negotiations. Wyndham White’s suggestion avoided 
getting the USA embroiled once again in bilateral discussions with the EEC, and could 
get the agricultural negotiations out o f the impasse as well as constituting a test o f EEC 
willingness to make offers in this sector. In short, it could give agriculture a bold stroke. 
Herter decided to stop the quibbling about the rules, and sought to move ahead with the 
agricultural part of the Kennedy Round, starting with a prompt agreement on the date 
for tabling offers.54 With the President Johnson’s support, at the end of January 1965, 
Herter left for Europe to try to get the agricultural negotiations under way by securing 
an agreement that all countries would table specific offers on agricultural trade at the 
earliest date possible.55
In Geneva, Wyndham White put forward his proposal of launching the 
agricultural negotiations by avoiding further theological discussion, and tabling 
concrete offers by April, in the form governments judged appropriate, for all 
agricultural products.56 To get EEC approval, however, Herter left for Brussels to meet
The need for the US to push ahead agriculture was made more urgent by the fact that the USA's acceptance to table 
exceptions without parallel progress in agriculture had been interpreted by some as a weakening of American stance 
regarding the idea that agriculture and industry had to be linked. Memorandum for the President from Herter 
"Agriculture in the Kennedy Round", 19 January 1965, NSF Subject Files: Trade- Kennedy Round, Box 48, IBJL.
53 HAEC JMAS 95 Letter from Hinton to Tuthill, 14 October 1964; IMA 59, 1964-1966, box 450 telegram TAGG 2522 
from Blumenthal to Herter, 20 November 1964 and Letter from Blumenthal to Herter, 15 December 1964, Herter 
Papers, Box 1, JFKL.
54
Telegram 1155 from Herter to Tuthill, 21 December 1964, NSF Subject Files: Trade- Kennedy Round, Box 48, LBJL; 
Memorandum for the President from Herter "Agriculture in the Kennedy Round", 19 January 1965. NSF Subject Files: 
Trade- Kennedy Round, Box 48, LBJL; PRO FO 371/183399 Telegram 165 from UK Embassy in Washington to Foreign 
Office, 26 January 1965. The document reported conversation between Roth and Chadwick of the UK Embassy in 
Washington.
55
Letter from Johnson to Herter, 21 January 1965, Bator Papers, Box 1, LBJL; NA 59 1964-1966, box 460 Telegram 
1510 from Herter to Tuthill, 13 January 1965.
56
NA 250 1964-1966, Subject Numeric FT 13-2, Box 979, Telegram 2705 from Blumenthal to State Department, 22 
January 1965; NA 59, 1964-1966, box 460, Telegrams 2713 and 2714 from Herter to Roth, 27 January 1965; AECB BAC 
122/1991-3 Rapport 26 de la délégation de la Commission pour le négociations GATT, 27 January 1965.
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Mansholt and Rey and to obtain their agreement to negotiate along Wyndham White’s 
proposals. The two Commissioners played a central role in achieving to a final 
agreement with the American negotiators. Mansholt was deeply disappointed by the 
American position. He had envisaged the Kennedy Round as a part of a “grand desigti'\ 
as he put it, for global management o f markets for agriculture and he did not want to 
give MDS up, judged a valuable negotiating rule that worked in this regard. At the same 
time, despite the disappointment, Mansholt was aware that some progress had to be 
made, and that the plan could not be refused outright. Thus, he opposed tabling offers in 
April 1965, as the EEC could not do so until all internal issues of the CAP, notably the 
agricultural and financial regulations, had been settled, but suggested to start negotiating 
on 16 September 1965 when, it was hoped, the new part of the CAP would have been 
approved. However, Mansholt did not abandon his plan to use the Kennedy Round to 
organize world agriculture, and suggested that the date had to be conditional upon prior 
agreement by the Contracting Parties on the elements of agricultural protection to be 
encompassed by the offers. Decision on which elements o f national policy affected 
international trade had to be made on a joint basis, and not simply left to each 
participant. As such, in the interests o f the MDS approach, Mansholt suggested that 
there must be prior agreement on the relevant elements o f protection and domestic 
support system that had to be negotiable.57
Despite the frustration caused by the further delay that Mansholt was suggesting, 
Herter was prepared to be flexible over timing, i f  this could help the Commission 
overcome difficulties on the CAP during the summer, and could wait until the 
Community had resolved its internal disputes, but on the condition that the EEC 
accepted a date for concrete tabling o f offers regarding the whole agricultural sector, 
irrespective of the outcome o f any internal negotiations or the discussions in Geneva. 
The United States would go along with the 16 September 1965 date, if this were the best 
the EEC was prepared to offer, but the date had to be unconditional. At the same time, 
Herter insisted that negotiations on grains get started in April, given that the EEC 
already had common prices for these commodities.58
Mansholt doubted the ability o f the EEC to table offers for grains, making 
progress on one product without, simultaneously, tabling offers on others. But it was 
difficult for the EEC to refuse an April start for grains, when in 1964 it had repeatedly 
stated that as soon as grain prices were established, negotiations could begin. He also 
had doubts about the ability to unconditionally accept the 16 September date as this had 
fundamental implications for the EEC; it implied the fixing o f meat and dairy product 
prices before September in order to be able start negotiations on these commodities and 
the approval of the financial regulation, a thorny issue among the Six. The commitment 
of the EEC on the 16 September date thus had a strong political relevance, as it affected 
the pace of the setting up of the CAP and the working agenda of the EEC. Rey did not 
share Mansholt’s doubts. In the latter’s view, the EEC could accept American proposals 
for an unconditional 16 September date, and to start negotiations over grains in April
Note on visit of EEC Vice-President Mansholt, February 8-9, "Kennedy Round and agriculture" attached to 
Memorandum from Roth to McGeorge Bundy, 9 February 1965, NSF Subject Files: Trade- Kennedy Round, Box 48, 
LBJL; NA-250 1964-1966, Subject Numeric FT 13-2, Box 979, telegram 2750, from Blumenthal to Herter, 8 February 
1965. PRO FO 371/183399 Telegram 9 from O'Neill to Foreign Office, 2 February 1965. The telegram reported the 
conversation between the Commission, Herter and Blumenthal given by the Americans to O'Neill.
S 8
Ibidem and Letter from Roth to Curtis, 8 March 1964, Roth Papers, Box 1 LBJL; AECB BAC 62/1980-54, PV 304, 3 
February 1965.
233
for, after months of stalemate, the time really had come to strike a deal in order push 
ahead with agriculture.59
The final agreement between the Commission and Herter was eventually 
reached when Mansholt visited Washington on 7 February. The compromise consisted 
of tabling offers on grains on 1 April, then, between April and September, an inventory 
of border protections and domestic support measures affecting trade in commodities 
other than grains would be carried out, in order to reach agreement to the greatest extent 
possible on the protective elements to be included in the negotiations; and, finally, on 
16 September 1965, offers on commodities were to be unconditionally tabled, meaning 
irrespective o f the EEC internal negotiations during the summer, and of the outcome o f 
the discussion in Geneva.
While accepting this timetable, Mansholt cautioned Herter about the possibility 
o f implementing it. Negotiations on grains could start because, after having forced 
partners to wait for the decision on UGP, the EEC could not request any further delay 
while it settled the rest o f its agricultural regulations. However, it was not politically 
feasible to proceed with the bulk o f agricultural offers before the EEC internal 
regulations were completed. And, if  the Council o f Ministers failed to reach agreement 
before the summer vacation, it would almost certainly refuse to table agricultural offers. 
Mansholt believed that the two most eager countries among the Six to attend the Round, 
The Netherlands and Germany, were also those most hesitant about completing 
regulations, The Germans due to September elections, and the Dutch owing to food 
price increases that would probably result. This would allow the French to hold 
Kennedy Round agricultural offers conditioned on the internal regulations. Mansholt 
frankly admitted that the Commission was in favour o f the September date because it 
provided a major source o f leverage to get the German and Dutch to agree to next CAP 
lot. Thus, once again, the Commission was hoping to exploit the GATT talks to move 
ahead with the CAP.60
The meetings of February started to resolve the deadlock over agriculture, but 
once the agreement had been reached between Herter and Mansholt, the Commission 
needed the approval of the Member States. Aware that a refusal to agree to follow the 
Herter-Mansholt timetable could have serious repercussions for the GATT talks, at the 
Council of Ministers meeting in early March, the Six approved it without discussion and 
authorized the Commission to proceed with the grain negotiations in April, and to table 
offers an all other agricultural products on 16 September 1965. In elaborating these 
offers, the Council would take into account the results o f negotiations on cereals, of the 
confrontation of agricultural policies and of the state of work within the EEC regarding 
the elaboration o f its CAP.61
The Herter-Mansholt discussions were able to push the negotiations ahead. In 
Geneva on 18 March 1965, the EEC, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan
59
Ibidem; Rey appeared to be ready to agree to the American proposals but was stopped by Mansholt whose rigidity 
surprised the Americans. PRO FO 371/183399 Telegram 9 from O'Neill to Foreign Office, 2 February 1965 reporting 
conversation between O'Neill and officials of the US delegation in Brussels.
^  NA 59, 1964-1966, box 450 Telegram BUSEC 379 from Herter to various US Embassy "Mansholt and the Kennedy 
Round", 9 February 1965; Letter from Roth to Murphy (US Under Secretary USDA), 23 February 1964, Roth Papers, Box 
1 LBJL. While Herter showed to have a comprehensive approach towards EEC difficulties, Freeman was quite sharp with 
the Commissioner, indicating that there was a deep concern in Washington about the delay on agriculture and the rigid 
insistence of the E C  on the margin o f support formula. Memorandum from Roth to McGeorge Bundy, 9 February 1965, 
NSF Subject Files: Trade- Kennedy Round, Box 48, LBJL,
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£J\
set a timetable for agricultural negotiations, as already agreed by Mansholt and Herter. 
Therefore, following daunting discussions over agriculture, a schedule for negotiations 
had been adopted. Beneath the surface, however, the situation was much more 
complicated. In fact, the steps were slowed down by a last minute difficulty created by 
German hesitation. Despite the formal acceptance given to the EEC Council of 
Ministers, Bonn and, to and to a lesser extent, The Hague, were resistant in accepting 
the 16 September date unconditionally, as this presupposed the adoption a huge part of 
the CAP, adoption of common prices for milk, meat and rice and o f the financial 
regulations that could cause problems to the German government because of the general 
election of September 1965. The Herter-Mansholt agreement postulated more than 
Germany could possibly deliver by 16 September 1965, as Erhard had instructed 
German officials that no final decision could be taken on agricultural products in 
Brussels, and no new price decisions were to be accepted before the German elections. 
Bonn was anxious to avoid repeating the difficulties over UGP, when a fixed 
international deadline had been used to pressure it into unpopular domestic decisions. In 
fact, when meeting de Gaulle in mid-March, Erhard informed the French President that 
while he had been able to approve UGP before the German election, the new CAP batch 
would only be approved after Germany had gone to polls. Yet, for Erhard the problem 
was not only the negative impact on German farmers, but also the German intra-EEC 
bargaining position that could become weaker if the French obtained another favourable 
batch of CAP provisions, while giving nothing in exchange. The French could simply 
exploit the Kennedy Round to obtain progress on the CAP. 3
While accepting the 16 September date, so not to appear as the stumbling block 
for the Kennedy Round, Bonn’s opposition to further fixing common prices remained. 
During Herter-Mansholt, the Dutch and the Germans privately told Blumenthal that if  
the EEC tabling o f offers on 16 September required that, by that time, all the internal 
CAP issues had to be settled, the deadline could not be met by the EEC.64 Within the 
German government, Schwarz, the Minister of Agriculture, remained opposed to fixing 
common prices, and to find a way out he suggested that the EEC spokesman in Geneva 
made a qualifying statement, saying that, in September, the EEC could only be able to 
make vague offers.65 Schwarz’s proposal was picked up by Stedfeld, German delegate 
to GATT. While, in mid-March, an agreement was being reached in Geneva, the 
German official confidentially approached Wyndham White informing him of serious 
German difficulties. Stedfeld therefore suggested that the Commission representative 
make an oral statement indicating that “in certain marginal cases”, where the EEC 
system and prices were not finally decided before 16 September, the EEC offers could 
be more general in nature, and perhaps temporarily withheld altogether. Faced with this
NA 59 1964-1966, box 460, Telegrams 2871 and 2872 from Blumenthal to Herter, 11 March 1965. Letter from 
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German stance, Wyndham White spelled out that any statement qualifying it would 
upset the entire deal.66
In any case, the Germans did not give up also because the firm opposition of 
Schwarz remained. Thus, at the 18 March GATT discussions that had to approve the 
Mansholt-Herter agreement, German representatives tried to attach qualifications in 
order to exclude some products from the 16 September tabling. Washington was deeply 
irritated by the German attitude, and openly spelled out its annoyance. The US 
Ambassador in Bonn, McGhee, made clear to Lahr that any attempt to qualify the 16 
September date would jeopardize the whole agreement. McGhee also expressed 
concerns regarding the German attitude towards common prices in the forthcoming 
CAP negotiations.67 Lahr tried to reassure McGhee that he and Schroder would urge the 
German government to “take reasonably prompt action” on meat and rice, while, for 
dairy products and sugar, delay in fixing prices had not to be overdramatized, as 
progress in GATT could be made after the German election,68 As it had already 
happened during the UGP discussions, the German government once again appeared to 
be a set o f Ministers who were in permanent disagreement, rendering the German 
decision-making process incoherent. And from the way the German government was 
getting ready for the negotiations over the CAP, another storm seemed to be brewing.
Thus just when an agreement seemed to be within reach regarding agriculture, 
the situation was turned out to be much more complex. In Geneva, the Germans insisted 
on their reservations and asked that some reference be included in the Herter-Mansholt 
plan. With the categorical refusal o f the Americans to do so, and the irritation of the 
Commission, France and Italy, the Germans requested that such a reference was at least 
included in the EEC declaration o f acceptance o f the Herter-Mansholt plan. After some 
hurried consultation between the Commission and the 111 Committee in Geneva, the 
impasse was overcome by an ambiguous declaration by Hijzen, issued after the EEC 
and the USA had agreed on the settled schedule, stating that, in considering the content 
of its offers for September 1965, the EEC would take into consideration the 
development o f the elaboration o f the CAP.69
With the March agreement, negotiations on the agricultural sector were 
eventually put on track. A working method had been identified, and, at this point, it 
seemed that the Kennedy Round was well on its way. In effect, in April, governments 
started examining their system o f protection, and in mid-May they tabled their proposals 
to set up an international commodity on grains. After much haggling, negotiations over 
grains had gotten under way. Unfortunately, the situation was much more complicated 
than this. As already anticipated by German attitude over the Herter-Mansholt plan, 
tension continued to characterise relations within the EEC until such tension exploded 
in a full crisis at the end o f June 1965, which came to completely block the Kennedy 
Round.
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Conclusion
The chapter has illustrated how the interest of the Six in attending the GATT Round as 
a regional trading unit allowed them to overcome the difficulties that existed within the 
EEC, and to reach compromises. To set up a common list meant moving from six 
national commercial policies to a common commercial policy. The preparation for the 
Kennedy Round moved the Six in this direction, and pushed them to make the necessary 
compromises and, in this sense, the GATT talks represented an external stimulus in this 
regard. The elaboration of the exceptions list also showed that even if, generally, The 
Netherlands and Germany were characterized by a more liberal attitude than France and 
Italy, it is also true that also the former two countries had their industries to protect, and 
did not hesitate in calling for trade protection, as was the case for the paper sector. 
Hence, in the commercial policy of the all Six, liberalism coexisted with protection and 
regulation.
In the elaboration of the exceptions list, the Commission played a key role. It 
elaborated basic compromises, used its technical skills to formulate bargains acceptable 
to all Six and to promote a common commercial policy, and in this way enhanced its 
role in the EEC decision-making process. At the same time, the elaboration o f the 
exceptions list showed that Member States retained in their hand in the decision-making 
process, and maintained ultimate control of every single item of the exceptions list and 
hence of the EEC commercial policy.
As for the United States, despite their efforts to get to Geneva with a very liberal 
stance, they too had trade sectors to protect. Therefore, in the US trade policy, 
liberalism similarly coexisted with protectionism. In agriculture, the USA started with 
the unrealistic position of advocating linear reductions in agricultural protection 
equivalent to the 50% cut in industrial tariffs, and to make tariff reductions to all 
products covered by tariffs. Eventually, they switched to a pragmatic approach, 
according to which participants would put forward the offers which best suited the 
arrangements of their particular system of protection. The USA hoped, in this way, to 
maintain agriculture as part of the negotiations and to push the EEC to make meaningful 
offers. At the end of May 1965, meaningful discussions for both the industrial and the 
agricultural sectors were under way. Lists of exceptions had been exchanged and 
exchanges of offers on cereals had started at the end of May. It seemed that 1965 would 
turn out to be the decisive year. However, as the German attitude towards the respecting 
o f the 16 September 1965 date for tabling offers in the agricultural sector anticipated, 
another storm was arriving on the horizon of the Kennedy Round.
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Chapter Eight
Deadlock: The Crisis of the Empty Chair
Introduction
Chapter Six and Seven described the intricate period running from June 1964 to 
May 1965. They portrayed the slow progress the EEC internal disagreement and the 
lack of rules over agriculture imposed on the Kennedy Round, but also described the 
first achievements made on manufactured goods, and then on agriculture, thanks to the 
setting o f UGP. At first sight, this progress cause one to believe that 1965 was set to be 
the decisive year for the Kennedy Round. At the end o f May it apparently seemed that 
the Round had gained a certain amount of momentum: negotiations over exceptions lists 
continued, discussions over the international grain agreement had just been kicked off 
and an unconditional date for offers in agriculture in September 1965 had been settled. 
Yet beneath this serene surface, the situation was far more complicated. First, the Six 
still had to agree on another crucial batch of CAP negotiations, and, second, frustration 
existed among the Six for the way in which the EEC was developing. All the tensions 
that existed at the EEC level, anticipated by the German and Dutch ambivalent attitude 
towards the 16 September date, exploded in a major EEC internal crisis -  the so-called 
crisis of the Empty Chair -  at the end o f June 1965, with the result o f stymieing 
progress in the Kennedy Round.
After briefly describing the factors that led to the crisis, this chapter portrays its 
consequences for die Kennedy Round and the attitude the Six, the Commission and the 
United States adopted to deal with it. Regarding the Americans, we will demonstrate 
that the USA not had only a paramount interest in keeping the Kennedy Round alive, 
but also in protecting the European integration process from the crisis. It was also this 
second goal that drove the position of the White House and State Department, despite 
complains from the Department o f Agriculture for the alleged negative consequences on 
US farm interests. On the European side, we will show how the tensions that existed 
among the Six over the EEC agenda, and a lack of confidence between them, played a 
major part in the outbreak of the crisis. It was only at the end of July 1966, with the 
final agreement on the CAP and on the definition of the Commission mandate to attend 
the agricultural part of the Kennedy Round that the EEC crisis was ended and 
negotiations in Geneva between the USA and the EEC could begin. The aim of the 
chapter is to show that the crisis had no effect on the Commission’s role and position in 
the Kennedy Round as this institution retained all its power and authority to negotiate 
and was even able to increase it in the second last part of the Round. I also show that 
Luxembourg compromise had no effect on the way the common commercial policy had 
to be adopted in the Council of Ministers as the Six had, already before the crisis, 
informally decided that decisions on this policy would be decided unanimously.
8.1 The break out of the crisis of the Empty Chair
In sending his annual report on the EEC to the State Department in January 
1965, US Ambassador Tuthill warned that another difficult year seemed in prospect for 
the Kennedy Round because of the difficult negotiations on the exceptions lists and 
agriculture. He “urged that in grappling with these issues and in defending our interests 
-  which we certainly must do -  we keep our basic security interests ever in mind and 
seek to deal with the specific issues with a balance of firmness and patience” . Tuthill’s
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suggestion of bearing in mind security interests and his call for patience and firmness 
proved to be a thoroughly useful suggestion to guide US action in the second half of 
1965.1
Despite the setting o f UGP, tension continued to condition relations among the 
Six. Germany was dissatisfied with the priority the achievement of the CAP had been 
given since 1961, while Chancellor Erhard remained fully determined and focused on 
establishing the Political Union project in the EEC, as German proposals o f  November 
1964 on the EEC agenda had demonstrated. Feeling that a great sacrifice has been made 
by accepting UGP, Germany entered 1965 convinced o f being owed something in 
return, above in terms of its Political Union plan.2 This German hope receded rapidly. 
While France had at first been prepared to discuss political union, in March, Couve de 
Murville made it known that progress in this field would be possible only after the 
approval of the financial regulations for the CAP. Thus France continued to require the 
preliminary accomplishment of the CAP as a condition o f making progress in other 
fields, and had no intention of paying Germany back for the UGP, as Bonn felt it 
deserved, since the completion of the CAP was something laid down by the Treaty of 
Rome. This French stance further increased German suspicious towards de Gaulle’s 
desire to impose his own priorities on Germany. It seemed that France had its agenda 
and had every intentions to implementing it, regardless of any German agenda.3
To cap it all, the French stance towards US role in the monetary system and 
East-West relations seemed to have been formulated in order to create further strain 
between France and Germany. In February 1965, de Gaulle described the international 
monetary system as an inequitable deal, which allowed to the United States to finance 
its external commitments and buy up European firms by simply printing dollars and 
building up a huge balance o f payments deficit. The French president challenged the 
pre-eminence o f the dollar as an international currency, suggesting a return to the gold 
standard, and invited other governments to turn their dollar surpluses into gold so to 
bring the system to an end. Even if Germany also felt that the American deficit in its 
balance of payments could not continue forever, and that the Europeans could not buy 
many more dollars, and indeed warned Washington of this, they had no intention of 
following the French lead by developing an antagonistic attitude towards the Americans 
in monetary relations. By the same token, De Gaulle’s “courtship of Russia” and his 
statement that the policies of France and Russia were marked “by growing 
understanding and cooperation” raised suspicions in Bonn regarding French policy 
towards the Soviet Union.4
Faced with this situation, Erhard and Schroeder became convinced that Germany 
had to compel France to approve progress in other areas -the completion o f the customs
NA 59, 1964-1965 Ecin 3 Box, box 795 ECBUS A-505 from Tuthill to State Department, 20 January 1965.
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union and the common commercial policy, elimination o f fiscal borders, transport and 
monetary policies, the strengthening o f the European Parliament, greater integration in 
foreign policy and, obviously, the Kennedy Round -  which were of greatest interest to 
Germany, and to use the approval o f financial regulations to this aim. The financial 
regulations had to be exploited to  make progress in other areas, as this was the last 
opportunity to get concessions from France. In this exigency to get concessions from 
France in exchange for progress over the CAP, the agricultural part of the Kennedy 
Round complicated the German position. Germany had continuously emphasized its 
support for the GATT negotiations, but the 16 September date for tabling agricultural 
offers in Geneva presupposed progress on the CAP that Bonn had problems in 
committing itself to. Thus, GATT commitments, which made progress on the CAP 
mandatory, seemed to push the Germans to urgently seek equivalent measures in other 
areas.5
On the other side of the Rhine, Paris reasonably doubted the Germans’ 
willingness to make further progress on the CAP. Since the agricultural marathon 
negotiations of December 1961, Germany had shown itself to be recalcitrant in 
achieving the CAP and had reiterated that the achievement of the CAP was only due in 
1968, as the Treaty of Rome laid down. So, Bonn had not allotted much priority to this 
common policy in plans on the EEC working agenda and, worse, in June 1964 
Reinhardt had openly claimed with Wahl that there was no need to set the CAP in order 
to attend the Kennedy Round, as the EEC members could attend the negotiations on an 
individual basis.6
French doubts about the German willingness in setting the CAP increased right 
when progress for this common policy had become urgent for France. First, Germany 
had entered the agricultural part o f the Kennedy Round hoping to get the be able to 
maintain its imports of cheap food from third countries, and had therefore suggested the 
concessions o f quantitative assurances to third countries, exactly the request 
Washington had been making since 1963. To exclude such this possibility, the French 
had made it crystal clear that they would allow no quantitative assurance, and would not 
conclude the Kennedy Round, including its industrial part, without the full elaboration 
o f the CAP. Thus, the final establishment o f the CAP remained urgent for Paris in order 
to avoid the Kennedy Round bringing it into question.
Second, Germany had been constantly warned that its request for high UGP 
would artificially increase EEC production and, in particular, production on the part o f 
French farmers, due to the higher prices which would be on offer. Without a EEC 
financial regulations, the cost o f  this surplus would have borne by the French 
government. As such, Paris considered the approval o f the financial regulations as 
economically necessary for France, and an instrument to make Germany “pay the price 
o f its earlier political choice” of high UGP. As a result, France prepared to become even 
tougher in its tactics to see that the CAP was accomplished.7
The tension within the EEC at the beginning o f 1965 did not concern only 
Franco-German relations. To make the situation even more strained came along Italian 
and Dutch discontent about the EEC agenda. Since 1958, Italy had not seen its 
agricultural exports increase in a meaningful way, as French exports had done. Until 
1965, the CAP had concerned grains, meat, dairy products, and not products of main
 ̂ HAEC - MAEF, OW 36, Note, 19 January 1965 reporting conversation between Schröder and Couve de Murville. The 
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concern to Italy, such as fruit and vegetables, olive oil, rice and wine. Worst, Italy had 
experienced a huge surge o f imports of meat from outside the EEC, with the result of 
making the poorest EEC member the largest net contributor to the EEC agricultural 
fund because o f the CAP financial rules. Rome therefore wanted to extend the CAP to 
products relevant to Italy. Moreover, like Germany, Italy also resented French action 
within the EEC. Rome felt that France had to pay the other Member States back for 
having obtained UGP in December 1964, which, with the lowering of prices for hard 
wheat, imposed sacrifices to Italy too, and had to allow progress in the political union. 
To cap it all, Italy was also unpleased with the priorities that the EEC had pursued up 
until that moment. The economic integration of the six EEC members, with the 
dismantling of the barriers to trade within the EEC and the setting of the CET at level 
lower than the Italian tariff levels, increased economic competition on the Italian 
market. For this reason, Italy asked to balance this increased competition with common 
regional and social policy in order to help lessen the economic inequalities that existed 
among the EEC regions. Notwithstanding the Italian request, not much attention was 
paid to those issues at the EEC level. As a result, in March, Italian discontent towards 
the EEC agenda, the CAP and the French clearly surfaced and made Italy shift its stance 
from the mediating position it had often played since 1958 to a more confrontational 
one.8
As for the Dutch, in February 1965, they made it clear to the French that they 
attached great importance to the condition that, when the financial regulation was 
discussed, a central place be recognized to the European Parliament in the budget 
procedure of the EEC. Foreign Minister Luns had already identified this aim at the 
Council of Ministers meeting of 1 December 1964 and, on 2 February, the Dutch 
Parliament had passed a motion openly demanding the extension and strengthening of 
the powers of the European Parliament. As with the adoption of the financial 
regulations, national parliaments would not control part o f the financial sources o f the 
EEC, it being necessary to strengthen the role of the European Parliament, and if this 
condition went unmet The Netherlands would not approve the financial regulations.9
There was no doubt that until 1965 France had been the leader of the 
Community, able to impose its points of view to the Five. The French, helped by the 
Commission, were setting up a kind of CAP that matched French interests and were 
leading the Kennedy Round in a way which caused tough clashes with the Americans. 
Until that time, the Five had made concessions to the French, fearing that, otherwise, 
the French would abandon the EEC. However, by 1965, the economic advantages that 
French enjoyed in the EEC were such that the Five doubted whether France would ever 
dare to leave, and it appeared that they wanted to be recompensed for the sacrifices they 
made to keep France in the Community.
In this strained framework, the Commission presented its audacious March 1965 
proposals for making progress in many fields at the same time, and gave fire to the 
powders. The necessity for an arrangement for financing the CAP provided the 
Commission with an opportunity for political progress. At the end of March 1965, it put 
forward its proposals on the financing of the CAP, seeking French agreement to 
strengthen the supranational qualities of the Communities, giving more power to the
o
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Commission and the European Parliament, in exchange for highly favorable financial 
arrangement on agriculture. The Commission would be provided with independent 
funding based on the transfer o f customs duties and duties levied by the national 
governments on imports of foodstuffs into the EEC. The European Parliament would 
have the task of scrutinising the Commission’s receipts and expenditure. The 
Commission’s move was a clear potential hazard, and it had major consequences on the 
relations among the Six.
The description o f the events leading to the final breakdown at the end of June 
1965 at the Council of Ministers session of 28 June -  1 July 1965 is clearly out of the 
scope of this account. What matters here is that the Commission’s proposals were 
discussed between the Six until the end of June 1965 and took up the entirety of the 
Ministers’ attention. France had no intention of paying the political prices o f increasing 
the power of the Commission and the Parliament in order to obtain the financial 
regulations o f the CAP. It wanted only the financial regulations to be approved and had 
no intention o f yielding to supranationalism. In contrast, the Dutch, the Germans and 
the Italians, even if not fully supporting the Commission’s proposals, insisted on their 
indivisibility in order to get French concessions on institutional reforms, and in 
particular on the power o f the European Parliament. The three countries, under the 
leadership of the German Foreign Minister Schröder, strongly opposed the French goal 
o f obtaining the approval of the financial regulations without parallel progress on the 
European Parliament.
The Commission’s proposals were based on a miscalculation: Mansholt and 
Hallstein had believed that de Gaulle would pay a political price to get the final 
approval o f the CAP. But a financially independent EEC with a strengthened 
Commission and Parliament was clearly abhorrent to de Gaulle, who was not willing to 
pay the price set by the Commission. Faced with the toughness with which the Five 
defended their position, the French decided to do what they had threatened to do many 
times. After many warnings on the serious consequences o f a failure to agree, during the 
night of 30 June, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, chairman of the Council 
o f Ministers, pointing to the impossibility to find an agreement, declared the Council of 
Ministers session over, instead of getting down to further extensive negotiations, as had 
become customary in such situations, as previous negotiating marathons had shown. 
Then, in the followings days, France withdrew from the work of the EEC Council of 
Ministers and other policy-making committees of the Community, including the 111 
Committee, and the crisis o f the Empty Chair broke out.10
8.2 The US reaction: keep the Round alive while supporting 
European integration
The breakdown in Brussels was to have immediate repercussions in Geneva. 
Washington had hoped that the stalemate over UGP would be the last (of the many) 
obstacles to date, and that negotiations in Geneva could begin in earnest. But the crisis 
made the destiny of the EEC and, consequently, of the Geneva talks, uncertain. The
For a description of the events which took place from the end of March to the end of June 1965, in addition to 
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Council of Ministers of 28 June -  1 July 1965 see CM2 1965/51 PV de la 172ème session du Conseil de la CEE, 28 June 
-  1 July 1965 and the account made by Boegner to the Quai d'Orsay in HAEC -  MAEF OW 36, Télégramme 791/800,1 
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effect of the crisis was immediately felt in Geneva. As a result “of the shock waves of 
President de Gaulle’s explosion under the European Common Market [...] the KR [...] 
suddenly has sagged to a point where it is all but impossible to find a pulse beat" wrote 
the Los Angeles Times.11
In Washington, the Commission’s move to link the financial settlement o f the 
CAP to supranational progress was seen as risky.12 But despite the miscalculations o f 
the Commission, according to the American Ambassador in Paris, Charles Bohlen, the 
new crisis had not been caused by this institution, but instead had its origin in 
manifestly political factors.13 Bohlen did not believe that de Gaulle wanted to break up 
an organisation he did not like: even de Gaulle could not fail to take into account the 
economic advantages that the EEC gave to France. De Gaulle’s “objective [was] to 
retain what he would regard as [the] useful essence of Common Market -  trade and 
perhaps financial benefits to France -  while striking [a] decisive blow at political 
institutions which [were] basically repugnant to his view of [the] indivisibility of French 
sovereignty.” De Gaulle was attacking not only the Commission, but also the Council of 
Ministers, which had become a Community institution where decisions affecting the 
internal affairs of France were taken outside the direct control of French national 
institutions.14
For the American Ambassador, the other key factor in the crisis were Franco- 
German relations. Paris viewed the German agreement on the financing of the CAP as a 
commitment that Bonn had to honour because it was essential to France’s participation 
in the EEC, and not as a way of extracting concessions. Therefore, the French 
considered German support for the Dutch-Italian position on the powers o f the 
European Parliament a stab in the back. The major problem for the French was that 
confidence in the Germans was no longer justified. In short, for the American 
Ambassador, de Gaulle’s aims were to put a stop to the trend towards supranational ism 
within the EEC and to make certain that qualified majority voting (QMV) would have 
little or no practical relevance, to stop the Commission from acting as a political catalyst 
and to reduce its functions to purely technical ones. Moreover, de Gaulle’s aim was to 
stop the Five, under the leadership of Schroder, from blackmailing France.15
Although the United States had a considerable interest in the course and 
outcome of the crisis, it decided to take no initiative. On the contrary, a discrete attitude 
was maintained in order to avoid accusations from the French of interfering with EEC 
internal matters. Washington carefully and deliberately refrained from commenting on 
the EEC crisis, and took the line that it was a matter of concern that the Europeans had 
to resolve amongst themselves. However, if publicly the United States decided not to 
make any comment, in private they feared the impact the crisis could have on the
11 Quoted in Preeg E. H. Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis o f the Kennedy Round o f Negotiations Under the GATT. 
(Washington , DC: Brookings Institute 1970), pp. 112-113.
12
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de Gaulle. "But the issue was not cleverly drawn and the timing was off. [...] Hallstein and company [...] moved 
carelessly and prematurely". Memorandum from David Klein to McGeorge Bundy, "De Gaulle and the Common Market", 
7 July 1965, NSF Country File United Kingdom, Box 215, LBJL. French officials reported to the Americans that the 
"Commission has been getting a swelled head". Telegram n. 33 from Bohlen to State Department, 1 July 1965, NSF 
Country File, Europe and USSR, Box 171, LBX.
13 "The General does not roll out his big guns to deal with 'quartermaster1 problems", wrote Bohlen.
14
According to Bohlen, it made no sense to think that the French government was simply bluffing to get a better deal 
on financial regulation: "Not only would this be using a sledge hammer to crack peanut; but more seriously it would be 
bad negotiating tactics -  and the French are rarely guilty of that sin". Telegram n, 140 from American Ambassador in 
Paris, Bohlen, to State Department "French purposes in EEC crisis", 7 July 1965, NSF Country File United Kingdom, Box 
215, LBJL.
15 Telegram no. 33 from Bohlen to State Department, 1 July 1965, NSF Country Rle, Europe and USSR, Box 171, LBJL.
243
Kennedy Round, European integration and the Atlantic Alliance. If the EEC were to 
breakdown because of the French, the Kennedy Round could hardly be able to continue. 
And such a failure could impose French leadership, and diminish US influence, in 
Europe, and encourage American isolationism and protectionism. For the USA, the 
failure o f the Round would represent a failure to continue postwar policies of 
liberalization in trade fields, and could have serious implications for world trade and 
political relationships.16 Washington had never saw these GATT negotiations as a 
merely tariff-reduction exercise. After de Gaulle’s veto to British entrance into the EEC, 
the Kennedy Administration had counted on the MLF and the GATT negotiations to set 
up the Atlantic partnership, and keep the two sides o f the Atlantic together. Moreover, 
some US officials feared that the breakdown o f the European Communities could cause 
a historical setback for the US postwar policy, which included support for European 
political union and the Franco-German reconciliation, and would bring to an end 
Kennedy’s idea for an Atlantic partnership. As Winand notes, “soon American officials 
worried that [de Gaulle] might link security, economic, monetary and political issues in 
order to torpedo both the EEC and NATO, and more generally to oppose US policies 
wherever they threatened to undermine his vision of Europe and French 
independence” .17
Washington was reassured by the firm reaction o f the Five and their opposition 
to any compromise with the French that would jeopardise the Treaty of Rome. It looked 
on with satisfaction as European governments, despite the wavering of the Belgians, 
stood firm. However, Washington considered the unity o f the Five to be rather fragile, 
because the opposition to de Gaulle lacked unified leadership, above all a German 
leadership, and hoped that, after the German election, scheduled for September, Bonn 
could take the lead.18
It is against this background that the reaction o f  American negotiators in the 
Kennedy Round should be considered. Christian Herter, his deputy William Roth, and 
Michael Blumenthal, hoped the Five would hold firm towards the French, but also 
hoped the crisis would be quickly resolved otherwise the Round would collapse, given 
that the American delegation’s authority to negotiate was set to end on 30 June 1967. At 
the end o f July, because of the French absence, short of a miraculous European 
reconciliation, it was clear that the Six could not respect the 16 September deadline to 
table offers in the agricultural sector. At this point, Washington had to make up its mind 
about whether to proceed with the negotiations in spite o f  the fact that the EEC could 
not attend, or to wait for the crisis to pass.19
NA 59-250-57, 1964-1966 Ecin 3 Box 793 Telegram n. 37. From American Embassy in The Hague to State 
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The decision to go ahead with the negotiations was taken by President Johnson 
following the request of Herter, the State Department, Bator and Bundy who held that if 
the Geneva negotiations were formally halted, they would be difficult to revive, and 
would then collapse. In particular, an indefinite postponement of the agriculture talks 
was to be avoided, allowing useful discussions to begin with other countries. They 
feared that the crisis in the EEC and the full stalemate on agriculture could be exploited 
by Japan, UK and other agricultural importing countries more interested in the industrial 
part of the Kennedy Round an excuse not to make progress in agriculture. Proceeding 
with the agricultural part of the Round would maximize pressure on the EEC to table 
satisfactory offers at a later date, and Washington could make it absolutely clear that the 
Round had to include agriculture too. On top of this, the decision would strengthen the 
hand of those in the EEC who favoured a liberal policy and could later join the 
agricultural negotiations, catching up in a similar spirit, making a point to those in the 
EEC who did not want progress in Geneva.20
In the State Department’s eyes, persevering with the Kennedy Round could be of 
crucial importance for the Community and the Commission. Once the crisis was over, 
negotiations in Geneva could well emerge as a major enterprise in which the Six could 
find and maintain their integrity as a Community.21 Given the hostility de Gaulle was 
displaying towards the Commission in the crisis, it was important not to undercut this 
institution’s role: since Geneva was an important framework where it was negotiating 
on behalf of the Community, the Round’s continuation could play a significant role in 
the Commission’s survival as a political force. It was for this reason that Washington 
refused to consider the proposal from GATT Director General Wyndham White to 
continue the Round, simply replacing the Commission with the six Member States who 
would negotiate on an individual basis. The State Department considered this option as 
incompatible with the key American political objective to foster the unity of Western 
Europe. Therefore, Dean Rusk, the American Secretary o f State, forbade Wyndham 
White from raising the issue with the French. The Kennedy Round had to be negotiated 
by the Community, represented by the Commission. One last consideration held sway in 
Washington: continuing the negotiations in Geneva would be the most effective way of 
ensuring that the solution of the EEC crisis would include a Kennedy Round element. In 
short, American national interests dictated going ahead with the trade negotiations as 
best as it could, despite the complications and difficulties introduced by de Gaulle’s 
action.22
In deciding to table offers on 16 September, Johnson had to overrule the strong 
opposition of the Agricultural Department, and of the major GATT members. The 
Department of Agriculture mainly objected to the tabling on the ground that domestic 
farm groups would attack the American decision as a sign o f weakness in the US policy 
of obtaining significant benefits for US agriculture: the USA were making concessions 
despite the EEC not showing up. Freeman wanted to postpone offers until the EEC was 
ready as he was not only skeptical that the EEC would come meet their commitments in 
agriculture, but was also “worried about the political heat if  [the USA] put even 
conditional offers on the table while the EEC sits on its hands” . For the secretary of 
agriculture, no risk existed o f the industrial negotiations proceeding ahead, while the
20
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agricultural ones stalled. Given the slow pace of the negotiations up until that time, no 
concern existed that “industry would suddenly spurt away from agriculture, thus 
increasing the danger that agriculture would be left out o f the negotiations” . This quarrel 
over the tabling of the agricultural offers gave also the opportunity to Freeman to 
reaffirm what he had been claiming since 1963; if the EEC did not put on the table 
agricultural offers which promised a liberalization of trade “there would be no Kennedy 
Round”.23
Moreover, the Department o f  Agriculture held that the American negotiators had 
been too accommodating o f the EEC. In November 1964, they had accepted to drop the 
link between the agricultural sector and the industrial sector, and then postponed the 
tabling of agricultural offers from April to September 1965, as the EEC was not ready 
to negotiate. Then, in July 1965, face with clear impossibility on the part o f the EEC to 
table offers, the STR and State Department wished to push ahead in any case with the 
tabling of offers on the ground that this was the only way to keep the Kennedy Round 
alive. For the Department o f Agriculture, however, the TEA had been passed to with the 
aim o f reducing the CAP’s discrimination, thus no longer made any sense to table offers 
if the EEC did not do the same. US farm leaders would interpret the tabling as “a 
betrayal o f the premise o f the Trade Act and as a sacrifice o f agriculture”.24
In contrast, Bator, Bundy, Herter and the State Department held that the holding 
up o f agriculture would kill the Kennedy Round off, because negotiations in Geneva 
would have to be interrupted also in the industrial sector. “If we push full steam ahead 
with industry, we will be charged with decoupling agriculture from industry, and 
throwing in the towel on agriculture without a real try” , said Bator. Even if no one 
expected the EEC to make great offers regarding agriculture, by going ahead in 
September 1965, the USA could maximize the chance of getting worthwhile 
concessions from the UK, Canada, and Japan, all important markets for the USA, and 
even perhaps obtaining something useful from the EEC. As Herter put it, “it is too early 
to quit, and to risk the collapse o f the entire negotiations” . 25
Thus the EEC crisis gave rise to a new debate within the Johnson administration 
regarding the inclusion o f agriculture in the Round. The line of reasoning “no 
agriculture, no Kennedy Round” supported by the Department of Agriculture was not 
shared by the rest of the Johnson administration. Bundy was clear with Freeman: “it is 
not my view that there can be no Kennedy Round unless the Community makes 
significant offers in agriculture. The result would certainly be a smaller and far less 
significant Kennedy Round than we all hope for. But it might still be possible that the 
agricultural concessions offered by Japan, Canada the EFTA countries, and the rest and 
in the industrial concessions offered by the above and the EEC would provide a basis 
for a fair, balanced bargain -  balanced both in agriculture, and overall -  which would be 
of a significant benefit to the United States.” Actually, for Bundy that fact that the 
conclusion o f the Round could not be made dependent on agriculture success did not 
imply that the USA had given up meaningful negotiations in agriculture, but simply 
meant that the USA had to be realistic in its outlook. In any case, what mattered to him
23 Memorandum from Bator to the President "Agriculture in the Kennedy Round" 10 August 1965, NSF Subject file, box 
48, LBJL. See also Letter from Freeman to Bundy, 11 August 1965, NSF Subject file, box 48, LBJL.
24
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25
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at that time was that offers in agriculture were tabled, so to keep an active stance in the 
context o f the Kennedy Round.26
Thus the deadlock within the EEC caused the quarrel within the Johnson 
Administration over the link between agriculture and the whole Kennedy Round to 
resurface, just as it had done in November 1964. Because of the opposition of Freeman 
in tabling offers, Bator took the issue directly to President Johnson, asking whether the 
USA should table agricultural offers even though the EEC was not going to do so “de 
Gaulle has thrown a monkey-wrench in their machinery, the EEC will not be ready until 
January 1966 at the earliest”.27
President Johnson, usually receptive of Bator’s positions regarding the Geneva 
talks, followed the advice of his assistant in this case as well. Johnson also, however, 
adopted Herter’s proposal to compromise with Freeman, consisting of withholding the 
offers items of interest to the EEC.28 It was on this ground that, on 19 August, Herter 
announced that the USA would table offers in the agricultural sector, but withholding 
those o f interest to the EEC.29
It was by employing this same argument that Washington convinced the other 
contracting parties to table too. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada, Australia and 
Japan were in fact against the tabling offers in absence of the EEC. According to them 
the Six had such a relevant place in the agricultural sector, that it was pointless to 
negotiate without them. Washington had to use all its political weight to, first force the 
British hand in terms of attendance, and, once this had been achieved, to also convince 
the other countries. On 16 September, the United States, the main participants and 
agricultural exporting countries tabled their offers, hoping, in this way to prevent a 
dangerous a halt in Geneva.30 With this decision, Washington was attempting to 
reconcile its trade interests with the European integration process. It therefore hoped 
that the persistence with the Round could not only boost US exports, but also help the 
Six to regain unity and the Commission to maintain its role in international trade policy.
Despite the US effort to keep the Kennedy Round alive, the internal crisis o f the 
EEC, and the difficulty of the EEC to meaningfully negotiate, raised the fear that the 
Round could end in failure. This provoked rumours in the press about alternatives that 
the United States could take to pursue tariff liberalization without the EEC. With the 
British, claimed Roth, that there was “no point in considering the possibilities at this
26
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roar
juncture”, and nor did the British stance appear particularly accommodating o f 
discussing alternatives. With twenty-five percent of British trade taking place with the 
EEC, tariff negotiations without it the latter were difficult to conceive of. As such, the 
commercial strength and importance o f the regional EEC agreement made a Kennedy 
Round without the EEC an unlikely operation.31 In truth, despite Roth’s claims, the 
crisis of the EEC caused some officials o f  the Johnson Administration look to 
alternatives to the Kennedy Round. Even if  no cut and dried plan existed in 
Washington, Mann and Greenwald of the State Department enquired of London 
whether the latter would be prepared, if  necessary, to take part in tariff negotiations 
which did not include the EEC. The rather uncommitted British answer, according to 
which it was somewhat early to start considering alternatives to a failure of the Kennedy 
Round, and the fact that in November something seemed to be changing within the 
EEC, blocked any discussions.32
8.3 The EEC in the middle of the crisis: ticking over
In taking the decision to press ahead with the negotiations, Washington also 
relied on Jean Rey’s conviction regarding the importance of continuing progress in 
Geneva, and informal indications from the Five that the internal crisis of the EEC 
should not be allowed to interfere with the Community’s external relations, or to stall 
the Round.33 After the French withdrawal, one o f the decisions the Five had to take was 
whether to continue the Community’s activities or wait for the French to come back into 
the fold in Brussels. In particular, the Five had to make up their minds whether and how 
to carry on the Kennedy Round negotiations. On the one hand, the Five wanted to 
demonstrate to the French their willingness to go ahead in spite o f the French empty 
chair, and one o f the ways to do this was to allow the Commission to negotiate in 
Geneva. On the other hand, they did not want to antagonise the French through taking 
provocative steps, and negotiating in GATT over issues that also involved France could 
be seen as a provocation in Paris, and hamper a quick resolution of the crisis. It would 
not be facilitative of to reconciliation o f the Six if  the Five were to proceed as a unit in a 
forum in which the French were also represented. At the end of July, the Five and the 
Commission considered what action to take in terms o f  the Geneva negotiations and 
concluded that they could not table offers in the agricultural sector without a new 
Council o f Ministers’ decision. Under the existing mandate to negotiate issued by the 
Six, the Commission could continue the discussions in the industrial sector, and for 
grains in the agricultural sector, while a new mandate was required to table agricultural 
offers for other products on 16 September.34
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The solution chosen by the Five and the Commission was fully in line with the 
broad stance adopted by the Five to keep the Community ticking over while refraining 
from taking substantive new decisions. It consisted in going on with negotiations in 
Geneva under the existing mandate, but refraining from participating in the tabling of 
offers in September. In this way, the Commission could continue to attend the Geneva 
meetings under the mandate previously received, without annoying the French with a 
new mandate given by the Five.36 The Germans tried to persuade the other four partners 
to go along with tabling a partial agricultural offer and then seeking the written approval 
of the French. Their aim was not to move ahead in the Geneva talks without the French, 
but rather to maintain action to keep the Round alive and to prove French willingness to 
participate in EEC activities in fundamental external relations. However, the proposal 
was rejected by the Commission and the Benelux countries, above all Belgium, on the 
ground that it was a provocation to the French, and by the Italians because the only 
agricultural products for which offers could be tabled were those covered by tariffs i.e. 
fruit and vegetables, these being products for which Italy, as the main exporter to the 
EEC, was not happy about seeing a reduction in protectionism at the multilateral level. 
Unity o f negotiations for the sector had to be maintained. At any rate, the Germans only 
engaged in “gentle persuasion” on Rome as they felt that they could not afford to push 
the issue too far with the Italians and lose the latter’s goodwill regarding other aspects 
of the crisis during which it would be important to maintain solidarity among the Five.37 
Hence, it was decided to go on negotiating in Geneva under the mandate issued 
previously, even if  the Commission had a clear problem in engaging in meaningful and 
substantive negotiations.38
As for the French, during the crisis they kept carefully themselves informed of 
the activities of the EEC through the deputy permanent representative, Maurice Ulrich, 
who had remained in Brussels.39 Throughout the crisis, Rey insisted to them that France 
had to be represented on the Article 111 Committee, but always received categorical 
refusals.40 Yet Paris never obstructed the work on the GATT and never opposed the 
right of the Commission to continue negotiating in Geneva. The French were perfectly 
aware that meaningful negotiations would resume only once the internal crisis o f the 
EEC was over and, given the fact that the Commission was acting under the existing 
mandate, they judged it to be wise not to spark an unnecessary war with the Five over
35
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the Kennedy Round.41 The French, who were just as interested as the Five in the 
Kennedy Round, and therefore did not want to obstruct it, stayed well abreast of 
progress made in Geneva. And when rumours circulated in the international press that 
the United States intended to push ahead with the Kennedy Round, excluding the EEC, 
they immediately queried Washington and sought assurances about American 
intentions, assurances that Washington gave.42 Also revealing of the French attitude 
towards the EEC and the Commission was the French proposal made at the end of 
October on the American subsidies to chicken exports. Washington had decided to 
apply a system of subsides to chicken exports and the French delegation to GATT asked 
the delegations of the Five in Geneva to set up a coordinating meeting which the 
representatives o f Commission could attend as “assistants techniques”. Thus Paris, even 
if bypassing the formal EEC framework, sought the cooperation of the Five, and even 
wanted the Commission to be present at the meeting. The French request revealed that 
Paris had no intention of sabotaging the EEC or of excluding the Commission. At any 
rate, the Commission refused the French proposal on the ground that any consultations 
needed to take place within the EEC framework of the 111 Committee.43
In continuing the talks in Geneva, the Commission took care not to go beyond 
the remit o f the mandate and kept in close contact with the French delegations to the 
GATT and to  111 Committee in order to inform them o f any step taken and progress 
made.44 For example, when, in November 1965, the Commission, at the strong 
insistence o f Rey, and with the opposition of Commissioner Matjolin, who feared the 
move could annoy the French, authorised its delegation in Geneva to agree to the 
creation o f the GATT working groups on chemicals, pulp and paper and aluminium, and 
to attend the working group on textiles, it carefully specified to its delegation that it had 
to remain strictly within the bounds o f its mandate and that, consequently, no 
concessions on tariff reductions to third countries could be made. In addition, Rey was 
asked by the other Commissioners to inform the French delegation in Geneva about the 
stances assumed in these working groups.45
Confirming once more that challenges to the negotiating role of the Commission 
did not come specifically from the French, at the 111 Committee meeting of 14 October 
1965, representatives of the Five underlined their wish to be associated as strict as 
possible to the informal discussions the Commission was attending in Geneva with third 
countries. This request had come in particular from the German government that, in 
June 1964, had already agreed with Paris that observers o f the Member States had to 
attend the informal meeting organised in Wyndham W hite’s office and attended by the 
Commission, Japan, UK and the USA.46 Predictably, Hijzen opposed the request and 
recalled that an understanding had already been reached according to which Member 
States would attend formal meetings without speaking rights, but not the informal ones 
that took place in Wyndham White’s office.47 Informal meetings had a frank, direct and
41
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at the same time flexible character that facilitated the discussions and benefited the 
negotiations. And, in fact, the most important discussions were taking place within this 
framework. The Commission was obviously concerned with maintaining this 
prerogative which strengthened its role as negotiating agent and allowed to unburden 
itself of Member States’ presence. Hijzen expected that as soon as it became clear that 
the real negotiations were moving to the informal plan, Member States would insist on 
being present. However, he firmly refused such presence in this kind of meeting, both to 
defend the prerogative of the Commission and to maintain their usefulness. In effect, 
each member state would attend with a two-to-three people delegation, with the result 
that the Commission would be flanked by a group too numerous in size, and the open, 
frank and flexible character o f the informal meetings would be endangered.48 In the end, 
Member States did not challenge the Commission’s right to attend the informal meeting 
their absence, but asked this institution to rapidly and exhaustively inform the 111 
Committee of the content of the informal meetings.49
In any case, no major decision was taken in Geneva during the crisis. Although 
technical work could continue under the existing mandate, any significant step ahead 
required a new authorisation from the Council of Ministers. With the passing of time, 
the Commission became progressively less able to actively and meaningfully attend the 
discussions, and the necessity for the EEC Council o f Ministers to give new instructions 
to the Commission was strongly felt.50 In October, the Commission was requested by 
the Council of Ministers to submit a report on the Kennedy Round by 31 January 1966 
so that an appraisal of the situation could be made.51 Then, at the end of November 
1965, the EEC Council of Ministers discussed with the Commission the situation 
concerning the GATT negotiations. Both Rey and the Five agreed on the necessity for 
the Council to be able to give new instructions to the Commission in order to play any 
further part in the Geneva talks. In spite o f the efforts of Washington, the Commission 
and the Five to treat the Kennedy Round as a-business-as-usual affair, it had, in fact, 
come to a halt due to the EEC paralysis. The Five were therefore at a crossroads: 
bearing in mind that American authority to negotiate lapsed on 30 June 1967, if they 
aimed to conclude the Kennedy Round, meaningful negotiations needed to start by 
February 1966. The conclusion reached was that the Five could wait for the French until 
January 1966, but if  Paris persisted in its boycott, they would be obliged to consider 
whether to go ahead in the Kennedy Round as a Community composed of five 
members, in order to ensure a modicum o f success in the negotiations. The Five feared 
that, in case of failure, the Johnson Administration would come under pressure to revise 
its European policy, and, as such, they had to stop the French from letting the crisis drag 
on until progress in Geneva became impossible. In this sense the trade negotiations had 
the potential of becoming a breaking point of the EEC activities.52
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8.4 The Luxembourg agreement and the Kennedy Round
Hopes o f settling the crisis improved when, in November, the Five and France 
agreed to meet in Luxembourg in the middle o f January 1966 without the Commission 
to discuss the EEC internal decision-making process and, in particular, qualified 1 
majority voting (QMV) within the Council o f Ministers and the power of the 
Commission. De Gaulle had brought the two questions into the open during his 9 
September press conference, requesting that the QMV, which was due to be applied to 
Council o f Ministers decisions after January 1966, not be applied and that the 
Commission stop acting as an independent political authority.53 f
In view of the Luxembourg meeting, the Americans set about ensuring that the i
settlement o f the crisis would be consistent with an American conception of European | 
integration, and with the need to conclude the Kennedy Round. Ambassador Tuthill | 
urged the Five not to accept any change in the Treaty o f Rome, in particular on majority |
voting and on the powers o f the European Commission, and to include the Kennedy r
Round in any settlement reached with Paris. Washington was, in particular, counting on ,
Bonn and The Hague, as it believed the Belgians and the Italians strongly wished for the !
return of the French and were not likely to push hard on GATT until a solution to the <
EEC crisis was either in sight or out o f the question.54 \
Pressures were made, above all, on Germany. When Erhard and Schröder visited I
Washington at the end o f December 1965, Ball argued that the French insistence on I
downgrading the Commission was o f particular concern to the United States, while I
Heiter stressed the urgency of an early resumption in talks in Geneva and emphasized 
that commitment to progress had to be high on the list o f conditions for any settlement |
the Five hoped to reach with the French. At the end of the visit, in a joint communiqué, 1
Erhard and President Johnson ‘agreed that the successful conclusion of the Kennedy |
Round trade negotiations is o f major importance. [...] These historic negotiations must i
move forward as rapidly as possible with the active participation of the EEC’.55
Moreover, in January, Roth and Blumenthal visited Brussels and made clear to ■
the Commission that, if decisions were not taken in the near future, the Kennedy Round |
would fail. For the Americans, it was important to clarify this because they perceived |
there to be a “lot of woolly thinking in Brussels about the possibility of extending the j
TEA”.56 With the Commission, the Americans pressed on a topic that they had j
repeatedly focused on, that is to say the functioning of the Community in Geneva which [
was slowing the GATT talks. The United States found it difficult to negotiate with the I
EEC because o f the difficulties in dealing with the Commission. From the outset I
Washington, while supporting the European Commission’s role as negotiator for the Six |
in the Kennedy Round as a way o f  supporting the European integration process, had f
lamented the absence of a permanent Commission delegation in Geneva, a factor that ,
greatly hampered communication, and posed serious problems for negotiations as a 
whole, as well as the lack o f instructions of the EEC and their rigidity when they did |
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arrive. Roth and Blumenthal underlined the necessity of the EEC to have a high level 
permanent representative in Geneva, such as an ambassador, who would be able to 
conduct negotiations with authority and flexibility. The EEC Council had to elaborate a 
mandate foreseeing more flexibility in the EEC position so to allow the 111 Committee 
and the Commission to take decisions on a day-by-day basis and thus advance more 
rapidly in Geneva. In short, the Commission needed a mandate not a fa it accompli. 
Moreover, for Roth, the EEC needed a central negotiating committee with more 
authority and flexibility than the 111 Committee. Rey understood the need for a high 
level permanent negotiator in Geneva and made a pledge that, as soon as the 
negotiations in Geneva restarted, the Commission would be adequately represented. 
However, issues regarding re-forming the 111 Committee and the flexibility of the EEC 
decision-making process were matters for the Council and had to be treated with caution 
due to their close link to the EEC crisis. Only once the crisis was over would it be 
possible to ask the Council o f Ministers to set up procedure to speed up the decision­
making process for the Geneva negotiations. The need to give greater flexibility to the 
EEC’s negotiators in the final stages o f the Kennedy Round was appreciated and there 
were certain ideas for achieving it, such as a committee of State Secretaries from the six 
members states.57
As well as putting pressure on the Five and the Commission, Washington also 
moved in Geneva. Increasingly concerned over the pace of the Kennedy Round 
negotiations in light of the expiration o f the President’s negotiating authority on 30 June 
1967, and to ensure that the GATT negotiations were considered in the meetings of 
Luxembourg, Washington urged Wyndham White to publish a report to illustrate the 
state of the play in Geneva and to push ahead with the negotiations.58 On 3 January, 
Wyndham White circulated his report that, for tactical reasons, exaggerated the urgency 
to act and tried to inject renewed rhythm and impetus into the Kennedy Round, 
proposing a timetable to bring the negotiations to an end during the early weeks of 
1967. Wyndham White also impressed on GATT members the need to provide their 
delegations with broader authority to actively and continuously negotiate on all fronts 
from March-April 1966.59
Before considering the January negotiations between the Five and France, it is 
worth underlining that, before June 1965, the Commission had been particularly keen 
on QMV coming into being from January 1966.60 However, the Six had differing 
opinions on this matter as none of them wanted to apply QMV to important matters, 
such as the CAP and the Kennedy Round, since none of them wanted to be placed in a 
minority position which they were forced to accept. Before June 1965, a tacit agreement 
had been reached that important issues would be decided by unanimity.61 Therefore, 
France was not the only government to refuse the application of QMV to the most 
crucial issues. As Schroder put it to Rusk and McNamara “no Common Market member 
should be outvoted by a majority on any question of vital importance to that country”
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and, in any case, a further mandate for the Kennedy Round had to be given on the basis 
of unanimity,62 Even before de Gaulle’s press conference, it was unlikely to occur that a 
member that strongly held a minority position would find itself overruled by the 
majority, with the latter pushing ahead with their vision notwithstanding the opposition 
o f those not in agreement. However, what mattered to the Five was how to assert this 
position without modifying the Treaty of Rome, without formally abolishing QMV or 
without formally recognising the power of veto. As for the French, according to the 
account given by Brunet, French official of the Quai d ’Orsay, responsible for EEC 
issues, the matter of majority voting had been discussed by the French government. The 
Quai d’Orsay had held that given the general agreement o f the Five on this issue, 
especially the position o f Germany, the matter could still be the subject of a tacit 
agreement. However, de Gaulle had overruled his Foreign Minister and preferred to 
bring the question out in the open.63
As for the other crucial issue at the Luxembourg meeting -  the Commission’s 
powers -  the French wanted it to abandon its aspirations to independent political 
authority and to go back to playing its allotted role under the Treaty o f Rome. For Paris, 
the Commission had acted appropriately until December 1964, and all the French 
government wanted was to go back to that situation.64 To better understand the French 
stance towards the Commission, it should be noted that Paris had a rather pragmatic 
approach. In the Geneva negotiations before June 1965, the Dutch and the Germans had 
often tried to reduce the role o f this institution as they were of the opinion that the 
Commission was too often found to be in support o f the French positions, and was not 
willing to compromise with the Americans. The French, by contrast, supported the 
Commission. For example, when, during the GATT Ministerial Meeting of May 1963, 
Erhard and Luns had asked not only to be present at the negotiations with the 
Americans but also to be able to speak, they had met the categorical refusal not only of 
Jean Rey, but also o f Giscard d’Estaing, who did not want the Dutch and the Germans 
to participate actively because he considered them too susceptible to American pressure. 
Likewise, when in November 1963, Wyndham White had suggested the setting up of an 
informal steering group to make progress in the Kennedy Round, composed of the 
United Kingdom, the United States, France and Germany. Paris had resolutely rejected 
the proposal, while Bonn took time to discuss it. The only quarrel between the French 
and the Commission had taken place in October 1964 over negotiations in agriculture, 
but here the French move was not dictated by the aim o f downgrading the status of the 
Commission in Geneva, but was instead motivated by the desire to cease discussions 
with the Americans due to the German refusal to set UGP. In this light, the French 
request regarding the Commission’s powers appeared to have as its aim a return to 
1964.
When the Six gathered in Luxembourg on 17 and 18 January for an 
extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers, Couve de Murville submitted his 
“Decalogue” concerning the working style of the Commission, and insisted that QMV 
be changed, since France would not accept that she could be outvoted on issues of vital 
importance. Furthermore, i f  a revision o f the Treaty was not possible, an arrangement of 
a political nature, ruling out the QMV in cases in which any member state government
Memorandum of conversation between Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Bator and German Ministers Schroeder and Von 
Hassel, Washington 20 December 1965, Francis M. Bator's papers, Box 21, LBJL.
^  NA 59, 1964-1966, Box 460 Telegram n. 104 from American Embassy in Paris to State Department, 26 September 
1965.
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opposed it, had to be envisaged 65 The Five replied with firmness: no breach to the 
Treaty of Rome would be allowed and no right of veto could be recognised. Couve de 
Murville also presented a timetable in order to bring the crises to an end:: agreement on 
the Decalogue and QMV by the end o f January; and the adoption of the CAP financial 
regulations, defined by the French Minister as a ‘precondition to overcoming the crisis’, 
by 31 March 1966; the coming into effect of the Merger Treaty by 1 April; an 
agreement on the composition of the new Commission by 1 March and the formal 
appointment of the Commission by 18 April. The French timetable dealt with issues that 
most interested France and left the Kennedy Round to one side. The mention of the 
financial settlement of the CAP without any parallel mention of the trade negotiations 
was totally unacceptable to the Germans and the Dutch. Schroder and Luns refused to 
consider the French timetable, and claimed that they would only discuss the issues set 
out on the agenda, namely the QMV and the powers of the Commission. Given the 
impossibility of reaching an agreement, the Council of Ministers meeting was adjourned 
until the end of January.66
Between the two meetings in Luxembourg, Washington heightened its pressure 
on the Five to insert the Kennedy Round in the final settlement with France. This was 
particularly crucial as the French, with their timetable, had adopted the position that 
French any agreement to discuss the EEC mandate for Geneva was dependent on a prior 
agreement on CAP financing and the installation o f a new Commission. Just as had 
been the case before June 1965, the French were hoping to use the German and Dutch 
desire for early action regarding the trade negotiations as leverage to obtain the French 
request on the timetable.67
Particularly receptive of this American pressure were the Germans, who 
considered the GATT negotiations to be of greatest importance. Neef, the Secretary of 
State at Ministry o f Economics, held that it should be made clear to de Gaulle that Bonn 
would give its final agreement to the agricultural financial settlement only on the clear 
understanding that, in return, the General would cooperate in the Kennedy Round.68 In 
view of the second meeting o f the Council of Ministers of Luxembourg, the German 
government decided to inconceivable that the French would again dictate the agenda of 
the EEC.69 Obviously, the German government could not be sure that its tactics would 
be rewarded and that the French would abandon their blocking tactics. And, in fact, on 
26 January, Lahr asked the US government -  unofficially -  how the US would respond 
if the Five were to renew the Commission negotiating mandate in the Kennedy Round, 
without the French.70 This request illustrated German resoluteness in not wanting to 
make any concessions to the French on the EEC agenda and the Kennedy Round, and, 
at the same time, to move ahead with the GATT negotiations, despite the French. Rusk 
got ready to give Bonn an “authoritative” response, that could bolster German the 
intention to remain firm in front of the French, instructing the US embassy in Bonn to
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inform the Germans that “US is negotiating in Kennedy Round with Commission acting 
on behalf o f  Community. Whether Commission's instructions come from Six member 
States or from Five acting for Community is internal matter for determination by EEC 
members involved. If  Five decide to give Commission instructions enabling it to resume 
effective participation in KR, US would be prepared to proceed with negotiations on 
that basis” . However, for Rusk it was also important that the content o f this response did 
not make itself known before the Luxembourg meeting: Paris could too easily accuse 
the Americans o f interfering.71
In the meantime, as the EEC Council o f Ministers had requested in October, on 
19 January 1966, before the second Luxembourg meeting, the Commission presented 
the Council of Ministers a detailed report on the Kennedy Round dealing with both 
agriculture and industry, setting out in detail the problems which needed to be resolved 
to enable the Commission to negotiate in Geneva. The Commission hoped, in this way, 
make sure the Kennedy Round stay the centre o f attention for the Six.72
At the Council o f Ministers meeting of 28-29 Januaiy 1966, an agreement was 
quite easily reached concerning the Commission powers, with the transformation of the 
French Decalogue into a ‘Heptalogue’ which did not downgrade the Commission role 
but placed it in the limits defined in the Treaty o f Rome. The QMV issue proved more 
difficult to settle, giving rise to the ‘agreement to disagree’ -  developed following a 
proposal made jointly by Spaak and Luns -  which merely stated the disagreement and 
noted that it did not prevent the resumption of the EEC work. Then, when the issue o f 
voting seemed settled, Schröder insisted on unanimous voting for all questions which 
had to be settled by 1965, and, in particular, for the CAP, since this vote should have 
taken place the previous year. Couve de Murville, pointing out that the problem had not 
been raised by the French, refused to give special treatment to these particular issues 
and mused out loud that such an approach would imply unanimity on any agricultural 
mandate for the Kennedy Round, which was also supposed to be approved in 1965. For 
the French Minister, both questions had to be governed by the same agreement reached 
on the basis o f QMV. Schröder remained steadfast to the very end regarding the need 
for a unanimous vote on the CAP and, for a brief period at the very end, it looked as if  
the issues o f the CAP and the Kennedy Round might develop into important stumbling 
blocks. In the end, however, the Six agreed that both the CAP and the Commission 
negotiating mandate for the agricultural sector in Geneva would be decided on the basis 
of unanimity. As regards the decisions the Six had to take in the Kennedy Round in the 
other sectors, given the fact that these were important matters for the member states, 
they would be covered by the agreement reached by QMV.73
Following the suggestion o f Couve de Murville, the Six then considered the 
agenda of the Community. The French Minister stated that priority had to be given to 
the financial settlement o f the CAP, notwithstanding the importance of the GATT 
negotiations. The Five, and in particular Schröder, made clear that no progress would be
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made in the CAP without parallel progress in the Kennedy Round, but agreed 
nonetheless that the Council of Ministers would deal with the financial settlement o f the 
CAP as a priority and, then, with the Kennedy Round. The agreement (and 
disagreement) on QMV, the powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers’ 
agenda brought France back into the fold in Brussels and brought to an the crisis o f the 
empty chair.
The Americans were satisfied with the settlement of the crisis: the French had 
obtained no concessions on any of the major issues, the Treaty of Rome had not been 
modified, and the Kennedy Round had achieved a prominent place in the final 
settlement. The crisis of the empty chair was over and the GATT negotiations could 
finally be concluded.74 However, Washington had to wait until the end of July 1966 to 
meaningful start negotiations in Geneva. The crisis of the empty chair may have come 
to an end, but an agreement between the Six on agriculture and the GATT negotiations 
had still to be reached and in the nervous atmosphere of the aftermath of the crisis this 
did not prove to be an easy task.
8.5 Ending the crisis
The EEC crisis between June 1965 and January 1966 largely frustrated progress 
in the Kennedy Round. The Luxembourg compromise took France back to Brussels, but 
had not eliminated tensions between France and the Five.75 Furthermore, tensions 
risked mounting up when, in March 1966, France withdrew from NATO. At this point, 
it seemed that the EEC could become entangled in a new crisis over security issues, 
which would thereby again prevent negotiations in GATT from progressing. The Six all 
agreed that every effort had to be made to keep the EEC and NATO matters separate, in 
order to prevent the NATO crisis from causing the paralysis of the EEC. A debate took 
place in Germany, in which Foreign Minister Schroder claimed it to be politically 
impossible for Germany to adopt the agricultural financial settlement, involving large 
payments to France, while France was attacking NATO and endangering German 
security. Following Schroder’s statement, Chancellor Erhard, supported by Economics 
Minister Schmucker, pointed out that the EEC and NATO matters had to be kept 
separate.76
The United States also felt that the EEC should be kept separate from NATO 
matters. NATO could live on without France, while the same could not be taken for 
granted in the context of the EEC. This did not imply that the USA would not respond 
to the NATO crisis directly in the security context, but according to Rusk “both internal 
and external work programs of the European Economic Community, specifically 
including the Kennedy Round, will be carried forward as rapidly as possible”. 7
The Six had various decisions to take regarding the Kennedy Round in order to 
be ready to get to Geneva with a negotiating position. They had to specify their 
proposals for the commodity agreement on cereals that had been only sketched in May 
1965, to work out their offers for the rest of the agricultural sector, and take further
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positions in the industrial sector.78 However, the Six had a huge amount o f agricultural 
business to settle in Brussels before they would be in a position to negotiate in Geneva. 
The Luxembourg meetings had reaffirmed the link between the CAP and the Kennedy 
Round and, at any rate, without a common policy, they could not negotiate in Geneva. 
As such, it was clear that, because o f the time required to settle the CAP issue, the 
summer would be approaching by the time the EEC would be able to table agricultural 
offers in Geneva.
For the first time, at the end o f February, the Council of Ministers discussed the 
Commission’s January report on the Kennedy Round, and, here, the quarrelling about 
the EEC agenda continued with Italy, Benelux and the Commission fearing not only 
French obstructionism on GATT but also German feet-dragging on the CAP. Rey asked 
the Council to rapidly give directives for the industrial sector and for cereals, while they 
stated that, for the rest o f the agricultural sector, the EEC needed to fix common prices. 
In view o f the final phase of the Geneva bargaining process, Rey also raised another 
crucial question, that is the need to speed up the EEC decision-making process by 
letting the Commission and the 111 Committee, rather than the Council of Ministers, 
agree on technical issues. All political issues would be ruled out by the Council o f 
Ministers. In effect the problem o f the EEC working in Geneva did not concern only the 
Commission but also the 111 Committee. This Committee had not been able to give the 
right instructions to the Commission because Member States sent officials who were 
unable to commit governments, with the result that every single issue, no matter 
whether technical or political, had to be dealt with by the Council o f Ministers, wanting 
to maintain its grasp on GATT talks. In this way, the EEC decision-making process was 
considerably slowed, as Ministers did not meet on a day-by-day basis to give 
instructions to the Commission. What the Commission therefore asked was to 
strengthen the 111 Committee’s role. If the EEC was to effectively attend the last phase 
o f the Round, something was had to be modified in the way it attended international 
trade negotiations.
Despite Rey’s focus to the last issue, Member States concentrated on the issue o f 
the agenda. The Dutch Minister for Economics, van den Uyl, expressed his concern for 
the situation in the agricultural part o f the Kennedy Round. To regain an active role in 
Geneva, the EEC had to adopt internal decisions on agriculture and, in the meantime, it 
had to quickly adopt proposals for the commodity agreement on cereals, and had to 
present, as soon as possible, its offers for the other agricultural products, even if partial 
in nature, as not all the CAP had been approved. German Minister Schmiicker recalled, 
in Luxembourg, the Six had agreed that the Council, having the the financial regulation 
as its starting point, had also to examine the Kennedy Round. The same importance and 
urgency was to be attached all the respective issues on the EEC agenda, with the same 
willingness to find a solution, which were to be considered . The Kennedy Round 
negotiations had to be rapidly resumed, in fact for Germany the financial burden of the 
CAP could be bearable only if compensated “par le biais d ’une plus grande ouverture du 
commerce de la Communauté sur le marché mondial”.
To respond the Germans claims, Couve de Murville, while emphasizing the 
importance France attached to the Kennedy Round, observed that before any 
agricultural offer could be made in Geneva, the EEC needed to agree on common prices 
for the main commodities, and that this agreement was conditional on the approval o f 
the financial regulations. The French Minister also underlined the importance third
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countries attached to the EEC’s approval of moderate prices and the contradiction 
between pushing for liberalization o f  international trade and an increase o f prices within 
the EEC. At the same time, Couve de Murville adopted a generally cooperative 
approach towards progress for the Kennedy Round. Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium 
approved the intensification of EEC work on GATT, but noted that in order to allow the 
EEC to actively attend the Kennedy Round and to table agricultural offers, major 
progress had to be made on the CAP. In short, all the Six, while agreed on the need to 
make progress on the CAP, also shared the opinion that it was important to rapidly 
make progress in the Kennedy Round, and eventually decided to make an urgent and 
immediate drive to complete the EEC negotiating position for the industrial sector. In 
particular, Couve de Murville agreed to allow the Commission and the 111 Committee 
to elaborate offers to be made for the chemical sectors, and to table them in Geneva on 
15 April at the same time as the American proposals for the modification of the ASP. 
French agreement was of remarkable importance, as France had always refused doing 
so until after the Americans had presented their offer on the ASP.79
Throughout March, proposals on cereals were discussed by the Commission, 
together with the 111 Committee, COREPER and the Council of Ministers. By the same 
token, the industrial part o f the Kennedy Round was also considered, and, in particular, 
the 111 Committee and the Commission elaborated the offers for the chemical sector. 
All the governments, France included, actively participated in order to define the EEC 
positions.80 However, French activism on the Kennedy Round remained conditional on 
progress on CAP financing. Holding that little progress was being achieved, at the 
COREPER meeting of 1 April, Boegner stated that France would not take any definitive 
decision on the Kennedy Round, or give any directive to the Commission, before the 
adoption of the CAP financial regulations. This stance was not to blocke to the Council 
of Ministers from actively pursuing the discussions on the Kennedy Round and to 
elaborate decisions which, nevertheless, were to be frozen or, as Boegner put it, 
“gardées dans les ‘cartons’ d’où elles pourront être ‘sorties’ le moment venu et 
‘déposées alors à Genève”. France would attend the technical discussions on the 
Kennedy Round, but no directive could be given to the Commission and no proposal 
could be made to third countries, either for the industrial or the agricultural sector. The 
French reservations upset the Dutch and the Germans. According to the Dutch, a French 
attitude whereby the important decisions regarding the stance in the Kennedy Round 
became conditional to a certain extent on the approval of the financial regulations was 
comprehensible, but a stance consisting in refusing all decisions on the GATT 
negotiations before the approval o f the financial regulations was going to far. By the 
same token, Germany recalled that the working agenda o f the EEC which had been 
agreed up in Luxembourg gave priority to the financial regulations, but parallel efforts 
were to be also made for the Kennedy Round.81
At the Council of Ministers meeting of 4-5 April, which, among other things, 
had to authorise the Commission to negotiate over chemicals in Geneva, Couve de 
Murville maintained the French stance. Faced with the French move, Schmücker 
underlined the importance of the Kennedy Round for Germany, which needed to 
increase its exports through the GATT talks to face the financial burden deriving from 
the CAP. In any case, the Germans realised that, because of the lack of confidence
79 CM2 1966/4 PV de la 177*™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 28 February-1 March 1966.
80 .
CM2 1966/8 PV de la 179*™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 21 March 1966. See also CM2 1966/17509 entirely 
dedicated to the discussions which took place in March within the EEC on the Kennedy Round.
81
CM2 1966/17509, Note d'information du COREPER, S/202/66, 1 April 1966 and ibidem Conseils CEE/CECA, 4-5 Avril 
1965, Note à l'attention de M. le Président, 1 April 1966.
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among the Six, to push the Kennedy Round forward, along with the CAP, a working 
method was necessary. Thus Schmiicker put forward a proposal derived from Boegner’s 
claim about “keeping decisions in a box and take them out at the right moment” : 
decisions on both the financial regulations and the Kennedy Round were to be taken, 
but were to be finally approved only when a balance between progress for the Kennedy 
Round and financial regulations had been assured. This working rule meant that 
Germany could agree on a first part o f negotiations on the financial regulations, but this 
agreement would not be taken out o f the “box” until the following Council o f Ministers 
meeting reached agreement on part o f the Kennedy Round.82
Couve de Murville did not appear very impressed by the German proposal, and 
recalled how, under the Luxembourg agreement, priority had been given to the financial 
regulations, which up until that moment had not been the subject of great progress. For 
this reason, the French Foreign Minister refused to allow the Commission to start 
negotiations in Geneva on the chemical sector. At any rate, he was ready to change 
position if, in during the ongoing meeting o f  the Council of Ministers, progress was 
made on the financial regulations. And, in effect, after the Kennedy Round, Ministers 
approached the financial regulations issue. This topic was satisfactorily discussed and, 
as a result, Couve de Murville allowed the Commission to start negotiations in Geneva 
over chemicals, despite his general reserve.83
In effect, as explained in next chapter, on 15 April 1966 the Americans were 
supposed to present their proposals on the ASP and, as Rey warned, if the EEC did not 
respect the 15 April date to table its offers on chemicals, the Americans could use this 
as an excuse for not tabling their proposals. Couve de Murville was aware that a new 
stalemate could have dangerous consequences for the Geneva talks. Consequences that 
France, interested in concluding the Round, wanted to avoid. This shows, once again, 
that, for the French, the Kennedy Round remained a leaver to obtain concessions from 
its partners. In Brussels, the French delegation made out that its concessions on the 
Kennedy Round had cost France a lot, and requested concessions from the Five in 
return. “Notre arme secrète, c ’était notre très réelle bonne volonté en ce qui concerne la 
négociation Kennedy,” wrote a French officiai in 1966.84 In short, German and Dutch 
keenness for the Kennedy Round gave the French government a valuable bargaining 
chip to move forward with the CAP.
The April Council of Ministers meeting gave new impetus for the adoption of 
the financing regulations and the EEC preparation for the Round. Ministers set to work 
along the plan envisaged by Schmiicker, that helped to clear the air of distrust which 
had, for so long, surrounded the financial regulations. April activities made Lahr 
positive regarding the possibility o f the Commission being able to negotiate by July in 
Geneva, and he expected the French, finally, not to obstruct the Kennedy Round “and 
hold to their word of honor [...] whatever doubts one might have about the French, 
[Lahr] did not believe that they were outright swindlers”,85
82
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On the other side of the Atlantic, Washington too tried to understand whether de 
Gaulle would wreck the Kennedy Round, or would let the French government 
collaborate.86 De Gaulle’s claim on 21 February that French exposure to further 
competition could pay off and that, consequently, French industry had to be ready to 
face worldwide tariff reductions reassured Washington. And Blumenthal, from his trip 
to Paris, got the impression that Paris would bargain hard but would not deliberately 
cause the Kennedy Round to fail.87 In any case, what mattered was that the Six got 
ready to show up in Geneva with a negotiating position. In order to do so, Washington 
reaffirmed its commitment to the Kennedy Round for political and economical reasons, 
and President Johnson personally emphasised “the continuing great interest o f the 
United States in the Kennedy Round”.88 Washington alerted the Six and the 
Commission to the fact that the Kennedy Round had to be concluded by 30 June 1967. 
The US negotiating authority expired on that date and it was doubtful whether Congress 
would be willing grant an extension without adding crippling amendments. Thus, the 
hard bargaining was to begin in September 1966 on the basis of industrial and 
agricultural offers tabled before August.89
The turning point for the EEC preparation for the Kennedy Round came in May 
when, at the meeting of Council of Ministers of 11 May, the Six agreed on the financial 
regulations for the CAP for the 1966-1970 period. Germany made clear that the final 
approval of the financial regulations was, in any case, conditional on progress made on 
the Kennedy Round.90 As a result o f the progress over CAP prices, on 12 June, the 
Luxembourgeois Ambassador Borschette, president o f the COREPER, was able to 
present a report to the Council of Ministers of 14 June 1966 based on technical work of 
the Commission and the 111 Committee containing proposals on the position the EEC 
should adopt in Geneva on cereals, tropical products, chemicals, aluminium and paper. 
In submitting the report, Borschette claimed “Il m’est agréable de pouvoir dire au 
Conseil qu’il y longtemps que, comme Président des Représentants Permanents, il ne 
m ’a plus été possible de présenter un rapport aussi satisfaisant qui celui qu j ’ai 
l’honneur de vous soumettre. [...] un effort considérable a été fait par touts les 
délégations afin d ’élaborer des offres ou de prendre des position communes que même 
les plus optimistes n’osaient espérer” .91 The Council approved proposals for the 
commodity agreement on grains, and authorised the Commission to immediately start 
negotiations in Geneva. Ministers also approved offers for topical products, aluminium 
and paper, and authorised the Commission to table them in Geneva. Again, even if 
Couve de Murville had stated that decisions on the Kennedy Round should be kept ‘in
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the box’ until the entire CAP issue was been settled, France actually allowed decisions 
taken for the Kennedy Round to be presented in Geneva in June, without waiting for all 
the CAP questions to be resolved.92
The considerable progress the EEC was making in June on the Kennedy Round 
and the CAP allowed Rey to attend an informal meeting with Wyndham White, Herter 
and the British Powell in Geneva at the beginning o f July 1966. As a result of these 
discussions, Wyndham White set up a tight timetable for making progress in the 
industrial and agricultural sectors. The July meeting represented a decisive moment 
progress in this context. For the first time, after all the delays of the previous years, 
there was the clear feeling that the final phase o f the negotiations was about to start and 
that success might be attainable.93
At the end of July, the EEC reached package decision on the Kennedy Round 
mandate and the CAP. The Six achieved a final agreement on agricultural finance 
regulations, and on a phased programme up to 1 July 1968 for implementing common 
prices on a wide range o f agricultural products, including meat and dairy products. They 
also agreed on 1 July 1968 as the date for achieving full internal free trade and for 
completing the move towards the CET.94 The agreement on the CAP opened the way 
for the final debate on the offers to be tabled in the agricultural sector. In a four-day 
marathon that ended in the early hours of 27 July, the Council of Ministers, following 
the proposals o f the Commission, approved offers for a large selection o f agricultural 
products other than cereals.95 After having reached a final agreement on the package 
deal for the CAP and the Kennedy Round, French Deputy Permanent Representative 
Ulrich could claim, ‘The crisis is over’.96
The EEC approval of agricultural offers opened up the way for intensive 
discussions in Geneva. After almost two daunting years spent on the rules of the 
negotiations, and a year o f deadlock because o f the EEC’s internal bickering, at the end 
o f July 1966, the Kennedy Round could finally be put in motion.
Conclusion
When the negotiations for the Kennedy Round resumed in February 1966, not 
only had no radical transformation taken place, but it even seemed that time had stood 
still. Just as had been the case prior to the outbreak o f the crisis, progress in the 
negotiations in Geneva depended on progress in EEC internal negotiations, and in 
particular on the CAP. Moreover, as had already been agreed before June 1965, all the 
decisions related to the GATT negotiations were to be reached by unanimity and this 
because France refused to apply QMV to important issues, a position shared by the 
other Five, who also wanted to base such decision on unanimity. It was only the total 
lack of confidence between France and the Five and, above all, between France and
CM2 1966/34 PV de la 188^  session du COnseil de la CEE, 14 June 1966.
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Germany, that led to the overt statement by the Six that the CAP and the GATT 
negotiations had to be subject to the unanimity rule.
The events that took place during the crisis o f the Empty Chair shed some light 
on Paris’s approach towards the GATT negotiations. Its attitude during the six months 
of boycott displayed its interest in the Kennedy Round. First it kept itself informed on 
the activities of the Commission and the Five in Geneva and in Brussels, and, second, 
when the rumour circulated about a possible American move to push ahead with the 
Kennedy Round, excluding the EEC, they immediately sought assurances about 
American intentions.
Despite the French attack on the Commission, this institution kept its influential 
and crucial role in elaborating the final part of the EEC mandate for the Kennedy 
Round, as the EEC discussion over the Kennedy Round and the CAP from February to 
July 1966 demonstrated. In fact, it was on its proposals that the Six elaborated their 
negotiating position for the final phase o f the Kennedy Round. After the crisis o f the 
empty chair, the Commission was still able to act vigorously. The French never 
questioned its negotiating role or its right to represent the Six in Geneva, not only for 
the industrial sector but also for in agriculture, for which it lacked authority to negotiate 
under article 111 of the Treaty o f Rome. If  the French had been interested in 
downgrading the Commission’s role in international trade relations, they could have 
warned the five members to the respect o f the Treaty of Rome, respect that the Five had 
firmly supported in Luxembourg. Paris had every interest in letting the Commission 
represent the EEC. First, French policy-makers often took the same view as the 
Commission regarding the GATT negotiations. Second, from the French point of view, 
it was preferable to have the Commission leading negotiations with the United States 
for the six member states than to have this pivotal role occupied by Germany or the 
Netherlands, who were too amenable to American pressures for France’s liking. 
Whatever the French might have said about the Commission, in practice they had a 
rather pragmatic approach towards this institution. When France judged that it was in 
her economic interest to have the EEC represented by the Commission, no hue or cry 
would be heard from the French government. As for Germany and The Netherlands, as 
is better demonstrated in the following chapters dedicated to the negotiations in the 
industrial and agricultural sectors, they had earlier been, and were still, critical o f some 
of the Commission stances in the Kennedy Round, but found their criticism 
compromised by the fact that they had so recently taken up cudgels in defence o f the 
institution, and now felt inhibited from openly criticising the Commission on the 
Kennedy Round.
It is worth noting that the Six were able to reach an agreement on the CAP and 
the Kennedy Round, despite the bad relations the Six had in NATO context. The Six 
kept EEC matters completely separate from NATO issues. They had such strong 
economic and political interests in staying together in the EEC that they had no 
intention of endangering them because of NATO questions, no matter how important 
the matter was. It was this very interest that pushed the Six to compromise on the CAP 
and the Kennedy Round 1966 had begun with a major crisis for the EEC, but, by the 
middle of the same year, great achievements had been made in setting up a single 
agricultural market and a common commercial policy with which to attend the Kennedy 
Round. Again, the need to attend the Round acted as a lever to secure progress in the 
CAP. The American’s firm position that the Kennedy Round had to include agriculture 
pushed the Six, and above all the recalcitrant Germans, to adopt the financial 
regulations and unified prices. Moreover, as shown in the following chapters, in the 
aftermath of the crisis, the Kennedy Round had a positive effect on the cohesion o f the
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Six: although their unity had been badly shaken, the need to confront the United States 
with a united front in order to defend the regional dimension of the EEC allowed the Six 
to recover unity and cohesion, at least in trade relations with third countries.
As for Washington, in dealing with the Crisis o f  the Empty Chair and in keeping 
the Kennedy Round alive, it considered not only its commercial interests, but also the 
positive effects the Kennedy Round could have on the European Commission and the 
unity of the EEC. During the months o f the crisis, Washington never seriously 
considered the option o f  concluding the round without the EEC, and this not only 
because the regional trading area was too relevant in trade relations and a GATT Round 
without it was simply pointless, but also for the benefits the Kennedy Round could 
bring to the Atlantic alliance and European integration.
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Chapter Nine
Negotiations in the industrial sector: towards freer trade
Introduction
The Kennedy Round had been promoted by the US government Administration 
in October 1962 with the passage o f the TEA. Since that date the United States and the 
EEC had spent almost two years bickering on the rules and seeking reciprocity in 
concessions granted. Once some basic rules had been agreed -  50% reduction across the 
board, with as few as possible exceptions- and some others had not been agreed at all -  
on disparities, the meaning of “overriding national interest” to justify exceptions -  the 
focus o f  the negotiations finally moved to products. After the tabling of the exceptions 
lists in November 1964, the negotiations in the industrial sector slowly got under way 
and, at this point, as Evans notes, “the search for reciprocity moved from the abstract to 
the concrete, from the blackboard to the bazaar” .1 The bazaar-like activities were then 
interrupted by the crisis o f the Empty Chair and it was only in May 1966 that they were 
re-started.
Chapter 9 is fully dedicated to the Round’s batch o f negotiations concerning 
industry and how trade was liberalized. The aim is to demonstrate how the reciprocal 
interest in reducing protectionism that existed on both sides of the Atlantic led both the 
EEC and the USA to reduce their barriers so that, despite the many problems which 
existed, some valuable results were nonetheless within reach. With the end o f  the 
justification process in March 1965, informal bilateral confrontations among the linear 
bargainers began. The aim was to pragmatically discuss problems created by the 
exceptions lists, and to define the orientations and procedures to then be retained in 
view o f the continuation of the negotiations in the multilateral phase. However, from the 
cross-examination exercise, it emerged fairly as fairly clear that, in a number of sectors, 
what one country was prepared to offer depended to some extent on what others could 
do in the same sector. This situation concerned, above all, textiles, chemicals, steel, 
aluminium, pulp and paper, which represented 30% of OECD members imports in the 
industrial sector.2 For this reason, in early 1965, Wyndham White suggested to the 
Steering Group -  the informal group of the United States, Japan, the EEC and the 
United Kingdom -  the setting up o f sector groups to deal with the special problems of 
aluminum, steel, pulp and paper, cotton textiles and chemicals, in order to see how, in 
the light of the difficulties, discussion among the countries most affected could 
eliminate the problems that lay in the way of a linear cuts and thus lead to tariffs offers 
being maximised.3 Products covered by sector groups were not the most important 
items in the negotiation, but were simply the most problematic. In fact, machinery and 
transportation equipment, which alone represented 36% of OECD members’ imports in
Evans, J.W. The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: Twilight o f the GATT (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), p. 221.
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manufactured items and the biggest sector for value o f exchanges between the EEC and 
the USA, were not covered by a sector group they did not present multilateral problems.
The Kennedy Round was a complex negotiating process that dealt with all 
industrial products, but as this thesis is dedicated to the US-EEC trade relations, this 
chapter considers those sectors most relevant both for the transatlantic trade relations 
and for US and EEC relations with other countries. Attention is therefore dedicated to 
those sectors that had a major importance for these relations in terms of trade volume, in 
terms in time spent haggling over them, or in terms o f impact on the other sectors. As 
such, attention is dedicated to machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, paper, 
steel and cotton textiles. The aim o f this chapter is to describe the commercial policy of 
the USA and the EEC. The USA pushed for decreasing protectionism, but, at the same 
time, had its own products to protect. The EEC wanted to defend its regionalism, but at 
the same time was prepared to reduce the CET as a bargaining chip to obtain 
concessions from third countries. In order to describe in a clear manner the negotiations 
in the industrial sector, the account is given sector by sector, though negotiations on 
these sectors were linked: A country asked for concessions in the paper sector and was 
ready to offer something in the mechanical sector, for instance. To be sure, each of the 
trade sector considered here would be worthy a full chapter on its own but this would 
make this thesis too long and heavy. To get a better idea of the how the negotiations in 
the industrial sector were conducted, a case study of aluminium is presented in the next 
chapter. Moreover, to portray the negotiations in a clearer way, the industrial part of the 
Kennedy Round is presented separately from the agricultural part. In practice, however, 
the two were linked. And in fact, negotiations in the former sector were progressing at a 
slow pace until 1966, as governments were biding their time, waiting for developments 
in the agricultural sector.
9.1 Patterns of trade across the Atlantic 1961-1965
Before describing the industrial sector negotiations, it is useful to illustrate the 
trade patterns of the EEC and the United States, to get an idea of which directions their 
trade was taking, and the changes which had taken place since 1962, when the USA had 
passed the TEA. This section illustrates the USA and EEC exports to the world and to 
each other, in order to place trade across the Atlantic within the context o f world trade. 
Moreover, in order to understand how important each sector of the industrial 
negotiations was for the EEC and the United States, this section describes the 
composition of US-EEC trade by commodity.
Table 1 portrays US exports by major area of destination. It shows that the EEC 
was one o f the most dynamic markets for the USA. From 1961 to 1964, US exports to 
the Six grew as fast as US exports to the traditionally largest market for the USA, 
namely Canada, while, in 1965, they this growth slowed, even if  it continued to grow 
faster than exports to Japan and the United Kingdom.
266
T abic  1 US expo rts  by  m ajo r a re a s  o f d estin a tio n s (in thousands o f  $)
Source: SITC Classification. Source: O EC D  SITC Rev.2 - Historical Series 1961-1990 (Paris: O EC D
2000)
Table 2 illustrates US imports by area and country, and shows that, just as with 
for exports, Canada and the EEC held relevant positions. Moreover, imports were 
inferior to exports, with the result that the USA had a trade surplus with these areas
T ab le  2 US im p o rts  by  m ajo r a re a  an d  co u n tr ie s  (in thousands o f S)
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Table 3 shows US trade surplus by area in 1964. At a glance, it reveals that the 
EEC was a crucial area in the U S’s achievement of a trade surplus.
T a b le  3: US t r a d e  b alance in  1964 by  m a jo r  c o u n trie s  and  a re a s  (in  tho u san d s of S)
Thousands of $
Total surplus 7486325







Source: see Table 1.
Table 4 illustrates the composition of US exports to the EEC by commodity, and 
shows that machinery and transport equipment, crude materials, chemicals and 
manufactured goods had a prominent place. Machinery and transport equipment were 
the most important sector for volume of trade and growth rate.
T ab ic  4: com position  o f US ex p o rts  to  th e  E E C  1961-1965 (in th o u sa n d s  o f USS)
SITC 1961 1962 1964 1965
Total trade 3564029 3650009 4590854 5007743
0 Food and live animals 475693 665137 769676 932724
1 Beverages and tobacco 120548 129539 129145 127542
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 745258 613264 830959 757715
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 214127 241729 311382 270463
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 129965 117025 169797 167369
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 370747 379844 512293 544885
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 421932 391049 564035 512049
7 Machinery and transport equipment 830677 936977 1063669 1372238
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 138731 162942 228709 312339
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 14802 12562 11179 10419
Source: see Table 1.
Table 5 portrays the composition of US imports from the EEC and demonstrates 
that manufactured goods and machinery and transport equipment represented the major 
import sectors.
T a b le  5 : com position  o f US im p o rts  f ro m  th e  E E C  1961-1965 (in  tho u san d s o f  USS)
SITC 1961 1963 1964 1965
Total imports
0 Food and live animals
2225904 2518177 2837977 3329082 
119654 118646 122663 129437
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1 Beverages and tobacco 66346 76718 83905 87761
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 118127 118462 110783 103876
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 14084 9344 11215 11214
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 11859 11209 11598 14518
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 124450 148158 178204 196830
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 727974 760962 822332 1056697
7 Machinery and transport equipment 616557 706589 850724 990004
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 339263 455856 521896 580856
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 87590 112233 124657 157889
Source: sec Table 1.
It is worth pointing out, in comparing Tables 5 and 6 and considering US trade 
balance with the EEC, taking 1964 as an example, (Table 6) that despite the fact that the 
volume of US exports to the EEC in the industrial sector was larger than exports in the 
agricultural sector, the USA gained a good share of its surplus in the latter sector. In 
fact, while trade for manufactured goods was a two-way street, in that the US exported 
to the EEC and vice versa (in manufactured goods the USA had even a deficit with the 
EEC), in the agricultural sector US imports from the EEC were much lower than 
exports. These trade patters go some way to explaining what led to a reduction in 
protectionism in the industrial sector, but in no such progress for agriculture. In fact, 
both the USA and the EEC had a reciprocal interest in increasing exports to each other 
in the industrial sector, while the same could not be said to be true for agriculture.
T ab le  6: com position  of US tra d e  ba lan ce  w ith  the  EE C  in 1964 (in  th o u san d s of S)
SITC
Total imports US Exports to 
from the EEC the EEC Balance
Total trade 2837977 4590854 1752877
0 Food and live animals 122663 769676 647013
1 Beverages and tobacco 83905 129145 45240
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 110783 830959 720176
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 11215 311382 300167
4 Animat and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 11598 169797 158199
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 178204 512293 334089
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 822332 564035 -258297
7 Machinery and transport equipment 850724 1063669 212945
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 521896 228709 -293187
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 124657 11179 -113478
Source: see Tabic 1.
Tables 7 to 11 illustrate American exports to each of the Six by commodity. 
They show that the USA was able to take advantage of the growing economy of the Six 
at the beginning o f the 1960s, in fact American exports increased in all sectors to the all 
Six, and this despite the implementation of the EEC customs union. The most dynamic 
sectors were chemicals and transport equipment. These tables also show that Germany 
was the US’s biggest customer among the Six, as it accounted for 40% of EEC imports 
from the USA.
269
T ab le  7: US e x p o rts  to F ra n c e  1961-1965 by m ain  ca tego ries (in  thousands o f S)
1961 1963 1964 1965
Total 556717 669307 790721 891538
0 Food and live animals 25678 58887 79996 100009
1 Beverages and tobacco 12084 10593 11431 9963
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 143081 101164 119031 85490
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 19618 38230 39966 29846
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 763 1099 2595 4369
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 54316 62823 75464 80555
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 76917 85420 100174 96973
7 Machinery and transport equipment 190392 256016 296532 384734
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 32527 53694 63870 96611
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 1341 1381 1662 2988
Source: sec T able 1.
T ab ic  8 US e x p o rts  to  I ta ly  1961-1965 by m ain  ca teg o ries  (in th o u san d s  o f S)
1961 1963 1964 1965
Total 847458 970125 916122 950729
0 Food and live animals 121516 118737 101300 181003
1 Beverages and tobacco 11988 12520 10870 9500
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 199872 171593 192998 179882
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 70715 102805 101900 100696
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 70715 102805 101900 100696
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 70840 61866 68454 57290
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 95963 124434 115555 97431
7 Machinery and transport equipment 174508 235074 184931 177011
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 23667 33528 33370 45772
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 7674 6763 4844 1448
Source: see T able 1.
T a b le  9 US e x p o rts  to  B e lg iu m /L u x em b o u rg  1961-1965 by m a in  categories (in th o u san d s of S)
1961 1963 1964 1965
Total 408293 504542 600095 623781
0 Food and live animals 75871 90035 104684 118602
1 Beverages and tobacco 13971 14595 13526 14301
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 54126 53000 75863 67737
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 26607 45086 35449 31347
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 2463 1742 4192 2543
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 63192 71730 99366 105632
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 44285 64121 81504 69811
7 Machinery and transport equipment 111556 140217 159595 185402
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 14938 22475 24088 26446
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 1284 1541 1828 1960
Source: see Table 1.
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T ab le  10 US ex p o rts  to  N etherlands 1961-1965 by m ain categories (in  thousands o f S)
1961 1963 1964 1965
Total 691004 749793 969940 1043031
0 Food and live animals 186886 228201 276124 304273
1 Beverages and tobacco 19366 21621 22144 25536
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 121675 106284 157200 179201
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 41140 70849 62581 48426
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 26436 27444 37605 30424
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 99196 108211 162675 175972
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 48701 60614 74355 71949
7 Machinery and transport equipment 121707 97278 136241 159093
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 25192 28552 40025 46725
9 Commodities and transactions not elswhere classified 705 739 980 1432
Source: sec Tabic 1.
T able  11 US e x p o rts  to  G erm any 1961-1965 by m ain categories (in th o u san d s  of S)
1961 1963 1964 1965
Total 1 0 6 0 5 5 7 1 0 9 1 0 5 6 1 3 1 3 9 7 6 1 4 9 8 6 6 4
0 Food and live animals 167291 175257 2 0 7 5 7 2  2 2 8 8 3 7
1 Beverages and tobacco 6 3 1 3 9 67949 71174 6 8 2 4 2
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 2 2 6 5 0 4 20 3 6 7 9  28 5 8 6 7  2 4 5 4 0 5
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 5 6 0 4 7 76647 71486 6 0 1 4 8
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 2 9 5 8 8 14725 23505 2 9 3 3 7
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 8 3 2 0 3 82922 106334 1 2 5 4 3 6
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 1 5 6 0 6 6 156021 192447 1 7 5 8 8 5
7 Machinery and transport equipment 2 3 2 5 1 4 258111 286 3 7 0  4 6 5 9 9 8
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 4 2 4 0 7 53834 6 7 3 5 6 9 6 7 8 5
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 3 7 9 8 1911 1865 2591
Source: see Table 1.
Table 12 considers the exports and imports o f the Six to the USA on a 
commodity basis. Although all the Six had a trade deficit with the USA in terms o f total 
trade, Germany enjoyed a surplus in machinery and transport equipment and 
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Table 13 considers the EEC exports by major area. While intra-EEC trade grew in 
importance for all the Six thanks to the implementation o f the customs union, the EFTA 
bloc also remained important. As a market, the USA remained of particular importance 
to Germany.
Tabic 13 EEC exports to major area 1959-1965
1959
Total
Exporting countries exports EEC EFTA USA
Rest of 
the World
France 5350 1527 760 470 2953
BLEU 3279 1522 524 444 789
Netherlands 3579 1597 847 209 926
ermany 9756 2731 2649 913 3643
Italy 2876 792 642 345 1097
Total EEC 24840 8169 5422 2381 9408
France 7362
1962
2712 1175 426 3049
BLEU 4325 2458 620 414 833
Netherlands 4584 2256 1057 200 1071
Germany 13264 4512 3687 965 4100
Italy 4666 1625 957 441 1643
Total EEC 34201 13563 7496 2446 10696
France 10048
1965
4115 1571 594 3768
BLEU 6382 3947 791 532 1112
Netherlands 6393 3561 1210 244 1378
Germany 17892 6306 4830 1436 5320
Italy 7188 2891 1199 618 2480
Total EEC 47903 20820 9601 3424 14058
Source: S tatistical Office o f  the E uropean Com m unities. B asic Statistics o f the C om m unity 
1960,1963.1966)
9.2 Machinery and transport equipment sector
As already anticipated, the fact that a sector group did not exist for machinery 
and transport equipment should not obscure the fact the largest interests in the Kennedy 
Round participant lay squarely in this sector.4 Together with the chemical sector, it was 
the most rapidly growing part o f  trade in manufactured goods and, as table 14 reveals, 
the major sector o f exports for Italy, Germany, The Netherlands and the USA.
Table 14 Composition of total exports of the Six and USA in 1964
France Italy Germany BLEU Netherlands USA
0 Food and live animals 1140075 1318052 295429 294661 1318052 1318052
1 Beverages and tobacco 295558 69932 52177 34128 69932 69932
4
NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1,Briefing for Governor Herter "USA-EEC 
talking points”, 3 August 1966.
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2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 634578 456800 431378 346060 456800 456800
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 311921 532554 788612 225589 532554 532554
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 26353 45764 45001 13425 45764 45764
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 872753 532651 1875250 312599 532651 532651
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 2550863 1125764 3568684 2806141 1125764 1125764




Commodities and transactions not elswhere
818126 302902 1457732 402856 302902 302902
classified 55166 54283 209688 125143 54283 54283
Source: see Table 1.
Despite the importance of this sector, previous accounts of the Kennedy Round 
hardly mention it and prefer to focus only on the five sectors covered by a group. 
Indeed, it is not easy to track the history of these negotiations. By virtue of the fact that 
no major problem was encountered, this sector is also hardly mentioned in the archives. 
The description o f  these negotiations is, however, o f major importance. First, this sector 
mostly concerned the USA and the EEC for its rate of growth; second, it highlights that 
while Italy and France wanted to defend EEC preferences in this sector, Germany and 
the Netherlands, being interested in enhancing their exports, wanted to reduce the CET 
as a bargaining chip. This sector is a good example of those compromises that were 
necessary between the Six to set up a common commercial policy.
When the EEC list was set up in November 1964, the majority of its exceptions 
had been demanded by Italy and France. They had felt that the financial and technical 
means third countries and, notably, the United States’ industries had meant that the EEC 
was unable to give up the existing protection levels of the CET. Moreover, they were 
already reducing their national tariffs to join the CET, which, in turn had been reduced 
at the Dillon Round by an average o f three points. These two countries were facing the 
increased competition on their markets at the regional level of the EEC, and appeared 
cautious in allowing an increase of competition at multilateral level. Thus they insisted 
on the retention o f the level o f protection for this sector, in order to retain the possibility 
o f expanding their industries at EEC regional level without exposing it to the American 
and EFTA competition. By contrast, underlining the competitiveness of the industries of 
the Six in this sector, and that fact the EEC was one of the most developed trade units in 
world trade, Germany and The Netherlands did not share Italian and French positions 
and wanted few exceptions. Moreover, the EEC was a net exporter for this sector and 
had every interest in getting to Geneva with a short list in order to be able to push the 
EFTA countries and the USA to shorten theirs. As Table 15 shows, Germany had an 
outstanding interest in increasing its exports outside the EEC, and the only way to 
achieve this goal was to meet in Geneva with a short exceptions list.
T ab le  15 E xports  o f th e  Six in m ach inery  a n d  tra n sp o rt equ ipm en t (S IT C  C lassification 7, in US S 
th o u san d ) in 1964.
1964 Wo rid EEC UK EFTA+ Finland USA
BLEU 1057264 732048 38188 108502 35433
Germany 7491028 2356797 297205 2095819 699246
France 2284896 761148 75625 359729 85208
Italy 1839743 679456 76912 280274 84393
Netherlands 1369403 711477 83272 248699 65217
Source: SITC Classification. OECD SITC Rev.2 - Historical Series 1961-1990 (Paris: OECD 2000)
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It should also be recalled that for these two countries a further decrease in the 
CET simply meant returning to the national tariffs back which they had had in 1958. In 
the end, the French and the Italians accepted to withdraw some exceptions, but, for 
Bonn and The Hague, the list remained long and they considered it essential to reduce it 
in order to have the chance to bargain down other countries’ tariffs.5 The EEC 
exceptions concerned public work machinery, nuclear reactors, electronic calculating 
machines, where the EEC feared not only American and EFTA competition but also 
that stemming from Japan, as well as some machine tools, air conditioning machines 
and sewing machines. The list also concerned motors and detached pieces for heavy 
trucks, tractors, heavy buses and their pieces, including motors, bicycles, helicopters 
and light aircrafts and diesel motors. A 50% reduction on cars and aircrafts could be 
made only if  the trading partners were willing to grant equivalent concessions. The Six 
hoped in this way to reduce the preferential access British cars enjoyed on the EFTA 
markets, pushing both the UK and the small EFTA countries to do the same, but without 
insisting on the condition that there be a reduction in the CET in sectors of major 
interest them, such as pulp paper and paper, wood products and non-ferrous metals, so 
important to the Nordics. By June 1965, the Six had also set the rate of partial 
exceptions at an average level o f 20%, despite German request of 25%.6
The EEC complained, but without stressing the point too greatly, about 
American NTBs such as the Buy American Act. The industries of the Six, and in 
particular the French Federation o f Mechanical Industries, had asked their governments 
to oppose this American NTB, which disadvantaged European producers in American 
public procurement. However, the EEC knew that because of its own NTBs, such as the 
road tax on cars, it could not insist on too much with the USA.7
The USA tabled no exceptions in this sector. As the US industry was strong 
enough to bear a 50% reduction of duties, and interested reducing reduce third 
countries’ protection levels, the Johnson administration decided to arrive in Geneva 
with no exceptions and a fully liberal posture in order to push other countries to do the 
same. Washington was naturally worried by the EEC exceptions, which heavily hit US 
exports in this dynamic sector. To be sure, as showed in chapter 7, other sectors were 
even more affected, but this sector was too crucial for its value and dynamism for the 
Americans to accept EEC exceptions as they had been proposed. In particular, 
Washington asked for reduction in duties on machine tools, electronic machines, pubic 
work machines, and aircrafts and light helicopters for which it was prime EEC supplier. 
In order to press the EEC to significantly reduce its exceptions, Washington counted on 
the fact that this sector was of crucial importance also to the EEC, and to the Germans 
in particular (see Table 15). The US market was of great importance to the EEC too, 
while the Six had to reduce their exceptions if  they wanted to increase their exports to 
the EFTA countries. It was by focusing on these two elements that Washington hoped to 
push the Six to reduce their exceptions list so that it could maintain its practically 
unqualified linear offers.8 Washington was not disappointed by the EEC offers in the
5
PRO BT 241/844 Telegram 96 from Roberts, British Ambassador in Bonn, to Foreign Office, 3 May 1965, reporting 
conversation between Keiser, Stedfeid, Horn of the German Ministry of Economy, and Roberts, Hughes and Denman.
6 CM2 1965/39 PV de la 168?"* réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 13-14 May 1965 and CM2 1969 PV de la 169*"* réunion 
du Conseil de la CEE, 14-15 June 1965.
7 MAEF, DE/CE GATT 949 F.I.M.T.M. «Négociations tarifaires CEE/Etats-Unis au sein du GATT: Note complémentaire 
de la Fédération des Industreis Mécaniques», August 1963. CM2 IA 1.824.52 Prise de position du Conseil des Présidents 
de ITJNICE au sujet des négociations tarifaires multilatérales au GATT, 11 Décembre 1963,14 A.4/10 A.4.
O
AECB -  BAC 122/1991-3, Rapport n.32 de la délégation de la Commission pour les négociations du GATT, 29 March 
1965; AECB PV 345, 19 January 1966, Annex «Rapport de la Commission au Conseil sur les négociations commerciales
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automobile sector. It had a major interest in cars, which the Six subjected to the full 
50% reduction, and, at the same time, hoped to increase their exports to the EEC 
through their branches in Germany. The Americans had only a minor interest in 
exporting to the EEC their buses, trucks and tractors, too heavy for the markets o f the 
Six.9 However, the United States complained about the automobile road-use taxes 
which heavily hit US cars.10
The British and the other EFTA countries, similarly to the USA, had not 
presented exceptions as they also hoped that their liberal stance could push the EEC, 
and in particular the French and the Italians, to significantly reduce duties. This sector 
formed the biggest group of items o f British exports to the EEC and the USA, therefore 
the United Kingdom was also disappointed by the EEC exceptions, but its discontent 
was limited to certain exceptions, notably radio sets and parts, machine tools, pumps, 
diesel engines, tractors and heavy lorries for which was the first supplier of the EEC. In 
any case, London felt confident of being able to secure a fairly wide range of substantial 
tariff cuts during the course of the negotiations.11
With the EEC agreement to subject cars to the 50% reduction and the US lack of 
concern for the rest of the automobile sector, this sector became the subject of an almost 
intra-European negotiation. None o f the EFTA countries tabled any exceptions in the 
automobile sector, hoping that their markets would be attractive enough to push the Six 
to make concessions to them in other sectors which they considered crucial, notable 
pulp paper and paper, aluminium and wood products. Moreover, Sweden, in addition to 
cars, was interested in boosting its exports of trucks, and was particularly concerned by 
the EEC exception on these items and their parts. It had a 24% duty on cars and it hoped 
that its offer to halve this figure would push the EEC to do the same on trucks. As for 
the British, they asked for a reduction in the CET for the entire sector, especially on 
heavy trucks, tractors and buses, including detached pieces.
Within the EEC, the Germans looked with interest at the Americans and EFTA 
countries requests to the EEC to substantially reduce exceptions for the entirety the 
machinery and transport equipment sector. When the EEC list had been set, the 
Germans had opposed the inclusion of tractors, heavy lorries, some machine tools and 
electronic machines, so they paid close attention to the demands of British, EFTA and 
US complaints, hoping to push the recalcitrant Italians and French to reduce 
protection.12 The insistence of the United States, the United Kingdom and other EFTA 
countries that the EEC had to reduce its exceptions list, together with the similar
au GATT», NCG (66)3. NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1,Briefing for Governor 
Herter "USA-EEC talking points", 3 August 1966.
9
AECB PV 345, 19 January 1966, Annex «Rapport de la Commission au Conseil sur les négociations commerciales au 
GATT», NCG (66)3. Remarks made by Blumenthal at a press conference on 7 December 1965, Herter paper, box 1, 
JFKL For an excellent account of the treatment of the automobile sector in the Kennedy Round see Ramírez Pérez, S.M. 
"The role of multinational corporations in the foreign trade policy of the European Economic Community: the automobile 
sector between 1959 and 1967" in Actes du Gerpisa, N.38-"Variety of capitalism and Diversity of Productive Models" on 
which this account of the automobile sector is grounded.
In Austria, Belgium, France and Italy this tax was calculated on cylinder capacity or fiscal horsepower, instead of the 
cost or price of the vehicle. Most European cars did not exceed 2500cc or 16 fiscal horsepower, while (aside from 
compacts) American cars exceeded both these figures. The result was that a 220 SE Mercedes which cost 48,000 francs 
in France, paid tax of 150 francs, while Chevrolet Chevy II 200-400, which cost only half the price, paid 1000 francs a 
year. For a full description of all NTBs applied by GATT members see Non-tariff barriers to GATT Agreement, August 
1966, NSF: Subject File, box 47, LBJL
11 PRO BT 241/844 Telegram 17 from Cohen (UK Delegation to GATT) to Foreign Office, 15 February 1965;PRO BT 
241/844 Telegram 28 from Cohen (UK Delegation to GATT) to Foreign Office, 15 February 1965; PRO FO 371/189598 
Memorandum "The Outlook of the Kennedy Round", from Melville (Head of British delegation to Geneva) to Mr. Stewart 
o f the Foreign Office, 26 July 1966.
PRO BT 241/844 Telegram 96 from Roberts, British Ambassador in Bonn, to Foreign Office, 3 May 1965, reporting 
conversation between Keiser, Stedfeld, Horn of the German Ministry of Economic, and Roberts, Hughes and Denman.
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German and Dutch stances within the EEC, made this sector the likely candidate for an 
improvement o f offers by the EEC in the final bargain. However, as there was not a 
particular obstacle, apart from the willingness of participants, to the reductions of 
tariffs, this sector was set aside while negotiations took place on the other industrial 
sectors and on agriculture. Governments wanted to see how the whole bargaining 
process developed before taking a final decision on the concessions to be granted. As a 
result, it would be only in the very final phase of the Kennedy Round that this sector 
would become fully involved in the bargain.
9.3 Chemicals: a tough transatlantic confrontation
While no specific obstacle existed to reducing protectionism in the mechanical 
sector, the situation was completely different for chemicals. As the Tables in the first 
sections showed, the chemical sector had a relatively prominent place in EEC-US trade 
relations. And, as table 12 shows, within the EEC, it was particularly relevant for the 
Germans, who enjoyed a trade surplus with the Americans. However, chemicals, in 
addition o f being one o f the most important sectors in the Kennedy Round, also 
represented one the talks’ most turbulent parts, as negotiations became dominated and 
stalled, so putting at risk the entire GATT talks, by the issue of the ASP. And it would 
be only on the very last night o f the negotiations, on 15 May 1967, that an agreement 
was eventually reached.
The ASP customs valuation system affected some categories of products 
entering the US market, and, in particular, benzenoid chemicals. It provided that any 
imported benzenoid chemical which competed with a similar domestic product on the 
US market had to be valued on the basis of the American selling price of the domestic 
product. In this way, imports could not compete with domestic products.13 When, in 
1962, Kennedy had suggested the sweeping reductions in tariffs, the EEC responded 
that by demanding that the ASP also be included in the GATT Round in order as to 
harmonise commercial conditions. The Europeans attached great practical significance 
to the elimination of the ASP, and were determined to make this an express condition 
for any tariff reduction in the chemical sector, as well as an implied condition for 
liberalising industrial trade generally. In this way, they could also respond to the likely 
pressure the USA would place on them to reduce the CET. In fact, the Europeans 
attached an even greater symbolic significance to the abolition of this NTB, which had 
come represent their capability to push the USA to grant concessions. This firm 
European position was also grounded on the stance taken by the EEC chemical industry, 
which held that the ASP had no reason to exist. The US chemical industry was strong, 
and had numerous branches in Europe and, therefore, did not require this kind of 
protection. The European chemical industry, with the exceptions of the protectionist 
Italian industry, was not opposed to a reduction in tariffs, provided that the ASP was 
abolished.14
In November 1964, following the suggestion of France, the EEC put organic 
chemicals on the exceptions list and refused to subject them to the justification process 
so long as the problem o f the ASP went unresolved. Thus American action on the ASP 
was a precondition of the opening of the negotiations and if Washington refused to 
abolish it, the EEC would withdraw the entire chemical sector from the Kennedy
13
PRO FO 371/189598 US Congressional Records, 31 May 1966. For a full history of the ASP legislation since its 
enactment in 1930 and a detailed description of the problems raised by the ASP, see this Congressional report and 
Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and Power in the 1960s, pp.147-152.
14
AECB BAC 62/1980-53 TEA-Travaux Préparatoires (Communications de Rey, Maijolin, Caron), 1963.
276
Round. In addition to this general reservation, it had also tabled total and unspecified 
partial exceptions and disparities claims. With these premises -  a NTB to be removed, 
exceptions and disparities -  it would come as no surprise that this sector had every 
chance o f becoming one o f the most troubled parts o f the Round.
To further complicate the situation, the US chemical industry was opposed to 
reductions of duties and wanted to maintain unaltered the US level of protection, 
preferring to enhance its exports through corporations in Europe. Above all, the 
American chemical industry was opposed to the abolition of the ASP, for it preferred to 
maintain this effective protection than to see European duties reduced. It was not 
interested in reducing its duties in order to get concessions from the Europeans, and put 
strong pressure on the US government to exempt chemicals from the linear cut. Despite 
this pressure, the US government subjected virtually the whole chemical sector to the 
50% reduction, excepting only a small percentage, a very drastic step since most of 
these tariffs had remained unchanged since the 1930s. In truth, it would have been 
difficult for Washington to do otherwise. The US chemical sector was highly 
competitive globally speaking, while one of the areas for which the EEC pointed to the 
existence of the disparities was the chemicals sector, US tariffs being considerably 
higher than the CET. Consequently, the USA had to subject virtually the entire sector to 
the 50% reduction, if it wanted to appear credible in its effort to liberalize trade through 
the Kennedy Round.15
In addition to the USA and the EEC, other countries had important trade 
interests in this sector and became actively involved in the negotiations. Switzerland 
had a major interest in enhancing dyestuff exports to the Six, but the EEC had made any 
reduction on this item conditional on the elimination of the ASP. As a result, 
negotiations with the EEC depended on the American stance on ASP and the Swiss 
found this unacceptable, despite their desire to see the ASP abolished. To cap it all, the 
EEC had identified the existence o f disparities with the United States, thus once more 
subjecting the destiny of tariff cuts to America’s attitude.16 Just like Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom also had a key interest in this sector. London considered the Kennedy 
Round to be a means to attack the ASP which locked out British exports of organic 
chemicals and, at the same time, to reduce discrimination in Europe. Like the EEC, the 
United Kingdom also took the position that the Americans had to make up their minds 
to remove the ASP. However, like the Swiss, the British were also worried about the 
consequence on intra-European trade of the EEC refusal to even discuss the chemical 
sector unless the Americans removed the ASP, and feared that too rigid an attitude 
would simply cause stalemate fir chemicals, with negative consequences for the whole 
of the Kennedy Round.17
With the presentation of the exceptions lists, it became clear that unless the 
United States got ready to seriously discuss the elimination of the ASP, disappointing 
results in this crucial sector of world trade were just around the comer. The US 
government generally recognised that the ASP was not a proper system of customs 
valuation. However, the EEC stance on the ASP put the US delegation in Geneva in an 
objectively difficult position. First, the American chemical industry did not have such
15 Trade Talk Review, Vol. XI, No.2, 26 February 1964 in Heiter Papers, box 13, JFKL; Memorandum for the President 
from Roth, 5 October 1965, Roth Papers, box 1, LBJL
16 AECB -  BAC 122/1991-3 Rapport n.36 de la délégation de la Commission pour le négociation du GATT, 6 May 1965; 
ibidem Rapport n.51 de la délégation de la Commission pour les négociations du GATT, 3 August 1965.
17 PRO FO 371/183386 Letter from Hughes to O'Neill, 18 May 1965 and PRO BT 241/845 "The Kennedy Round" Brief 
for the President's talks with Mr. Willis Armstrong, 24 January 1966. Japan too was concerned by the removal of the 
ASP and consequently made pressure on the Americans. However, it excepted 80% of the chemical sector and it was 
therefore less able to effectively put pressure on Washington.
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an urgency to reduce European tariffs that it would accept relinquishing the massive 
protection of the ASP. Second, the US delegation faced legal problems: This NTB had 
been established by a law of Congress and its removal necessitated Congressional 
action. But with the protectionist mood that was starting to mount in the legislative body 
and with the opposition o f the chemical industry this consent would only be obtainable 
with great difficulty.18
Washington was irritated by the insistence o f the EEC -  and above all o f the 
French, as it considered the EEC position a French inspired one -  on the ASP. The 
custom valuation system applied to only 10% of US chemical imports and the EEC was 
exaggerating the question beyond o f its proportions only for bargaining purposes.19 At 
the same time, Washington felt that its offer to reduce tariffs on virtually all chemicals 
was extremely generous, given that it proposed to reduce all tariffs in this area by 50% 
including those covered by the ASP,_ and therefore the removal o f the ASP, which had 
to be approved by the US Congress, was an additional concession for which GATT 
partners had to offer greater compensation through further offers, such as the abolition 
of the road tax in European countries. Thus if  the USA was to make concessions on 
ASP, the European partners had to make further offers and take actions on their own 
NTBs.20
The idea that the American trade partners had to make further offers to obtain 
the removal o f the ASP was rejected outright by the EEC: the ASP was inconsistent 
with GATT rules and had simply to be abolished. As a result, at the end o f May 1965, 
the stalemate was confirmed and risked keeping chemicals out of the negotiations, with 
all the resulting potential dangers for the Kennedy Round and intra-European trade.21
Despite their opposition to dealing with the ASP as a preliminary condition, the 
Americans were aware that the refusal of the EEC to negotiate on chemicals if the ASP 
went untouched, and British pressure to abolish the ASP were too weighty to be 
ignored. And in fact, Herter, Roth and the State Department concluded that they had to 
do something regarding the ASP in order to unlock the negotiations. American failure to 
do so would necessarily have a detrimental effect upon the US negotiating position in 
Geneva. Washington could not push its trading partners to assume a liberal posture 
while it maintained such protectionist and legally inconsistent devices. Thus, the US 
government had to establish a basis for proposing modifications to the system itself. 
What Herter and Roth thought might be feasible was to get the translation of the 
chemical tariff rates, as magnified by the ASP, into ad valorem equivalents and then 
cutting these in half, in exchange for further offers by the US’s partners. This last point 
remained crucial for them, as it would be the only way to present to Congress and the 
American chemical industry a settlement with which the US government could show 
that some valuable concessions from other countries, such as the abolition o f the British
18
Minutes of tfie fifth meeting of the Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, 4 March 1965, Herter papers 
box 14, JFKL; PRO BT 241/844 Telegram 137 from Baker (UK delegation to GATT) to Foreign Office, 25 June 1965.
19
Of the 850 US rates on the chemical sector 170 were zero duties and represented two-third of US chemical imports; 
the remaining one third was subjected to duties, covered or not by the ASP. In 1964 the average tariff in the whole 
chemical sector was of 5.9%, and 16% was the average of dutiable imports.
20 PRP FO 371/18339 Telegram 165 from Lord Harlech of the British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, 25 
January 1965, reporting conversation between Roth and Commercial Minister at the Embassy Chadwick; PRO FO 
371/183399 Letter from Chadwick of the British Embassy in Washington to Neale of the Board of Trade,26 January 
1965 reporting conversation between Roth and Chadwick. Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Public Advisory Committee 
for Trade Negotiations, 4 March 1965, Herter papers box 14, JFKL.
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AECB -  BAC 122/1991*3 Rapport n.40 de la délégation de la Commission pour les négociations du GATT, 6 May 
1965; PRO BT 241/844 Telegram 137 from Baker (UK delegation to GATT) to Foreign Office, 25 June 1965.
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prohibition on coal imports or the road tax in Europe, had been obtained.22 It was on 
this ground that, in December 1965, President Johnson charged the Tariff Commission 
with preparing for him a new schedule containing tentative converted rates for 
chemicals subject to ASP. The Tariff Commission would then publish a recommended 
list o f converted rates, but the rates could become effective only if  enacted by 
Congress.23
The American plan did not win the support of the Europeans. London deemed 
that what the Americans were contemplating was merely to abolish the ASP and to 
convert the ASP protection in a duty protection and cut the effective rates by half, 
Which, in practice, meant that if a published tariff rate o f 40% was, under the ASP, 
effectively 100%, the Americans would abolish the ASP, halve the 100% rate and write 
50% into their new tariffs. However, the British found little practical use in having a 
prohibitive level of 100% reduced to an equally prohibitive level of 50%, for which it 
had also to grant further concessions. Powell warned the Americans that the EEC 
reaction would be even more strongly opposed and that they might be prompted to 
exclude chemicals from the Kennedy Round entirely. The end-result could be an EEC- 
EFTA arrangement on chemicals similar to the US-Canadian auto agreement, warned 
the British.24
Contrary to British expectations, the Commission’s reaction was not totally 
negative. With Roth, Hijzen repeated that the EEC was not prepared to give any 
concessions in exchange for the removal of the ASP, which was in flagrant 
contradiction with the GATT rules.25 At the same time, the Commission was worried 
about the stalemate in chemical negotiations and had no intention of refusing the 
American plan out of hand. Despite the lack of enthusiasm for the plan, it recognised 
that the Americans had at least taken an initiative, after much stonewalling. At this point 
it was up to the EEC to make a step, i f  it did not want to see the removal o f the chemical 
sector from the Kennedy Round. Thus, at the 111 Committee meeting of 14-15 
February 1966 -  the first after the end of the Crisis o f the Empty Chair -  the 
Commission suggested that, while maintaining its reserve on the ASP, the Committee 
could start working on the rate of reductions of the partial exceptions to be presented in 
Geneva.26 The Commission was reinforced in its conviction by the results o f the 
steering meeting of the Big Four on 18 February, which had the general aim of setting 
up an informal schedule to carry out the negotiations, following the end of the Crisis of 
the Empty Chair. Here, the Americans declared for the first time since November 1964 
to be wiling to talk about the ASP and announced their intention to put forward 
proposals at the middle of April 1966. With this American declaration, the United
22
Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, 4 March 1965, Herter papers 
box 14, JFKL; PRO BT 241/844 Telegram 137 from Baker (UK delegation to GATT) to Foreign Office, 25 June 1965. For 
Herter and Roth's position in particular see memorandum for the President from Roth, 5 October 1965, Roth Papers, 
box 1, LBJL. Roth made Johnson known that indications from Congress had reported that Congress agreed to this 
course of action.
23
Memorandum for the President from Bator, 7 December 1965, Bator Papers, box 13, LBJL. PRO FO 371/189598 US 
Congressional Records, 31 May 1966.
24
PRO BT 303/152 "United States-United Kingdom discussions in Washington 8-10 November, 1965: Kennedy Round, 
brief for Sir Richard Powell", note by the British delegation to GATT, 28 October 1965 -  Annex A: Industrial Tariffs. 
Memorandum of conversation between American (Herter and Roth) and British (Powell, Denman and Hughes) officials 
in Washington, 9 November 1965, Roth Papers, box 1, LBJL; PRO BT 241/845 Telegram 255 from Melville to Foreign 
Office, 15 December 1965.
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Kingdom and the United States asked the Commission to complete its offers for the 
sector, and to provide the list o f disparities it intended to invoke so negotiations could 
start in the second part o f April. Hijzen found these requests reasonable and, although 
still bound by the EEC mandate, promised to do his best to convince the Council of 
Ministers to table all data as soon as possible.27
Against this background, at the Council o f Ministers meeting at the end of 
February 1966, Rey pressed to start working on the rate of the partial offers, while 
maintaining the reservations about the ASP. The firm attitude, that the EEC had 
maintained up until that time, had pushed the Americans to present proposals in mid- 
April 1966, claimed the Commissioner. However, now the Six had to ease the 
discussions on the ASP by adopting the rate of partial exceptions, table them in Geneva 
on 15 April and start negotiating with GATT partners. The Commission’s position was 
strongly supported by the German Neef who was also worried for the deadlock, and 
pushed to start negotiating, and by the Benelux countries and Italy. Above all, contrary 
to the position the French had always maintained, Couve de Murville approved the 
Commission proposals. If at first glance, Couve de Murville’s decision seemed a major 
step for France, considering that it was taken only one month after the end of the Crisis 
o f the Empty Chair with no progress yet achieved on the CAP, it actually confirmed that 
France had no intention o f putting the Kennedy Round at risk by refusing to table partial 
exceptions.28
Following the proposals presented by the Commission, the EEC Council o f 
Ministers, on 4-5 April 1966, approved the rate o f the partial exceptions. The 
Community would offer tariff reductions o f between 22 and 30 percent. In tabling 
partial offers, the EEC would make it known it was doing so on the assumption that the 
barriers o f the ASP would be eliminated. Thus, the EEC’s offers on chemicals remained 
conditional, but at least the EEC had agreed to discuss them.29
The decision o f the USA to present its proposal on the ASP and the EEC 
decision to table offers opened the way for a new phase in bargaining. At least at this 
point there was something to talk about. At the chemical sector group of 3-4 May 1966, 
attended by the United States, the European Community, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland and Japan, Blumenthal presented the US proposal for the ASP and Hijzen 
tabled the EEC conditional exceptions. After an attempt to keep negotiations on what he 
retained the insufficient EEC duty cuts in this sector, pushed by the GATT partners, 
Blumenthal put forward the US working hypothesis -  not a formal offer -  composed o f 
two aspects. First the ASP was to be replaced by an equivalent system of tariff 
protection, translating ASP duties into ad valorem equivalents. The converted rates 
would then be subjected to the 50% tariffs cuts, but to become definitive the conversion 
of the rates needed the approval o f  Congress. Moreover, the USA could make a formal 
offer only in the framework of a package, separate from the tariff negotiations on the 
rest of the chemical sector, in which, in exchange for the abolition of the ASP, GATT 
partners would make additional offers to the United States. Further, such a package 
required the approval o f Congress. In order to show the legislative body that a balance 
existed between concessions made and received by the United States, GATT partners 
had to make significant concessions before the USA would decide whether or not to 
offer concessions on the ASP. A separate package had to stand on its own feet and be
27 AECB -  BAC 122/1991-4 Rapport n.62 de la délégation de la Commission pour les négociations du GATT, 3 March 
1966.
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attractive to Congress. The US tactic was clear: the ASP had to avoid being the major 
stumbling block for the negotiations, causing the situation that the entire Kennedy 
Round agreement might stand or fall on the basis o f what Congress chose to do.30
The reaction of the US partners was one o f great frustration. The EEC, UK, 
Switzerland and Japan rebuffed the American position that the abolition of the ASP, 
which was inconsistent with GATT rules, justified additional offers. Moreover, the 
converted rates would remain high even after the 50% reduction, therefore the USA had 
cut their higher rates by more -  and in some cases by substantially more -  than 50% in 
order to eliminate the problem of disparities. To cap it all, the working hypothesis was 
subjected to the whims of the Congress, with the result that the American legislative 
body would condition the negotiations.31
Despite the frustration, the Commission and the British felt it dangerous to reject 
the American working hypothesis, as this was the only proposal the USA had made 
since 1964. Therefore, it had to be accepted as working hypothesis and then improved. 
Only in this way could a complete failure be avoided.32 The Six were highly dissatisfied 
by the American ASP proposals, which seemed merely an offer to consolidate the ASP 
in the form of a tariff, for which the EEC also had to pay a price. Among the Six, 
however, there was a large range of views. Germany was willing to accept the American 
suggestion as a starting point for negotiations. The German chemical industry feared 
that, if negotiations were not started on this basis, the Kennedy Round would not result 
in substantial tariff reductions at all, and could never, therefore, lead to the abolition of 
the ASP. France adopted a position similar to that o f Germany and surprised, through its 
“reasonableness”, the Commission.33 By contrast, Italy was firmly opposed to accepting 
the working hypothesis. As stated, Italy had no significant economic interest at stake in 
abolishing the ASP, but was using the obstacle of the ASP as a pretext for blocking or 
limiting the negotiations in the chemical sector. The Netherlands too took a tough 
position against the American working hypothesis, but for reasons opposed to the 
Italians ones. Dutch industry had negatively reacted to the American offers and the 
Dutch government refused to accept it as a starting point for negotiations.34
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Because of these divisions among o f the Member States, the Commission was 
unable to convince the Council o f Ministers to accept the American working hypothesis 
even as a provisional point o f departure for negotiations. And it was only under the 
strong pressure of the Germans, and the weak opposition of the French, that it was 
agreed at the Council o f Ministers meeting o f 13-14 June to charge the COREPER and 
the 111 Committee with considering the further implications of American proposals and 
report their views back to the Council, rather than dismiss them out of hand. The Six, 
however, restated their position o f  November 1964 claiming that, if  the ASP were not 
removed, they would refuse all concessions on chapters 29, 32 and 39 of the CET.35
The finding of a solution was complicated not only by the difference in 
appreciation o f the US working hypothesis which the United States and the EEC had. 
The point was also that the threat from the US partners to withdraw their concessions 
unless the ASP was removed was not enough to push Congress to remove it. To the US 
chemical industry, it was of much greater importance to keep its own high protection 
rather than gain reduction o f other countries’ tariffs. Thus, the Europeans lacked 
leverage to force the Congress to abolish ASP. As Herter reminded Erhard and Schroder 
in September 1966, if  the Europeans were to withdraw their chemical offers, US 
industry would be only too happy.36 On the other hand, the EEC chemical industiy, 
while attaching a major interest to the removal of the ASP, had no intention payoff 
paying a big price in order to see it abolished. The only thing the Europeans could do 
was to confront the Americans with the warning of withdrawals of concessions 
inevitably ranging beyond chemicals. However, this meant putting at risk the entire 
Kennedy Round for the sake o f the ASP.37 At any rate, the EEC remained completely 
stuck on the American working hypothesis and, by the end of 1966, it had not yet 
decided whether to accept it as the negotiating basis. As a result, 1966 ended with in 
utter deadlock -  not even a negotiating basis had been greed -  a fact that seemed to 
endanger the chemical sector, with bleak consequences on the whole Round.38
9.4 Paper sector: problems with the Nordic countries
In comparison to the mechanical and chemicals sectors, paper certainly had less 
relevance in world trade. However, it came to play a key part in the Kennedy Round 
because o f the centrality it had in trade relations between the EEC and the Nordics. The 
EEC was the first exporting market for the Nordics, and they had every intention o f 
obtaining meaningful concessions. Upon entering the Kennedy Round, they made clear 
their refusal to reduce tariffs in the entire industrial sector if the EEC were to continue 
to refuse to reduce its protection, as it had done in the Dillon Round. Thus, they took a 
adopted a very confrontational attitude, hoping, in this way, to put pressure on the Six. 
If  the EEC was interested in enhancing its exports in other sectors -  mechanical and 
transport equipment in particular -  the paper sector had to be fully included in the 
reduction. As a result, paper came to have a major relevance for the Round. If the 
Nordics, dissatisfied with the EEC reductions, would not reduce tariffs in other sectors, 
the EEC would react by adding further exceptions and, consequently, also scaling down 
tariff concessions with the United States.
35 CM2/17S09 Rapport de Borschette à la Présidence du Conseil de la CEE, 12 June 1966; CM2 1966/34 PV de la 
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The Six faced difficulties in reducing protection. Their paper industry lacked the 
natural resources of the Nordics and, at the same time, was depended on the latter for its 
supplies of raw material; the EEC obtained two-third of its pulp from the Nordics and 
was thus strongly dependent on this source. The Nordics maintained artificially high 
pulp prices, however, in order to ensure that foreign paper manufactured products would 
not be able to compete strongly with their exports. In short, capitalizing on their 
position as dominant European supplier, they maintained a situation whereby their 
paper product processing industries would maintain their large foreign markets.39
Despite all this, being aware o f the importance of the paper sector for the Nordic 
countries and under the strong insistence of the Commission, the EEC had tried to make 
an effort to keep its protectionism to the minimum, and avoid a complete impasse as 
had been the case in the Dillon Round. The EEC tabled conditional partial exceptions, 
whose rate had not be agreed, on pulp paper and newsprint while, for the highly 
important basic paper and Kraft paper, the offer consisted of a reduction of no more 
than two points. The EEC made its offers conditional. Internally, financial aid was to be 
provided to the EEC industry as means of ensuring an adequate indigenous capacity, 
which would protect the Community against any Scandinavian price squeeze; 
externally, a broad agreement with the Nordic countries on producing and marketing 
conditions was to be reached, and it was according to the result of this agreement that 
the Six would fix partial exceptions. As a result, in order for multilateral negotiations to 
start, the EEC first needed to carry out bilateral meetings with the Nordics.
Even though the EEC and the Nordic countries had the primary interests in this 
sector, the United States was not indifferent regarding what happened. In terms of trade, 
the United States had a secondary interest, but still relevant a relevant one, concentrated 
in Kraft liner. However, what worried the United States was the scaling down on of 
concessions in the whole Round that could be caused by the EEC refusal to grant 
meaningful offers to the Nordics. The Americans, together with the Canadians who had 
a major interest in this sector, were annoyed by the EEC claim that a preliminary 
bilateral agreement had to be found with the Nordic countries. This bilateral agreement 
could simply lead to a European deal that would exclude Canada and the USA. Thus the 
United States unsuccessfully put pressure on the EEC to start negotiating in the 
multilateral framework, or at least be allowed to attend the bilateral work set up 
between the Nordics and the EEC.40
Because of the difficulty in negotiating on paper, following the suggestion of 
Wyndham White, a sector group was set up. However, by early 1966, the Commission 
and the Nordics were getting nowhere with their bilateral agreement. In fact, only a 
preliminary study on the trade problems had been carried out and, in any case, the 
Swedish Ambassador, Montan, representing the Nordic countries, claimed that the price 
policy of the industries was not within governmental competences. As a result, the 
paper sector was completely deadlocked.41
The complete stall over the paper sector was looked upon with concern by the 
Commission. Progress on this sector was necessary if a meaningful reduction in trade 
barriers was to be achieved between the EEC and the Nordics in the rest of the Kennedy
39
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Round. After the end o f the crisis o f the Empty Chair, it was the general policy of the 
Commission that, given the dangerous stalled position the Kennedy Round, the EEC 
had to take important steps to unlock the talks in Geneva. What the Six had to do, they 
felt, was to complete their exceptions list with the elaboration of the rate of the 
exceptions. This applied to chemicals, aluminium, steel and also paper for which the 
EEC had to define the partial exceptions and table them. The aim of the Commission for 
pulp paper was to favour a reasonable development o f EEC production, in harmony 
with a regular expansion of imports. What mattered to the Commission was to combine 
the tariff cuts in Geneva, indispensable to reach a final agreement with the Nordics, with 
coherent and harmonised measures of industrial policy to favour the progressive 
adaptation by the EEC industry to the tariff reductions. In effect, for the Commission, 
the Kennedy Round had to be used as an instrument to get the Six to adopt a common 
industrial policy for paper.42
It was with these aims in mind that, after the Luxembourg meetings of January 
1966, the Commission emphasised to the Six the urgency to move the discussions in the 
paper sector forward, by defining the rate o f  the partial exceptions and tabling them, 
despite the lack of agreement with the Nordics regarding their price policy.43 An 
agreement among the Six still appeared difficult. Italy and France considered financial 
aid for the EEC industry to be a preliminary condition to grant concessions. By contrast, 
the financial aid through a para-fiscal tax posed problems for the Germans and the 
Dutch due to opposition from their national parliaments.44 At the same time, for 
Germany it remained paramount to elaborate a solution allowing decent offers to the 
Nordics, as only in this way could Germany hope to get concessions from these 
countries in other sectors, such as the mechanical one, and this despite the opposition o f  
the German paper industry to make substantial concessions in Geneva.
The elaboration o f the offers to be presented in Geneva was carried out by the 
Commission and the 111 Committee, and was finally adopted by the Council o f  
Ministers only in mid-June 1966, when the Six adopted a package of concessions which 
also included provision for other sectors. The Dutch and the Germans suggested 
alternative proposals to the para-fiscal tax for pulp paper and newsprint, in order grant 
valuable concessions to the Nordics and, at the same time, putting European industries 
in the condition to be able to stand the fall in the level of protection. On pulp paper, the 
EEC had a 6% ad valorem duty, plus a bound zero-duty contingent for 1,9 million tons 
which had been given to the Nordic countries in the Dillon Round. In the meantime, the 
importing need of the EEC had grown to 3 million tons. Against this background, the 
Dutch and the Germans suggested to maintain the 6% duty, and to consolidate a zero- 
duty contingent for a volume higher than 1,9 million tons. To further favour third 
countries, an annual increase in the consolidated contingent, corresponding to a  
percentage linked to the increase in EEC consumption would be allowed. For the 
Germans and the Dutch, the advantages of this proposal consisted in the fact that third 
countries were guaranteed bigger zero-duty contingents, together with share of the 
increase in EEC consumption, while the EEC industries maintained 6% tariff protection. 
For newsprint ,the CET was at the 7% level, and Germany and France benefited from 
zero-duty contingents of 600,000 tons for 1966. The Germans and the Dutch suggested
42
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maintaining the 7% duty and consolidating a zero-duty for a given contingent, together 
with a measure allowing third countries to share eventual increases in EEC 
consumption. For the Dutch and the Germans, their proposal represented a sound 
compromise between the wish to avoid endangering the EEC industries and an effort to 
respond to the requests of the Nordic countries, to which important concessions had to 
be granted in order to get valuable counter concessions.45
The Dutch-German proposals were opposed by France, Italy and Belgium who 
underlined the necessity to more efficiently protect the EEC industry. Above all, they 
met strongly opposition from the Commission on the ground that they were not able to 
ensure equal supplying conditions among paper producers, and therefore stood in the 
way of the achievement of a real EEC common market in this sector. The transforming 
industry of the EEC needed to dispose of pulp paper at a uniform price, and at a level as 
near as possible to the world price. The German-Dutch proposal did not achieve this 
aim and, in addition, created the problem of dealing with a repartition of the contingent 
among the Six. 50% reductions o f duties were required, firmly claimed the 
Commission. The Commission saw the Kennedy Round as an instrument to favour the 
realization of the common market, with uniform commercial and industrial policy, 
while the German-Dutch proposals ran contrary to this aim.46
Against the firm Dutch and German opposition to accept a solution based on a 
para-fiscal tax restated at the Council of Ministers meeting of 4-5 April 1966, the 
Commission tried to elaborate a compromise halfway between its own position and that 
of the Federal Republic and The Netherlands, on the basis o f the indications put forward 
by Ministers, namely making the maximum concession possible to the Nordic countries, 
allowing the EEC industry to enjoy prices on pulp paper at a uniform level, and as close 
as possible to world prices, and maintaining the production capacity o f the EEC. The 
major problem in finding a compromise was that the Commission grounded its 
proposals on a different industrial policy for this sector than the one that had been 
requested by The Netherlands and Germany. These two countries, in fact, opposed the 
subsidization o f their industries, supported on the contrary by the Commission to favour 
a uniform industrial and commercial policy within the EEC. 7
Grounded on the compromise suggested by the Commission at the 111 
Committee o f early June, and thanks to the insistence o f this institution to see its 
proposals approved, at the Council of Ministers meeting of 13-14 June, the Six 
eventually adopted the final offers for the paper sector.48 The Six were aware that offers 
needed to be urgently adopted in order to unblock negotiations in Geneva and this push 
toward and compromise. The EEC decided to offer a 50% reduction on pulp paper, 
reducing the duty from 6 to 3%; on the internal front, in view of permitting EEC firms 
to bear the tariff reduction, subsidies could be granted by the Member States. The 
subsidy, however, would taper off over a seven to ten year period from the beginning of 
the implementation of the tariff reductions. Implementation of the subsidy depended 
upon legislation in member countries. Moreover, the Six agreed that the 3% duty would 
then be suspended according a pace to be determined. On newsprint, the 7% rate would
45 AECB BAC 62/1980-55, «Note de la réunion du Comité 111, 21 Mars 1966», 24 March 1966. For a full description f 
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46 AECB BAC 62/1980-55, «Note de la réunion du Comité 111, 21 Mars 1966», 24 March 1966. CM2/17509 Note 
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be maintained and a zero-tariff contingent would be offered and bound for 420,000 
metric tons -  lower than the existing unbound quota, but there would be no link with the 
EEC level of consumption, as the Germans and Dutch had requested. For other basic 
paper and paper products and cartons, the reduction would be o f two points, and on 
some others even 4-5%, as the Commission had requested. As a result, the CET for 
these products which ran at between 16 and 21 % would be reduced to 13-17%. In total, 
under the proposals of the Commission, the paper sector would be subjected to an 
average reduction of 14,7%. Despite the lack o f agreement with the Nordic countries 
over their marketing policy, in order to allow the negotiations in Geneva to move 
forward, the Commission was authorised to table offers, even if  such agreements 
remained conditional on concluding the negotiations. As a result of this compromise 
among the Six, the EEC excepted 85% of dutiable imports and 52% of all imports in 
this sector. The quasi-totality were partial exceptions. 81% of these partial exceptions 
consisted o f offers to reduce duties by less than 20%.49
Germany accepted these proposals as a form o f compromise. In mid-June 1966, 
the EEC had to table its offers if  it wanted to negotiate with the Nordics. However, N eef 
remained unsatisfied, as he felt that EEC cuts on basic papers were too small and tariff 
contingents too low to avoid causing a negative reaction on the part o f the Nordics. 
Concessions on paper remained crucial to get counter-concessions in other sectors, thus 
Germany accepted subscribing to these offers with the clear understanding that the EEC 
would improve them in the course o f the negotiations, and the German government 
adopted this position despite a request to increase protection coming from the German 
paper industry.50
At the beginning of July, the EEC tabled its offers and the negotiations for the 
paper sector finally got under way. The United States and Canada did not react 
negatively to the EEC offers. Given US interest in pulp paper, the Americans received 
positively the offer o f 50% cut, but it also labelled the EEC offers on newsprint -  in  
which it had no major interest at any rate -  as not constituting an offer because of the 
small volume of the contingent. The USA also judged EEC offers on paper products 
such as Kraft linerboard, in which it had a greater interest, as a skimpy start to be 
improved upon.51 By contrast, the reaction o f the Nordics was negative. They judged 
the EEC offers as a starting point which had to be substantially improved upon. The 
reduction on pulp paper from 6 to 3% was positive, but the Nordics would have 
preferred a full reduction to zero and, in any case, the EEC offer would not have a great 
deal of impact, as a duty-free contingent already existed. On newsprint, they judged the 
o f 420,000 tons contingents, inferior to the French and German duty-free imports duty 
in 1965 o f 586,000 tons, to be largely insufficient, and not capable o f permitting them to  
share in the increased level of consumption. Norway, whose exports of newsprint to the 
EEC represented more than half o f total exports for this sector, demanded a 50% duty 
reduction. Moreover, Sweden and Norway judged largely insufficient the two point 
reduction on basic paper and other paper. Therefore, unless the EEC chose to improve 
its offers, they would withdraw theirs to establish a balance.52
^  CM2 1966/34 PV de la 188ème réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 13-14 June 1966.
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To cap it all, in a turbulent meeting in November 1966 between Hijzen and the 
Nordic delegation, the Nordic countries refused to subject the reduction in tariffs to an 
agreement on marketing conditions, for they claimed to be unable to influence the 
policy of their industries, and they interpreted the request for the agreement as an 
excuse not to make concessions. The Nordic countries were genuinely irritated by the 
importance the Six were giving to their own paper industry, which did not have the 
economic importance for the EEC which the Six were purporting to grant it. With the 
refusal of the Nordic countries to discuss their marketing policy, and the refusal of the 
Commission to improve offers, the former decided to interrupt the bilateral negotiations 
with the EEC and to shift the negotiations to the multilateral level.53 As a result, at the 
end of 1966, no agreement seemed to be within reach in this hugely important sector for 
the trade relations between the EEC and the Nordic countries.
9.5 The complicated world of steel
By the beginning o f the Kennedy Round, the steel sector had become the most 
difficult one in which to achieve to tariff reductions. In fact, the rate of growth in this 
sector had slowed substantially, and steel makers on both sides of the Atlantic sought 
protection, Some data can illustrate this situation. In the United States, the steel industry 
was undergoing major changes. It had been the first to benefit from the postwar boom in 
steel-intensive consumer products, such as automobiles and domestic appliances, 
however, since the beginning of the 1960s the growth in demand for steel in these vital 
domestic markets had slowed down, under challenge from substitute products such as 
aluminium and plastics. On top o f this, the 1960s saw a progressive shift in the patterns 
of trade: once a leading exporter o f steel, by mid-1965, the USA had became world’s 
largest importer. At the beginning o f 1960, it started to experience the greatest import 
penetration o f all major steel producing countries. Imports grew from about 4% of 
domestic production in 1960 to about 8% in 1964 and then 12% in 1970.54 In 1964, US 
steel exports were worth $622 million and imports $749 million. In this same year, 
imports accounted for 7.3% of US consumption. In 1965, exports decreased to $508 
million and imports increased to $ 1,177 million, and accounted for 10.3% of US 
consumption. US steel manufactures argued that imports were penetrating deeper into 
the US market, partly as the result o f foreign overcapacity and cut-rate prices, and partly 
because of increased US costs, including wage and other employee benefits costs.”  The 
increase in imports combined with sharper decline in internal steel demand and 
employment pushed the American steel industry to demand protection. Thus the steel 
industry, that in 1962 had been favourable to the TEA, by 1965 had changed its 
position, and made clear its opposition to any general reduction in tariffs. Despite this 
opposition, the United States had presented a full 50% reduction on this sector hoping, 
in this way, to get the same kind o f concessions from other countries.56
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On the other side o f the Atlantic, the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was the greatest net exporter of steel, followed by Japan, and the second largest 
importer. In 1960, its exports accounted for 57% o f world exports, however this share 
was in decline, and had become 45% in 1964 and 32% in 1970. Like the USA, th e  
ECSC had also begun to experience import penetration, even if  at a slower pace. From  
1960 to 1964, penetration rose from 4% to 6% and then to 8% in 1970. Just as in th e  
US, the level of demand in the ECSC declined. This pressure from the rising im port 
penetration and declining demand pushed the European industry to also request fo r 
protection. Because o f the conjuncture o f the steel market, the Six and the H igh 
Authority were recalcitrant in reducing duties and in fact an agreement not to tab le  
meaningful offers in Geneva was easily reached.57
In order to understand the ECSC position in the Kennedy Round, and the entire  
development of the talks in Geneva, two facts should be reported. First, the negotiating 
position o f the Six was complicated by the fact that, in 1964, the ECSC did not have a  
CET for its products. The Treaty o f Paris o f April 1951, establishing the ECSC, dictated 
some harmonization, and not the averaging, o f the tariffs of the Six by the end o f th e  
1958. Because it broke the MFN rule principle, the Treaty required a GATT waiver, 
granted in 1953 and stated that, in 1958, the general incidence of the duties had to b e  
less restrictive than the general incidence o f the national duties. In 1951, the average 
level o f  rates of the Six was about 14%, even if the effective duties were much low er 
because o f temporaiy reductions and suspensions. The rate of the duties o f the Six w as 
highly spread and varied, from the low 4% level of Benelux to the high 21% of Italy. In  
1958, the national duties were harmonized at around 7%: Benelux and Germany 
adopted the former Benelux duties, increased by 2 points -  therefore 6% - while France 
increased the Benelux level by 4 points and Italy of 5%, so having, respectively, 8% and  
9% duty levels. Second, in 1957, the ECSC and the United Kingdom had reached an  
agreement, outside the GATT forum, in which the former agreed to maintain the 7 %  
rate in return for substantial reduction from the latter. They also agreed that duties could 
be unilaterally increased after consultation. In fact, as early as February 1964, because 
o f the steel crisis, the High Authority of the ECSC “temporarily” increased the duties o f  
the Six to 9%.58
The ECSC trade sector opposed the reduction in duties. In particular, they 
opposed the tendency to lower duties and then establish NTBs that had the negative 
effects o f creating incertitude in trade exchanges for the arbitrary way in which they 
were applied. The broader aim was to establish equality in the importing conditions a t 
world level. This meant that duties had to harmonized worldwide at a reasonable level, 
but also that NTBs, like the safeguard measures and customs valuations that the USA 
had, as well as obstructed imports, had to be abolished. On top o f this, equitable 
antidumping measures common to all Kennedy Round participants needed to be  
elaborated. Harmonization o f tariff and non-tariff barriers was the major aim th e  
European trade sector.59 The need to harmonize duties was shared by the ECSC, fo r 
which the disparity between the average US duty, between 5 and 8%, the British duty,
57
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between 15-20% and the ECSC duty, between 5-9%, had to be eliminated, to harmonize 
duties at a level of 6-7%.60
For the Kennedy Round, the ECSC Council established the double aim of 
establishing common external tariffs for its products and of then elaborating the rate of 
reduction to be presented in Geneva.61 This meant that the ECSC had to enter the 
negotiations with a unified tariff, and, to do so, they had to resolve the problem of 
differing substantive national rates among the Six. According to the High Authority, the 
raising of duties in 1964 had shown that the 7% level at which the Community had 
fixed its tariff protection in 1958 appeared too low and this also meant that a 50% 
reduction on this rate was out of question. Supported by all the Six, its aim was to 
elaborate a solution, allowing the ECSC to emerge from the Kennedy Round with a 
tariff o f 6-7%. Therefore, 7% was both the level of the CET to be established, and its 
final level. The problem for the ECSC was how to reach this aim without putting the 
steel sector on the exceptions list. In fact, faced with the ECSC refusal to lower its 
duties, the other countries might decide to do the same, so reducing the liberalizing 
impact of the Round. An escamotage was needed, and it could consist either in taking as 
base rate for the reduction the legal waiver level ofl4%, which was the duty bound in 
GATT, and accept a 50% cut, or in proposing as base rate the temporary level of 9% 
and making a partial exception with a tariff cut of 30%. The Six opted for the first 
solution, as it allowed them to avoid tabling any exceptions, but it was clearly a solution 
that was heading for trouble in Geneva. In effect, they would offer to reduce their legal 
duty of 14% by 50% to achieve the 7% duty that they had applied before the increase of 
February 1964.62
In Geneva, the USA and the other participants could not avoid noting that the 
ECSC offer for a full 50% cut was actually a full exception, as it had been based on a 
phoney base rate.63 The strongest opposition came from London, and caused problems 
in EEC-UK relations during the whole of the Kennedy Round. The United Kingdom 
had an important interest in reducing the ECSC duties as the Six imported 12.6% of 
British total steel exports in 1964. It had tabled no exceptions on steel because, in 
comparison to other countries, it had the high duty of 15%, and because it hoped in this 
way to push other countries to do the same. Regardless of the base rate the ECSC would 
chose for negotiating, the British looked at the effect of any cut offered in terms of the 
increase in access to the Community market. This meant that the ECSC had tabled a full 
exception and, consequently the UK would refuse any reduction. The strong reaction of 
the British could also be explained by the fact that they felt that they had already paid 
for the reduction in the EEC steel duty when they negotiated the UK-EEC agreement in 
1958 with which they also reduced duties. On top of this, having a 15% duty on steel,
60 HAEC CAEB5, 1785-1 PV de la 47hm réunion du Comité 111, 26 June 1963.
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the British also opposed the ECSC aim of harmonising rates at a 6-7% level which, for 
then, would mean a reduction o f 50%.64
In addition to the United Kingdom, Austria and Japan also had a high level o f  
interest in obtaining or maintaining increased access to the ECSC markets. Austrian 
exports of steel to West Germany in 1964 represented 40% of Austria’s total steel 
exports, and about 40% of West Germany’s steel imports from markets outside the 
EEC. When changed to the new average level o f  the ECSC CET, the low German 
average tariff rate would increase, thus running the risk of reducing Austrian access to  
the traditional German market. As for Japan, while the US and the EEC industry 
experienced troubles, the Japanese industry was going through an extremely positive 
trend. Its production grew at a fast rate and steel demand outstripped the growth o f  
GNP. It was also a dynamic exporter: in 1960 Japan shipped 11% of world exports, and 
its share had climbed to 23% in 1964, and 30% in 1970. At the same time, Japan 
enjoyed a low rate of import penetration, at about 1%, which remained stable through 
the 1960s and the 1970s. Japan was the world’s largest steel exporter and the largest 
steel supplier to the United States.65 Therefore, in Geneva, Japan offered a very 
substantial linear cut and hoped that the Kennedy Round could start further opening up  
the European market. In this sense, Japan and the United States had a common interest 
in further opening the EEC markets. Japan exported 44% of its total steel exports to the  
United States, but only 4% it that total to the EEC. Therefore, if  Japan’s access to the  
markets of the Six could be increased, the level o f Japanese exports to the USA m ight 
decrease.66
By May 1965, the negotiations on steel were completely stonewalled. In order to  
achieve some progress, Wyndham White suggested the setting up of a sector group 
which held its first formal session on 14 July 1965, and was attended by the  
EEC/ECSC, USA, UK, Japan, Austria and Sweden. But little additional progress w as 
made. The ECSC continued to claim that it could chose the base rate which it preferred, 
while the other countries continued to maintain that the ECSC had simply excepted 
steel. The ECSC also continued to stress the need to achieve some harmonisation o f  the  
duties o f the biggest producing and exporting countries because o f the structural 
overcapacity. In any case, with the break out o f the crisis of the empty chair, any 
meaningful negotiations were called off until February 1966.67
When the negotiations resumed, Washington felt it urgent to get away from the 
increasingly sterile debate on base rates. Unless the negotiations were moved on, and 
the ECSC injected some flexibility into its position, other countries would revoke their 
50% reduction offers. Improvements in ECSC offers were essential if  steel was to  
remain in the Kennedy Round and serious repercussions on the rest of the negotiations 
avoided.68 The American way out of the deadlock consisted in shifting the discussion 
away from the base rate issue, picking up the ECSC proposals to harmonize duties and 
in suggesting target rates. Duties for many o f the steel headings of the major trading
64
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countries would be reduced to the target duty of 5%. For the EEC, this meant a 
reduction o f about 4% from the average of 9%. For the Japanese, it meant a larger 
reduction, over 50% in many cases. For the British, it also entailed a large reduction, of 
the order o f 50%.69 The US approach fitted perfectly with American interests, as US 
duties were generally lower than those of the other participants. The principal goal, 
however, was to keep steel in the negotiations, since failure to do so would have had 
serious effects on the overall negotiations.70
The Japanese and the smaller producers reacted favourably to this way out o f the 
impasse. Having already put forward the proposal for target rates in 1963, and having 
already claimed that some harmonization had to be achieved among the duties o f the 
major trading countries, the ECSC, too, positively received the target plan.71 However, 
the ECSC was willing to cooperate provided the United Kingdom was willing to do the 
same. In effect, the UK remained the critical factor in keeping steel within the Kennedy 
Round, and the key issue would be the extent to which Britain would be prepared to 
accept the new conception of target rates. Unfortunately, London maintained its 
opposition to harmonisation, and hence to the target rates plan, and remained unmoved 
from its position. The United Kingdom offered a cut of 50% in its steel tariff without 
exceptions, while the ECSC had simply tabled a full exception. Steel was a sector in 
which the British required substantial reciprocity from the ECSC, but the harmonization 
was not capable of providing it.72
As a result, at the end o f November 1966, the negotiations on steel were 
dangerously deadlocked. In the last days of negotiations in May 1967, with heavy 
pressure from the USA on the British, the target rates became the basis for negotiations 
and permitted that steel remain in the negotiations for the time being. However, in the 
meantime, 1966 drew to a close with negotiations on steel fully stalled.
9.6 Cotton textiles: transatlantic trade and LDCs
When the Kennedy Round was launched in May 1963, it promised to be a more 
comprehensive set of trade negotiations in comparison to the preceding Rounds. It was 
to deal with agriculture, with NTBs and was to favour the trade interests of the LDCs. 
In effect, the industrialized countries had assured that Round would represent an 
opportunity for LDCs to increase their exports and, consequently, their development. 
They were under the pressure o f the UNCTAD conference and hoped, with their 
assurance, that GATT too could promote the trade interests of the LDCs, to get rid of 
the critics who often made out that GATT was merely a rich men’s club that only 
favoured its own interests. To prove their goodwill, they had also agreed that LDCs 
would not be required to grant reciprocity in the exchanges of concessions with 
developed countries. However, when promises were to be transformed into facts, 
troubles emerged, as the industrialized countries did not appear to intend to concede a
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great deal. This was especially true of the EEC, which had an association agreem ent 
with the African countries o f the Yaoundé convention and, under French instigation, 
was therefore unwilling to make tariff cuts and to reduce these preferences. T ra d e  
relations between the industrialized countries and the LDCs in the Kennedy R o u n d  
would be deserving of a thesis on their own. Here attention is dedicated to  th e  
negotiations in cotton textiles, a sector o f special interest for the LDCs, in order to  
illustrate these trade relations.
During the 1960s, worldwide exports of cotton textiles were loosing ground in  
comparison to other textiles, particularly manmade fibres. While exports of o th e r  
textiles grew by more than 60% from 1960 to 1966, exports of cotton textiles increased  
only marginally. However cotton textiles were becoming increasingly important in t h e  
economics of the LDCs. From 1960 to 1965, the volume of exports of cotton yearns a n d  
woven fabrics of the industrial countries declined by 21 and 13% respectively, w h ile  
exports from the LDCs increased by 22 and 10%. Because of the importance of co tto n  
textiles for this latter group o f countries, this commodity became crucial in the re la tio n s  
between them and the industrialized countries in the Kennedy Round. In fact, s in c e  
1963, the LDCs had warned that results in this sector would deeply influence their f in a l  
appraisal o f the Kennedy Round. Therefore, even if  cotton textiles did not concern  
USA-EEC relations directly, it is worthwhile paying attention to this sector, as it a llo w s  
us to describe the role of the LDCs in the Kennedy Round, and the relations b e tw een  
them and developed countries in this important sector. 73
Trade in cotton textiles was regulated by the Long-Term Cotton T ex tile  
Agreement (LTA), signed in GATT in 1962. In 1959, in referring to the problem o f  
exports of manufactured products from the LDCs which, with their wage ra te s , 
substantially lower than those of the industrialized countries were accused of cau sin g  
market disruption, Wyndham White noted that it was clear that, as LDCs’ n e w  
industries enjoyed relatively favourable conditions o f production and started to com pete  
on world markets, they would cause difficulties o f varying severity to the industries o f  
the developed countries. However, according to the GATT Director General “It will b e  
a test o f the common sense as well as of the goodwill of the more industrialized 
countries how they react to this problem”,74 and, two years later, the industrialized 
countries showed how they intended to react: demanding quota restrictions. When, in  
1961, President Kennedy came under the pressure of the American cotton tex tiles  
industry that vocally demanded quota restrictions against the sharp increase of im ports 
from the Asian countries, the US President gave way. At the same time, being aw are  
that responding to the request o f quota restrictions and ignoring the need of the L D C s 
for exports would represent a dangerous precedent, the Kennedy Administration sought 
a solution that could ease the pressure on the American market while ensuring L D C s 
access to  the markets of the industrialized countries, so to give them a chance to ea rn  
foreign currencies through the exportation o f a commodity in whose production th ey  
enjoyed a competitive advantage. The broader aim was to regulate cotton textile trad e  
and the flux of such exports. The result was the LTA, the first worldwide commodity- 
type agreement set up for specific manufactured products, that, under the suggestion o f  
Wyndham White, was lodged in GATT. It was signed in 1962 and covered a five y e a r  
period. The agreement regulated international trade in cotton textiles and permitted
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quantitative import restriction if importing countries adjudged that imports were causing 
market disruption. The major condition o f the LTA was that the importing countries had 
to expand their imports by 5% every LTA year.75 Shorn o f its embellishments, the LTA 
was simply a worldwide market control scheme by which the importing countries -  
mostly the advanced industrial ones -  imposed on the exporting countries -  mostly 
LDCs, plus Japan and Hong Kong -  quotas which limited their exports of cotton 
textiles. The result was that it was not competitiveness to determine trade patterns but 
quotas, and trade had little to do with free  trade, but much more to do with its regulation 
to the advantage of the inefficient importers.76
The exporting countries had accepted the agreement as an act of cooperation to 
avoid market disruption in the importing countries, hoping in this way to have a chance 
to steadily increase their exports. However, by 1964, their disappointment with the LTA 
was clear. The LDCs criticised the developed countries’ loose interpretation in 
determining when market disruption existed and, in particular, they complained that 
importing countries were the sole judges of whether their markets had been disrupted. 
Safeguards against market disruption had been liberally used even in situations when 
they were not called for. The LTA had come to represent legalization of illegal 
restrictions and discriminatory action in order to frustrate, rather than promote, LDCs’ 
exports. Through the LTA, the LDCs were denied what they considered hard currency 
earnings from exports of one o f the few items they could manufacture. As such, they 
felt that it was be very mistaken to continue this bad precedent for international trade, 
and demanded the dismantling of the LTA and the adoption of measures that were 
capable of promoting their exports. To be clear, upon entering the Kennedy Round, the 
LDCs openly stated that the results in this sector would be crucial in the overall 
assessment of the negotiations.77
While the LDCs demanded the dismantling of the LTA, the United States and 
the EEC asked for its renewal for five more years. Indeed, this represented an 
outstanding priority for them: if  the LTA was not renewed, they could continue to 
restrict imports, in the way they were doing, only through violations o f GATT rules.78 
Washington was under the strong pressure of the cotton textile industry, which, in 1962, 
had accepted the TEA only on the condition that the LTA was signed in Geneva and, in 
1964, had refused any reduction in levels of protection on the ground that its unhealthy 
economic condition would not allow it to withstand foreign competition. Washington 
decided not to table exceptions for cotton textiles, but considered the renewal of the 
LTA with no modification until 1972 as a necessary precondition for the negotiations in 
Geneva. The main US objective was to renew the agreement, under the authority and 
provisions of which the United States had negotiated seventeen bilateral agreements 
with other countries, controlling the amount of cotton textiles the seventeen respective
75
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countries could export to the United States. Only then would the United States agree to 
consider tariff cuts and quota liberalization.79
The EEC cotton textile industry was united in asking protection from the 
competition o f the LDCs in the form of quantitative restrictions and therefore desired 
the continuation of the LTA. Particularly strong were the requests for protection from 
the French, Italian and German industries, which feared the competition of low-wages 
countries such as India, Pakistan, Hong Kong and Sri Lanka. Moreover, within the 
EEC, Italy was a major textile producer and aimed at keeping the EEC preferences, 
while the industry o f the other five members was already having to deal with the 
pressure from Italian industry, and was not ready to be exposed to increased 
competition.80 In order to avoid putting the entire sector on the exceptions list, and 
willing to achieve a prolongation of the quantitative protection necessary to favour the 
adaptation of its industry, the Six accepted the Commission suggestion to set up a 
conditional exceptions list, claiming to being willing to reduce tariffs by 50% or to  
increase quota imports, provided that the LTA was renewed.81
For the Commission, negotiations on cotton textiles not only had the external 
dimension of the negotiations with third countries, but had also an internal dimension. 
First, they had to serve to complete the EEC common commercial policy by adopting a 
common regulation on the safeguard clause that could be invoked by importing 
countries in case of market disruption. In fact, the Six maintained their national 
regulations, but the Commission held that a common commercial policy necessitated 
not only common tariffs but also common regulations and the cotton textile negotiations 
could be an instrument to push the Six to adopt them. Second, whatever the result o f the 
textile negotiations- a simple renewal of the LTA or other solutions -  what mattered 
was that the Six combined their common commercial policy with coherent and 
harmonising measures of industrial policy in order to be able to face the competition o f  
the low-wages countries, accelerate the structural adaptation of the EEC industry to  
global competition, and allow a progressive reduction in barriers to trade. As had been 
the case for other sectors, for textiles too, the Commission underlined the necessity f  
adopting a common industrial policy by virtue of the reduction of tariff barriers and the 
setting up of the common commercial policy. The elaboration of these two common 
went hand in hand.82 For the Commission, however, this was not an easy task as the
79
Statement by Mr. Stanley Nehmer -  US delegation to GATT Cotton Textile Committee Geneva, November 30 -  
December 4,1964, NSF-Subject File, box 48, LBJL; PRO FO 371/189598 US Congressional Records, 31 May 1966. For a 
full account of the American position in this sector see Zeller, T.W. American Trade and Power in  the 1960s (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), pp.208-212.
^  AECB BAC 118/83 851 Discussion du 28 février 1964 entre Millet et Reimer, Oorschot et Hoogland (Dutch officials 
members of 111 Committee); AECB BDT 144/92 Marjofin cabinet papers box 777, Note à l'attention de Monsieur 
Marjolin, 1 June 1964. MAEF, DE/CE GATT 931, Note «Préparation de la Conféra nee KENNEDY -  Opinions des 
producteurs français», 5 February 1964. Already during the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EEC in 
1961-1963, the German textile industry had feared the negative impart imports into the EEC from the Commonwealth 
countries through the UK could have if these countries were to get even the slightest reduction of trade barriers, while 
die Italian industry had entered the EEC hoping that the Community might protect it through market-sharing agreement 
world- wide. For German industry, see Schulte, M. "Industrial Interest in West Germany's Decision against the 
Enlargement of the EEC. The Quantitative Evidence up to 1964" in Journal o f European Integration History, 3,1 (1997) 
pp. 35-61. For the Italian industry, Ranieri, R. "Italian industry and the EEC" in Deighton , A. and Mifward, A.S. (eds) 
Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: the European Economic Community 1957-1963 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), 
pp. 185-198.
CM2 1964/143, PV de ta 149“™ session du Conseil de la CEE, 10-15 November 1964.
82
AECB BDT 144/92 Marjolin cabinet papers box 781, Note de la Commission sur l'opportunité d'accélérer la mise en 
place d'un politique commerciale commune dans llndustries du textile et de l'habillement, 30 April 1964; ibidem 
«Politique Commerciale commune dans le secteur des industries textiles» Note d'information diffusée sous l'autorité de 
Rey et Levi Sandri, 13 July 1964. AECB -  BAC 122/1991-5 Rapport n.70 de la délégation de la Commission pour les 
négociations du GATT, 16 June 1966.
294
conducting of the negotiations in the cotton textile sector was not its sole source of 
competition: In 1962 the LTA was signed by member states on an individual basis and 
not by the EEC. The Commission had hoped that, in the framework of a common 
commercial policy, the EEC would signed it but not all Member States had agreed. As a 
result, only Member States were the signatories to the Agreement and they negotiated 
on the quantitative restrictions, while the Commission negotiated for tariffs.
As for the United Kingdom, the other big importer of cotton textiles, London 
made clear that it could not contemplate any reduction in its basic tariffs, nor could it 
offer any improvement in quantitative access. 40% of UK consumption was met by 
imports, mainly from the low cost suppliers, and this meant that the British were already 
importing on a large scale from the LDCs. For London, it was up to the Americans to 
open their markets to imports from developing countries.84
With the USA and the EEC asking for the renewal o f the LTA, the UK refusing 
to make any concessions and the LDCs objecting to the renewal of the LTA, it 
immediately appeared that negotiations for this sector would be difficult. Therefore, a 
sector group was set up to decide whether and in what form the LTA could be extended. 
Wyndham White looked with concern at the deep opposition that divided the LDCs one 
the one hand, and the EEC and the USA on the other. Not only did it risk bringing no 
meaningful result in the sector, but it could also dangerously increase the dissatisfaction 
of the LDCs towards GATT. The stature and the credibility of GATT were at stake as 
the issue of LDCs and textile was strictly linked to the advantages GATT could grant 
this group of countries. For this reason, Wyndham White took an active role as honest 
broker in order to find a negotiating ground to get the discussion over cotton textiles 
under way and to ensure that the LDCs would receive meaningful concessions. He 
feared that they would engage in a strong attack on the Americans and the EEC, neither 
of whom were in any mood to make concessions, but above all on the Americans for the 
restrictive way safeguard measures against market disruption had been used. Therefore, 
he endeavoured to secure acceptance of a package deal as a basis for negotiations 
involving tariff reductions, quota liberalisation and more liberal implementation of the 
LTA by importers in exchange for an agreement to renew the Arrangement by
545exporters.
The United Kingdom, The United States and the EEC agreed on the schema of 
negotiations suggested by Wyndham White, even if the Americans made it bluntly clear 
that while they were prepared to negotiate a more flexible administration of the LTA, 
they were not prepared to envisage changes in the Agreement itself. Among exporters, 
only Japan and Hong Kong accepted the renewal of the LTA, and asked for important 
concessions in the field of contingents and their administration. These two traditional 
exporters were subject to the competition of new ones -  Pakistan, India, South Korea 
and the UAR -  and were willing to renew it so to ensure a part of the US and European 
markets. In contrast, the plan was rejected by India, Pakistan and the UAR who 
criticised the LTA, and refused to engage in renewing it in its current form, also for fear 
that it would become permanent. The opposition from India and Pakistan was 
particularly tough. They claimed that the Agreement benefited importers but not
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exporters, who had signed the Arrangement but saw their exports grow at slower pace  
than non-signatories countries. And India even argued that the US record was so bad in  
its use o f quotas that some international body was required to make impartial decisions 
on disruption.86
After the breakdown o f the multilateral negotiations based on of Wyndham 
White proposal, the United States began negotiating bilateral agreements with th e  
principal exporting countries. Since many LDCs refused to renew the LTA unless ta r if f  
cuts were made and quotas eased, Washington promised to increase the level of quotas 
if this agreement was renewed with no changes. It was along these lines that bilateral 
negotiations were successfully concluded with Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and K orea  
and whose progress continued with Israel, Spain, Colombia and Pakistan. With th e se  
bilateral negotiations the United States put an end to the impasse “through a policy o f  
encirclement”.87
In fact, Herter and Roth were annoyed with the US textile industry and shared 
the grievances of the LDCs. They held that while the textile industry vocally pressed fo r  
the renewal of the LTA, it was “expanding capacity at breakneck speed on th e  
assumption that tight restriction would continue” .88 To make things even worse, th e re  
remained the fact that the US Government was “paying a foreign policy price” in i ts  
relations with textile producing countries. Singapore was an example: The U S  
Government was about to impose a quota on Singapore’s cotton-goods exports. T h e  
resulting unemployment was likely to lead to anti-US street agitation and strikes, w h ich  
worried the White House. On the other hand, if the Americans made an exception fo r  
Singapore they would get into difficulties with Taiwan, Japan and Korea, who w e re  
already upset about American imports policy. Herter made the case for a change in  
policy, and of putting some distance between the Johnson administration and the tex tile  
people. The US industry was increasing its production and employment,level and th e re  
was no need to protect it, consequently in Geneva the United States had to work to  
expand and not restrict trade. For Herter, the problem of the Johnson Administration 
was “how to get off the hook without a major row with the textile people and th e ir  
friends on the Hill” and this could be achieved if Johnson made clear to the industry th a t 
he intended to keep monitoring the textile situation and give “help when [it] is needed” . 
Johnson approved of Herter’s position, but for him the aim of creating distance between 
his position and that of the textile industry was made difficult not only by the pressure 
coming from Congress, but also by the pressure from the Department o f Commerce, 
which had every intention of backing the textile industry’s request, with the result tha t, 
in practice, no new approach in textiles policy emerged.89
Washington held that a way out o f the deadlock also consisted in putting 
pressure on the EEC to purchase more imports from the LDCs, but the Six stood up in  
the face o f such pressure. 90 And on top o f this, the negotiations between the EEC and
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the exporting countries had adopted a slow pace. After June 1965, the exporting 
countries had preferred to await the end of the Crisis of the Empty Chair before trying 
to meaningfully negotiate with the EEC. Then, after January 1966, the EEC preferred to 
first see what progress the United States made in bilateral negotiations, in order to 
understand whether the possibility existed to obtain the renewal of the LTA. In truth, 
the Commission doubted that the LTA could be extended without changes, as 
Washington wished, and held that US insistence was holding up sector progress, but 
because of the importance of the USA in the cotton textile market, the Commission 
preferred to wait. It was only at the end of October 1966 that the Commission met, on a 
bilateral basis, the exporting members of the LTA, Portugal, India, Pakistan, RAU, 
Japan and Hong Kong, to negotiate on the renewal of the LTA.91
At any rate, for the EEC it was difficult to have bilateral discussions with the 
countries interested in textiles. These discussions included the general question of 
residual restrictions and other national import controls on which the Commission did 
not have authority to speak. Thus, it was first necessary that bilateral agreements took 
place between the Member States and cotton textile exporters, and then the Commission 
could negotiate on the tariff side. The situation involving Japan was particularly thorny. 
Member States maintained QRs against Japan, and they were not likely to relinquish 
them within the framework of an overreaching EEC package arrived at with the 
Japanese until after the individual Member States had had an opportunity to utilize these 
for their full bargaining purpose with other EEC Member States. As 1966 drew to a 
close, the renewal of the LTA looked far from certain, the EEC had just started its 
negotiations on cotton textiles, and, to the annoyance of the other countries, it continued 
to hold up negotiations into early 1967.92
9.7 Pressure on the EEC: the withdrawing lists
The Crisis of the Empty Chair from June 1965 to January 1966 had almost 
stalled the negotiations in Geneva. When France regained its place in the EEC Council 
o f Ministers and the other decision-making institutions, the difficult task of completing 
the EEC offers awaited the Six and the Commission. After the EEC had eventually 
tabled all its offers, the difficult bargaining with the USA and the other Kennedy Round 
participants took place. With the US government authority to negotiate in Geneva 
elapsing in June 1967, not much time remained to conclude the Round. This situation 
worried Wyndham White, who feared that no much time was left to conclude the 
Round. It is for this reason that at the 8 July 1966 Trade Negotiating Committee 
meeting he directly intervened in the pace of the negotiations, and called on the 
participants to reach an assessment, by the middle of November, of other countries* 
offers and specify what improvements would be made in their own offers, and the 
withdrawals they would demand if these requests were not met. After this assessment, 
the final intensive phase o f bargaining was scheduled to be concluded by the end of 
February 1967. For Wyndham White, to make progress in the Kennedy Round, “a 
brutal confrontation” among the participants had to take place.93.
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Wyndham W hite’s proposal was welcomed by Kennedy Round participants and 
in particular by the USA. Washington felt that the EEC’s total exceptions greatly 
outweighed American mandatory exceptions and exclusions. Thus, there would have to  
be substantial improvements in the EEC offers before the USA would be satisfied w ith 
any overall Kennedy package. The US objective came to be to get the EEC to improve 
substantially it. The USA recognized that this would be a difficult task because o f the  
EEC political cross-currents, and the nature o f its decision-making machinery. The fac t 
was that, for the EEC, once a compromise had eventually been reached in Brussels, 
after extenuating negotiations that balanced the different interests of the Six, it w as 
difficult to change this equilibrium in a new bargain with the Americans or the EFTA  
countries. The Commission had the tendency to show up in Geneva with an inflexible 
mandate to negotiate which bore more resemblance to a “leave or take it position” , 
rather than a bargaining position. As a result, the negotiations with the EEC w ere 
drawn-out and frustrating. The issue o f the Commission’s power to negotiate had been a  
major problem from the beginning and it became particularly so in the phase during 
which concessions had to be exchanged, but the Brussels institution demonstrated n o  
flexibility to exchange anything. Against this background, Washington held that any 
changes in the EEC list would only be achieved under the threat of specific 
withdrawals. The November assessment would cause the wide differences of v iew  
among participants to crystallize and, accordingly, it might precipitate a crisis 
atmosphere that could push Kennedy Round participants, and the EEC in particular, to  
improve offers. Therefore, the major purpose o f the November assessment was to  
compel the EEC Council of Ministers to improve its offers and give the Commission th e  
negotiating leeway which it had hitherto lacked.94
Washington looked on with apprehension at the negotiations between the EEC  
and the small EFTA countries. With their narrow export interests, these countries w ere  
particularly hard hit by the EEC exceptions, and warned that they would be forced to  
make heavy withdrawals unless the EEC offers were improved.95 Any substantial 
unravelling of EFTA countries’ offers would inevitably reduce the scope of th e  
Kennedy Round, and set off a chain reaction of counter-withdrawals. At the same tim e, 
however, Washington counted on the EEC interest in reducing discrimination with th e  
EFTA countries as constituting a leaver to push the Six to improve their offers. T he 
EFTA markets were too important for the Six, and Washington hoped that this would 
push the Six to improve offers.96
On 30 November, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, the Nordic 
countries, Switzerland, Austria and Canada tabled the lists of improvements of offers 
that they wanted from the trading partners that would allow them to maintain their 
original offers, the list o f offers they would totally or partially withdraw in case 
improvements were not conceded, and the list of improvements they were willing to  
make to their offers lists. The EEC decided not to table any request or warning lists. In 
effect, the formulations of such lists would have required another Council of Ministers 
meeting, like those that had taken place in November 1964, when the EEC exceptions 
list was negotiated, and in June 1966, when the EEC offers were completed, during
94
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which compromises were reached after long drawn out negotiations, and neither the 
Commission nor the Six ever considered holding another one. The EEC preferred to 
wait for the appraisals of the other Kennedy Round participants, and then to get ready to 
negotiate for the final phase. On top o f this, a list of withdrawals from the EEC carried 
the risk of leading to a scaling down of concessions to be exchanged.
When the warning and improvements lists were exchanged, it became clear that 
the main target was the EEC. The USA recognized that “The total EEC offers position, 
inadequate as it is, holds out the possibility of significant improvement of US trading 
opportunities in Europe over those now existing”.97 At the same time, however, 
according to American data, these offers remained lower than the American ones (Table 
16) and particularly deficient in certain sectors of heavy US interest.
Tabic 16 : US-EEC Summary of Offers, 1962 $ million, c.i.f.
Nonagricultural Agricultural Total
US imports EEC US imports EEC US imports EEC
from  EEC imports 
from  U S
from EEC imports 
from US
from EEC im ports 
from  US
Total imports 2,457 2,927 220 1,171 2.677 4.089
Available fo r 
concessions
2.181 2,486 180 365 2.361 2.851
Total offered 2.095 1,939 167 47 2.262 1.988
Total not 
offered




2,167 1,976 178 355 2.365 2,331
D utiable offered 2,081 1,706 167 38 2,248 1,744
Available fo r 
concession, free
14 496 2 9 16 505
O ffered to b ind  
free
14 235 • 9 14 244
G reater than 
50%  cuts
9 2 - - 9 2
50%  cuts 1.921 1,235 167 1 2.088 1.254
Less Ilian 50%  
cuts
151 451 - 37 151 488





binding o f duty­
free treatment
1,990 1.653 180 22 2.170 1.675
Excluded Agricultural Group Commodities. Source: NA 364. Rees, o f  US trade Representatives on  the 
Kennedy Round, box 1, US delegation to  the Sixth Round o f  GATT trade negotiations “ Assessm ent o f 
offers a s  o f N ovem ber 30 ,1966”, 30 N ovem ber 1966.
For Washington, the problem was not only the imbalance in offers, but also that 
the EEC exceptions included a heavy impact on a sector o f special interest to the US. In 
particular, EEC exceptions impacted with disproportionate weight on mechanical, 
transportation and electronic sectors, where US trade and growth potential were most 
heavily concentrated. On a number of these items, of high interest to the USA, namely
97
NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, US delegation to the Sixth Round of GATT 
Trade Negotiations "EEC -  Part 1, Delegation Evaluation of Offers", 1 November 1966.
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earth handling equipment, automated machine tools, scientific instruments, computers 
and electronic calculating machines, the EEC had made no offer at all. T hus 
Washington wanted the EEC to meaningfully increase its offers on these sectors, in  
addition to chemicals, Kraft linerboard, steel and aluminium (Table 17).98
Table 17: US requests list to the EEC
Sector Share o f  the request list
Chemicals 8.4%
Transform ed papers 4.5%
Synthetic fibres, textile 3.8%
Raw alum inium 2.9%
M echanical sector 43,2%
ECSC products 37.3%
Source: AECB BAC 122/1991-7 «N égociations com m erciales dans le cadre du GATT». C om m unica tion  
de la Com m ission au Conseil N CG (66)65, 22 D ecem ber 1966.
To convince the EEC to improve offers, the USA also tabled a withdrawing lis t, 
hitting 5,4% of US imports from the EEC (Table 18).
Table 18: US list of withdrawals
Sector Duty applied after 
withdrawals
the %  o f  the sector in re la tion  to  
total list
Textile 20-50% 17%
M etals 0-30% 28%
O f w hich alum inium 19%
O f w hich ferrous-alloyed 9%
M inerals 10-50% 4%
M echanical machine 12% 10%
Electric instrum ents 10-35% 2%
Optical instrum ents 17% 8%
Photographical instruments 15% 20%  ■
Fire arm s 16% 6%
Other 5%
Source: see table 18.
The Commission received with disappointment the withdrawing list o f the U SA . 
While a purely quantitative analysis o f the US and EEC offers on the table before 30  
November showed a slight quantitative imbalance in favour of the United States, th is  
imbalance was largely compensated for by the qualitative analysis of these offers. In 
effect, the US duties were, generally, higher than the CET and, in some cases, they  
remained prohibitively lofty even after a 50% reduction. Moreover, the USA applied 
NTBs -  the anti-dumping legislation, customs valuations system and the ASP in 
particular -  which represented serious obstacles for EEC exports. The Commission a lso  
noted that the United States had put on the exceptions list products covered by high 
duties: wool had a duty of 55%, glass of 50%, gloves 70%, and watches 70%. W ith 
these high duties, US imports would inevitably remain weak. Therefore, if  the USA and 
the EEC lists were compared only on the basis of volume of trade, as the Americans had 
done, it appeared that the EEC list was larger than the American ones. However, the  
situation was completely different when the comparison was also made based on the  
rates o f duties which had been put on the exceptions list. Thus, for the Commission,
98
NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, US delegation to the Sixth Round of GATT 
Trade Negotiations "EEC -  Part 1, Delegation Evaluation of Offers", 1 November 1966. See also ibidem, US delegation 
to the Sixth Round of GATT trade negotiations "Assessment of offers as of November 30, 1966", 30 November 1966.
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considering the qualitative elements, a balance existed between the US and the EEC 
offers, and the US withdrawals would create an imbalance and the EEC would be 
obliged to take action to re-establish equilibrium."
As for the EFT A countries, British asked for an improvement o f offers over a 
wide range o f items, among which the most important were tractors, trucks and their 
detached pieces, machine tools and motors.100 Most importantly, the British also tabled 
their warning list, that above all hit the mechanical sector. “Friendly Commission and 
German sources” had repeatedly made clear to them that the only way to achieve 
improvements was to confront the EEC with withdrawals sectors of special interest for 
its trade. The only way of getting concessions was to show “teeth” .101 Despite the 
suggestion that had been given by “friendly Commission and German sources”, the 
Commission was surprised by the British list o f potential withdrawals. In effect, 
considering not only a quantitative analysis but also a qualitative analysis -  the level of 
the British duties after the reductions would remain remarkably higher in numerous 
sectors than the CET -  balance existed. The British list o f withdrawals hit important 
exporting interests of the EEC, and created had the effect of removing balance on the 
quantitative level, and that could not be merely explained as negotiating tactics.102
The Commission expected the small EFTA countries to table requests and 
warning lists, as these countries had tabled no exceptions.103 When the lists were tabled, 
however, the Commission had not expected them to be so large. The Nordics felt that 
they had been hard hit by the EEC exceptions. Total exceptions covered 2,7% o f EEC 
industrial imports from the Nordic countries, partial exceptions 24.6% and disparities 
3%. In order to maximise the pressure on the Six, the Nordic countries decided to 
negotiate in the industrial sector as a unit under the leadership of Swedish Ambassador 
Nils Montan, and to pool their withdrawing lists. Even if the trade interests of the four 
countries were not identical, they represented an important market, and a common list 
o f withdrawals would impress the EEC.104 The Nordic countries asked for 
improvements in the paper, aluminium and mechanical sectors. The potential 
withdrawals concerned 32,4% of their imports from the EEC, and the mechanical sector 
was the most concerned, with cars making up one third o f the list. The withdrawals hit 
Germany in particular. The aim was to push this country, that had major interests in the 
Nordic market, to push the Six to make concessions. Thus, the Nordic nations applied 
shock treatment to the EEC and, deciding to negotiate as a unit, they compiled a joint 
list of withdrawals which affected a huge part their imports from the EEC.10
The EEC was not the only Kennedy Round participant to be asked to improve its 
offers. The British made the same request of the Americans; the Americans made the 
same o f the Canadians and, above all, the Japanese. But none of these requests, or 
subsequent warning lists, was as long as those presented to the EEC. The EEC was
99
AECB BAC 122/1991*7 «Négociations commerciales dans le cadre du GATT», Communication de la Commission au 
Conseil NCG(66)65, 22 December 1966.
100
AECB BAC 122/1991*8, Communication de ta Commission au Conseil NCG (66) 60 final "Aspects Essentiels des 
Négociations au GATT (pays industrialisés)”, 20 December 1966.
101
PRO BT 303/396 letter from Denman in Geneva to Douglas Carter of the Board of Trade, 17 June 1966.
102
AECB BAC 122/1991-7 «Négociations commerciales dans le cadre du GATT», Communication de la Commission au 
Conseil NCG(66)65, 22 December 1966.
103 CM2 1966/68 PV de la 196*™ réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 26-27 October 1966.
104
AECB BAC 122/1991-18 Compte Rendu de la réunion du 13 Octobre 1966 (Suéde/CR/9/66) "Négociations 
bilaterales avec la Suede”, 27 October 1966. AECB -  BAC 122/1991-7 Rapport n.91 de la délégation de la Commission 
pour les négociations du GATT, 9 December 1966. Denmark, considering its preponderant interest for the agricultural 
sector in respect to the other Nordic countries, would attend the agricultural negotiations on an individual basis.
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Administrative History of STR, Narrative History, Vol. 1, Box 1, LBJL.
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therefore under pressure to rectify the imbalance to forestall extensive withdrawals. The 
USA and EFTA clearly transmitted the message to the EEC that it represented the major 
stumbling block in the course to successful negotiations, and that it was up to the EEC 
to improve its offers. Thus, at the end of 1966, the threat of withdrawals w as 
characterising the Kennedy Round, and at this point it was up to the EEC to respond.
Conclusion
This chapter has described how negotiations to liberalize international trade took  
place. Increased opportunity to export was what a country sought; Increased opportunity 
to import into its own market was what a government reluctantly offered. What pushed 
the liberalization of trade was a reciprocal interest in boosting exports. Despite all the 
difficulties in the different sectors, as the Americans also noted, the fact remained tha t 
the initial offers for the Kennedy Round had already been greater than what had been 
achieved in the previous rounds. All countries were interested in reducing barriers in 
order to boost their exports, and this led to reciprocal concessions. As shown in the  
chapter dedicated to the final bargain, it was the common desire to successfully 
conclude the industrial part of the negotiations that pushed the parties to compromise 
first in Brussels among the Six, and then in Geneva between the USA and the EEC.
It is worth noting that while the general aim of the Kennedy Round w as to  
increase freer trade, neither the USA nor the EEC negotiated to fully achieve such a 
goal across the board. Not only did they have sectors in which they wanted to maintain 
protectionism, such as paper for the EEC and glass, lead and zinc for the USA, but there  
were also sectors, like cotton textiles, in which they aimed at maintaining the existing 
level of protectionism and regulate international trade along principles that had nothing 
to do with free trade. Therefore, in the trade policy o f the USA and the EEC, as in tha t 
o f the other developed countries, liberalism, protectionism and regulation cohabited. A s 
for relations between industrialised countries and LDCs, the cotton textile negotiations 
showed that, despite the general pronunciations made in 1963 about the trade 
opportunities the Kennedy Round would provide the LDCs, when negotiations started, 
it became clear that few concessions would be given to them, as industrialised countries 
had no intention to open their markets.
This chapter has also showed that while the Six wanted to maintain the  
regionalism of the EEC, they were also interested in reducing the CET as a bargaining 
tool to get concessions from third countries. Obviously, differences existed among the  
Six. France and Italy were more reticent in reducing duties, while in line with its trade 
interests Germany was in leading the push for EEC to reduce duties, even against the 
will o f its industries, as in the case o f paper.
This chapter showed that the Crisis o f the Empty Chair had no impact on the  
Commission. Its negotiating role in Geneva was not challenged by Member States and, 
internally, this institution remained essential to shape the common position o f the Six. 
The Commission role was important because, in GATT negotiations, technical and 
economic issues were crucial, and the Commission was able to provide the essential 
technical expertise. Thanks to its technical skills, the Commission was able to influence 
the debate and the final result o f the discussions among the Six. This allowed this 
institution to maintain its crucial roles of source of compromises, broker among the Six, 
and negotiator with third countries. Immediately after the Luxembourg meetings o f  
January 1966, the Commission started pushing the Six not only to complete their offers, 
but also to improve them, and such pressure was also brought on the French who, on 
their part, never questioned the role o f the Commission. As it was in the interests of the
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Six to negotiate as a single unit, so to strengthen their position in Geneva, they needed 
to Commission to represent them. The Commission also had the aim of promoting 
European economic integration through the establishment of a complete common 
commercial policy and also an industrial policy. The Kennedy Round appeared to 
represent an opportunity to establish this common policy. However, as negotiations over 
cotton textile -  where member states retained their negotiating authority to set quota 
with Japan -  and the negotiations over paper -  where Germany and The Netherlands 
resisted the Commission’s aim to establish subsidy for this sector -  these aims were 
opposed by Member States.
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Chapter Ten
A case study: aluminium
Introduction
The industrial part of Kennedy Round represented a huge negotiation process in 
terms o f the number of products involved. As it is obviously not possible to give a full 
account here of all products considered in Geneva, it may be worthwhile focusing 
attention on a particular case study. Aluminium would seem an excellent example on 
which to base a case study: its negotiations involved the EEC, the USA and the EFTA 
countries and it therefore accurately reflects the fundamental shape of the Kennedy 
Round as a major negotiation among the EEC and the USA, but also as a set of inter- 
European negotiations. The Six, while negotiating with the Americans, could not forget 
that they also had major interests at stake in Europe, and in the relations between the 
EEC and the EFTA, and the concessions the latter would exchange also depended on 
the concessions between the EEC and the USA. The case of Aluminium offers a good 
illustration of this triangle. On top of this, it demonstrates how the Six reconciled their 
different commercial policies. Among all the compromises the Six had to reach in order 
to attend the negotiations, there is barely another case in the industrial sector in which 
the EEC had more difficulties in reaching a final agreement. They had polarised 
interests, caused by their differing respective industrial and commercial policies, but, in 
the end, because they needed to elaborate a compromise so to be able to bargain in 
Geneva as a trade unit with a common commercial policy, they were able to develop a 
common position. Aluminium also demonstrates one of the major features of the 
Kennedy Round: once a compromise had been reached in Brussels among the Six, after 
prolonged and difficult discussions, it was difficult to change it in Geneva. The position 
of the EEC already represented a compromise. Therefore, even if  aluminium certainly 
did not have the same relevance in trade value as the mechanical sector had, or the same 
relevance the ASP had in terms o f time, it is nonetheless an excellent case study with 
which study the Kennedy Round and surely deserves special attention in this thesis.1
10.1 The aluminium market
As a way of introducing negotiations that took place in Geneva, and to better 
understand them, some basic information is presented here about aluminium. The basic 
raw material, bauxite ore, is first mined, crushed and then refined to produce alumina 
(aluminum oxide powder). The alumina is then shipped to smelters where an 
electrolytic process is used to remove the aluminum from it. The resulting molten 
aluminum (primary aluminium) can then, if  desired, be combined with alloys before 
being cast into ingots o f  different sizes and shapes. Generally, bauxite is transformed 
into alumina near the mining location, and is then transformed into aluminium either 
near the place of consumption, or near cheap energy sources. The need for big 
investments for the production o f aluminium (from 15 to 20 times bigger than for the 
same quantity of steel) made the aluminum industry a highly intensive capital one and 
explains the high concentration o f this industry. At the same time, the very nature of the 
technical demands of aluminium-making forced the internationalisation of the firms
For an account of the negotiations over the aluminium sector see the article of Ly Van Luong, M. "L'aluminium 
européen dans les négociations commerciales du Kennedy Round" in Cahiers dHistroire de l'Aluminium, 28/2001.This 
article is fully dedicated to the aluminium in the Kennedy Round, though only from the French-Pechiney point of view.
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involved. Bauxite had to be mined in the tropics; alumina was reduced near cheap 
electrical sources, and finally aluminium was fabricated near consumer markets. Thus, 
for example, a European firm would mine bauxite in Africa, would smelt alumina in 
Norway and then make the primary aluminium in France.2
Five major firms dominated the aluminium market and accounted for 65% o f the 
production o f the Western world: Alcoa (USA), Alcan (Canada), Reynolds (USA), 
Kaiser (USA) and Pechiney (France). In addition to these firms, the German Wav 
(Vereunigte Aluminium Werke AG), Norwegian Aardal and the Swiss Alusuisse had 
global relevance.3 Table 1 illustrates world production o f aluminium. At a glance, it 
reveals that the biggest share of production stemmed from North America.









Source: AECB B A C  62/1980-59, “Fiche de Renseignem ents sur l'a lum inium ” (8444-1II/D/65) de la D G  
M arché Intérieur. Commission. 23 June 1965.
From 1950 onwards, the aluminium industry became increasingly international 
in terms of pricing, management, and sales. Regarding prices, after 1950, the expansion 
of production and exports and the reduction of tariffs in the previous GATT Rounds 
encouraged the evolution of a single price internationally applied for primary 
aluminium, which converged around the London price, generally accepted as the 
“world” price for this commodity. As Table 2 shows for 1964, the prices of primary 
aluminium in the various producing countries were rather similar.
Table 2: Aluminium prices in different countries in 1964
Country Price (price/lb)
Italy 25,40




Source: AECB B A C 62/1980-59, “Fiche de Renseignem ents sur l'alum inium ” (8444-1II/D/65) de la DG 
Marché Intérieur, Commission, 23 June 1965.
Therefore, small differences in tariff rates impacted heavily upon the direction 
and flow of trade in aluminum, also because no quota restrictions hindered exchanges. 
And, as table 3 shows, large differences existed in the tariff rates among the OECD 
countries.
2 For a good, and brief history of aluminium industry, from Napoleon III to 1980s, see Holloway, S. T. The aluminium 
multinationals and the bauxite cartel (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1987).
 ̂ AECB BAC 62/1980-59, "Fiche de Renseignements sur l'aluminium" (8444-III/D/65) de la DG Marché Intérieur, 
Commission, 23 3une 1965.
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Table 3: Tariffs on selected Aluminium Products and other trade distorting factors (upon entering 
the Kennedy Round)
Ingot Bars. Sheets Foil Pow der Tubes. Cable. Other T rade
(Unwrought Sections &  Plate & Pipes Stranded Restrictions
Aluminium) Solid Flakes Wire
C hap ter (76.01) W ire (76.03) (76.04) (76,06) (76.12)
BTN (76.02) (76.05)
Austria 140 Sh/KG 11% 11% 32% 25% 15% 18% T u rn o v e r  t a x
Duty 5.25% 6.75% 5.25% 8.25% 8.25% 6.75% 5.25% re fu n d  t o
ex p o rte rs;
T u rn o v e r
TEX e q u a liza tio n
T a x
Canada 5.4% 22.5% 3c per 30% 27.5% 22.5% 22.5% A ntidum ping
lb. duty
Denm ark 0 0-5% 7% 5-8% 0 5% 8%
Iceland 15% 15-35% 15% 10-35% 30% 35% n.a
Ireland 0 3 7 .5 % 0-50% 37.5% 0 0-37.5% 0
Japan 15% 20% 20% 20% 15% 20% 20% U p  to  80®« t a x  
r e l ie f  o n
expo rte ra  to  n e w  
m arkets.
Im porters  h a d  t o  
p o s t 5®o b o n d  
u n til p a y m e n t  
w a s  m ade
Norway 0 6% 6% 2-4 0 5% 0.20
K r./K g. Kr./Kg.
Spain 16% 17-20% 17-20% 17-20% 20% 17-20% 20% Fiscal T a x
Duty 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 10% on im ports 
(reduced
Fiscal T ax temporarily 
from 12%)
Sweden 0% 3% 3% 5% 0-10% 3% 6%
Sw itzerland 65.00 85.00 70.00- 80.00- 100.00 85.00 100.00
in  Francs fo r  
100 kg.
85.00 200.00
United 0 (n-alloved) 12.5% 12.5% 20% 20% 12.5% 20%
Kingdom 10%(alloved)
United 5.4% 2.5c./lb. 20% 19%
States 19%





5.4% 9.6% 9.6% 11.2% - 4.8- 12.4% 14% T a x  e x e m p tio n
16% 14.2% fo r  e x p o r te r s :  
tra n sm iss io n  t a x
o n  im ports  6 -
12®o
Italv 15.4% 17.2%- 18% 18.4- 17.2- 19.9% 21.5% T u rn o v e r t a x
Dut>7 2% 18% 2% 20.8% 22.4% 2% 4%
3 .3 %  A d m in . 






L uxem bourg 5.4% 9,6% 9.6% - 11.2- 4 .8-
15% 16% 14.2%
Netherl. 5.4% 9.6% 9.6% 11.2- 4.8- 12,4% 14% Turnover tax
Duty 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 16% 14.2% 6.5- 9% (T.O.T.)
W ith T .O .T . 6 ,5-10%  9%  9.5%
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France 13.4 15.2% 15.2% 20% 21-22% 19% 19% R eb a te s  and
(nonalloved)- 
13.8%  * 
(alloyed)
o the r
a l lo w a n c e s  to  
ex p o rts
Germany 9% 14% 14% 12- 8-15% 15.2% 14% 4-60o T O E  ta x
14.4% o n  im p o rts : 
reb a te s  to
EEC (final 9% 15% 15% 15-20% 10-21% 19% 19%
e x p o r te rs
CET)_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: B rief o f  K aiser Aluminum & C hem ical Coipoiation to the Trade Information Committee, 
undated 1964. H c itc r papers, box 14, JFKL.
Ownership and management o f aluminium companies were international in 
nature to a significant degree. For example, American Reynolds had a sheet and foil 
plant in Mexico, and joined Mitsubishi in a venture to build a plant in Japan. The Italian 
Montecatini was part of a group building a plant in Madras in Spain. The German Vaw 
joined Indian interests in planning a plant at Koyna. Kaiser had joined Pechiney in 
aluminium reducing and fabricating ventures in Spain, and was in the process of 
constructing a fabricating plant in Western Germany. As a result, large firms were 
integrating their production through foreign subsidiaries. In order to have an idea o f the 
internationalization process that was taking place, Table 4 shows the proportion of 
national aluminium reduction capacity owned by foreign companies in a list of 
countries, including the United States, Canada, Italy and West Germany, for 1963.
T able4 : P ro p o rtio n  o f national alum in ium  reduction  capac ity  ow ned  by foreign com panies in  1963. 
Country Percent Foreign- F oreign  companies
O w ned
US 1 A lusuisse (Swiss)
Canada 10 B ritish  Aluminium (UK)
Brazil 46 A lcan (Canada)
M exico 49 A lcoa 35% (US); American &  Foreign Power 14%
Austria 13 A lusuisse
Germany 22 A lusuisse
Italy 30 A lusuisse 25%; A lcan 5%
Norway 24 A lcan 8%; Alcoa 10%British Aluminium 6%
Spain 25 Saichim e (France) 17%, K aiser (US) 8%
Sweden 22 A lcan
UK 47 Reynolds (US)
Camcroun 97 Pechiney-Ugine and  other French coinpanicd 87% - Syndicat 
B elge de Faliminium (Belgium) 10%
India 42 A lcan 32%; Kaiser 10%
Japan 20 A lcan
Australia 84 K aise r 37%; Alcoa 14%; Rio Tinto-Zinc (UK) 33%
B r ie f  o f  K a is e r  A lu m in u m  &  C h e m ic a l C o r p o r a t io n  to  th e  T ra d e  In f o r m a t io n  C o m m it te e , u n d a te d  1964 , 
H e r te r  p a p e r s ,  b o x  1 4 , JF K L .
Marketing, as well as production, was becoming increasingly international. For 
the free world as a whole, about 27% of production entered into international trade in 
1960 (Tables)
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Table 5: production and exports of major producers of primary aluminium (Average 1958-1960» 
thousands of long tons)
Country Production o f  Prim ary alum inium  (P) Exports o f  Crude Alum inium  (E) E/P
USA 1.647 136 8%
Canada 592 459 78%
EEC 412 47 11%
N orway 142 125 88%
Japan 104 1 1%
O ther free  world 247 84 33%
Total free  world 3.144 852 27%
Source: Bracewell. S., Bauxite, A lum ia and Aluminum, (London: Government Publications. 1962). 
pp.68-70 taken from B rief o f  K aiser Aluminum & Chem ical Corporation to tire Trade Inform ation 
Com m ittee, undated 1964, H erter papers, box 14, JFKL.
The aluminium industry was a sector enjoying a process of strong expansion. 
During its early growth phase, just before WWII, this industry was largely oriented 
toward national defense, but, after WWII, aluminium was extended to civil uses w ith  
the result that both its production and its consumption boomed. A glance at table 6 
reveals that world production and consumption quadrupled from 1950 to 1965. T h e  
EEC increased its production from 125,000 tons in 1950 to 559,000 tons by 1963 and its  
consumption from 162,000 tons in 1950 to 783,000 in 1963. The same exceptionally 
fast rate growth was also registered in the United States.
Table 6: production and consumption of primary aluminium 1950-1965 (1000 tons)
Production_____________________ Consumption___________________ Surplus (+) Deficit (-)
Country 1950 1959 1963 1964 1965 1950 1959 1963 1964 1965 1950 1959 1963 1964 1965
Germany 28 151 209 219 234 50 228 303 366 387 -22 -77 -94 -147 -153
France 60 173 299 316 340 55 168 243 249 232 +5 +5 +56 ♦ 67 +108
Italy 37 75 91 115 124 48 86 128 120 122 -11 -11 -37 -5 +2
Belgium - - - . - 5 49 89 111 118 -5 -49 -89 •111 -118
Netherlands - - - . - 4 10 20 21 25 -4 -10 -20 -21 -25
CEE 125 399 599 650 698 162 541 783 867 884 -37 -142 -184 -217 -188
Cemeroun - 42 52 53 51 - . - • - - +42 +52 +53 +51
Greece - - . - - - 3 4 4 5 - -3 -4 -4 -5
CEE+ ass. 
countries
125 441 651 703 749 162 544 787 871 889 -37 -103 -136 -168 -140
USA 652 1772 2099 2316 2490 823 1846 2362 2530 2837 -171 -74 -263 -214 -347
Canada 360 544 650 759 750 59 80 145 160 175 +301 +474 +505 +599 +575
Norway 45 145 219 262 279 10 24 22 25 21 +35 +121 +197 +237 +258
Japan 25 100 224 266 298 19 111 258 170 270 +6 -11 -34 -4 +28
UK 30 25 31 32 25 184 294 319 359 359 -154 -269 -288 -327 -334
Others 51 207 389 458 504 82 300 474 542 579 -31 -93 -85 -84 -75
West world 1288 3234 4263 4796 5095 1339 3199 4367 4777 5130 -51 +35 -104 -19 -37
Soviet bloc 219 854 1182 1285 n.a. 244 790 1160 n.a. n.a. -25 +64 +25 n.a. n.a.
S o u rc e : A 1SC B  B A C  6 2 /1 9 8 0 - 5 9 ,  “ F ic h e  d e  R e n s e ig n e m e n ts  s u r  l 'a lu m in iu m ”  (8 4 4 4 -1 1 1 /D / 6 5 )  d e  la  D G
M a rc h é  I n té r ie u r ,  C o m m is s io n , 2 3  j u n e  1 9 6 5 .
Tables 7 and 8 show import and export patterns. A glance at them reveals tha t 
exchanges flows were increasing. The Community, the UK and the United States w ere 
all net importers of primary metal, although, within the EEC, Italy, the Benelux 
countries and Germany were net importers, while France was a net exporter.
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T able  7: Im p o rts  an d  o f p rim ary  a lum in ium  (in 1000 tons)
i F rom f 1961 1962 i 1963 : 1964
j |G
i
F I B L N E E C G F I BL N EEC
i G
F I BL N EEC IG F I BL N
j T o ta l 
| im p o rts  
F ro m
1 138 4 3 2 6 7 0 14 291 118 52 44 68 15 296 121 56 54 89 20 340 ! 165 72 33 113 22
(E E C
| ! 13
- 6 50 7 7 6 12 - 6 41 8 66 5 - 4 72 10 91 1 15 - 4 85 11
i E A M A J . 4 0 - 5 . 4 4 . 4 6 . _ 4 6 4 6 . . 46 !1- 41 1 i
I T o ta l
j y d
l co u n t
j 125
j
3 21 15 7 171 106 6 38 2 7 7 184 116 10 50 17 10 203 j 150 31 2 9 28 10
| U SA ! 33 1 4 3 1 4 3 19 2 6 4 1 31 2 0 6 13 5 2 46 |3 6 18 7 10 4 ■
] C an 4 8 2 8 7 1 6 6 22 3 11 10 1 4 7 2 6 3 11 3 2 45 j 32 2 5 4 3 l
| N o r 21 - 5 2 1 2 9 31 - II 1 . 4 3 3 0 - 11 2 1 44 146 7 7 3 . (
f S w it 1 7 - - - - 7 9 - - 1 - 10 11 - 1 1 1 14 i 6 1 ! 2
1 S ec re t 1 - - - - . 2 2 . - . - _ 22  12 6 26 12 7 _ » à
Source: AECB BAC 62/1980-59, “Fiche de Renseignements sur l'a lum inium ” (8444-HI/D/65) de la D G  
M arché Intérieur, Commission. 23 June 1965.
Table 8: Exports of primary aluminium (in 1000 tons)
‘ To 1961 1962 1963 1964 i








3 69 - 1 2 75 3 62 - 1 1 67 5 84 - 1 - 90 7 98 11 1 1 118 j
1 Total
\ -ïrd
1 55 - - 1 56 3 43 - - - 46 9 41 - - - 50 3 27 8 - - 38 j
ï count !
j UK 1 - - 1 - 1 - - - 1 . 1 -  - * 1 1 . 5 - - 6 1
î USA - 38 - - - 38 - 31 -  - - 31 3 29 -  - - 32 - 12 - - - 12 i
! Arg - 6 - - - 6 - 3 - - - 3 - 4 -  - - 4 5 - - - 5 !
î S u it - 1 - - - 1 3 1 - - - 4 1 1 - - - 2 1 - 2 - - 3 î
Source: AECB B A C 62/1980-59, “Fiche de Renseignements sur l ’alum inium ” (8444-11I/D/65) de la DG 
M arc lié Intérieur, Commission. 23 June 1965.
Despite all these characteristic, which would seem to make aluminium a prime 
candidate for a 50% reduction, this sector became a problem in the Kennedy Round and 
in the context o f the relations between the USA, the EEC and the Nordic countries, 
because of the firm refusal of the EEC, under the instigation o f the French, to make a 
meaningful reduction of duties.
10.2 The EEC aluminium industry and the common position for 
the Kennedy Round
Within the EEC, the leading firm was the French company, Pechiney. It 
produced 80% o f French aluminium in 1964, and 6,4% of that o f the Western World. It 
was a highly diversified chemical and metallurgie industrial giant, and competed 
successfully on world markets, including in the US. The second largest producer was 
the German firm, Vaw, a long-established and government-owned enterprise, which 
produced 90% of German aluminium, and 4.5% o f  the W est’s. It had thrived for many 
years following WWII without any duty, or a relatively low one on imports of primary 
aluminum, and its strength did not require significant protection. Despite this, German 
production was greatly inferior to its consumption with the result that, among the Six, 
Germany was the largest aluminium importer. The other major EEC producer was the
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Italian Montecatini. Like Pechiney, it was a diversified chemical and metallurgic 
corporate firm.4
As Tables 6 and 7 show, EEC imports came principally from Canada, the U SA  
and Norway, even if  a considerable shift in the ranking of the supplying countries had 
taken place, to the detriment o f Canada. The USA was the first supplier to the EEC, 
followed by Norway and Canada. Among the Six, Germany was the biggest importing 
country, and France the biggest exporter. Table 9 lists the principal source of imports by  
the EEC, including imports from France, which among the EEC was the only exporting 
country o f any relevance. Between 1958 and 1961, EEC imports grew and France w as 
the country that most beneficiated from this increase.
Table 9: EEC imports of Primary Aluminium (in thousands of metric tons)
Year Total France (1) Cam eroun
(2)
Total, excl. 1+2 Canada US N orw ay Other
1958 145 19 21 105 38 3 23 4 1
1959 186 28 23 135 43 32 24 3 6
1960 327 40 38 249 99 94 32 2 4
1961 272 66 44 162 63 42 29 2 8
Source: O ECD  Statistics. “N on-ferrous m etals” , 1961-62, Part IV , taken from  Brief o f  K aiser A lu m in u m  
&  Chem ical Corporation to  the T rade Inform ation C om m ittee, undated 1964, Hertcr papers, b o x  14, 
JFKL.
In 1957, the Six had very different duty rates on primary aluminum, w hich 
spread from 25% in Italy and 20% in France to 0% in the Benelux countries. Germany, 
while having a legally bound duty o f 10%, had an effective rate of 0%. In establishing 
the CET, the average o f the four national tariffs would have set the CET at 14,5%, b u t, 
as aluminium was considered a sensitive product, it was placed on List G, and the C E T  
level was negotiated between the Six. By an agreement reached on 2 March 1960, th e  
CET was set at a 10% level and, because o f the EEC deficit between production an d  
consumption, and the traditional imports o f Germany and the Benelux countries from  
third countries, to facilitate these imports under List G Protocol, 5% tariff contingents 
were granted to them.
Table 10: Rates duties of the Six in 1957,1963 and CET rates on primary aluminium (76.01 BTN)
Country' 1957 1963 1968 C ET level
France 20% 13,4% 9%
Italy 25% 15,4% 9%
Germ any 10% (7%) 9% 9%
B enelux 0% 5.4% 9%
Source: A ECB B A C  62/1980-59, “F iche  de R enseigncm cnts
sur ra lum in ium ” (8444-III/D /65) de  la D G  M arche Intérieur, C om m ission. 23 June 1965.
As a result of the GATT Article XXIV:6 negotiations in 1960-1961, the CET on 
primary aluminium was set at 9% level. Thus, as a result of the setting o f the CET and 
o f the GATT negotiations, Benelux and Germany increased their tariffs while France 
and Italy had to lower theirs by more then 50%. Because of the existence of the 5%  
tariff contingents that the Benelux countries and Germany were granted (see Table 11
4
AECB BAC 62/1980-59, "Fiche de Renseignements sur l'aluminium" (8444-III/D/65) de la DG Marché Intérieur, 
Commission, 23 June 1965. For a description of the French aluminium industry see Hachez-Leroy, F. L'aluminium 
français: l'invention d'un marché, 1911-1983 ( Paris : CNRS, 1999)
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for the volume in 1964-1966), imports into the EEC were carried out at a more 
favorable rate than the 9% duty that the EEC had placed on primary aluminium.
Table 11: Contingents under List G
1964 1965 1966
Germany 60.000 80.000 121.000
Belgium 13.500 26.000 35.000
Netherlands 10.800 10.000 13.000
Total 84.300 116.000 169.000
Source: see table 10.
When the Americans suggested the launching of a new Round with a 50% 
reduction, Pechiney took a clear-cut stance, opposing any reduction of the CET. The 9% 
duty was considered a limit to concessions and barely sufficient to protect French and 
EEC production. The French firm aimed at setting up a regional EEC preferential 
market, mostly supplied by EEC and French production, which, in 1963, already 
provided 45% of the production of the Six. Pechiney put strong pressure on the French 
government to oppose a reduction of the 9% duty. It asserted that the EEC firms 
disposed of resources and technicalities that would allow, in a few years, production to 
meet the European consumption need at competitive prices and good quality by 1967, 
so ensuring the independence of the EEC. The European producers had undertaken a 
constant and expensive effort to modernize the aluminium transformation industry and 
to increase its production levels. In fact, France had increased its capacity in the 
Noguères plant, which could produce 30,000 tons; Germany too had the new plant in 
Norf which could produce some 40,000 tons; Italy had the new plants in Fusina which 
could produce 20,000, and in Sardinia, which could produce up to 100,000 tons. The 
Netherlands too had a new plant which could produce 60,000. However, this self- 
sufficiency could be attained only if  condition this industry was not endangered by 
external competition and was given time to become competitive before being exposed to 
more severe competition. Without adequate customs protection, an inflow of imports 
would endanger permanently this development, and make the EEC dependent on third 
countries for this essential item. The French and EEC industry needed more time, 
maintained Pechiney.5
The French firm looked with alarm to the other side of the Atlantic. North 
American unused production capacity was equal to the EEC’s total consumption (Table 
12), therefore, claimed Pechiney, North America would ask concessions on aluminium 
in order to place its production overcapacity on the European market.6
Table 12: North America production 1955-1960 (thousand of tons)
Capacity______________________Production___________________ Unused capacity
USA Canada Total U SA Canada Total USA Canada Total
1955 1440 590 2030 1420 550 1970 20 40 60
1960 2235 798 3033 1827 690 2517 408 108 516
1962 2253 798 3051 1925 625 2550 328 173 501
+ 2408 867 3275 483 242 725
+  capacity of production considering also unused firms for lack o f market.
Source: M AEF D E/C E GATT 930 Note de Pechiney «Négociation entre la CEE & les Etats-Unis». 26 
February 1963.
MAEF DE MAEF, DE/CE GATT 931, Note «Préparation de la Conférance KENNEDY -  Opinions des producteurs 
français», 5 February 1964./CE GATT 930 Note de Pechiney «Négociation entre la CEE & les Etats-Unis», 26 February 
1963.
6
MAEF DE/CE GATT 930 «Négociation entre la CEE & les Etats-Unis», 26 February 1963.
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Against this background, asserted Pechiney with a dramatic tone, a reduction o f  
duties on primary aluminium would pave the way to foreign control o f the European 
aluminium industry, so strategic for the automobile, aeronautic and defense fields. The 
EEC would not develop its industry, and what had happened in the United Kingdom, 
where most of the aluminium industry was under North-American control, would also 
occur in the EEC. Pechiney was, in fact, annoyed by the strong investments made by 
North American firms in Italy, Germany and Belgium, leading, according to the French 
firm, to the control of the European industry by “groupes anglo-saxons”, as the  
Canadian and American firms were defined. Thus, the French aluminium industry 
pointed to the alleged aggressive commercial policy o f the “Anglo-Saxons”, and the  
defense of the European industry as reasons to maintain the 9% duty which was already 
the result of big concession from the EEC, and it was felt that it should not be possible 
to endanger the existence o f  the EEC aluminium industry by making further 
concessions.7
The position o f the French government at the Kennedy Round reflected th e  
interests o f the guiding-firm, Pechiney. Paris held that a reduction of the duty was to be  
avoided because of the particularly favourable production conditions North American 
and Scandinavian countries enjoyed and, above all, to allow French firms to have 
sufficient resources to invest in research in the ferroalloy sector, crucial to spatial and 
aeronautic construction. At the same time, France, as interested as the other EEC 
members in a successful Kennedy Round in order to increase the volume of world 
exchanges, could not ignore the fact that compromise would be necessary to ensure th e  
Round’s success, and this also applied to the aluminium sector. As a result, the Quai 
d’Orsay kept a more flexible position than the one demanded by Pechiney, and, from 
the beginning, was aware that a total exception for primary aluminium was not feasible 
solution, because of the likely opposition of Germany and the other Kennedy Round 
participants.8
As for Germany, even if  VAW was a state-owned firm, Bonn did not only take 
into account the national producing interest, but was also influenced by the  
requirements of the transforming industry, which sought primary aluminium from 
traditional suppliers at advantageous prices. In 1964, Germany imported 165,000 tons 
o f primary aluminum, of which 15,000 from the EEC and the rest from third countries 
(Table 7), and, as such, favored a reduction in the aluminium duty. The Benelux 
countries also favoured the reduction of the CET, possibly to the zero level. They had 
no relevant national production and, in 1964, imported about 40% of their consumption 
from third countries. Therefore, the position o f Germany and the Benelux countries w as 
in total conflict with the French one. As for Rome’s view, Italian production in theory 
could fully supply Italian consumption, but Italy exported 25% of its production, with 
the result that it had to import, and, in 1964, 88% of its imports came from outside the 
EEC. The Italian aluminium industry held the same position as Pechiney; it aimed at 
increasing its production, was making new investments and felt that a reduction o f the 
CET would endanger this aim. The Italian government, however, had a more softer
MAEF DE/CE GATT 930 Note de Pechiney «Négociation entre la CEE & les Etats-Unis», 26 February 1963. The almost 
total production of the United Kingdom was made by British Aluminium Co, which had been bought by the American 
firm of Reynolds in 1959; AECB Marjolin cabinet papers, box 791, «L'aluminium au regard de la négociation Kennedy», 
14 October 1964. The quote is from this second documet.
g
MAEF, DE/CE, 1961-1966 GATT 932, Note de la Direction des Relations Economiques Extérieurs (DREE) -  Ministre des 
Finances, 4 November 1964.
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position in comparison to its industry, as it could not ignore that it brought in 88% o f its 
aluminum imports from outside the EEC.9
Because of this difference o f interests, for the Six, establishing a common 
position to negotiate in Geneva proved difficult. As illustrated in chapter 7, when the 
Commission had presented its exceptions list to the member states in October 1964, it 
had proposed to subject aluminium to a tariff reduction. Holding that the French would 
never accept a 50% reduction, Rey and Maijolin had suggested to reduce the duty from 
9 to 7% and to suppress the tariff contingents that Germany and Benelux had under 
Protocols XII o f the G List. The major aim of the Commission was the abolition o f the 
national contingents that it found incompatible with an EEC common commercial 
policy and wanted to also use the GATT Round to achieve this goal. The results o f the 
prolonged bargaining of November 1964 had led the Six to decide that, unless the 
Council of Ministers unanimously decided otherwise, the 9% duty would be maintained 
and the 5% contingents would be bound in GATT. In Geneva, in tabling its exceptions 
list, the EEC would simply claim that aluminium would be on the partial exceptions list, 
without specifying the content o f the partial exception. This agreement had been 
elaborated only because, in November 1964, the Six required a compromise in order to 
table their exceptions list. However, the fact that Germany, Benelux and the 
Commission firmly disapproved o f it was demonstrated by the fact the keeping o f the 
9% duty with the contingents was retained as a solution, if  no other option could be 
approved. Thus, they entered the Geneva negotiations fully determined to elaborate 
another solution.
10.3 The US position for the Kennedy Round
For the US government, the offer to be made regarding aluminium was a much 
easier decision than for the EEC. American firms looked with interest at expanding 
European consumption and deficit o f supply. They forecast huge increases in 
consumption within the EEC, and wanted to have the opportunity to share in it. They 
were increasing their investments to the area, but at the same time wanted to increase 
exports, considered the quickest way to share Europe’s expanding requirements. The 
American firms, thanks to their strong position in world market, pushed for a drastic 
liberalization o f international trade. Their objective was not to seek special treatment for 
the protection o f their industry, but rather to obtain maximum concessions on 
aluminium from US trading partners, notably the EEC and Canada, in order to achieve 
uniform rates of duty in all major markets at the lowest possible rates. For the industry 
in America, the complete and universal free trade in primary aluminium was a desirable 
objective, but it recognized that, because of the likely opposition of the Europeans, and 
the fact that the US President lacked authority under the TEA, the aim was not 
achievable for the time being. Thus, in the Kennedy Round, the USA had to be prepared 
to reduce its duty by 50%, from its actual ad valorem equivalent of 5.2%, provided the 
EEC reduced its duty to a comparable level from the CET rate of 9% - implying, 
therefore, a 70% reduction - and Canada, whose duty was the same of the USA, 
followed suit. Correspondingly, duties in other major countries had to be aligned with 
the adjusted US-EEC-Canada rate. If the EEC was not prepared to reduce its duty not 
even by less than 50%, then the only consistent position for the USA was to negotiate 
an increase in US tariffs by an amount appropriate to effect an equalization. As the
g
NA General Records of Department of State -  CDF 1960 -  1963, box 162, mémorandum of conversation in Paris 
between Bail and Giscard D'Estaing, 30 Mareh 1962; AECB Marjolin cabinet papers, box 791, «L'aluminium au regard de 
la négociation Kennedy», 14 October 1964; AECB BAC 62/1980-50 Note «l'inscription de l'aluminium sur la liste des 
exceptions dans les négociations du GATT», 11 November 1966.
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primary aluminium market was truly an international one, and aluminum was sold a t 
competitive prices in world markets, the aim of the American industry was to equalize 
rates worldwide.10
American firms looked with apprehension at the raising o f the German duty on  
aluminium caused by the setting o f the CET. The German market was their largest o n e  
and they did not consider the lowering of the French and Italian duties, and the resu lting  
increased market access to these two countries, adequate compensation. Even if, a s  
Table 7 shows, the United States had increased their exports to Italy and F ran ce  
following to the reduction of the CET, they continued to see the market o f Germany a s  
most important. Thus, the reduction of the CET remained crucial to reduce G erm an  
tariffs.11
Together with the harmonization o f duties, the target of US firms was also th e  
Canadian anti-dumping law which was used as a supplementary device to block an y  
significant quantity o f aluminium imports. While they exported aluminium to n early  
every capitalistic country, virtually no US aluminium products were sold to C anada  
because o f the anti-dumping provisions. Canada had not merely to reduce its duties o n  
aluminium by at least 50%, but had also to change its antidumping law, as it was only in  
this way that a reduction in duties could have genuine significance.12
In order to push the US government to  firmly press for the reduction of the C E T , 
the American firms also identified the US balance o f payments problems, a sensitive  
issue for the Johnson administration given the troubled positions of the US dollar. T hey  
first claimed that a reduction in the CET would pave the way to a huge increase o f  
American exports, so helping to redress the US balance of payments through a n  
increase in the trade surplus. Second, they argued that the EEC was actually in the b e s t 
position to afford non-restrictive policies: its monetary reserves were greater than th o se  
o f the USA, therefore it had very little justification for continuing policies w h ich  
accentuated this surplus. Echoing Kennedy, the American aluminium industry argued  
that the effective working of an international payments system depended in part on th e  
action o f  surplus countries to encourage imports and avoid uneconomical exports, th e  
exact opposite of what the EEC was doing.13
Given the fact that the aluminium industry was not asking for protection but fo r  
a reduction of other countries’ duties, Washington had no problem in adopting th e  
request o f its firms. Thus it did not put aluminium on the exceptions list, and arrived in  
Geneva asking for a 50% reduction for this sector, and demanding a modification o f  th e  
Canadian antidumping laws.
10.4 Trying to move the French: negotiations in Brussels
With the respective positions between the two sides of the Atlantic as distant as 
their respective coastlines, the aluminium negotiations inevitably developed into a 
difficult bargaining process. The decision of the EEC to except aluminium w as 
predictably criticized by the United States, Norway and Canada. All these countries
10 Brief of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation to the Trade Information Committee, undated 1964, herter papers,
box 14, JFKL; Memorandum for Herter "Aluminum and the Kenned Round", 6 January 1965 from Reynolds, Kaiser and
Aluminum Company of America, Herter Papers, Box 14, JFKL
U Ih.H
Ibidem.
12 Letter from Hodges to T.J. Rendy of the Kaiser Aliminium & Chemical Corporation, 10 July 1963, Herter papers, Box 
14, JFKL; Memorandum for Herter "Aluminum and the Kenned Round", 6 January 1965 from Reynolds, Kaiser and 
Aluminum Company of America, Herter Papers, Box 14, JFKL.
13 Brief of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation to the Trade Information Committee, undated 1964, Herter papers, 
box 14, JFKL
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considered the EEC industry to be made up of strong and efficient enterprises, which 
had gone beyond their national boundaries, and joined investments in third countries, 
indeed with their principal foreign competitors. The EEC aluminium industry appeared 
well equipped to face a reduction in its still high level of tariff protection. For Canada, 
Norway and the United States it was crucial to obtain a reduction in the CET 
preferential duty. The EEC was the only market where consumption was growing, but 
intra-EEC imports of aluminium were growing at a faster rate than imports from third 
countries.14
Particularly annoyed by the EEC exception was Norway. This country had a 
leading interest in aluminium. Although its biggest firm, Aardal, was not among the 
biggest, globally speaking, exports of aluminium represented a considerable share of 
Norwegian total exports, and it exported 88% of its total production. As Table 8 shows, 
this country was the second supplier to the EEC, and was particularly interested in a 
worldwide reductions in order to boost its exports not only to the EEC market, but also 
to the United States. In fact, it insisted on the reduction in the CET also partly because it 
feared that unless the EEC reduced its duty, the United States would withdraw its 50% 
reduction offers.15 As stated, Washington was unlikely to do so unless the EEC, the 
other major import market, made comparable efforts. The American aluminium industry 
had approved the 50% reduction in US tariffs, but on the condition that the difference 
between the CET and the US tariff be reduced. Hence, what of the action the USA took 
was of major importance to the Canada and Norway.16
Canada and Norway’s exports of aluminium to the EEC represented a greater 
share in the total exports of these countries was the case for the USA. As such, even if 
the USA was also one of the principle suppliers to the EEC, these two countries had an 
even greater interest in reducing the CET than the USA did. In fact, Washington 
counted on the pressure Oslo and Ottawa could put on the Six to obtain to the 50% 
reduction in the CET. In particular, in the case of Norway, 40% of its exports to the 
EEC were covered by exceptions, so that the EEC would be under pressure to make 
some accommodation to Norway’s interest.
Because of the difficulties that characterised this sector, Wyndham White 
suggested the creation of a sector group. In reality, the setting up of the sector group 
was the only tangible result achieved on aluminium before June 1966. After the 
presentation of the exceptions list in November 1964, negotiations over aluminium 
dragged on with Canada, the United States and Norway insisting that the EEC reduce its 
duty by 50%, and that they specify the content o f their partial exceptions. 
Unfortunately, this definition was interrupted by the Crisis of the Empty Chair. As 
aluminium was an item of special interest to the French, the Five and the Commission 
considered it wise to wait for the crisis to end before restarting the intra-EEC 
bargaining. Therefore, it was only in February 1966, after the Luxembourg meetings 
that brought France back to Brussels, that the Six and the Commission could again 
discuss the definition of the partial exception.17
14 NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 4 Talking paper on Aluminum, 6 January 
1965 and Memorandum for Herter "Aluminum and the Kenned Round", 6 January 1965 from Reynolds, Kaiser and 
Aluminum Company of America, Herter Papers, Box 14, JFKL
15 ANF 724711 1964-1967, box 3, Premier Ministre- QCEE- SGCI, Note de la DREE «Négociations commerciales de 
Geneva -  secteur de l'aluminium», 6 April 1967. This note covers the history of the negotiations over aluminium.
16 Preeg, E.H., Traders and Diplomats, p.102.
17 AECB PV 345, 19 January 1966, Annex «Rapport de la Commission au Conseil sur les négociations commerciales au 
GATT», NCG (66)3.
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As stated, the Commission had been disappointed by the Council of Ministers’ 
decision o f November 1964 not to reduce the 9% duty, and given that Ministers had 
agreed that this decision would be stuck to if no other solution was adopted, at the first 
meeting of the 111 Committee following the end o f Crisis of the Empty Chair, on 14-15 
February 1966, the Commission decided to reopen the issue. The Commission attempt 
to push the EEC to make a more liberal offer in Geneva received the support o f 
Germany and the Benelux, who had earlier approved the Commission proposals in 
November 1964, while Italy remained neutral. In contrast, the French made crystal clear 
their unwillingness to change their stance, thus no other solution than the one already 
reached in November 1964 could be adopted. In the context o f this disagreement, and 
because of the importance that aluminium had for third countries, Germany, the 
Benelux and the Commission took the issue to the Council of Ministers.18
The French government, and above all the French Minister of Industry, remained 
firmly opposed to reducing the 9% duty, on the same ground as in 1964. And this 
firmness was reinforced by the annoyance caused by the agreement reached in 1965 
between American and Canadian firms, on the one hand, and the German VAW, on the 
other, for the creation o f a new transforming plant in Germany whose source of primary 
aluminium would be supplied by Canadian aluminium.19
Despite French steadfastness, the Commission insisted on its proposal consisting 
o f reducing duty from 9 to 7% and on eliminating the tariff quota. In order to convince 
the French, Rey claimed that a valuable concession on aluminium was of foremost 
importance for the negotiation with Norway: the EEC position in relation to this country 
appeared difficult, as the EEC did not seem willing to make meaningful concessions on 
any products of interest to Norway, notably fish products, ferroalloy, paper and, lastly, 
aluminium. The Commission received the strong support o f Germany and the Benelux 
countries and, this time also o f Italy. In November 1964, Rome had shared the French 
position, but, in 1966, with its aluminium imports from third countries further 
increasing, and with its only major firm, Montecatini, having a major interest in 
chemicals rather than aluminium, it also aimed at reducing duties. However, the 
pressure from the Commission and the Five was not enough to move the French. France 
had never had problem in defending its stance in a position o f isolation and, in fact, 
Couve de Murville confirmed the French opposition to the reduction o f the duty from 9 
to 7%. Given this resolve, the Council of Ministers could not do anything but reaffirm 
the level o f the duty at 9%, and the binding of the tariff contingents, and charge the 111 
Committee and the Commission with defining the volume of the contingents.20
The negotiations on the contingents were lesson less complicated. France wanted 
to allow only a small contingent, in order not to nullify the retaining o f the duty, while 
Germany, Benelux and the Commission wanted a larger one in order to import from 
third countries, and improve the quality of offers in Geneva. The Commission estimated 
that, in 1970, EEC production o f aluminium would fail to account for 200,000 tons of, 
with production levels o f 1,200,000 tons and a consumption level of 1,400,000 tons. 
Thus it suggested a 5% tariff contingent representing the average o f 1964, 1965 and 
1966 levels, that is 120,000 tons a year; the Dutch suggested 200,000 tons 
corresponding to the uncovered consumption, while the Germans suggested 169,000
18 CM2 1965/IA16726, PV de la 77ème réunion du Comité 111, 14-15 Febmary 1966 and ANF 724711 1964-1967, box 
3, Premier Ministre -  SGCI, Note «Négociation Kennedy dans ie secteur de l'Aluminium», 1 April 1966.
19 ANF 724711 1964-1967, box 3, Lettre du Ministre de l'Industrie à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 8 March 
1966; ANF 724711 1964-1967, box 3, Premier Ministre -  SGCI, Note «Négociation Kennedy dans le secteur de 
l'Aluminium», 1 ApriJ 1966.
20 AECB PV 355,4 April1 1966 and CM2 1966/16 PV de la 182Èrne session du Conseil de la CEE, R/337,4-5 April 1966.
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tons, representing the contingent adopted for 1966. However, together with Italy and 
Belgium, in a mood of compromise, they were prepared to accept the Commission 
proposal of 120,000 tons.21
France had no intention of accepting such a big contingent, and was disposed to 
accept a 45,000 tons contingent, representing 50% of the average of contingents from 
1963 to 1965. France based its request on the assumption that, in 1970, contrary to what 
the Commission estimated, EEC production would be greater than consumption by 
27,000 tons, as the EEC production level would be of 1,267,000 tons, with consumption 
at a 1,240,000 tons. The prospect o f increased production in the EEC and its associated 
countries (Cameroun, Suriname and Greece) led France to be prudent in facilitating 
imports from third countries, and to take to Geneva the commitment to a 5% tariff quota 
only for 50% o f its imports in the previous three years. The French based their request 
on the principle that the EEC production had to be prioritized in the supply of EEC. 2
Therefore, the main difficulty in setting up the contingent was down to differing 
estimates of consumption o f primary aluminum of the EEC in 1970. The Commission 
and France had different opinions about the impact of the new uses o f aluminum, and 
the effects of the competition from other metal on aluminium. However this was not the 
only obstacle: For Germany, the issue of the EEC offers was broader than the issue of 
merely aluminium itself. Germany aimed to increase its exports to the Nordic countries, 
and a concession on aluminium to Norway, which had Germany as its largest partner 
within the EEC, was a good way o f demanding concessions of them. In contrast, a 
restrictive attitude on the part o f the EEC would push the Nordics to withhold any 
concessions. For Germany, the issue was not, therefore, constituted merely by 
aluminium, but the entire impact o f the aluminium negotiations on the Kennedy Round. 
For this reason, Bonn insisted that, in finding a solution to the problem, the Six had to 
bear in mind the importance of the Kennedy Round for their exports, and had to make a 
substantial offer of reductions in Geneva. In fact, while discussing the volume of 
contingents, Germany, supported by the Commission, Italy and Benelux, continued to 
press for a reduction of the duty from 9 to 7%, and the abandonment of contingents. 
Only if France continued to their negative stance, would they be prepared to accept the 
retention of the 9% duty with the adoption of 5% tariff contingents of 120,000 tons, 
provided that the Council foresaw the right to modify its contingent concession into a 
tariff concession, implying the abandoning of the G List contingent.23
It was only at the meeting o f the Council of Ministers of mid-June 1966 that the 
Six, urging a decision, finally reached an agreement. Under the proposals presented by 
COREPER President Borschette, the Council adopted the suggestion of maintaining the 
9% duty and offering the consolidation of a 5% tariff contingent for 100,000 tons, as a
1 Belgium indicated that it could accept such a solution provided it was offered to third countries for a limited period. 
This limitation was to be considered an essential element, as in some years the EEC could be in a position to re­
examine the all problems related to aluminium because of an eventual geographical extension of the tariff area of the 
EEC, and because of the solution to be given Protocol XII after the transitional period. AECB BAC 62/1980-59, PV de la 
233e"* réunion du Comité 111 (S/327/66), 17 May 1966.
22 ibidem; ANF 724711 1964-1967, box 3, Telex COMICECA/614 Boegner au SGCI, 18 May 1966; AECB BAC 62/1980- 
59 PV de la 8?™ réunion du Comité 111, 23 May 1966. For the French position on contingents see ANF 724711 1964- 
1967, box 3, Premier Ministre -  SGCI, Note «Négociation Kennedy dans le secteur de l'Aluminium», 1 April 1966.
23 ANF 724711 1964-1967, box 3, Telex COMICECA/642 Boegner au SGCI, 25 May 1966, AECB BAC 62/1980-59, PV de 
la 86éme réunion du Comité 111, 6-8 June 1966. AECB -  BAC 122/1991-5, Communication de MM. Rey, Marjolin et 
Colonna de Paliano NCG(66)19 «Etat d'avancement des travaux dans le secteur Aluminium», 8 June 1966. The EEC also 
consulted Greece, with which it had an Association agreement, on the issue of concessions to be made in primary 
aluminium. The Greeks, being aluminium producers, took a position close to that of the French. They estimated that, in 
1970, EEC consumption would be 1,240,000 tons with a total production of 1,480,000 tons. In this context, Greece 
estimated that tariff contingents of 5% should be granted for 60,000-70,000 tons a year. AECB BAC 62/1980-59 Note 
de la délégation hellénique (CEE-GR 51/66), 14 June 1966.
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compromise between the French, who had demanded a level o f 50,000-60,000 tons and 
the others, who had asked for 120,000. The EEC reserved for itself the possibility, after 
five years, to replace the tariff contingents with a reduction o f the duty to 7%, or by 
another tariff reduction to be negotiated. Any reduction of the duty from 9 to 7% would 
carry with it the abandonment of the tariff contingents under the Protocol XII of List G. 
On derived products, and waste and scrap the duty would be reduced from 5 to 4%, 
while the other products, which were covered by duties ranging from 15 and 19%, w ere 
scheduled for partial reductions to a 12% level, so to keep them 4-5 points higher than 
the protection of primary aluminium.24
Germany was disappointed by this final agreement. However, considering the 
French intransigence and the urgency to arrive in Geneva with a negotiating position in 
order not to stall the Kennedy Round, it reluctantly accepted it. However, for Bonn, the 
EEC had to be prepared to re-examine the volume o f the contingents according to  the 
reaction that the offer gave rise to in Geneva. Germany, Benelux and the Commission, 
(Italy had a more soft position), despite the formal decision o f 13-14 June, had no  
intention o f resigning to it and, as we shall see, once the EEC offers were tabled in 
Geneva, they would support Norway, Canada and the United States’ request either to  
reduce the duty or, at least, to increase the volume of contingent.25 As such, the EEC 
approached the Geneva talks with France firmly determined to maintain the volume o f  
the contingent in order to protect its industry, with the Commission and the Five, above 
all Germany, firmly convinced of the need to improve the offers in order to increase the 
concessions to the Nordics.
10.5 Trying to move the French: negotiations in Geneva
While, in Brussels, negotiations concentrated on getting the French to move, in 
Geneva, the bargaining centered upon the need to obtain meaningful access to the EEC 
market for primary aluminium, for the EEC was the only major world market where 
actual and potential production fell appreciably short of the actual and projected 
consumption. That the EEC offers would not receive a warm welcome in Geneva w as 
anticipated by Washington’s reaction, which claimed that it seemed to “rest in good part 
to acquiescence to the dominant French producer, Pechiney”.26 According to Roth, the 
offer on primary aluminium “amounted to no offer at all and may actually be less liberal 
than the present situation” because of the small volume of contingents. On aluminium 
products, the EEC offer, far below the 50% linear cut, was “completely inconsistent 
with the world trade picture”, since the EEC was by far the number one world exporter 
o f these products, exceeding the total exports o f the next five largest exporters 
combined. Washington gave this offer no credit. In this situation, a “hard bargain” was 
the only way to substantially improve the EEC offers.27 Washington considered the
24 CM2/17511 Note de la Présidence (S/405/66), 10 June 1966;CM2/17509 Rapport de Borschette à la Présidence du 
Conseil de la CEE, 12 June 1966; CM2 1966/34 PV de la 188ème réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 13-14 June 1966. The 
final decision of the Council stated "Le droit de douane actuel (9%) est maintenue. Un contingent tarifaire annuel à 
droit réduit à 5% pour un volume de 100,000 tonnes sera consolidé. Le Conseil convient, en outre, de l’inscription du 
texte suivant au procès-verbal de sa session: 'Le Conseil se réserve la possibilité, après une période de trois ans, de 
remplacer le contingent précité, soit par une réduction de deux points du droit de 9%, soit par une autre concession 
tarifaire à négocier. Il est entendu qu'une éventuelle réduction du droit de 9 à 7% comporterait l'abandon des 
dispositions du Protocole XII de la list G prévoyant l'octroi de contingents tarifaires. Il est entendu, en outre, que la 
présente décision n'affecte en rien les droit que les Etats membres détiennent en vertu du Protocole XII de la list G, 
pour les importations dépassant les 100,000 tons du contingent tarifaire consolidé".
25 CM2 1966/34 PV de la 188ème réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 13-14 June 1966; PRO FO 371/189598 Telegram 833
from Foreign Office to Bonn on the Anglo-German Economie Committee meeting of 20-22 July 1966, 26 July 1966.
£
NA 364, Recs, of US trade Représentatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, Note "Aluminium", 30 June 1966.
27 Mémorandum for Cecil R. King (House of Représentatives) from Roth, 4 August 1966, Roth Papers, box 2, LRJL.
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EEC to be a danger to a successful Kennedy Round. First, its stance could lead to a 
withdrawal o f offers by the Nordic countries, consequently reducing the liberalizing 
impact of the Round. Second, for USA, keeping its 50% reduction offer would be very 
difficult if the CET was not lowered.28
Table 13: Offers on Aluminium and Products Thereof
_____________________________________________________ Value in $ million________ ______________________________________
US offers Offers to US
Dutiable US imports50% cuts Less than 50% cuts No offer Dutiable imports from US 50% cuts Less than 50% cuts No offer
Canada 123 123 - - 33 12 21 > $ 500.000
EEC 39 39 - - 54 5 22 27
Japan 14 14 - - 14 9 5 -
UK 2 2 - - 9 9 - -
Other EFTA 46 46 - - 2 2 - -
Total 224 224 - . 111 37 48 27
Source: NA 364, Rccs. o f US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, Analysis o f  the 
Kennedy Round Negotiations on dutiable non-agricultural products, prepared by the Commerce 
Departm ent, 25 O ctober 1966.
With the EEC presenting its offers, all the offers (Table 13) were on the table 
and negotiations could finally begin. At the meeting of the Aluminum Sector Group on 
11 July 1966, attended by the USA, UK, EEC, Japan, Canada and Norway, the 
exporting countries Canada, Norway and the United States labeled the EEC offer as 
disappointing, as it did not give any potential for improved access to its market. Norway 
and Canada highlighted the importance that the aluminium industry had in the structure 
and development of their economies, and underlined the importance that they attached 
to access to the EEC market. Canada held that a free exchange system for this product 
would have been the best solution, but given that other countries were not prepared to 
follow this line, Ottawa agreed to give priority to tariff reductions, and to appreciate 
them for the degree of market access which they would ensure. As such, Canada 
considered the EEC offers to be not at all in line with the aims of the Kennedy Round. 
The EEC level o f contingent, whose consolidation was the only new aspect, if compared 
to the level o f access to the EEC market in 1966, raised doubts regarding the value of 
the offer Norway also underlined the importance of aluminium to its economy and 
evaluated offers on the table according the access they would grant.29
The United States shared the appraisal o f Canada and Norway to the EEC offer. 
Even if  the consolidation o f the tariff-quota system was a positive element, the level of 
contingent was inferior, however, to the sum of the contingents still retained by member 
states on a national basis. The offer therefore did not open up access to the EEC market. 
The United States, Canada and Norway, while admitting that a full 50% cut from the 
EEC was not realistic expectation, indicated their preference for as great a cut as
28 NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, Note "Aluminium", 30 June 1966; NA 364, 
Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, Background Paper "Negotiations with the EEC”, 1 July 
1966 and NA 364, Rees, of US trade Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, Analysis of the Kennedy Round 
Negotiations on dutiable non-agricultural products, prepared by the Commerce Department, 25 October 1966.
29 At an informal meeting preceding the 11 July one, Canada floated the idea of global free trade in aluminium 
suggesting that all interested countries bring duties to zero. The Canadian suggestion was nebulous regarding the 
details and, in any case, United States free trade would require legislative approval. Canada talked to the French but 
received little encouragement in their sounding out of the French on possible duty-free treatment of the raw materials. 
The Canadian suggestion was not put forward at a formal sector group session. NA 364, Rees, of US trade 
Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, Note "Aluminium", 30 June 1966; NA 364, Rees, of US trade 
Representatives on the Kennedy Round, box 1, Background Paper "Negotiations with the EEC”, 1 July 1966; AECB BAC 
122/1991-8, Communication de la Commission au Conseil NCG (66) 60 final "Aspects Essentiels des Negotiations au 
GATT (pays industrialisés)”, 20 December 1966.
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possible on aluminium, rather than the binding o f tariff contingents on the part o f th e  
EEC.
Commission representative Hijzen defended the EEC position on the ground th a t 
the exception on aluminium was necessitated by reasons of overriding national interests, 
for the structure of the EEC aluminium industry did not allow for a 50% reduction. H e  
also noted that the EEC foresaw an increase in production, a slow-down in consumption 
and, as a consequence, a decreased need to import on the part o f the EEC. Against th is  
risk o f reduction of import levels on the part o f the EEC, the consolidation o f th e  
100,000 tons at 5% duty-quota represented an important guarantee for exporters. In th e  
end, the working group took note of the EEC offers, but then no other meeting to o k  
place because the position o f  the governments were so far apart that an agreem ent 
appeared impossible.30
Because of the deadlock in the working group, negotiations proceeded on a  
bilateral basis between the EEC and its exporters. In effect, Norway, Canada and th e  
United States continued to exert pressure until the end of the Kennedy Round in 1967 in  
an attempt to push the EEC to reduce its 9% duty. However, given the French  
opposition to moving in this direction, the only way to improve the EEC offers was to  
get the tariff contingents increased. The Germans were aware that such an improvement 
remained urgent, not only to avoid the withdrawal o f its offers by the USA, th u s  
reducing the level of liberalization for aluminium, but also to avoid a reduction o f th e  
liberalization process in Europe, due to the dissatisfaction of the Nordics in this regard. 
However, because of the French intransigence, it seemed unlikely that the EEC w ould  
offer more than a token increase in its tariff contingent. At the end of 1966, the hope to  
achieving a significant reduction in tariffs in the aluminium sector was bleak. B ecause 
o f the refusal of the EEC to improve its offers on aluminium, as well as on other sectors, 
the Nordic countries, Canada, and the United States decided to present a warning list to  
the EEC. However, not even this move had much effect on the French. As fully show n 
in chapter 12, dedicated to the final bargain o f the Round, in the end, the EEC conceded 
only a small increase in its tariff contingent to the great dissatisfaction o f United States, 
Canada and, above all, Norway.
Conclusion
Diverging policies and priorities of the participants constituted the basic problem  
for the aluminium negotiations. France aimed at setting up an EEC regional market in  
order to to be able to increase its production and exports, looked with apprehension a t 
American investments in Germany and wanted, therefore, to maintain the C E T  
protection levels. In contrast, Germany and Benelux wanted to continue to import from  
third countries. On top o f this, for Germany it was urgent to make concessions to th e  
Nordic countries as a way o f  encouraging them to do the same. Thus, the Germans 
pushed for a reduction in CET protection. The Six had different industrial an d  
commercial policies and this made the elaboration o f a compromise difficult. However, 
as with other sectors, the need to elaborate a common position to attend the negotiations 
in Geneva pushed the Six to find a middle ground and reach a compromise on th e ir  
commercial policy. The French aims were challenged not only within the EEC but a lso  
by Norway, Canada and the United States, who all aimed at reducing worldwide 
protection and setting up a transatlantic market. Further, Washington felt it necessary to
AECB BAC 62/1980*59 Compte rendu (ALUM/CR/1) «Réunion du Group sur l'aluminium- juillet 1966», 26 July 1966; 
AECB -  BAC 122/1991-5 Rapport n.74 de la délégation de la Commission pour les négociations du GATT (présenté par 
Rey, Marjolin et Mansholt), 18 July 1966; PRO FO 371/189599 Note "Aluminium" by the Tariff Division of the Board o f  
Trade, October 1966.
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bring pressure on the EEC in order to be sure that the Nordic countries, annoyed by the 
small EEC offers in this sector, would not withdraw their offers in other sectors, so 
reducing the impact of the Kennedy Round. Thus, when 1966 ended, sharp differences 
still existed in the aluminium sector that made a final agreement difficult.
This description of the aluminium sector has confirmed what had already been 
demonstrated in the previous chapter dedicated to the negotiations in the industrial 
sector; the role of the Commission was not weakened by the crisis of the empty chair. In 
fact, immediately after the end o f  the crisis, the Commission did not hesitate in 
continuing to support the 9% reduction, just as it had done in November 1964, and nor 




Negotiations in agriculture: deflecting EEC regionalism
Introduction
In the previous chapters, we analyzed the negotiations in the industrial sector 
and concluded that, despite the numerous difficulties, some significant results remained 
likely. All parties had an interest in advancing their exports and therefore agreed to  
reduce their tariffs. Chapter 11 is dedicated to the negotiations in the agricultural sector 
and, more exactly, to grains, on which the greatest part of the negotiations centered. In 
fact, this commodity had a crucial importance in the Kennedy Round. It was the  
commodity with the largest volume of trade involved and the bulk of US exports to the 
EEC. Moreover, grains were a basic commodity on whose treatment depended also 
meat and dairy products. Most importantly, grains represented the test o f how the EEC 
variable levy mechanism would be lodged in the world trading system and in general o f  
the EEC and its CAP on world trade in agriculture. The EEC was setting up its regional 
organization of agriculture and the negotiations in Geneva over grains would show the  
place the Six wanted the EEC to have in world trade for farm products, and the reaction 
o f the USA to the European stance. This means that the description o f the agricultural 
negotiations gives us the chance to also describe the American attitude towards the CAP 
and therefore towards European integration. In this chapter, we shall conclude that 
liberalizing agriculture was a major American objective but this aim clashed head-on 
with that of EEC which had every intention o f defending and facilitating the functioning 
o f the Common Agricultural Policy by establishing a regional market for agriculture, 
and were not interested in trade liberalization or in increasing exports to the US. This 
led to a major clash between the two sides of the Atlantic. The United States was also in 
a difficult position. Being on record as favouring European integration, they could not 
openly attack the CAP, which was one of its major tenets.
In the Kennedy Round major attention was dedicate to grain. Being a basic 
commodity its treatment conditioned the other commodities and above all meat and 
dairy products. Moreover the United States had a major interest in improving its 
agricultural exports right on grain and, as a result, much attention was dedicated to these 
products. The discussions on agriculture, however, concerned also other agricultural 
commodities. In order to have a full picture o f the negotiations in this sector and of the 
commercial policies of the EEC and the USA, the last session of this chapter briefly 
describes the rest of the agricultural negotiations.
11.1 Protectionism in agriculture and GATT: a longer
perspective
When the Kennedy Round opened and agriculture was explicitly included in the 
negotiations, governments were fully aware o f the difficulty of this task. Foreign trade 
in farm products was a complicated issue because of the long tradition of protectionism 
that existed among developed countries. In terms o f relatively recent history, temperate 
agriculture protectionism of a permanent nature became progressively more relevant 
during the end o f the nineteenth century with agricultural crisis of 1870s and 1880s in
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Western Europe. Grain prices in particular fell dramatically as a result of the steady 
expansion o f American and Australian production and a decrease in ocean freight rates. 
While some nations reacted to the change by adjusting their agricultural sector, some 
other reacted with protectionism. Therefore, as the price of feed grains fell, The 
Netherlands and Denmark, after a period of painful adjustment, became specialized in 
livestock and dairy products. Others, including France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
the South o f Europe, reacted by starting to set duties on grains, and then on the other 
agricultural products whose price depended on grains. During the inter-war period, 
protection increased further as a result of a combination of overproduction and falling 
demand that led prices and farmer income to crash dramatically. Traditionally 
protectionist countries reacted by supplementing tariffs, which had been made almost 
ineffective because of the fall in prices, with quotas and licences so to close their 
markets to flood of excessively low-cost products. Countries like The Netherlands and 
Denmark reacted by setting up export subsidies and pricing mechanisms in order to 
close the gap between domestic and export prices. As a result, virtually the entire 
agricultural sector came to be protected against outside price competition through 
quotas, licenses, support for prices and incomes, and subsidies for exports. And this 
time the protectionism wave touched also the United States which in the 1920s made 
efforts to support farm prices and incomes through increased tariffs, and then, during 
the 1930s the Roosevelt Administration, bought into more a direct form of intervention 
through price support and subsidies to exports. As a result, the divorce between 
agriculture and marketplace rules was complete.1
In 1947, under the pressure of big exporting countries like Australia and Canada, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was conceived to be applied to all 
merchandise trade, without making distinction between agricultural and industrial trade. 
In truth, the United States and the Western European countries had no intention of 
weakening the protection and support they gave to their agriculture. They pursued the 
major goal o f stabilizing and increasing the revenues of farmers and deemed 
liberalization of agriculture as incompatible with these aims. Very important social 
issues were at stake. Thus, strong pressure for protection in major trading nations 
created incentives for governments to grant special treatment to agriculture and GATT 
rules resented this necessity. The United States asked and obtained the right to restrict 
imports of agricultural products when necessary to implement measures to restrict 
domestic production (article XI o f GATT). The Western European countries, concerned 
with using quantitative restrictions for balance o f payments reasons, obtained article XII 
of GATT which allowed for this possibility.2
During the entire 1950s, the USA had an agricultural surplus which was harder 
to deal with than expected. The high domestic support prices were proving to be an 
incentive to domestic surplus production and, at the same time, it was becoming more 
difficult than expected to cut down production when it was not wanted. In 1955, the 
GATT contracting parties were forced to approve an open-ended waiver requested by
For an account of protectionism of agriculture in Europe see Tracy, M. Government and Agriculture in Western 
Europe, 1880-1988 (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989). For American and European protectionism see Evans, 1 
W. The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy; Twilight o f the GATT? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1971); T. K. Warley "Western Trade in Agricultural Products" in Shonfield, A. Internationa! economic relations o f the 
Western World, 1959-1971 VoKl, Politics and trade (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs,1976), p.287-402. For a broader view of the history of agriculture, not dealing only with 
protectionism, see the recently published Federico, G. Feeding the World. An Economic History of Agriculture (1800- 
2000), (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006).
2 For a description of agriculture treatment in GATT the best account remains Josling, T.E, Tangermann, S., Warley, 
T.K. Agriculture in the GATT (London: Macmillan/StMartin Press, 1996) and Avery, W.P. (ed.) World Agriculture and the 
GATT (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
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the USA to enable it to apply the Agricultural Adjustment Act enacted by the US 
Congress in 1954/1955.3 That Act imposed on the administration the duty to introduce 
quantitative import restrictions (QRs) on a range o f agricultural products whenever such 
kind o f protection was needed to implement domestic US agricultural policies. Such 
QRs were applied on cotton textiles, wheat, groundnuts, rye, barley, oats and dairy 
products.
On the other side o f the Atlantic, the protection o f  agriculture and the 
preservation of adequate level o f income o f  agriculture was a basic policy following the 
end o f WWII. Until the early 1960s, practically all European countries were still facing 
balance o f payments problems and this allowed them, in accordance with Article XII o f  
GATT, to apply QRs to the extent necessary to protect the equilibrium of their 
payments balance. While such measures were at that time progressively being abolished 
on industrial products, the elimination process did not extend to the agricultural sector, 
where QRs and similar import measures persisted on a large range of products, 
particularly those produced in temperate zones. During the 1960s, the progressive 
improvement in the balance o f payments o f West European countries forced them to  
gradually give up recourse to the payments equilibrium legal exception. Still, most did 
not abolish QRs or similar measures on what they considered to be sensitive agricultural 
products including grains, dairy, meat, sugar and fruit and vegetable products.
Thus the international trade problem in agriculture stemmed directly from the 
problem of farm income, which was lower than non-farm income. Virtually all 
countries were willing to forego some o f the potential gains from trade in order to m ore 
moce closer to the desired pattern of income distribution in a politically acceptable 
manner and, consequently, maintained the most extreme kind o f protectionist measures 
on the bulk of their agricultural production. The aim of increasing income w as 
combined with the desire to increase, against the wide fluctuations in the past, the  
degree o f stability in agricultural prices. Therefore, agricultural protectionism in the  
industrialized countries was a major factor restricting world trade.
As illustrated, GATT did not succeed in preventing a widespread reinforcement 
of agricultural protectionism. Despite the fact its rules applied to agricultural and 
industrial trade alike, the first four rounds exclusively concentrated on cutting customs 
tariffs for the industrial sector and agriculture escaped GATT discipline. However, in 
the middle of the 1950s, widespread concern started to arise in GATT circles about the 
agricultural sector. The exporting countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
started demanding the subjection o f agriculture to GATT rules.4 The urgency to deal 
with agriculture increased when the Six presented to GATT in 1958 their Treaty o f  
Rome, which foresaw organization of trade in agricultural products at the regional level. 
As shown in chapter 3, during the 1950s, while at the multilateral level discussions on 
agriculture were completely deadlocked, in Western Europe, attempts were made to  
regulate agriculture in a European regional framework, as it appeared that a solution 
wider than the national context was required, if domestic policies in support of farmers 
were to be maintained. These regional European attempts failed too, until when the aim 
to organize agriculture was included in the Treaty o f Rome and the establishment of a 
common market for farm and food products and a common agricultural policy became 
one the major aims o f the EEC. With this major breakthrough at European regional 
level, the big exporters and the United States started claiming that agriculture had to be
3
The affirmed US position at the time was that without an open-ended waiver it would have had to leave the GATT. 
The US renounced that waiver only in 1995 as part of the Uruguay round.
4 Curzon, G. Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and its Impact on 
National Commercial Policies and Techniques (New York: Preager, 1965), pp. 166-168.
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brought within the GATT rules so to try to soften likely European discrimination. As a 
result, discussions started in Geneva on the various measures of agricultural protection, 
the extent to which GATT rules had proved inadequate to promote the expansion of 
trade in agriculture and steps that might be appropriately taken. And the USA was clear 
in identifying the basic problem in the trend towards increased agricultural protection in 
Western Europe and the prospect that techniques of protection largely outside the 
procedures of GATT might be applied by the EEC in its common agricultural policy.
Studies were made from 1958 to 1961 on the problems that affected world trade 
in agriculture. In 1958, a GATT study, the Habeler report, was published. The 
agricultural part of the report centered on the high level of protection, the accumulation 
of surpluses by low cost producers, and the inability o f existing GATT rules to deal 
with these problems. A subsequent GATT working committee -  Committee II -  
examined the policies o f individual countries and reported in detail on the generally 
autarkic policies that had evolved in member countries. And here, the USA, supported 
by the major exporting countries, tried to exert pressure on the EEC to relax rather than 
intensify existing measures of protection.5 Pressures were also made during the Dillon 
Round where the USA, unsuccessfully, tried to insist on getting guarantees of access 
from the EEC so to be sure that the CAP would not damage American exports.
American requests to include agriculture in the Kennedy Round were therefore 
the continuation of attempts made since 1958 to try to ensure that the CAP would not 
implement worldwide discrimination against non-EEC producers and of conflicts in 
trade policy left open from the Dillon Round. The Kennedy Round was the first GATT 
Round where agriculture came to the forefront of the negotiations and a comprehensive 
attempt was made to try to deal with trade in farm products. The inclusion of agriculture 
was so crucial that the Kennedy Administration unequivocally stated that no agreement 
would be concluded in Geneva unless agriculture was meaningfully included in the 
liberalization effort of the new Round. The USA sought significant liberalization, by 
which it meant a reduction in protectionism and guarantees of acceptable access to the 
EEC market, while safeguarding its national policies that protected powerful 
agricultural interests.
To the creation of the CAP, to establish the regulation of agriculture within the 
European regional framework, the United States responded with the request to try to 
also deal with agriculture at the multilateral level. However the aim was not o f attacking 
the CAP’s existence, considered an essential element of the European integration 
process, but rather to reduce the discriminatory aspects of this common policy. The 
USA kept the line adopted in 1958 when the Treaty of Rome was presented to GATT. It 
did not challenge the existence o f the CAP and it did not openly challenge the variable- 
levy system. Rather it decided to negotiate in the framework of the CAP, asking for a 
reduction o f discrimination.
The Six accepted the American suggestion to include agriculture in the Round. 
Yet, they had different goals. They did not aim at liberalising trade, but to regulate it at 
the GATT multilateral level. And to do so, the EEC felt it necessary to intervene not 
only in border protection but also in the domestic policies of the GATT participants. For 
this reason, it presented the MDS approach which responded to the aims of increasing 
the revenues o f farmers and stabilizing world markets through the stabilization of 
prices. The Six were organizing trade in agriculture at the EEC regional level and tried 
to do the same at the multilateral level, favouring the development of a system to
5 NA Department of State, 1960-1963 CDF, box 872, GATT "Draft Progress Report of Committee II 'Effects of Protection 
on Trade™, 18 October 1960 and ibidem "Official report of the US delegation to GATT Committee II on Expansion of 
Trade, October 6-20", 21 November 1960.
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manage world trade compatible with the functioning of the CAP. On top of this, while 
the USA wanted to decrease the discrimination levels contained within the CAP, the 
EEC wanted to get the acceptance o f GATT for this common commercial policy which 
was inconsistent with GATT rules.
This clear contrast o f aims across the Atlantic was well reflected in the 
negotiations over rules that took place in Geneva from December 1962 to March 1965. 
The Kennedy Round participants agreed on the aim of the agricultural negotiations, 
notably to “provide for acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural 
products [...] in furtherance o f a significant development and expansion of world 
trade” . However, no agreement was reached on the way to achieve this goal, because o f 
the different conceptions o f what the Kennedy Round was to aim at. It was against this 
background that negotiations in Geneva over agriculture, after almost three years spent 
discussing the rules, eventually started in May 1965 on cereals.
11.2 The background to the grains commodity agreement: the 
International Wheat Agreement and the Baumgartner-Pisani Plan
The Kennedy Round participants agreed to negotiate commodity agreements 
aiming at balancing world production and consumption and assuring supply at equitable 
prices. All this was considered to lead to the objective o f creating “acceptable 
conditions of access to world markets”, as stated in GATT Ministerial meeting of M ay 
1963.6 While no commodity agreement existed for meat and dairy products, a lim ited 
arrangement for cereals already existed and it was in the context of the experience 
obtained with this agreement that GATT members negotiated in the Kennedy Round. In 
1949, the International Wheat Agreement (IWA) had been signed by Australia, Canada, 
France, the United States, Uruguay, and certain wheat importing countries. It had been 
renewed many times and, in 1962, it had been renewed for five years. Faced with the  
two basic problems o f international trade in cereals -  the instability of prices and the  
existence of surplus among developed countries -  the aim of the participants to the IW A 
was to assure supplies of wheat to importing countries and markets for wheat to  
exporting countries at equitable and stable prices and to help with the disposal o f  
surpluses. Importing countries granted part of their markets to exporters, on condition 
that exporters met the fixed upper and lower price limits established in the IWA. The 
agreement, however, was deficient, as Argentina and the Soviet Union, two major the  
wheat producers, did not join. Further, it had very limited engagements. It was centered 
only on prices and the only constraint was to respect a rather wide range o f price, 
between $1,625 and $2,025 per bushel. In fact, prices of exchanges were at a level near 
the higher limit but the level was not maintained by cooperation by importers and 
exporters, but by the effort o f the USA and, to a lesser extent, Canada which limited 
their sales, at the cost of considerable stocks, to maintain stable prices. Therefore, the 
essential instrument to guarantee price stability in support of the market had not been 
the IWA but the concerted policy o f the USA and Canada. In contrast, the market o f  
feeding cereals was not organized and prices had tended to decrease.7
A suggestion to conclude a more comprehensive agreement was made by the 
French government in November 1961. On the basis of the work of Committee II, in 
September 1961 Wyndham White asserted that since GATT rules were not, in practice, 
applied to agricultural trade, it would be better to examine the prospects of negotiating
® Preeg, H.E. p. 152.
7 ANF 724.713, box 4, Note pour le cabinet du Ministre 127/CE «Project d'accord mondial sur les céréales», 26 April 
1965.
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terms of access to markets. The invitation of the Director General was picked up by 
French Minister of Finance Baumgartner at a GATT Ministerial meeting and French 
Minister o f Agriculture Pisani at the FAO conference, both in November 1961. In fact, 
the French also put forward their plan for a commodity agreement to elude the British 
request to guarantee Commonwealth countries traditional access to the British market, 
during the negotiations between the EEC and the United Kingdom in 1961-1963.8 
Suggesting a general approach, the Baumgartner-Pisani plan, based on market 
organization for trade in basic agricultural commodities, starting with grains. The 
French proposals were grounded on the assumption that there was a large food 
deficiency in developing countries, and protectionist policies in industrial countries that 
had led to increase surplus stocks and had constrained producing countries in a ruinous 
price war with subsidised exports. A policy was to be developed to raise world prices to 
the level o f the biggest importing countries, which meant the EEC, and in turn, to utilize 
the additional revenues gained thereby to finance shipments of surpluses to 
undernourished nations unable to afford imports. In this way both exports subsidies and 
the system o f levies in the importing countries would be neutralized and a single 
international price would be set up in all the markets. Exporting countries would obtain 
higher income and would be able to finance food aid programs for the LDCs, and in 
return for the advantage of securing higher prices for their exports, they would 
undertake not to increase their production. Any surpluses in the importing countries 
would be utilized to carry out a concerted international food aid program to stimulate 
the consumption of products from the temperate zone by the LDCs.
At the Ministerial meeting of GATT in December 1961, the decisions was taken 
to refer to a special study the problems of world trade in temperate agriculture. The 
Cereals Group was set up to study problems in trade for these commodities and it was 
tacitly understood by all participants that the major issue was the question o f continued 
access to EEC markets in the light of the decision by the Six to subject cereal imports to 
a system of variable levies. It was in this framework that the French proposals were 
examined. They were received as a bold attempt to deal with agriculture, but were not 
considered equitable, practical or, above all, able to maintain access to the EEC 
markets. The United States made it clear that any consideration of a price increase had 
to be linked to access assurances for non-EEC exporters and supply management. The 
major importing countries, especially the UK and Japan, refused to pay higher prices for 
imports in order to finance aid supplied by exporting countries. Also, the assumptions of 
the proposals were questioned. Exports subsidies were not ruinous, but quite modest or 
nonexistent for low cost exporters; and the assumption that global supply and demand 
could be balanced if only stocks in the rich countries could be transferred to the poor 
countries was not, in 1961, accepted as a long run solution. The prevailing outlook was 
that food aid was a temporary stopgap after which the specter of accumulating surplus 
would reemerge. Under these circumstances, a substantial increase in world prices 
would lead to oversupply on world markets. Moreover, the proposal to align world 
prices to the EEC levels was seen as a rather transparent attempt on the part of the 
French to ensure general acceptance of the EEC system of internal support prices and 
variable levies. Even if the French proposal was not considered feasible for immediate 
negotiations, as is described in the remainder o f this chapter, they paved the way to a
ANF 724.713, box 4, Premier Ministre, Comité Interministériel pour tes questions de Coopération Economique 
Européenne, Note «Négociations commerciales multilatérales au GATT : secteur agricole», 1 April 1966.
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new trail to organising markets at international level and influenced the EEC proposals 
for drawing up a general agreement on cereals in the Kennedy Round.9
The decision taken at the GATT Ministerial meeting of May 1963 to negotiate a 
commodity agreement in the framework on the already existing Cereals Group was 
therefore the continuation of discussions already underway since the end o f 1961, While 
there was no dissent about the need for a world grains agreement, divergences remained 
regarding the elements for the Agreement and in particular regarding the approaches to 
access, level and role o f international prices and the financing of food aid. These 
differences entangled with the general disagreement over the rule to negotiate in 
agriculture, with the result that when negotiations started in May 1965 no rule to set up 
the Cereals Agreements had been fixed. At the 1964 session of the Cereals Group, 
Washington had been prepared to negotiate on the MDS, provided that UGP were set at 
a low level and the EEC gave an access guarantee. The EEC had opposed the latter 
request as incompatible with the CAP and maintained that a negotiation on price and 
MDS was sufficient to regulate trade in grains. Thus, the major issue of disagreement 
between the EEC and the big exporters was clear: guarantees of access, and it would be 
this question on which negotiations would concentrate.
11.3 Cereals trade across the Atlantic
As a way of introducing negotiations on grains and to fully appreciate their 
developments and results, it is essential to first illustrate grains patterns of trade across 
the Atlantic. This illustration sheds some light on the difficulties the United States had 
in the negotiations with the EEC and in particular its lack o f bargaining power. 
Agricultural exports to the EEC had a major importance to the USA. Not only did they 
receive about one-third o f US exports to the area but they also had a major relevance in 
US trade surplus. As the three following tables illustrate, despite the volume of trade 
involved in the agricultural sector being inferior to that in the industrial sector, the USA 
exported substantially more than what it imported from the EEC, with the result that in 
1964, out of a total $1,752 million surplus, agricultural surplus represented $700 
million.
T ab le  1: com position  o f US e x p o rts  to  th e  E E C  1961-1965 (in  thousands o f  USS)
SITC 1961 1962 1964 1965
Total exports 3564029 3650009 4590854 5007743
0 Food and live animals 475693 665137 769676 932724
1 Beverages and tobacco 120548 129539 129145 127542
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 745258 613264 830959 757715
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 214127 241729 311382 270463
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 129965 117025 169797 167369
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 370747 379844 512293 544885
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 421932 391049 564035 512049
7 Machinery and transport equipment 830677 936977 1063669 1372238
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 138731 162942 228709 312339
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 14802 12562 11179 10419
Source: S ITC  Classification. Source: O EC D  SITC R ev.2 -  H istorical Series 1961-1990 (Paris: O EC D
2000)
9
Preeg, H.E. p. 152-153; Casadio, pp.117-118. NA Department of State, 1960-1963 CDF, box 872, Telegram CA-2508 
Circular outgoing telegram, 18 April 1962. For the full speech delivered by Baumgartner see NA State Department, CDF 
1960-1963, box 721.
328
Tabic 2: composition of US imports from the EEC 1961-1965 (in thousands of USS)
SITC 1961 1963 1964 1965
Total imports 2225904 2518177 2837977 3329082
0 Food and live animats 119654 118646 122663 129437
1 Beverages and tobacco 66346 76718 83905 87761
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 118127 118462 110783 103876
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 14084 9344 11215 11214
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 11859 11209 11598 14518
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 124450 148158 178204 196830
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 727974 760962 822332 1056697
7 Machinery and transport equipment 616557 706589 850724 990004
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 339263 455856 521896 580856
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 87590 112233 124657 157889
Source: see table 1.
Table 3: composition of US trade balance with the EEC in 1964 (in thousands of $)
SITC
Total imports US Exports to 
from the EEC the EEC Balance
Total trade 2837977 4590854 1752877
0 Food and live animals 122663 769676 647013
1 Beverages and tobacco 83905 129145 45240
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 110783 830959 720176
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 11215 311382 300167
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 11598 169797 158199
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 178204 512293 334089
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 822332 564035 -258297
7 Machinery and transport equipment 850724 1063669 212945
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 521896 228709 -293187
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 124657 11179 -113478
Source: see table 1.
Table 4 illustrates the composition o f the US agricultural exports by major 
commodity involved. The table reveals that the bulk of these exports were in oilseeds, 
wheat and above all feedgrains.
Tabic 4: composition of the US agricultural exports to the EEC by major commodities (thousands 
of US dollars)
Commodity 1958 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Variable-levy commodities
Wheat 79000 46332 173039 50606 63365 67085 70283 107259
Feedgrains 158000 197146 194012 336457 295182 334433 478099 498405
Rice 5854 6894 15035 14247 13399 15378 10139 18823
Beef & veal meat 31 38 49 64 163 1064 1511 647
Pork 400 418 561 341 2061 8624 377 1.334
Lard 2100 2326 3401 2134 2543 2489 1062 1104
Dairy products 1800 2997 2084 3603 22551 54398 30473 1213
Poultry and eggs 364 28551 45835 53479 30.613 31676 30747 236
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Non variable-levy commodities
F ru its  & v e g e ta b le s  71631 57665 69952 93070 102225 88695 106402 91851
O ils e e d s  71052 120245 134294 174028 169860 235840 245208 301624
Unmanufactured tobacco 96452 97003 97384 106609 104983 106877 107738 122690
Feed grains arc those included in the SITC  categories 043 (barley) ,044 (m aize) and 044 (rye and oats). 
O ilseeds includes soybeans. Source: SITC Classification. Source: OECD SITC Rev.2 - Historical Series 
1961-1990 (Paris: OECD 2000) an d  O E C D  Exports, Series B. 1958 and 1960.
To fully appreciate the relevance o f the EEC for US exports in cereals, table 5 
illustrates the major markets o f destination of American cereals and it reveals that the 
EEC was the second market after Japan for wheat and the first market for feedgrains.
Tabic 5 US exports by major destinations in 1965 (in thousands of metric tons)




Developing countries 14,435 1,473
Sino-Soviet bloc 71 416
Other 946 3,774
All countries 19,097 20,875
Source: O EC D  Commodity Trade: Exports, Series C, 1965. Taken from  Preeg, E.H. Traders and  
D iplom ats, p.151.
From these data, it is fully understandable why agriculture in general and cereals 
in particular took a high rank in importance and urgency in the Atlantic alliance. Trade 
in wheat and other grains formed the bulk of the trade in agricultural products between 
the two sides of the Atlantic, and it was indeed for this basic commodity that the EEC 
was setting the CAP and the variable-levy system. With its relevant position in US 
exports and in world trade in general, the EEC was the key to agricultural trade 
liberalization and it posed the major threat to US exports.
Table 4 shows that US exports to the EEC both for wheat and feedgrains had 
increased. For wheat, after a wavering trend from 1958 to 1962, exports began to 
increase again. The fate o f US exports of wheat was conditioned by the fact that for this 
commodity the EEC was largely self-sufficient (Table 6).
Tabic 6: rate of the EEC self-sufficiency in cereals in 1964
EEC Germany France Italy Netherlands BLEU
Wheat 90 70 109 95 32 68
Rye 98 107 103 46 75 69
Barley 84 65 123 48 39 47
Oat 92 91 101 85 68 86
Maize 64 2 105 79 - 1
Average 85 77 110 87 35 51
Source: Istituto Statistico delle  C om unità  europee. A nnuario di statistica agraria. 1970.
The production o f the Six as a whole was adequate to meet EEC demand, which 
remained quite stable at about 27 million metric tons from 1960 to 1965. EEC wheat 
production increased from about 24 million metric tons in 1957-60 to about 28 million 
in 1963-65. Total wheat production was in surplus of demand, and some of this surplus 
was eliminated by subsidized exports. Imports of wheat from the USA were restrained 
by the basic variable levy system to the role of filling any gap between EEC production
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and consumption. Worse, with the implementation of UGP in 1967, the Americans 
feared that their exports could fall. Where the USA seemed to have room to increase 
their exports was for feedgrains. For this commodity, American exports had been 
constantly increasing. Moreover, the EEC was not self-sufficient and there was a 
continuing and marked deficit to be filled by outside producers (Table 6). However, as 
for wheat, in this case too Americans exports were threatened by the UGP. In any case, 
as American exports, both for feedgrains and wheat, were growing, for the US 
negotiators it was difficult to say their exports were being excluded from the EEC 
market and, in fact, as showed in the remainder o f the chapter, the French emphasized 
this trend to the Americans.
Table 7 shows that among the Six, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands were the 
major markets for US exports o f wheat.
T a b le  7: US ex p o rts  o f  w heat to  th e  Six (in  thousands o f US$)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Germany 29171 11819 15901 21892 18355 28068
France 10831 5239 11139 8779 16122 17589
Italy 85718 1751 7971 6085 2664 13187
Netherlands 34729 25569 21121 26632 26602 38099
BLEU 12590 6228 7233 3697 6540 10316
Total 173039 50606 63365 67085 70283 107259
Source: see Tabic 1.
Table 8 shows that, again, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands were the major 
destination markets for US feedgrains exports that were increasing since 1961.
T a b le  8 US ex p o rts  o f feedgrains to th e  Six (in tho u san d s of USS)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Germany 26154 25018 29396 51702 58467 79658
France 184 101 1121 3254 4639 5665
Italy 8133 30765 59436 62687 133311 91079
Netherlands 58860 78774 79957 86211 105457 125571
BLEU 21239 32316 31197 37159 42298 50633
Total 114570 166974 201107 241013 344172 352606
Source: see table 1.
11.4 Cereals trade of the EEC and its proposals for the
commodity agreements in April-May 1965
For the EEC to achieve to a compromise to negotiate over grains in Geneva 
meant holding a Kennedy Round on a smaller scale in Brussels. In fact, its members 
were divided between exporters and importers of cereals. More exactly, only France 
was a significant exporter of grains, while the other countries were all net importers. 
This implied that, for the EEC, the elaboration o f a common position required a difficult 
compromise between the opposing interest o f the exporter, France, and importers, the 
other five, as would then be the case in Geneva. The EEC as a whole was interested in 
regulating trade for cereals through a commodity arrangement and also hoped to gain its 
trading partners’ acceptance of its farm policy. However, along with this common
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interest, differences also existed and were dictated by the opposing positions o f 
importers and exporters.
In 1958, France had entered the EEC with the clear aim of getting preferential 
advantages not only for its industry but also for its agricultural products, and for cereals 
-  wheat and feed grains -  in particular. French cereals were competitive at the EEC 
regional level but were uncompetitive at world level, given the cheaper American, 
Canadian, Australian and Argentine cereals. The level of world price represented an 
obstacle to French agricultural exports and France needed the EEC to purchase French 
agricultural surpluses. France produced substantially more than it could consume, 
particularly of soft wheat, and counted on the CAP to provide a means for disposing o f  
French surpluses. Soft wheat was France’s most serious agricultural trade problem 
posing questions of market access and of the financing of exports and surpluses. French 
wheat was more expensive than Canadian or American and was subsidized to compete 
on the world market. About 90% of French exports went to outside the EEC and given 
that French wheat was uncompetitive on world market, it needed to be heavily 
subsidized to compete, posing huge financial problems. France hoped to shift to the  
greatest extent possible the issue of the financial burden of surplus disposal to EEC  
partners. And to the extent, i f  the effort was successful, it would mean transferring to  
the EEC existing French concerns on surplus wheat disposal on the world market. Thus, 
France aimed, first, at achieving preferential access to the EEC markets to absorb its  
surplus of production and at excluding competitive imports from outside the EEC. 
Second it aimed at achieving financial solidarity in the EEC for its increasing 
production and surplus, which created huge stockpiling costs, and subsidies for exports 
o f French uncompetitive wheat to the world market. In effect, French agricultural costs  
bore heavily on French finances and an EEC solution appeared indispensable to th e  
French government.10
This French aim naturally generated problems in transatlantic relations. T h e  
United States yearned for the maintenance, and possibly the increase, o f its grains o u tle t 
in the EEC, and French goals were clearly incompatible with American ones. A s a  
result, a clear conflict existed between France and the United States over the agricultural 
part of the Kennedy Round, or as Couve de Murvüle noted “the conflict with the US in  
GATT pertains only to the agricultural part o f these negotiations”.11 For the French, th e  
technological revolution on farming which occurred in North America a generation ag o  
and in the UK during the post-war period was only now coming to fruition in France. 
They could not be denied its benefits and if  it led to a long-term change in the pattern o f  
international trade to the detriment of the US and other exporters, this was something 
independent of the Kennedy Round and exporters had to put up with it.12
Despite this basic disagreement, France, like the USA, had a positive interest in  
attending the agricultural part o f the Kennedy Round and, specifically, in agreement an  
international arrangement for cereals. The Round represented, in fact, an opportunity to  
reorganize and stabilize the markets o f basic commodities. Provided that the CAP w as 
not endangered, France was eager to join “toute discussion destiné à mettre fin  à  
l’anarchie qui règle sur le marché international des produits agricoles et elle a été la  
première à proposer des accords mondiaux destinés à stabiliser les cours et le commerce
10 HAEC -  MAEF 50 OW, Réunion Franco-Britannique entre Pompidou et Wilson, 7 July 1966
** Per biografia prendere Milwy rescue e Moravcksik. la citazione è presa da Mrovac. 17 
12
PRO FO 371/183385 Note o f the Tariffs Division '‘The Kennedy Round -  background", 14 October 1964.
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des principaux produits”, including grains, and wheat in particular, were o f fundamental 
importance.13
The basic drive behind the long-standing French interest in world grains 
agreement, as already expressed in the Pisani-Baumgartner plan, was to bring some 
discipline to exchanges through the fixing o f minimum prices for commercial 
transactions. Paris aimed at stabilizing world soft wheat prices at as high a level as 
possible in order to ensure a fair remuneration to producers, reduce the difference 
between French and international prices and, consequently, reduce the need to subsidize 
exports. During the EEC discussions on the common price for cereals, France had 
pushed for fixing a low price, as high prices increased the cost o f exports and 
production. But as, in December 1964, high prices had been fixed, France desired an 
increase of world prices to diminish the difference between the latter and the EEC price 
level.14 Moreover, France believed that the UK, Japan and other developed importing 
countries, plus the whole communist bloc were “getting a free ride” from the existing 
world market system with low import prices for which they made no effort to maintain. 
Hence, in its view, any agreement needed to include provisions whereby “freeloaders” 
assumed some position o f burden of maintenance of any agreement, including possibly 
helping to finance food aid. The additional interest in negotiating a commodity 
agreement was dictated by the need to answer the free-trade demands of the United 
States with a concrete proposal. 15
French aims generated problems not only across the Atlantic but also within the 
EEC as they were in opposition with those of the Five, and those of Italy, Germany and 
The Netherlands in particular. These three governments were reluctant to pay to finance 
French overproduction and surplus, and Germany had already shown to be recalcitrant 
in accepting France’s aim of shifting its financial burden to the EEC. Moreover, these 
three countries were net importers and imported wheat and feedgrains from outside the 
EEC, mainly from North America and Argentina and aimed at continuing to do so. 
They hoped that the Arrangement could guarantee the flow of EEC imports from third 
countries and insisted that the EEC took into consideration the need to maintain a 
reasonable level of imports. This situation among the Six is illustrated by Tables 9 and 
10 which illustrate the French exports to the Five (and the UK so to make a comparison 
with the Five) the Five’s imports from France and Australia, Canada and the United 
States.
13
HAEC -  MAEF 36 OW, Note «Politique européenne de la France -  Questions économique», 17 May 1963; ANF 
724.713, box 4,Premier Ministre, Comité Interministériel pour tes questions de Coopération Economique Européenne, 
Note «Négociations commerciales multilatérales au GATT: secteur agricole», 1 April 1966.
14 ,
ANF 724.70/10 Box 1, Premier Ministre, Comité Interministériel pour les questions de Cooperation Economique
Européenne, Note «Vue d'ensemble sur les négociations commerciales au GATT», 1 April 1966.
15 Telegram 5518 from Bohlen (US Ambassador to France) to State Department, 1 April 1965, NSF, CF Germany, box 
184, LBJL. The French government also had the support of the French farmers. The French farmer groups, the FNSEA 
and the Wheat Producers' Association, while at the beginning of the Kennedy Round had had doubts on these 
negotiations considered merely an American devise to expand exports, in 1965 held that a successful conclusion of the 
Round and in particular a worldwide arrangement on cereals, was of interest of French farmers. NA State Department, 
1964-1966 Subject numeric FT 13-2, box 979, telegram 439 from US Embassy in Paris to State Department, 23 July 
1965, reporting conversation between Bohlen and Jean Clavel (Director of Foreign studies for National Farmers' Union -  
FNSEA), and Henri Mannesson (Director of French Wheat Producers' Association).
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T ab le  9 F ra n c e ’s expo rts  o f  g ra in s  (in  tho u san d s o f  USS)
1961 1964 19 67
W orld
041 W h e a t (including spelt) and m eslin, unmilled 63835 191128 154022
043 Barley, unmilled 88656 158077 183337
04 4 M a iz e  (corn), unmilled 34751 63 9 2 7 12 84 79
045 C erea ls , unmilled ( no w heat, rice, barley or m a ize ) 1874 5455 14467
G erm any
041 W h e a t (including spelt) and m eslin, unmilled 2 4 8 9 5 19074 22864
04 3 Barley, unmilled 12105 36910 63061
044 M a ize  (corn), unmilled 47 66 34364 53029
04 5 C erea ls , unmilled ( no w heat, rice, barley or m a ize ) 636 1435 7889
Italy
041 W h e a t (including spelt) and m eslin, unmilled 5 23 4 1 7 23 2 8 9
04 3 Barley, unmilled 13963 6598 1717
044 M a ize  (corn), unmilled 14258 3714 2101
04 5 C ereals , unmilled ( no  w heat, rice, barley or m a ize ) 171 132 49
Netherlands
041 W h e a t (including spelt) and m eslin, unmilled 21 33 4085 12021
043 Barley, unmilled 5453 29 33 13556
044 M a ize  (corn), unmilled 147 324 44 55
045 C ereals , unmilled ( no w heat, rice, barley or m a ize ) 19 60 475
Belgium -Luxem bourg
041 W h e a t (including spelt) and m eslin, unmilled 92 13373 12237
043 Barley, unmilled 8239 13420 38780
044 M a ize  (corn), unmilled 353 569 9268
045 C ereals , unmilled ( no w heat, rice, barley or m a ize ) 173 1998 3617
United Kingdom
041 W h e a t (including spelt) and m eslin, unmilled 5191 2 5 4 9 6 10052
043 B arley, unmilled 4 5 5 5 2849 2
04 4 M a ize  (corn), unmilled 11495 2577 16938
045 C ereals , unmilled ( no w heat, rice, barley or m a ize ) 266 157 130
Source: see Table 1.
Since the beginning o f the discussions in the Cereals Groups in 1961, the Six 
had been united in refusing the access guarantee which third countries had been 
demanding. In adopting the mandate for the Commission in December 1963, the 
Council o f Ministers had approved the binding of the MDS as an instrument that would 
bring some discipline to world exchanges and, for the basic commodities for which an 
imbalance between supply and solvable demand existed, it had approved the 
negotiations on commodity agreements. Thus, an agreement on basic proposals, 
ambitious and running over the commercial negotiations, existed among the Six. Yet, 
the unity showed in Geneva was fragile in Brussels, and the agreement to negotiate 
along the MDS and set up commodity agreements could not hide the difference aim s 
which were at stake. In December 1963, the Dutch had made a proposal to apply an 
automatic safeguard clause in case the EEC imports fell under a given level in order to 
maintain the level of imports, while the Germans repeated that quantitative assurances 
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preparation o f the Six for the Cereals arrangement became entangled in these 
divergences.16
It was faced with this contrast of interests that on 7 April 1965, the Commission 
presented to the Council o f Ministers its draft for the agreement on grains to be tabled in 
Geneva. As noted, the Commission considered the Kennedy Round to represent a great 
opportunity to regulate agriculture at world level and deemed the commodity agreement 
in grains a first step in this direction. More specifically, the aim of the Commission for 
grains was to promote world cooperation in order to achieve to a balance between 
production and long-term demand, the elimination of short-term fluctuations through an 
enlargement o f existing demand and of international markets, and the increase and 
stabilization o f international prices at an equitable level. The Commission hoped in this 
way also to reconcile the different interests of the Six.17
The proposals of the Commission centered on prices, cooperation to manage 
surplus and binding of the MDS. Regarding prices, it considered that the international 
price of reference simultaneously represented an instrument to determine the support to 
be given to national producers, an instrument to stabilize prices in world exchanges and 
an orientation price of long-term production and exchanges. The proposal consisted of a 
commitment to fix a world price o f reference, and not to sell on the world market below 
it, and to fix the price at a level permitting the most efficient producers to sell on the 
world market without resort to subsidies to exports. This implied an increase of 
international prices so to cover subsidies, as had already been suggested by the 
Baumgartner-Pisani plan. The Commission insisted on the need to give stability to 
world markets, as an instrument to stabilize also the EEC market, and one way to do so 
was to fix and respect an international price of reference. Its proposals for grains prices 
were coherent with what it was suggesting for the CAP. For Mansholt, in fact the CAP 
had to lead to a decrease in subsidies and an increase in farm prices. The international 
price of reference together with the variable levy was needed to stabilize domestic 
markets and world exchanges. And if  third countries respected the international price, 
the levy would not be variable.18
Because of the existence of surpluses, to maintain such a price level the 
Commission plan foresaw limitation and discipline o f global supply through 
consultations among exporters and importers, and engagements to finance stockpiling 
and the disposal of surplus to be shared, within a ceiling, among industrialized 
countries. Parallel with discipline on surplus, the Commission envisaged measures to 
enlarge non-solvent demand in favor o f LDCs through the acceptance of some financial 
responsibilities for a food aid program, like the French proposals of 1961. The common 
financing of the selling off of surpluses and food aid represented one of the major 
elements of the Commission’s proposal.
The third element of the Commission’s proposal was the binding of the MDS: 
the difference between the remuneration effectively obtained by producers and the level 
of the international price of reference was to be calculated and then bound for three 
years. And this consolidation represented an commitment that all governments were to 
take. The creation of acceptable conditions of access also required commitments on the
^  MAEF DE/CE GATT 931 Note «Session du group céréales du GATT», 20 March 1964; ibidem Réunion agricole du 
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different support systems which meant, in turn, commitments on domestic policies. 
These were the three basic elements of the Commission’s proposal, and were fully 
compatible with its vision for trade in agriculture, which required an organization o f  
markets at multilateral level.
At the Council of Ministers meeting of 13 May, the Six reached only a 
framework agreement on the Commission proposals. They deemed these proposals to 
be a good negotiating basis to be presented in Geneva, but in fact differences between 
them existed. However, time to negotiate was limited by the fact that the EEC had to  
table proposal at the end of May, unless it wanted to be accused o f sabotaging the 
Kennedy Round. Thus, under the pressure o f Dutch Minister of Agriculture Biesheuvel 
who pointed out the necessity o f  the EEC to be able to present a proposal, what they 
decided to do was to agree on the agreeable and to postpone other problematic 
aspects.19
The first matter on which the Six were divided was prices. Belgians, Italians, 
Dutch and the Germans opposed the Commission’s proposal as it implied an increase in  
price that would boost production and, consequently, surpluses. Only a price o f  
reference set at the lowest level applied on world markets, without any subsidies, would 
not encourage production. The German Minister o f Economics, Schmuecker, opposed 
the increase also on the ground that it would correspond to a parallel reduction in the 
EEC budget revenues from levies. In contrast, the French Wormser asked for an 
increase in the international price of reference so to  reduce the difference with th e  
internal EEC price and make French wheat more competitive on world market. On top  
of this, France wanted the price to be set at a much higher level in order to increase 
production and to this increase to commonly finance the selling off o f surpluses to  
LDCs, as in the Baumgartner-Pisani plan. And if, clained Wormser, as a consequence o f  
the increase of the international price, the revenues from the custom protection would 
decrease, it was wise to bear in mind that the aim o f  the agricultural policy was not to  
create revenues.
The issue of price was further complicated by the fact that Mansholt had no  
intention to give up on the level o f international prices, so important in the Commission 
vision to organize agriculture on a global scale. International prices had to be set at a  
level that could satisfy soluble demand without subsidies, which required a moderate 
increase in world price. The level had to be remunerative for exporters producing in the  
best conditions and to allow them to export without subsidies. Thus price had not be  
much higher than the existing level of world prices, as the French were demanding, as 
this would stimulate world production, especially in Canada and the United States, and 
also reduce EEC income stemming from levies. The EEC needed to adopt a clear 
direction on this point, otherwise third countries would certainly ask for quantitative 
assurance. Because o f  the need to arrive at a compromise, the Council of Ministers 
decided to simply approve the principle o f an international price o f reference and 
charged the 111 Committee and the COREPER with discussing the issue and 
elaborating a final compromise, while negotiations took place in Geneva.
Divisions among the Six existed also on the Commission proposals to lim it 
global supply. According to the Dutch, these proposals would not be sufficient and 
limits to production were necessary, while for the French measures directly limiting 
production were incompatible with the guiding principles of the CAP, which w ere 
grounded on price mechanisms. The Germans highlighted that the Commission 
proposals did not consider any measure regarding the access conditions to the EEC
19 CM2 1965/30 PV de la 168*"* réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 13-14 May 1965.
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market and that suggestions for the common financing of surpluses would not be 
enough to give satisfaction to exporters. Moreover, the Dutch and the Germans found 
the consultations procedure insufficient to ensure the respect of the reference price and 
asked for more rigorous measures to restore a balance on world market, such as limiting 
production and import quotas.20 Germany, Benelux and Italy criticized the Commission 
suggestion on a food program, inspired to the Pisani-Baumgartner proposals. Being net 
importers, they had no surplus so they did not want to pay for financing the disposal of 
surpluses. Germany, in particular, was already concerned by the high CAP costs, it did 
not want to add new costs, this time for surpluses it had not produced.21
Even if  Paris did not share the Commission plan to finance food aid, it accepted 
the principle o f discipline and responsibility to finance imbalance. Until that time only 
the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, bore the burden o f keeping prices 
stable in world markets. In Geneva, the USA would surely ask importers for 
quantitative commitments on the level of their imports and stocks as a way to maintain 
discipline on world markets. These instruments would lead to the organization o f world 
market on quantity that the EEC, and above all France, wanted to avoid. Thus in the 
absence of quantitative discipline, the French felt that it was dangerous to also refuse 
the financial responsibility to keep the balance of world market. And with such a 
constructive proposal, the Commission would be in a stronger position to refuse to grant 
any concessions to the Americans and, if  the case arose, risk the failure of the 
agricultural part of the Kennedy Round.22.
Because of the lack of time to discuss the Commission proposals, the Six merely 
approved the food aid principle, but without specifying how in practice this had to take 
place and, and like the question o f price, they charged the 111 Committee and 
CEREPER with further studying the issue.23 Thus, the directive approved by the 
Council of Ministers in May 1965, in addition to binding the MDS, consisted in setting 
a minimum and mandatory international price o f reference for commercial exchanges 
and in setting up a food aid program whose cost would be bore by developed countries. 
Therefore the Commission received only vague instructions, but in any case discussions 
in Geneva could start.
11.5 The first round of negotiations in Geneva: the EEC under 
pressure
On 17 May 1965, the EEC, the United States, Australia, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Japan and Argentina tabled their proposals for the commodity agreement. As 
Preeg notes, while in the industrial sector each major participant was both an exporter 
and an importer and had therefore a reciprocal interest in reducing trade barriers, in the 
agricultural sector, and in grains in particular, there was “a large degree of polarization
20
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21
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into exporting and importing countri$s”J  Japan and the EFTA countries were importers, 
the EEC was the largest commercial importer, but France was an export o f soft wheat 
and had major interest in increasing its exports o f feed grains to the EEC. Australia, 
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Argentina were exporters This polarization 
anticipates the reasons why not a great deal was achieved in the end.
Since 1963 Under Secretary of State George Ball had recognized that for the  
USA a Cereals Arrangement was of great importance. It had to lead to the establishment 
o f acceptable access conditions to the markets o f the importing countries and the  
multilateral sharing o f the food aid burden. The EEC harmonization o f grains prices 
could bring about an abrupt drop in US exports as French producers shifted their sales 
from third countries into markets the USA had traditionally dominated, such as 
Germany. Therefore, an Arrangement on cereals was necessary to soften this effect an d  
maintain and possibly increase the US market in the EEC. The Arrangement was so  
important that without it “a major crisis would arise in the Kennedy Round”. T h e  
Americans were aware that they would have to reduce their exports of wheat, as th e  
EEC was almost self-sufficient for this commodity and France had a great surplus, b u t 
Ball held that Europe’s total food requirements were likely to increase as improved 
living standard were reflected in a shift from direct cereal to protein consumption th a t 
would increase EEC demand for feedgrains.24 The US was also concerned that the new  
agreement provided for an equitable sharing o f the responsibility for maintaining w heat 
prices level. Exporters and importers had to share these responsibilities through 
restraints on production required to implement the price and other provisions o f th e  
Cereals Agreement. 25
The US also aimed at setting up a food aid program with the goal not only o f  
sharing the responsibility of helping developing countries but also to contribute to th e  
management of wheat supplies: to the extent that other countries diverted excess 
production to food aid, the food aid program would make room for commercial im ports 
and reduce the pressure on export markets. This request was central in the US plan fo r  
the cereals agreements. The USA was heavily contributing to the food aid program and  
support from the EEC and other importers would not only be able to alleviate the U S  
burden, but could also make room for US exports on the markets of importers and keep  
the EEC surplus out of commercial markets.26 In addition to the commercial sales to  
industrially advanced countries, primarily EEC and Japan, the USA exported la rg e  
quantities of wheat as non-commercial sales under the Food for Freedom Program — 
Public Law 480. The food aid program had been a major component of US foreign 
assistance since the end of WWII. Originally, it had the dual purpose of meeting foreign 
policy objectives -  by responding to food need abroad -  and to the domestic need to  
export large US stocks of agricultural products, accumulated as an undesired result o f  
domestic farm policy.27
The need to negotiate a cereals agreement that could guarantee access to th e  
EEC market increased after the EEC set common prices for grains at a high level. T he 
USA had tried to different degrees to influence the implementation of the CAP. T hey 
had asked for the prices to be fixed at a low level and that this level be negotiated in 
Geneva before being adopted in Brussels. Then with the final setting of UGP in
24
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December 1964, and with the likely increase of EEC production stimulated by its high 
price, for Washington the commodity agreement became an instrument to protect its 
exports to the EEC. The United States agreed for the EEC to make proposals on grains 
according to the MDS, but the mere binding of the level of support would not be 
sufficient to ensure the flow of US exports. With the EEC variable levy system, imports 
into the EEC would be taxed so to ensure that imports would not have a lower price 
than the EEC prices. As a result, efficiency and competition would not play any role in 
EEC imports. For this reason, Washington asked for other provisions to ensure 
continued access to the EEC market and an opportunity to share in the growth of 
consumption. The EEC had to reduce its internal price and undertake a program to limit 
its own cereals production, otherwise, the USA would demand some form of access 
commitment in the form o f quantitative assurance.28
At the end o f May 1965, the GATT members started the long and extenuating 
negotiations on the Cereals Arrangement that would be completed only in the last hours 
of the Round in May 1967. For the Commission, these negotiations on grains were 
crucial not only to implement the kind of organization of world trade it supported, but 
also to affirm its role as negotiating agent of the EEC. As noted, the Cereals Group had 
been set up in November 1961, and both the Commission and EEC Member States 
could attend with speaking rights. At a meeting of the Group in 1963, the Commission 
showed up flanked by representatives of member states and its representative were 
“very anxious not to state anything in any way that would upset the representatives of 
the six member countries sitting behind him. So it was not only difficult to make a 
decision but even to make a statement”.29 The aim of the Commission was therefore not 
only to silence Member States, but also to get rid of their presence. In effect, the French 
officials of DG Agriculture, Rabot and Malvé, who conducted the negotiations, thanks 
to their ability to master the technical issues and defend EEC interests, were 
progressively able to achieve such aims.
Discussions in Geneva concentrated on three major issues: access, international 
prices and food aid. The three issues were inter-related even if debate centered on the 
most difficult one, namely access. Exporters were critical of EEC offers to bind the 
MDS given to cereal producers. In view of the high level of EEC prices, exporters 
considered this offer of little value, unless it was supplemented by a firm undertaking to 
provide access for a definitive volume of imports. With its proposals based on the MDS, 
and no specific access assurance guarantee, the EEC came under pressure from the 
exporting countries. Blumenthal requested specific engagements, such as the reduction 
of UGP, direct measures to limit production and quantitative guarantees for imports. In 
general, Blumenthal wanted importers to undertake a clear commitment to maintain the
level of imports plus the possibility for the exporters to share in the growing
• 10consumption.
Malvé, representing the Commission in this first round of discussion, defended 
the EEC position by referring to trade data. Since 1957, the EEC’s self-sufficiency rate 
-  the ratio o f total production to total domestic consumption -  had remained stable at 
86%, and net imports at 10 million of tons. For the period 1969-1972 the EEC had the 
aim o f maintaining its self-sufficiency rate at the 86% level, and the 10 million of tons 
of imports. In this sense, the consolidation of MDS was an indirect means to control
28
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production and maintain this level of imports. On top of this, Malvé expressed the 
irritation of the Commission for the development o f the negotiations. While the EEC 
was ready to make commitments, following the lead o f the USA, exporters kept on 
repeating what importing countries had to do to satisfy exporters’ interests but had not 
yet clarified the commitments they were willing to take, in particular concerning their 
domestic policy. The Commission official, supported by the British, warned the 
exporting countries that the consideration of exporters’ interests only, without the 
parallel consideration o f importers’ interests, would not lead to reciprocal concessions 
but to the break up o f the negotiations. Blumenthal refused Malvé’s approach on 
reciprocal concessions. According to him, the cereals agreement was to be placed in the 
context o f the Kennedy Round, thus reciprocity was to be considered to be global 
reciprocity. And, in any case, i f  the EEC aim was to maintain the relations between 
production and imports, it was useful to write this in the agreement, noted Blumenthal. 
In this first round of discussion this request was not picked up, but as illustrated below, 
it would indeed be on this suggestion that the Commission would complete its proposals 
in May 1966.31
As for the international price, agreement to keep this element in the 
Arrangement, as had been the case for the IWA o f 1949, was accompanied with 
profound disagreement on the level o f prices. This issue, however, did not put the EEC 
and the USA in direct confrontation. The Commission presented its conception of prices 
and suggested a moderate increase in the level o f international price.32 Japan and the 
United Kingdom firmly refused to increase the level o f the international price as they 
opposed paying higher prices for their imports. Exporters had mixed feelings and were 
divided. Higher prices would stabilize and perhaps increase exports revenues and for 
this reason were supported by Canada, Argentina and Australia, but a rigid and 
unrealistically high level of world price might encourage additional production and 
require production restrains or a market sharing system for commercial markets, and, 
for this reason, was opposed by the USA, who bore the major burden o f maintaining the 
level of price. For feedgrains, the USA strongly resisted an arbitrary increase in prices 
that might weaken its strong price-competitive position in this growing market. 
Consequently, the USA considered the preferred solution to be a form of agreed price 
range related to normal trading conditions.
On food aid, the EEC and the USA agreed that the Cereals Arrangement had to  
contain a food aid program, but differed on how to set up it. The USA wanted a flat 
annual commitment independent o f commercial market conditions while the 
Commission preferred a food aid related to disposal of surplus production. On the 
contrary Japan and United Kingdom were very reluctant to contribute to the food aid 
program that would benefit exporting countries, but would increase their financial 
responsibility. Food aid concerned countries with a surplus, not importers.33
This first round o f discussions, that lasted until November 1965, served mainly 
to present positions in Geneva. Despite the differences, a clear willingness to conclude 
an Agreement existed, as both the EEC and the USA had a strong trade interest in 
setting it up. However, any meaningful negotiation stopped dead when the EEC was
31
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caught up in the crisis o f the empty chair. The continuation needed the Commission to 
receive directives from the Council o f Ministers completing the mandate of May 1965. 
Thus, in November, the negotiations were suspended, with the EEC under heavy 
pressure from exporters to improve its offers.34
11.6 Completing the EEC mandate: an accurate balance of 
diverging trade interests
The six months o f stalemate in Brussels from July 1965 to January 1966 
deadlocked the Kennedy Round above all in agriculture, that was already lagging 
behind negotiations in the industrial sector. After the Luxembourg meetings of January 
1966, the Six urgently needed to complete the mandate to the Commission to negotiate 
in Geneva over grains. As shown in chapter 8, the marathon that led to the approval of 
the EEC negotiating mandate took place from February until the end o f July 1966 and 
ran parallel to the approval of the CAP financial regulations.
The firm opposition of exporters to negotiate only on the MDS and the interest 
the EEC had in concluding the agreement on cereals pushed the Commission and the 
Member States to have a more flexible approach and to integrate their May 1965 
proposals with new elements that could meet requests o f exporters. Immediately after 
the Luxembourg meetings in January 1966, the Commission was firm in emphasizing to 
the Member States the need to rapidly complete the EEC negotiating mandate for the 
Arrangement. In this way, the gap between the pace of the negotiations in the industrial 
and agricultural sector could be closed and the EEC could show its willingness to 
successfully conclude the Round. The need to complete the mandate was also dictated 
by the fact that grains were the basic commodities and their treatment would condition 
the outcome for the other commodities. Thus without progress on grains the entire
' i t
agricultural sector was stonewalled.
In elaborating its additional proposals, the Commission considered the flexibility 
that needed to be injected into the EEC position and the fact that, without some form of 
access commitment, exporters would not be willing to negotiate any form of agreement. 
According to Rey, if the EEC were able to add a reasonable provision for access, the 
Americans would be able to embark on a negotiating with a good prospect of success.36 
At the same time, the Commission had to keep in mind that Germany, worried about the 
financial incidence of the CAP, continued to be hostile towards common financing of 
surpluses and the food aid program. Nor Couve de Murville was enthusiastic about the 
Commission’s proposals. The principle of a common financing at international level 
implied a political solution which had to do with aid to the developing countries and 
therefore did not fall within the responsibility o f the EEC, and was instead a matter of 
foreign policy for Governments.37 The Commission had also to consider the Italian, 
German and Dutch opposition to increasing world prices for this would stimulate 
overproduction, making importing countries the principle contributors to finance 
disposal of surpluses created by exporters, reduce EEC revenues from the levies on 
imports and put the EEC industry of transformation o f cereals products in an
34
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unfavorable competitive position as it would be obliged to buy the raw commodities at 
higher prices than exporters.38
At the end of March, the Commission started presenting proposals to complete 
decisions left open since May 1965.39 Along the principles already illustrated at the 
Council o f Ministers o f May 1965 -  to fix the international price of reference at an 
equitable and profitable level, that would not provoke the formation o f the surpluses, 
and that would permit countries that produced with the best economic conditions to sell 
on world market without recurring to governmental subsidies to exports -  Mansholt 
proposed an increase in wheat price by 4-5 dollars a ton. The average o f the price of the 
quality o f wheat, Red Winter No. II United States (FOB Baltimore) for 1962/1965 o f 
$60,5 for tons had to be increase by $4,5 and the final level of $65 would represent the 
international price of reference. For feedgrains, the Commission proposed only a partial 
and limited readjustment, as the support granted to them in the different producing 
countries was generally less important than for wheat and the majoirty of feedgrains 
entered the world market without export subsidies, apart from the exceptions of the 
EEC and South Africa. The Commission suggested a limited readjustment varying from 
0 to 3$ for the different kind o f feedgrains in order not to disrupt the existing relation 
between wheat and feedgrains prices, following the increase o f international price for 
wheat.
In the 1965 discussion in Geneva, the Commission was faced with the strong 
demand for access guarantees. In order to be flexible and meet in some way third 
countries’ request, the Commission elaborated new proposals in the hope of actively 
restarting negotiations in Geneva and, at the same time, stopping any requests for access 
guarantees. Picking up what Blumenthal had indicated in the first round of discussions 
in Geneva, the Commission suggested a mechanism to set the individual responsibility 
o f each government, importers and exporters alike, for surpluses on the basis of the self- 
sufficiency rate to be bound for three years. If it were exceeded, as an automatic 
corrective instrument, the Parties of the Agreement would set up mandatory 
consultations to discuss appropriate market-reorganization measures and automatic 
mechanisms to limit the supply with a policy o f stock or the enlargement of the demand 
through the multilateral food aid program. This obligation would create an effective 
financial deterrent to excess production and make room for the maintenance of a normal 
trade flow. In the Commission plan, food aid was not only an instrument to help 
countries with low revenues, but was also an instrument to find and maintain the general 
balance o f  the grains market through the enlargement o f global demand, and to underpin 
access commitments. Moreover, what the Commission had in mind, through the penalty 
provisions, was to confront the EEC Member States with the costs of their own 
domestic policies. With these proposals, Mansholt and Rabot hoped to give the USA 
enough reassurance on the fate o f it’s the latter’s exports to the EEC and, at the same 
time, rapidly gain the approval o f the Six in order to start negotiating in Geneva.40
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The Commission hopes to rapidly gain the approval of the Six were short-lived. 
The French also presented a plan to for the Agreement on cereals, and, what is more, a 
plan that had nothing in common with the Commission’s stances, and consequently 
slowed progress in Brussels. At the Council of Ministers meeting of 21 March, Edgar 
Faure, the French minister o f Agriculture, presented a photocopy of the Baumgartner- 
Pisani plan. Faure claimed that, in the Commission proposals, food aid had only the 
residual role o f eliminating surpluses that could not be absorbed otherwise. In contrast, 
the discussion over grains in Geneva had to allow the EEC to define its general 
conception o f agricultural and food aid policy. Hence, the Agreement had to be 
considered from two points of view: trade among soluble countries and the concrete 
assistance to LDCs. This approach required the increase of the international price by a 
higher rate than that suggested by the Commission, $10 a ton for wheat and $3 for 
feedgrain cereals in order to increase production to a level sufficient to cover food 
requirements o f the LDCs. From the French point of view, this plan had the advantage 
of reducing the difference between world price and the EEC price, thereby making 
French exports more competitive worldwide.41
Italy, Germany and the Benelux countries rejected the French plan. They wanted 
only a small increase for wheat and no increase at all for secondaty grains. Moreover, it 
put on the shoulder of importers, who had to pay higher price for their imports, the 
burden of the food aid. The Germans also opposed the plan because it increased the 
international price and decreased the revenues from levies on imports. The strongest 
opposition came from The Netherlands. Biesheuvel claimed that the French proposal 
raised a question of political choice. The Western world had to decide whether to 
follow, at world level, an agricultural policy adapted to the solvable demand or to carry 
through production and price policies adapted to the larger need of world population. 
The French proposal showed a real interest for humanitarian needs, but was also 
extremely favorable to producing countries. And for Biesheuvel, the Western countries 
had to contribute to the improvements of the living conditions of LDCs through a policy 
of aid in the field of technical assistance and investments so to allow to these countries 
to develop. While Italy, Germany and the Benelux countries rejected French proposals, 
they welcomed the Commission suggestions as good basis for negotiations. Even if 
Germany was no so enthusiastic about the financial involvement, it fully welcomed the 
binding of the self-sufficiency rate as a device to meet the requests of third countries. 
Italy, Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands asked for some reductions in the level of 
price of wheat and for no modification in the price of secondary cereals, while 
Luxembourg asked for higher prices, but in general they all agreed with the 
Commission suggestion to organize world trade in cereals.42
From the end of March until the middle o f June, the efforts o f the Five and the 
Commission were concentrated on convincing the French to accept the Commission’s 
proposals. The Five and the Commission restated their opposition to the French 
proposals, regarded as being too ambitious and complex to be negotiated as a part of the 
Kennedy Round. In particular, Fanfani, Italian Foreign Minister, held that the French 
proposals risked widening the debate on cereals to include questions that went beyond 
the Kennedy Round. The issue o f agriculture as a part o f the imbalance that existed
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between North and South of the world belonged to the United Nations, while the issue 
o f balance between production and consumption belonged to GATT. And solutions that 
would frustrate the producing capabilities of the LDCs and increase their dependence on 
the developed countries were to be avoided.43 France, however, remained unmoved. 
Actually, its opposition to the Commission plan was not only based on the fact that the 
reference price was too low and food aid was treated as a commercial problem rather 
than as a political one. Couve de Murville held that the Commission’s suggestion for a 
self-sufficiency rate represented an access guarantee to third countries to which France 
had always been firmly opposed.44 The outcome o f  the EEC discussions on grains 
depended mainly on the French who, as Lahr put it, were “alone in support of their 
extravagant plan for food aid” .45
The French, however, had no intention of being inflexible. They were aware that 
a compromise with the Five was needed if the EEC was to show up in Geneva with a 
constructive position that would oppose the American request for quantitative 
assurance. If, as a consequence o f  the Six’s disagreement, the Commission showed up 
in Geneva without constructive proposals, the Americans would insist on quantitative 
assurances or limit of EEC production, so dear to the Dutch and the Germans.46 In 
effect, at the Council of Ministers meeting o f the mid-May 1966, the French made a 
step towards the Commission proposals. France found itself completely isolated against 
the pressure of the Five and Commissioner Rey. And against these pressures and the 
unwillingness to consider the French proposals as a negotiating basis for Geneva, Faure 
backed off from previous unrealistic position of massive increase in world cereals 
prices, making a considerable step in the Commission’s direction. In fact, renouncing 
the $10 increase in the price of cereals, France gave up its plan. Under the Luxembourg 
Presidency’s suggestion, the Council of Ministers adopted a $2,5-3,5 range a ton for the 
increase o f the international price o f wheat and no increase for feedgrains.47
But if  Faure had given up on price he had no intention of doing so on self- 
sufficiency rate, surpluses and food aid. The notion of self-sufficiency rate was 
especially objected to as, in the French view, it represented a sort of access guarantee to 
third countries and, most importantly, froze the existing situation regarding the flow o f 
imports, while nothing justified that an economic unit refusing to produce the quantities 
o f cereals necessary to meet its own demand. Rey tried to convince the French, noting 
that Commission did not suggest a unilateral commitment to imports, but a multilateral 
system under which governments could go beyond the rate, even if they would be 
financially responsible. Rey also warned that the Commission proposals had to be 
urgently approved so to have a bargaining position for Geneva, and refused Faure’s 
suggestion to start negotiating in GATT only on the basis of the MDS and the 
international price of reference. The Commission plan represented an interdependent 
unit that could not be divided and, in any case, the mechanism elaborated by the 
Commission to introduce concerted discipline between importers and exporters was the
43
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most important element of the EEC proposals. In the end, faced with Faure’s refusal to 
agree to the Commission suggestions and Rey’s refusal to start negotiating in Geneva 
on the ground of the elements already stated, discussions moved to the 111 
Committee.48
To try to move the French, the Commission diluted its proposals so to meet 
French preoccupations, but without changing the substance. Together with the 111 
Committee and the COREPER, the Commission elaborated a modification of its 
proposals concerning the relations between the self-sufficiency rate, and financial 
responsibility, giving up the direct link the direct link between exceeding of the rate and 
the financial responsibility which would exist only if surplus were created on world 
markets. In this way, the self-supplying rate had not the role of determining EEC 
production but rather to determine the basis of its financial responsibility for disposal of 
surpluses, if surpluses arose.49
Despite the new proposals made to meet the French position, at the Council of 
Ministers meeting of 26 May, discussions went badly. Faure could not accept them and 
restated the same French opposition to the self-sufficiency rate, and the same French 
vision of the reorganization of markets and food aid. Faure rejected the notion that the 
EEC had to accept financial responsibility for surpluses pointing out the paradox that an 
economic unit as the EEC, which was an importer and whose production did not cover 
its consumption, should contribute to surpluses on the world market. France’s problem 
in accepting the Commission’s proposals was that the self-sufficiency rate could set a 
limit to its production. What had to be resolved therefore was how to allow France to 
increase its production and how to share the financial responsibility for the surplus.50
“Faure’s filibuster”, as the Dutch described it, irritated the Dutch Minister 
Biesheuvel and the led to sharp and open criticism of the French and a warning that the 
financial regulation for the CAP could be endangered if the French continued opposing 
progress in the Kennedy Round.51 Together with the Dutch irritation and warning, 
however, existed also the inclination of the Commission and the Germans to 
compromise. In order to meet French worries on the possibility of the EEC increasing 
its production level without been financially responsible, Commissioner van der 
Groeben proposed the introduction of some further flexibility with the setting up of a 
rate o f self-sufficiency which would allow some margin for increases in production. 
This meant that the rate was to be fixed at a higher rate than the existing one in 1966, so 
to give the EEC room to increase its production level.
Despite the Commission’s willingness to compromise, Faure remained evidently 
evasive. As a result, at the end of May, none of the Five and the Commission had a clear 
idea as to how French would play the grains issue. The Five and the Commission feared 
that Paris would withhold agreement so it could use the grains proposal for bargaining 
purposes in the envisaged July package deal where the final CAP decisions would be 
taken. They felt that the Quai d’Orsay regarded the French acceptance of the self- 
sufficiency rate as major concession for which the French should extract concessions
4 8 .  .
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within the EEC, so delaying agreement for later bargaining use over the CAP. Faced 
with what were considered French delaying tactics, the Germans were becoming 
impatient and were considering submitting a substitute for Commission proposals, the 
core of which would be the consultation procedure to deal with the question of access. 
Bonn was stopped by the Americans who ruled out an agreement based on loose 
consultation, and held that the self-sufficiency rate could provide basis for serious 
discussion in Geneva.53
Actually, Faure’s performance was not solely dictated by the need to get 
counter-concessions, but was designed to mask differences within the French 
government. While Faure was still sticking to his plan and the Ministry of Agriculture 
was interested in increasing productivity and production, the Quai d’Orsay feared 
overproduction and was anxious to put a brake to the line of the Minister of 
Agriculture.54 Thus, while the French were holding a compromise in Brussels, in Paris 
the situation was evolving. The French Foreign Minister was leaning more and more to 
accepting the Commission proposal for self-sufficiency rate as at least a basis o f 
discussion and soft-pedaling or abandoning the MDS approach, for which he had never 
been an enthusiastic supporter. On top o f this, the French realized the financial 
regulations might be imperiled if they did not move on the Kennedy Round. Before 
engaging in an internal fight, the French Minister of Foreign Affaires questioned 
Washington to know whether the USA would be willing to negotiate on the basis of the 
Commission proposals. US Ambassador in Paris, Bohlen, who believed that the French 
were negotiating fairly and not stonewalling, assured him that the Commission proposal 
could be an acceptable basis.55 In the meantime, Rabot and Maijolin made considerable 
headway in bringing Faure and the French government around to accepting the self- 
sufficiency rate, with the provision that certain elements such as the food aid program, 
so dear to the French, were be strengthened.56
In early June, the Quai d’Orsay line eventually prevailed thanks also to the 
flexibility of the Commission. At the 111 Committee meeting of 9 June the French 
delegation accepted the self-sufficiency rate. The Six agreed that the self-sufficiency 
rate would not limit production but rather bring into play the financial responsibility o f  
the EEC, in case the rate was exceeded and a surplus created. Thus, in theory, a country 
could produce as much as it wished provided it did not perturb the world market. The 
country that had exceeded the rate o f self-sufficiency and created surplus could chose 
whether to stock the surpluses or use them for food aid, but a minimum part had to be 
used to this second aim.
On the basis o f the broad agreement reached at the 111 Committee level, the 
Council of Ministers meeting o f 13-14 June finally took the most important decision, 
defining the rate of self-sufficiency at a higher level than the existing one, as van der
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Groeben had suggested. As the Germans put it, “the Council played number game".58 
On the basis o f  the 85-86% existing rate, Mansholt suggested a 88-89% rate. Faure 
responded with 95% and then, given the negative reaction o f the Five and Commission, 
proposed 90%. Germans suggested 87-88%. As a way to compromise, the Luxembourg 
Presidency proposed to accept the French suggestion of 90%. All governments, except 
the Dutch, accepted the compromise. The Netherlands objected on the ground that this 
would mean a reduction o f EEC imports from the ten million tons to six to seven 
million tons. Mansholt recognized that 90% was too high and that he would have to 
come back to the Council for a modified mandate later, but for the moment the urgency 
dictated making an offer of some kind and starting bargaining in Geneva. Biesheuvel 
did not back down and every effort to persuade him to accept 90% failed. However, 
because of the interest the Commission had in immediately starting negotiations in 
Geneva, Biesheuvel declared that “sa delegation ne compte pas faire obstable à un 
accord qui pourrait se dégager au sein du Conseil. Dans ces conditions, il declare que sa 
delegation s’abstient de prendre position en ce qui concerne la fixation du taux d’auto­
approvisionnement de la Communauté à 90% étant toutefois entendu que sa délégation 
reconnaît être liée par la décision qui interviendrait”. Thus the decision was adopted 
with Dutch abstention.59
In the middle o f June 1966, after considerable and extenuating internal 
discussions, another important batch o f the EEC mandate for cereals was added. It 
provided that the EEC self-sufficiency rate would be bound for three years at 90%. The 
self-sufficiency was a means to discourage requests of access guarantees, which were 
incompatible with the CAP, and to make all producing countries responsible for the 
balance of world cereals markets. The specific commitment, however, was very loose: 
the self-sufficiency rate was offered at a level significantly higher that the existing level, 
the duration o f the binding would be in the order o f three years, with no guarantee after 
that time, the commitment was conditional on a global surolus, and the operation o f the 
commitment was, therefore, indirect and somewhat vague. 0
After having agreed on the notion of self-sufficiency rate, the last and crucial 
obstacle that remained to be discussed at the Council of Ministers of mid-June was 
represented by the financing of surpluses and the food aid program. Two issues were to 
be adopted: the principle EEC financial responsibility and the share of such 
responsibility. Following the compromise of the Presidency and the Commission the 
expenditure for exceeding the self-supplying rate would be “EEC expenditure” to be put 
on the Guarantee section o f the FEOGA. This last decision came to touch upon a crucial 
issue that was discussed in that period in Brussels, namely the high financial burden of 
the CAP, to which Germany had abundantly showed its opposition. Bonn was not 
willing to assume more financial burdens and was apprehensive about the financial cost 
of the Cereals Agreement. By contrast, France wanted the principle of EEC 
responsibility to be approved. Being the only exporter within the EEC, France was the 
country likely to have surplus. Thus it wanted to be sure the EEC would pay for it in the 
such an eventuality. And given the recalcitrance Germany had already demonstrated in 
the approval of the financial regulations of the CAP, its agreement to the financing of 
the surplus could not be taken for granted. Faure and Couve de Murville made crystal 
clear that they would not permit the start of the discussions in Geneva unless it was
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clear in Brussels who would pay and how much. Initially, German Minister o f 
agriculture, Hoecherl, tried to escape German financial responsibility claiming that as 
his country was a big importer, it would not create any surplus. As he put it, the 
question was “dans quelle mesure un pays comme l’Allemagne pourrait être tenu pour 
responsable de la situation ainsi créée”. Mansholt’s reply was simple: a lot. The level o f 
production within a Member State was the result o f the common agricultural policy and, 
in particular, of the level of common price for cereals that had resulted from a 
compromise in which Germany played a major role. Thus the responsibility of the 
increase o f production in a Member State had to be taken by the EEC. The Germans had 
wanted high prices that would stimulate French production and now they had to bear the 
consequences. In the context o f Mansholt’s firm claim, the COREPR meeting of 17 
June finally approved the principle o f EEC financial responsibility.61
The last piece o f the agreement, the share o f expenditure among the Six, was 
reached at the Council o f Ministers of the end of July 1966 on the basis o f firm German 
proposals. The EEC would finance up to a ceiling o f 500.000 tons exceeding the self- 
sufficiency rate, and within this limit the expenditure resulting from food aid would be  
financed by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). For 
quantities exceeding this limit, the Council o f Ministers would be called to take further 
decisions and envisage a different sharing than the EAGGF basis for the allocation o f  
the financial expenditures. Moreover, against the exceeding of the limit the Six would 
be automatically drawn in a discussion over the CAP, opening the way to a full 
discussions o f the costs and the evolution o f this common policy. For Germany, this 
was a method to limit its commitment to financing the surpluses that France would 
cause. France, aware o f German apprehension for the costs of the CAP, and that some 
reassurances to Bonn were necessary, acquiesced to German proposals.62
The end of the July Council o f Ministers meeting concluded the EEC 
preparation for the cereals negotiations in Geneva. The reaching of the final agreement 
took several Council of Ministers meetings and prolonged negotiations between the 111 
Committee and the Commission, which played a key role. Such negotiations were 
madedifficult by the need on the part of the Six to compromise their diverging interests. 
But, as it had already occurred in the industrial sector, the necessity to get to Geneva 
with a common position in order to attend the Round as a unit pushed the Six to make 
concessions to each other and achieve a final position.
11.7 The second round of negotiations in Geneva
While the Six were taking their decisions, exporters too were taking theirs. And 
like the EEC, exporters arrived at the conclusion that some flexibility had to be 
employed in order to arrive at the Arrangement. They realized that the CAP would be 
permanently established and that the Kennedy Round was the only forum where a 
reasonable accommodation to defend their interest might be secured. Thus, an 
agreement on cereals remained paramount. On top of this, another significant factor 
acted to somewhat change US priority, namely the recent trends in world grain 
production. US food aid burdens had increased substantially, particularly to India, 
depleting American wheat stocks to the point where the US government, in the summer 
o f 1966, was forced to reactivate half of its idle croplands to meet anticipated needs.
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Under these circumstances a joint response to food aid became far more urgent than it 
had been a few years earlier. From 1961 to 1966, US reserve stocks were steadily drawn 
down at the rate of 14 million tons per year, but this trend did not really cause alarm 
until India had successive droughts in 1965 and 1966 that coincided with a poor Russian 
harvest. A multilateral food aid program had become more essential than ever for 
Washington. As Blumenthal noted, the main American concern was to avoid a situation 
where the United States contributed to supply the great bulk of food aid to the LDCs 
while the other developed countries took over the commercial market. Any Community 
food aid contribution would help the Americans to maintain the US share of the EEC 
market by siphoning off grains that would otherwise be consumed in preference to 
American grain. World prices in commercial grain markets, moreover, had steadily 
augmented so that a moderate increase, at least in the existing minimum world price for 
wheat appeared not to have the potential to be disruptive.63
In view of the second round o f discussions that were supposed to start once the 
EEC had finally tabled its agricultural offers at the end of July, the principal exporting 
countries -  United States, Canada, Australia and Argentina -  tried to coordinate their 
proposals to be submitted in Geneva, in order not to present contradictory ones and to 
direct efforts towards common objectives. Yet, divisions existed among them and such 
coordination was complicated. While they, naturally, agreed on the need to obtain 
access assurance, on the requirements that importers and exporters alike cooperated to 
maintain the level of international price by restraining production, and on food aid, they 
could not agree on the level of international prices. The US indicated that it would be 
able to support an increase in the price range but not up to the level requested by 
Canada and Australia. Washington feared that, as was already happening, the major 
burden to maintain the international price level would be borne by American shoulders, 
and therefore was not in favour of a major increase of price level. Most importantly, the 
USA resisted the tough Australian pressure to increase the price as this would undercut 
US exports to the Japanese market, to the benefit of the more expensive Australian 
grains. This division among exporters lasted until the very end of the Kennedy Round in 
May 1967, and ran parallel to the USA-EEC confrontation.64
With the tabling of the EEC proposals at the end of July 1966, negotiations on 
grains eventually got started. Discussion concentrated on the new proposals of the EEC 
and in particular on the o f self-sufficiency rate. While the Six were negotiating in 
Brussels over the self-sufficiency rate in May 1966, Blumenthal had made it known to 
the Commission that he considered the self-sufficiency rate, linked directly to surplus 
disposal obligations, as the best prospect for a solution to the cereals issues. The French, 
however, were still holding out against the acceptance o f any proposals which would 
place penalties on the unrestricted growth of domestic production, and the Americans 
had hoped that the Commission would bring pressure to bear, so that the EEC could 
table offers along these lines.65 However when the Commission presented its final 
proposals, together with a similar offer by the United Kingdom, the concept o f self-
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sufficiency had been retained in a such a weak way such as to make it devoid of 
economic significance and, consequently, unacceptable to the United States and other 
grains exporters. First, the offer was to bind the ratio at a level substantially above the 
existing o f self-sufficiency rate, and only for three years, with the result that by the time 
there would be any reasonable possibility o f the binding becoming effective, the 
commitment would have expired. Second, the EEC proposed the adoption of self- 
sufficiency percentage, with the intention that, if  and to the extent that new surpluses 
rose in any season, the country exceeding its percentage had to withhold from the 
market an amount corresponding to the surplus. Thus, contrary to the requests o f  
exporters, there was no automatic link between the exceeding of the rate and corrective 
measures, because such would correspond to a quantitative guarantee that the EEC 
refused to give. Third, exporters wanted precise access commitments on the link 
between respective growth in consumption and imports so that imports could increase 
along with the increase in consumption levels. Finally, the rate, according to the EEC, 
was to be applied also to exporters, but in fact, this rate would not make sense for 
exporters. The self-sufficiency rate had to assume a quantitative meaning to be applied 
only to importers, while exporters would bear obligations only in the case in which 
prices on the world market fell to the level o f the minimum price. And for them this 
represented as an equitable commitment between exporters and importers. The EEC and 
the British offers were therefore considered completely meaningless in trade terms. 
Exporters analyzed the self-sufficiency rate from the point of view of creating 
reasonable access conditions and growth in exchanges, which meant assurance o f  
market access, an assurance that the EEC proposals did not give. What the USA was 
looking for with the Cereals Arrangement was to gain the firmest possible guarantees o f  
access, in return for which it was prepared to make concessions in other sectors of the 
Kennedy Round, and the EEC proposals, even if improved, did not give them what they 
wanted. Given this situation, the aim of the exporters became to turn the self-sufficiency 
rate into a firm guarantee of access by proposing that it should apply only to importers, 
by omitting the proviso that it operated only when new surpluses rose and thereby 
transforming it into an automatic mechanism, and by fixing each importers’ ratio at the 
average actually achieved in a recent base period. 66
As for the other elements o f the EEC offers, the USA appreciated the fact that 
the EEC had suggested a moderate increase in wheat price, but opposed the setting o f  
reference price for feedgrains. Washington looked mainly at these commodities to  
enhance its exports to the EEC, and refused to set a minimum price. As for food aid, the 
EEC proposals linked food aid to surplus disposal. In contrast, the USA refused such a 
link and wanted a specific program for LDCs, with each participant’s contribution to the 
program clearly defined. The USA pushed for a food aid program based on a fixed 
quantity program whose costs would be divided between exporters and importers 
according to their economic strength. It suggested a food aid program of 10 million tons 
a year to which it would contribute 40%. Herter and Freeman emphasized to Rey and 
Rabot the importance of food aid in its own right, and Freeman made clear that a  
situation in which the US gave massive food aid to LDCs, while others retained 
commercial markets would be impossible. To sum up, the USA held that the EEC
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tabled improved offers, but negotiations in Geneva were still a long way from an 
arrangement that would achieve American aims on access and food aid.68
Faced the exporters’ attitude to the self-sufficiency rate, the Commission 
negotiator Malvé categorically excluded that the EEC could give quantitative assurance. 
The self-sufficiency rate was not an engagement o f access by importers, but rather a 
devise to determine particular obligations in case surpluses created imbalance on the 
world market. The Commission also underlined that domestic policies of exporters had 
to also be possible topics o f discussion in the negotiations. As for prices, exporting 
countries continued to look at price as it was established under the existing International 
Agreement on Wheat, while the EEC wanted to replace this notion with an international 
price o f reference to be respected so to bind the level of domestic support for grains. In 
any case, the positive aspect was that both exporters and importers agreed to set up an 
international price. On food aid, the EEC continued to claim that the Kennedy Round 
was not the right forum to deal with food aid. The aim of the Agreement was to define a 
new order for the world market and food aid had to be dealt with in connection to 
surpluses. To sum up, it seemed that an agreement on price and food aid could be 
reached but, on access and internal policy positions, remained far apart.69
What annoyed the Commission was that exporters continued to demand 
concessions, without saying what they were prepared to give in return. A real 
willingness to get to a final agreement for cereals existed, but the main obstacle was that 
the EEC’s partners thought and negotiated in terms of simple specific interests and 
differentiated between importers and exporters, rather than in terms of a reorganization 
o f world markets. And, for them, it was up to importers to bear the greatest part of 
responsibility and commitments for this reorganization and stabilization. On the 
contrary, the EEC’s own proposals reorganized the world market by putting linking 
domestic policies and trade. Moreover, the EEC firmly supported the notion of 
balancing of concessions within the Cereals Agreement negotiations, while the USA 
and the other exporters wanted to place these negotiations in the general framework of 
the Round and held that it was fair and normal that negotiations on cereals be to their 
advantages to then be compensated with concession in other sectors. The Commission 
categorically refused that to be set up, the Agreement depended on concessions on 
textiles or bicycles.70
The United Kingdom, the other big importer of grains along with to the EEC, 
also offered to bind its self-sufficiency rate, but as it suggested 86% while its existing 
rate was 70%, it came under even stronger criticism than the EEC. Actually, the British, 
with their production expanding, were not ready to accept a percentage equal to the 
average in a base period, but wanted to bid for a much higher figure. Like the EEC, they 
saw merit in the principle underlying that obligations undertaken by importers and 
exporters had to be broadly comparable and refused to give concessions on grains to 
obtain further benefits in the industrial sector. Even if the major US aim to use the 
Kennedy Round to decrease the CAP protectionism let the big confrontation to be 
played out between the USA and the EEC, the United Kingdom, together with Japan,
68
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found itself under the heavy pressure from the US and other exporters. Unlike the EEC, 
the British had not tabled clear-cut proposals and, with their opposition to access 
commitments and the food aid, were under the strong pressure o f the Americans who 
were concerned about what they deemed the stalling attitude of the British.71
The Americans looked with apprehension at the stalemate, as an agreement on 
cereals was of crucial importance. Faced with the EEC poor offers on non-grains 
products, the USA at least wanted the Cereals Group to produce an acceptable 
multilateral arrangement that would serve US interests.72 Despite the new proposals o f 
the EEC and the efforts o f mediation made by Wyndham White, positions remained too 
far apart, even if a general willingness to negotiate some form of agreement and a 
chance of reaching it existed.73
11.8 Negotiations on non-grain agriculture: between failure and 
stall
Since the outset o f the Kennedy Round, negotiations the Meat and Dairy Groups 
had a slower pace in comparison to the Cereals Group and in 1966 it became clear that 
commodities agreements on these products were unlikely. While in the Cereals Group 
interest to  conclude an arrangement existed on both sides of the Atlantic, this was not 
the case for meat and dairy products. The United States was the biggest importers o f  
beef meat and it regulated its imports through a quota system that needed the approval 
o f Congress to be modified. Washington was disposed to take quantitative engagements 
to imports along the lines o f the existing import quota legislation, but it was not 
disposed to do tariff cuts and to take engagements on domestic policy, to fix an 
international price of reference and to negotiate on MDS plan as the EEC required. The 
USA, supported by New Zealand and Australia, proposed the setting of exporting 
contingents with an annual negotiation to take into consideration the increase o f  
consumption of the importing countries. In any case, it was disposed to do very little on 
meat and for sure it had no intention to engage itself in something similar to the IGA. 
The United States never pushed for the set up of the meat agreement and it left to meat 
exporters to play the major role in discussing the EEC proposals, making clear that it 
was not disposed to participate in a meat arrangement as envisaged by the EEC.74
The EEC took a major place in production and trade of beef meat. Even if it was 
a net importer, its production was rising thanks to improvement of technology. Only 
France and The Netherlands had a small surplus, while the other four members 
remained importers. Italy and Germany imported huge quantities of meat from 
Argentina and Denmark that France and The Netherlands could fill. However, Italy and 
Germany continued to prefer to import from their traditional suppliers. In Geneva the
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EEC and above all the Commission aimed to establish a commodity agreement so to 
contribute to the stabilization of world markets through the binding of the MDS and the 
establishment o f a reference price, hoping in this way to conciliate the different trade 
interests among the Six. Despite the Commission’s insistence on the necessity to set up 
a commodity agreement, at the end o f December no agreement had been reached on the 
basic features o f the Meat Agreement as positions remained too far away and a failure 
was just around the comer.75
The same stall existed for dairy products. In Geneva participants to the Dairy 
Group had agreed to include only butter, heavily subsidized product for which a world 
surplus existed, and to exclude other dairy products. Since 1958 the EEC had been self- 
sufficient. All the member countries, excluded Italy, were self-sufficient and the Dutch 
had also a large surplus to export. For this reason The Hague looked with much interest 
to a commodity arrangement that could organize trade in this sector and favuor access at 
world level for its surplus. The Dutch aimed above all to improving access to the British 
market of butter, already dominated by New Zealand, Denmark and Australia which 
received preferential treatment as member of the Commonwealth and EFTA. The Dutch 
set as a priority for the EEC the opening o f the British market to EEC (Dutch) butter.76 
The position of the EEC in Geneva was complicated by the fact that while the French 
and above all the Dutch had large surpluses that they wanted to sell on the German and 
the British markets, Germany wanted to continue to import from Denmark and 
considered the Dairy Arrangement as an instrument to make quantitative concessions to 
the Danish, concessions that the Dutch and the French were not disposed to do.77
The main obstacle on the way to the Arrangement was that the two big 
importers, the United Kingdom and the United States, had no major interest to set it up. 
The United Kingdom took 70% o f butter entering into international trade. Its major 
suppliers were New Zealand, Demark, Australia and to a less extent The Netherlands 
and it regulated its imports through quota the bulk of which was granted to New 
Zealand. The British wished to continue with this regulation and had no intention to fix 
an international price of reference and to give up their quotas. By the same token, the 
United States was openly hostile to the realization of an arrangement for dairy products 
and it refused to engage on its domestic policy and negotiate on MDS. What it was 
disposed to do was to negotiate on border protection.78
The Six, therefore, had to ascertain that while they saw the organization o f world 
market for dairy products had a considerable importance, the USA and the British had 
no interest in establish a commodity agreement or had no interest in doing so on the 
ground of the MDS approach. On top of this, France, Italy and The Netherlands had 
interest in enhancing their exports of cheese to the British, American and Swiss markets 
but this product had not been considered in the Dairy Products group. Consequently in 
Geneva the Commission tried to make pressure bilaterally on the US, the Swiss and the
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British delegations. However the treatment o f cheese on a bilateral basis with the 
Americans was a difficult affair for the Commission. Washington had a quota system 
and the Commission found it difficult to ask the Americans for guarantee of access 
when the EEC refused to do the same in the cereals sectors.79 As for the British they 
had not intention to make concessions and wished to retain their existing regulation. 
The Dutch, having a major interest in gaining more access to the British butter and 
cheese market, remained firm on their insistence that an arrangement had to be 
concluded and that the British had to make offers on cheese. They even claimed that it 
represented an essential condition for the positive conclusion o f the Kennedy Round 
both in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Against the Dutch insistence, in Geneva 
the Commission claimed that an Arrangement on butter and the possibility for the EEC 
to increase cheese exports remained crucial elements that would influence the attitude o f  
the EEC on the all Kennedy Round. But at the beginning of 1967, the British and the 
Americans made no concessions on cheese, while discussions in the Dairy Group had 
not yet progressed and a complete failure seemed all too likely.80
As for the rest o f  the agricultural products not covered by commodity groups, 
the negotiating situation was not much easier. As Table 4 in section 1 shows, a good 
half of US export to the EEC was not grains and concerned oilseeds, tobacco, poultry, 
fruits and vegetables. Given that the EEC admitted oilseeds bound-duty free, the 
negotiable part of the agricultural sector concerned the other products. In particular the 
US asked for tariff reductions on poultry, fruits and vegetables, tobacco and the 
maintenance of the existing treatment for oilseeds. In exchange Washington was ready 
to do a 50% tariff* cut on the all sector, but it excluded some of the products on m ajor 
interests to the Six, that is to say wine and cheese.81
As for products not covered by commodity groups, the EEC aimed at organize 
world trade in agriculture with the MDS approach and insisted that the internal policies 
of Kennedy Round entered the negotiations in Geneva. Despite the agreement reached 
between Mansholt and Herter in March 1965 to set up a study on the domestic policy o f  
the Kennedy Round participants, this study led nowhere. In fact, only the Commission 
gave indications while other governments were reticent to describe the domestic 
measures they used to support their agriculture and indicated that they would do offers 
only on border barriers.82
For the EEC the setting up of the list o f offers for non-commodity group 
products was as difficult as the establishment of the list of exceptions for the industrial 
sector. Each of the Six, and in particular France and Italy, had its own products to  
protect with the result that if the Commission paid attention to all their requests, hardly 
any offer would be tabled in Geneva. This institution elaborated proposals for moderate 
reduction of protection and presented member states a list o f offers that required 
equitable and balanced sacrificed from them. It hoped in this way that the all the Six 
would accept them as they stood and that a new negotiating marathon would be
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avoided. Initially, the Commission had aimed at negotiating only on the MDS plan for 
all products. But the tough opposition to this plan in Geneva, the US refusal to consider 
as an offer a mere binding o f the MDS and also the difficulty in implementing it -  as it 
was objectively difficult to set up reference prices for all products -  led the Commission 
to propose to member states to offer also some tariff cuts. Because of the impossibility 
to agree to international reference prices, the Commission proposed minimum import 
prices for products entering the EEC so to guarantee the stability of the internal market 
and gain the recognition o f the CAP for these products in Geneva. The Commission 
proposed minimum prices for eggs and chicken, fruits and vegetables, rice, cork wines 
and alcohols, tobacco, fish together with small tariff cuts that varied from 4 to 20% .83
The Six -  mostly because o f the French opposition -  were not able to take as 
they stood the already limited Commission’s proposals, with the result that a Council of 
Ministers marathon took place. France opposed any reduction of protection on fish, 
fruits and vegetables, wine, tobacco as it feared not only US competition but also 
Spanish competition. In truth, Italy neither was enthusiastic about conceding much to 
third countries, in particular for rice, fruits and vegetables for which it aimed to 
establish a protected Community market. However, Italian reticence derived also from 
its dissatisfaction with the CAP. Until that moment this common policy covered mostly 
products on interests to other EEC members and decisions were still pending on fruits -  
especially oranges -  and vegetables, wines, alcohols, tobacco, cork and food industry, 
all sectors of a major interest for Italy. However, the Commission’s proposals covered 
also sectors for which the CAP had not been elaborated, putting therefore at risk Italian 
interests. Thus before committing themselves to anything, the Italians wanted to know 
which benefit they were to obtain from the CAP. Thus it was only after Mansholt 
ensured that the Commission would soon present CAP regulations for products of 
interest to Rome that Italian Ministers o f Agriculture Tolloy seemed ready to accept the 
Commission’s proposals and asked only for few modifications.84
Benelux and Germany, even if  not enthusiastic about the idea of setting 
minimum import price as this would represent a new trade barrier, were ready to accept 
the Commission proposals in order to allow the EEC to eventually show up in Geneva 
with some offers and get meaningful counter concessions also for the industrial sector. 
Despite Rey and Mansholt’s warning that the Commission proposals represented the 
minimum concessions the EEC had to do in order to successfully conclude the Round, 
and that they contained a balance of concessions the Six had to do, Boegner insisted on 
negotiating item by item and asked for sensible reduction o f offers. Against the firmness 
with which France and to a less extent Italy asked to reduce offers, the Commission 
reformulated its proposals so to include French and Italian requests. Rey and Mansholt 
remained convinced that their original offers represented a batter valuable negotiating 
basis, but to elaborate a final compromise among the Six, they tabled new proposals 
reducing by one-fifth the EEC concessions. Germany and Benelux relied on the 
Commission and concluded that if  this institution held that the new proposals would in 
any case allow setting up a valuable negotiating basis, they would accept them. In any 
case the EEC offers remained incomplete, as they did not contemplate the level of
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minimum price for eggs and poultry, fruits and vegetables and fish.85 It would be only 
in a new marathon at the end o f December 1966 that the Six finally set these prices half 
way between the low level demanded by The Netherlands and Germany and the higher 
level asked by France and Italy. In the end, as the Commission had suggested, the EEC 
offers consisted on the binding o f a minimum price and small tariff cuts averaging to 
about 5%. Thus the offers were grounded on the proposals of the Commission. This 
institution, as it had been the case with grains and the industrial sector, played a crucial 
role thanks to its technical expertise and ability of suggesting solution.86
The expected EEC intention to table its offers on minimum price and to make 
only token tariff cuts led Washington to expect only poor concessions. This situation 
raised a new debate within the Johnson Administration on agriculture and on the offers 
that US government was to present in Geneva that once again signaled the 
dissatisfaction of the Department o f  Agriculture for the development o f the Kennedy 
Round and the US approach to the CAP. Herter and Roth wanted a strategy of generous 
US initial offers as a full 50% tariff reduction would create the most effective pressure 
on the EEC to elicit full offers and corresponded to the US general strategy for the 
Kennedy Round, consisting in making a strong opening bid so to push other countries to 
do the same. Herter and Roth’s insistence on this point was rather strong and was firmly 
supported by US Vice President, Hubert Humphrey, Rusk and Ball, and, above all, by 
White House Assistant Bator to whom Johnson mostly relied on the Kennedy Round. 
On the contrary, Secretary o f Agriculture Freeman, supported by the Department o f 
Commerce, wanted to make only minimal offers in line with what the EEC was 
expected to do. Freeman was skeptical that an aggressive strategy would push the EEC 
to move and was worried that “ in the crunch, [the USA] would lack the fortitude to 
make the necessary withdrawals” .87 Freeman held that foreign policy considerations 
related to US support for European integration and problems linked to the relations with 
the LDCs would push the USA not to require full reciprocity. Moreover, Freeman 
considered EEC offers as an attempt to legalize internationally the variable levy and 
gate price system, which relegated third countries to a residual support prices. Thus the 
Secretary o f Agriculture, while declaring o f being ready to acquiesce, decided to flag 
his concerns to Johnson. Consequently a meeting with Johnson, Bator Herter, Roth, 
Ball, Blumenthal and Freeman was organized. Johnson, who relied on Bator’s advice, 
decided to go ahead with the tabling o f meaningful offers to the EEC, on the ground that 
this would create the most effective possible pressure on the EEC to improve its 
offers.88
At the beginning of August the agricultural offers on non-commodity groups 
were exchanged. While negotiations on Group commodities took place in a multilateral
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context, the negotiations on the rest of products were essentially bilateral bargains 
product-by-product along the traditional negotiating method used since 1947: two 
countries negotiated and then, if concessions were agreed, they were extended to the 
other GATT member on the basis of the MFN rule.
When the EEC tabled its offers American pessimistic expectations proved to be 
right. The EEC offers made extensive use of minimum prices which the USA rejected 
as an unacceptable basis for negotiations, while offers of tariff cuts were limited in 
scope and shallow in depth.89 Washington considered the EEC proposals on minimum 
price as an attempt to obtain international acceptance of the reference price/variable 
levy system for major commodities and a number of token tariff offers had been 
included for this purpose alone. The USA had always maintained a pragmatic approach 
towards this policy and had always claimed that rather than have a quarrel on the CAP 
compatibility with GATT, it would negotiate with the EEC to set up mutually 
acceptable ways to protect the legitimate trade interest of the USA. Unfortunately, the 
EEC offers did not lead in this direction, as its offers did not allow reducing protection. 
Washington held that the situation was serious. A substantial improvement of offers by 
the EEC was needed if the negotiations as a whole had to be concluded.90
No much better appeared the situation for tropical products which were of 
crucial importance for the LDCs. For the EEC making offers on these products was a 
complicated affair. It had association agreement under the Yaoundé convention which 
granted preferential treatment to the associated African and Madagascan countries. The 
associated countries were opposed to any reduction of the preference and went to the 
extent of claiming in some cases that the EEC customs duties had to be raised against 
other LDCs. Aware of this situation, the Commission proposed to the Six only small 
tariff cuts. Among the Six, Germany and The Netherlands favoured the greatest 
reduction possible so to confirm the liberal attitude of the EEC and wanted the 
Commission to propose drastic tariff reductions on coffee, cacao, bananas and rum. For 
these two countries, the Kennedy Round had to be considered an instrument to reduce 
the difference between the treatment reserved to associated countries and that for the 
other LDCs. Couve de Murville held that as long as a solution was found to the problem 
o f access to markets and stabilization of trade flow, the French government would 
support the Commission list as it was too long. Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy took a 
middle-ground position between the French and the Germans and the Dutch. Eventually 
the Six agreed to consolidate duties to the level of the level set by the Yaondé 
convention and to do a 50% cut on some products, such as tea, on which duties had 
been suspended.91
The refusal of the EEC and its associated countries to meaningfully reduce the 
Yaoundé preference came to be under the attack of the non-associated LDCs, which 
held that there was little for them in the Kennedy Round, the United States and the
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United Kingdom and created division among LDCs.92 The British supported the LDCs’ 
pressure on the EEC to improve offers as they held indispensable that the Six improved 
their offers so to compensate the Commonwealth countries for the reduction of the 
British tariffs.93 As for the Americans, under the TEA they could reduce duties on 
tropical products, but only if  the EEC did the same. Since the passing of the TEA, 
American aim was to reduce, and ultimately to eliminate, the tariff preferences extended 
to AOC’s by the EEC under the Yaounde Convention so to allow Latin American 
countries to increase their exports to the EEC and decrease pressure on the US market. 
However, the refusal of the Six to make serious reduction closed the way to any 
meaningful result in this sector.94
Conclusion
The EEC’s preparation for the cereals negotiations in Geneva was long and 
difficult. France, being an exporting country, wanted to increase production. In contrast, 
the Five were importers and wanted to import cheap cereals from third countries. These 
opposing aims made the reaching o f a compromise difficult. But in the end, the need to  
get to Geneva with a bargaining stance prevailed. Economic and political interests to  
stay together were so strong, and were evident also in the Six’s efforts to find a 
compromise to negotiate as a unit. It was really in the trade relations with third 
countries, where a common position was needed, that the interests o f the Six to stay 
together and compromise was more evident. For the Six, the Kennedy Round attending 
as a unit meant reconciling often-conflicting economic interests. Agriculture and 
commerce with third countries was among these fields of conflicting interest, where the  
Six had to proceed without damaging the interests o f domestic pressure groups or the ir 
economy as a whole. To stay together, the Six had to hammer out common policy based 
on compromise. The Commission had a major role in the agricultural part of the Round, 
bigger than in the industrial part. It had tabled precise proposals and during th e  
discussions with the Ministers of the Six the Commission stuck to its proposals. And, in  
the end, the EEC negotiating position was due to the Member States, but above all to  
the Commission whose proposals prevailed ahead o f those of the French. Clearly, the  
Crisis o f the Empty Chair had not weakened the role o f the Commission.
For the USA, the agricultural negotiations were a difficult task. US agricultural 
exports to the EEC were about five times as great as the EEC exports to the USA in the 
same sector. The US comparative advantage in agricultural products was large and, with 
substantial reductions of trade barriers, US exports to the EEC would increase 
significantly. There was little chance that the Six would be willing to compound the  
difficulties they already faced in developing the CAP by opening their markets to the 
greater volume of US agricultural products unless the USA could give the EEC trade 
concessions of equal value in return. Because the EEC had not the relevant interest in 
exporting to the USA, the USA could offer very little in the way of reciprocal 
concessions in agriculture. Therefore Washington insisted that the final package o f  
concessions be balanced not sector by sector, but across the board on all items including 
the industrial sector and NTBs. But this was not enough to push the Six to make
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concessions. On top of this, the problem that the USA had was that it could not openly 
attack the CAP, it being a major tenet in European integration, and could not 
continuously put pressure on the EEC, unless it wished to be accused of interfering with 
EEC internal matters, and after the crisis o f the empty chair, Washington was also 
scared that any attack to the CAP and the balance of compromise among the Six could 
provoke another crisis.
Chapter Twelve
The final bargain: setting the tone of international trade
Introduction
In the previous chapters we outlined the negotiations in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors. We concluded that in the latter sector, despite many difficulties, the 
opportunity to reduce protectionism existed, while the same chance did not seem to 
exist for agriculture. In this chapter, we shall first analyse the final bargain that took 
place in Geneva from January to  June 1967. The aim is to show how a substantial 
reduction in tariff levels was achieved in the industrial sector, while only minor results 
were achieved in the agricultural sector. We shall conclude that these results of the 
negotiations set the tone o f international trade along patterns, which are still valid 
nowadays, freer trade in the industrial sector and protectionism in agriculture. They also 
defined the place of the EEC in world trade, rather liberal in the industrial sector but a  
major a stumbling block in agriculture. We shall also analyse the state of the relations 
between the EEC and the USA, to highlight that tensions characterised transatlantic 
relations and that Kennedy’s original aim to also strengthen the unity o f the Atlantic 
alliance through the new GATT Round seemed in trouble and that US support for 
European integration started to be challenged. This chapter also focuses on the internal 
EEC decision-making process, and on the role of the Commission. We shall conclude 
that the Commission was able to affirm its role of sole negotiator on behalf of the EEC 
and played a crucial role in the negotiations, and that it was able -  thanks to its technical 
expertise and the fact that it was conducting the bargain in Geneva -  to influence the 
positions of the Member States which, in any case, firmly kept the decision-making 
authority in their own hands.
12.1 Troubles in transatlantic relations
The initiative for a major round o f GATT negotiations had been taken by 
President Kennedy in January 1962, with the presentation of the TEA. The aim was to  
set up a sweeping liberalization o f international trade to be concluded by 1964. The new 
Round was the trade tool in Kennedy’s Grand Design that together with the Multilateral 
Force and the British entrance into the EEC was meant to lead to an Atlantic Partnership 
between equals. It had therefore not only trade relevance but also the political aim o f  
keeping together the two sides o f the Atlantic in coherent policy under American 
leadership. Well before the negotiations got underway in 1963, the Kennedy Grand 
Design was already in trouble. French President de Gaulle blocked British bid to jo in  
the EEC, and, with his additional refusal to the MLF, dealt a serious blow to American 
program. The veto further strained the already nervous Franco-American relations and, 
when it was followed by the Franco-German Treaty in January 1963, American-German 
relations were also shaken. Thus, the Kennedy Round was negotiated in a totally 
different context than that imagined by the Kennedy Administration.
The beginning o f the negotiations in Geneva further complicated transatlantic 
relations. EEC and American goals did not always coincide, and in agriculture were 
poles apart, and their tough confrontation in Geneva surely did not help to improve the 
atmosphere. French withdrawal from the EEC and the consequent stalling of the 
Kennedy Round during the crisis o f the Empty Chair, de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw 
troops from NATO in March 1966, together with French policy on the US dollar and 
the open criticism of Johnson’s military effort in Southeast Asia further added to the
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tension. The United States looked with apprehension at French foreign economic policy. 
Paris opposed the American plan for the monetary system and for the Kennedy Round. 
In July 1966, the Treasury Department concluded that France was “practicing economy 
warfare” against the USA “within a framework of a national policy which calls for the 
weakening o f US strength and influence in Western Europe as a necessary condition of 
establishing French hegemony over that area”.1 However, Washington did not have 
problems only in its dealings with France. The quarrel over the financing of American 
troops in Germany, which heavily hit the US balance o f payments, and that the Johnson 
administration wanted Chancellor Erhard to fund in the context of the Offset agreement, 
along with the US non-proliferation policy troubled American-German relations. 
Erhard’s fall at the end of 1966 was followed by the formation of the Grand Coalition of 
the Christian Democrats with the Social Democrats, headed by the CDU leader Kurt 
Kiesinger. The new Chancellor, together with Foreign Affairs Minister Willy Brandt, 
had every intention of strengthening relations with France, and attempted to give new 
substance to the Franco-German Treaty. In addition to Kiesinger and Brandt, Minister 
of Finance Franz Joseph Strauss, in particular, was a strong upholder of the Franco- 
German relationship. Thus while German-American relations worsened, the new 
German government seemed on the verge of performing a Gaul list turn.2
To make matters worse, with the US balance-of-payments deficit increasing, and 
all the strains this had on the monetary system, the Johnson administration, the Treasury 
Department in particular, reproached the Six for failing to share the security burden in a 
way proportionate to their economic strength and for not cooperating in supporting the 
US dollar. Washington continued place importance within relations on trade, security 
and monetary issues and kept having to face the refusal o f the Six to do the same. Given 
this attitude within the Johnson administration, discussions multiplied on whether the 
USA had to reduce its military presence in Europe, above all if the Offset negotiations 
with the Germans were not successful. Moreover, Johnson had also relied on the 
increase in exports through the Kennedy Round to improve the balance of payments, 
but the Europeans had first slowed negotiations, then stalled them with the Crisis of the 
Empty Chair and then refused to reduce their protectionism in agriculture. Worse, in the 
meanwhile, from 1965, the US trade surplus with the EEC started declining as a result 
of major increases in EEC exports in the industrial sector and, specifically, in the 
machinery and transport equipment sector. US exports continued to increase but so did 
imports and by a higher rate.3
1 Memorandum from Winthrop Knowlton to Fowler "France* 11 July 1966, Fowler Papers box 68, LBJL.
2
For the Johnson Administration and European see Schwartz A.T. Lyndon Johnson and Europe: in the Shadow of 
Vietnam, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, and Guderzo, M. Interesse Nazionale e Responsabilità Globale: Gli 
Stati Uniti, L'Alleanza Atlantica e L'Integrazione Europea Negli Anni Di Johnson 1963-69 Firenze, Aida, 2000.
3 The details o f US exports and imports by commodities with the EEC is shown in the following chapter dedicated also 
to trade patters after the conclusion of the Round.
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T a b le  1 US expo rts  and im p o rts  to  a n d  from  the  E E C  (1961-1972) in S thousand
Against this background, doubts about whether it was in the US interest to  
support European integration started to mount within the Johnson Administration. Since 
1947, the United States had agreed to bear European economic discrimination as a way 
to unify Europe politically. But, by mid-1966, the economic EEC regional system 
continued to lack this political aspect, while it increased trade discrimination with the 
implementation of the CAP. Formal support for European integration still characterised 
US policy towards Europe, but discontent in Washington was mounting. With the 
failure o f the EEC to achieve a higher level of political consolidation and the U S 
economic problems, portrayed by the US deficit in the balance o f payments, it was no 
longer possible for Washington to remain entirely deaf to protectionist requests of the 
domestic lobbies and Congress, to declare root and branch its support for European 
integration and to subordinate trade policy to foreign policy considerations.
On top of this, the worsening o f the balance o f trade made it more difficult for 
the Johnson Administration to justify reductions in protection. Johnson tried to oppose 
the protectionist mood o f Congress emphasizing, at the end of March 1967, that the 
failure o f the Kennedy Round would damage the Western world politically and 
economically and that the reductions in obstacles to trade would surely stimulate the 
growth o f trade and help the US balance of payments. However, discontent in Congress 
was mounting as the Johnson administration was blamed of not protecting US interests 
in GATT and was warned against selling out US agricultural interests in Geneva. As 
Zeiler notes, liberal policy favoured by Kennedy and Johnson did not seem to unite the 
Western Alliance and favour US trade interests, while it undermined “support [...] for 
American liberal trade policy” .4
The US change o f mood towards Western Europe was also illustrated by US 
reaction towards the second British bid to join the EEC made by Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson. At the end o f 1966, Wilson informed the Americans about his intention to 
probe the Six on a new application and then, if it seemed right, apply.5 The Johnson 
administration supported the EEC enlargement for the same reasons the Kennedy
4
Zeiler, T.W., American Trade and Power in the 1960s, pp.230-231 and Eckes, A.E. Jr, Opening American Market US 
Foreign Trade Policy since 1776 (Chapel Hill and London: The University Of North Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 190-194.
5 On the second British attempt to join the see Daddow, Oliver, (ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain's 
Second Application to Join the EEC, London, Frank Cass, 2002.
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administration had. UK entry could strengthen the EEC in the Cold War context and 
could also give it a more liberal outlook. However, concerns arose in the Johnson 
administration, also reinforced by the insufficiently liberal EEC attitude in the Kennedy 
Round, and by the stance of the Six towards the principle of military burden sharing. 
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler started wondering whether it was in the US 
interest to support European integration and EEC enlargement, or whether the USA had 
to preliminarily ask the Six to share monetary and military costs. Concerns also existed 
in the Department of Agriculture, which looked with apprehension at the application of 
the United Kingdom to the CAP whose protectionism the Kennedy Round was not 
being successful in reducing. Washington also looked with apprehension at the EEC 
web o f preferential agreements. The EEC already had associations under the Yaoundé 
convention and with Greece and Turkey, and was confronted with applications from 
Israel, Spain, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Austria. The 
preferential web tended to divert the EEC from full economic integration, dilute the 
Community structure and weakened it politically, while weakening the multilateral 
system.6
The US had supported European integration and then the EEC as a first step 
towards political union supposing that it would remain outward looking. But the EEC, it 
was held in Washington, seemed to be heading in other directions. And, in fact, when 
German Economics Minister Schiller, while negotiating over monetary issues in June 
1967, reminded US Treasury Secretary that the EEC had been a “US ‘baby’, with 
George Ball one of the fathers”, Fowler was quick to note that that EEC had been 
designed as an “outward looking” baby, a characteristic that the EEC was lacking.7
In this context of troubled transatlantic relations, for the Johnson administration 
the successful conclusion of the Round remained crucial and not only because it 
represented a major element of US trade and foreign policy. A failure would have major 
negative consequences on relations with the Europeans allies and domestically. The 
isolationist and protectionist mood with the USA would be strengthened and the liberal 
trade policy o f the Johnson Administration seriously endangered, while relations with 
the Europeans would be further strained. Moreover, Congress had conceded to the US 
government the large authority o f the TEA in expectation that US negotiations would 
obtain meaningful reductions in other countries’ levels o f protection. Thus the Johnson 
administration had to be able to show Congress that such meaningful results had been 
obtained unless it wanted to endanger US authority to negotiate for the future.
To push the Europeans to conclude the Round, a lobby action was undertaken by 
Washington. At the end o f February, Johnson threw his weight behind the efforts to get 
the Kennedy Round moving by emphasising its “greatest importance” both 
economically and politically.8 To further show that, for Washington, the GATT talks 
remained a priority, in February and March, Roth toured the capitals o f the Six to stress 
the American adamance, and Johnson’s personal willingness, to conclude the Round, to 
meaningfully include agriculture and the necessity that in Geneva the EEC started to 
quicken its decision-making process and to demonstrate more flexibility in negotiating.9
6 Draft Telegram from the State Department to all diplomatic posts "US policy on EEC Association", January 1967.
7 FRUS 1964-1968, Vol. VIII General and Financial and Monetary Policy, doc. 129. Memorandum of Conversation 
between Fowler, Bator, Schiller, Schoellhom, in Washington 19 June 1967.
O
PRO BT 241/847 "Kennedy Round' Draft Paper for Ministers, undated.
9
Opening Statement of Roth before the Subcommittee of Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 15 February 1967, Solomon Papers, Chron. Files February 1967, box 15, LBJL. For the meeting between Roth 
and Couve de Murville see ANF 724.713, box 7, Note, 7 February 1967. For the meeting between Roth and the Belgian 
government see NA 364-130 Rees, of the STR, box 5 telegram 4354 3 from US Ambassador to Belgium Knight to State 
Department, l  March 1967.
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In Februaiy 1967, acting USTR Roth reported to Johnson the state of the 
Kennedy Round. The major imbalance between EEC and US offers remained the 
critical problem. Even if the USA did not expect sharp reciprocity, it sought at least 
comparable offers. Actually, Roth was aware that the EEC would improve offers in 
non-grain agriculture only slightly, but held that some further concessions remained 
essential, above all for poultry, tobacco, offal, fruits and vegetables. Roth was more 
optimistic on the possibility o f signing of an Arrangement for cereals, with an access 
guarantee based on a SSR and a food aid program o f  10 million tons standing on its 
feet, so to  give US farmers higher prices and better access to the EEC markets. In the 
industrial sector, the USA aimed at increased offers in the mechanical and electronic 
sector, steel, aluminium and paper. However, the ASP, claimed Roth, remained “the 
single most difficult” conflict between the two sides o f the Atlantic. Not only had no 
ground to bargain been established, but the issue had also assumed “a tremendous 
symbolic proportions within the EEC” that consequently toughened its negotiating 
position. The question of agriculture and o f the ASP remained critical for the Johnson 
administration as the achievement of something valuable was essential to show 
Congress that the TEA had been usefully used. The US government could not turn up in 
front o f the legislative body empty handed, above all if it aimed at requesting the 
abolition o f the ASP. Therefore, in Geneva, the American negotiators would continue to 
insist that the Kennedy Round final settlement had to include not only industry but also 
agriculture and would press for a solution on ASP acceptable to Congress.11
Roth was convinced that the Europeans had the political and economic interest 
to bring the negotiations to a conclusion, however four years of the Kennedy Round had 
clearly demonstrated that tough pressure was necessary to push them to make progress. 
Thus, in the last and crucial phase of the negotiations for the American negotiators it 
became urgent to keep the pressure the up on them. Only in this way, could US 
negotiators hope to rapidly conclude the bargain in Geneva and avoid a serious crisis 
across the Atlantic and in Washington.12
12.2 EEC directions for the final state: more flexibility to the 
Commission
W hile transatlantic relations deteriorated, the relations between the Six were 
improving. With the major decisions over the CAP taken in May-July 1966, one of the 
main issues that had strained relations and placed them in crisis was pulled out of the 
EEC agenda. And at this point, no big confrontation lay ahead, at least for the moment. 
Obviously, tensions accumulated during the crisis o f  the Empty Chair and then in its 
aftermath- when not only the CAP was settled, but the Six also took the final decision 
to implement the customs union and the CAP from 1 July 1968, and completed their 
position for the Kennedy Round -  had not faded aw ay.13 But with these key decisions 
taken, tensions diminished and the final phase of the Kennedy Round gave the Six the 
opportunity to regain cohesiveness, at least in international trade relations, in order to 
face the final bargain with the USA and the other Kennedy Round participants. In effect
0 Herter died on 30 December 1966. Roth, until that time Herter's deputy in Washington, became acting US Trade 
Representative until March 1967, when he was officially sworn in by Johnson. On Roth's role in the Kennedy Round see 
Dryden, S. pp.97-113. For US Congress pressure on Roth to achieve a valuable compromise in Geneva and not conclude 
the Round unless this was obtained see Eckes, A.E. Jr, Opening American Market, pp.192-193.
** Memorandum for the President from Roth, 24 February 1967, Bator papers, box 12, LBJL.
12 __
NA 364-130 Rees, of the STR, box 5, Telegram 2197 from US delegation to GATT to State Department, 30 January 
1967.
13 On the relations among the Six at the beginning of 1967 see Ludlow, N.P., The European Community and the Crises 
of the 1960s: Negodating the Gaullist Challenge’ (London: Routiedge, 2006), chapter 5.
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the January-May 1967 period was characterized by a strong effort by the Six to stick 
together to resist US demands and defend their trade interests and, at the same time, by 
a strong awareness that concessions were necessary both in Brussels to maintain unity 
and to find a common positions, and in Geneva to conclude the negotiations. On top of 
this, the Six finally understood that the EEC’s cumbersome and time-consuming 
decision-making process for international trade negotiations had to be improved if  the 
Kennedy Round was to be concluded, and the key of the question remained the 
authority of the Commission to negotiate. In effect, in this last phase of the Round, the 
Six gave more room to manoeuvre to the Commission, allowing this institution to 
bargain with more flexibility than in the past. And it was with this increased flexibility 
that the Commission attended its double bargain: in Brussels with the Member States to 
get to a common position and then in Geneva with the GATT partners.
The EEC had been the major recipient o f the warning lists presented by other 
Kennedy Round participants on 30 November 1966. Consequently, the key question in 
January 1967 concerned the reaction to the threat of withdrawals in Brussels. The USA 
and the other participants, faced with what they considered insufficient offers by the 
EEC, adopted a muscle-flexing policy with the aim of pushing the Six to improve their 
offers. However, such a move was also risky as the Six could decide to react by 
stiffening their position and tabling a warning list too, so complicating the negotiations 
and scaling potential concessions down. Opportunely, in the two Council of Ministers 
meetings of late December 1966 and mid-January 1967, the EEC reacted in a flexible 
and pragmatic way in order to find an agreement with third countries and not risk a 
watering down of the final concessions, an outcome that would not have corresponded 
to its trade interest.
This flexible and pragmatic reaction, however, did not imply improvements in 
offers to the Americans and the British. In discussing the line of the EEC for the last 
final phase of the Round at the Councils of Ministers meetings of the end of December 
and beginning of January, Rey asserted that as the Scandinavians and the Swiss had not 
tabled exceptions in November 1964, a clear imbalance existed with the EEC in the 
industrial sector. On the contrary, American and British warning lists were absolutely 
unjustified, as a qualitative confrontation of the offers showed a clear balance, and 
therefore they had only a bargaining purpose to which the EEC did not need to respond 
with improvements. In any case, the EEC had not to respond with a withdrawing list of 
its own. Rather, it had to discuss with the Americans and the British the state o f offers. 
The German Secretary of State Neef reacted with alarm both at the potential 
withdrawals of third countries and to Rey’s assessment. The Kennedy Round and the 
expansion of international trade that was supposed to follow remained of the greatest 
importance to his government, above all in that period, in which the German economy 
was undergoing some difficulties. But now the success o f the Round was threatened by 
the risk that contracting parties would scale down their offers, above all if the EEC 
reacted in a rigid way. Neef was especially worried about the possibility of 
Scandinavian and Swiss potential withdrawals, which undoubtedly hit German trade 
interests harder than the trade interests of the Five, and wished the EEC attention to be 
concentrated on improving offers to these countries. But Neef held that the EEC owed 
something also to the British and the Americans and, even if for tactical reasons; he 
could accept that a balance in concessions existed, but the EEC had to be prepared to 
improve its offers. Thus, concluded Neef, the Commission had to prepare concrete 
proposals to re-examine the exceptions list, to suggest global compromises for problems
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that still affected key sectors, and to reduce the number of disparities it was still 
invoking.14
The Germans failed to get its EEC colleagues on board. In fact, the other five 
held that the time was not ripe for concessions. Couve de Murville, who felt that 
discussions of the Council of Ministers on the Kennedy Round often tended to overstate 
problems, to balance German readiness to improve offers, strongly underlined that the 
CET was lower than tariff levels o f the other countries and that the EEC had made 
reasonable offers which were as generous as those o f the Americans and the British. 
Therefore, the warning lists should not cause the EEC to modify its position and, if  
unjustified withdrawals were maintained, it would be obliged to table withdrawals of its 
own. Couve’s tough position was aimed at preventing the EEC from finding itself in a 
comer in Geneva and making concessions without trying to get improvements from 
third countries, as the Germans tended to do.15 In fact, while taking such a stiff position, 
the French Minister was implying that an imbalance existed with the Nordic countries 
and Switzerland. However, as meaningful negotiations with these groups of countries 
largely also depended on solutions to be given to the ASP and disparities, which 
remained crucial in USA-EEC relations, he found concessions at that moment 
inopportune. Couve de Murville highlighted another key reason to oppose 
improvements. As three years o f negotiations in Geneva had demonstrated, the EEC 
was unable to keep its negotiating positions secret because of its leaking attitude. I f  
improvements were started to be immediately elaborated they would inevitably be 
leaked and the negotiating strength of the EEC undermined. The French minister raised 
a crucial problem that, as shown below, was linked to the negotiating authority of the 
Commission.
Italy, as Italian Minister o f Commerce Tolloy declared, was ready to improve 
the EEC offers, despite the big sacrifice that this implied, but on the condition that these 
improvements led third countries to do the same and that a solution was given to ASP 
and the disparity issue. Benelux Ministers concurred on the need to improve offers 
towards the Nordic and the Swiss, but because of the impossibility of keeping the EEC 
negotiating position secret agreed with Couve de Murville on the dangerousness o f  
charging the Commission with adopting concrete proposals. The compromise to these 
positions was suggested by N eef and immediately picked up by Rey. For the German 
Secretary of State the only way to resolve the leak problem was to give larger and more 
flexible directives to the Commission, rather than precise instructions. N eef linked the 
problem o f  leaks to that o f the negotiating authority o f the Commission, which in view 
of the final bargain assumed a key relevance. Since 1963 the Commission had been 
negotiating under a strict mandate that, because o f its inflexibility, had slowed down 
discussions in Geneva. Building on of what Neef suggested, Rey emphasised that in the 
final phase, to effectively conduct discussions in GATT, the Commission did not need a 
mandate but rather only general guidance by the Council o f Ministers and more 
manoeuvring room and flexibility. Instead o f a mandate, Rey suggested allowing the 
Commission to negotiate ad referendum  with the Nordics and the Swiss, the countries 
to which improvements had to be made. His institution would work together with the 
111 Committee that would be promptly informed on the content o f the discussions with 
the EFT A countries and could bring any issue to the Council, in case disagreement
14 CM2 1966/90 PV de la 207"* session du Conseil de la CEE, 21-22 December 1966 and CM2 1967/2 PV de la 205ème
session du Conseil de la CEE, 12 January 1967.
15
Since the beginning of the Round in 1963, the French government had been worried that the Germans could bend to 
American pressure and in 1967 it feared that Bonn could bend to American threat of withdrawing offers and insist that 
the EEC improved its offers. See also ANF 724.713, box 7, Note «Négociations commerciales multilatérales de Genève. 
Aperçu sur l'état général des travaux», 2 March 1967.
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existed. In the end, the Council would give its approval. In this way the bargain in 
Geneva could be speeded up, leaks would be, if  not avoided, at least limited and the 
negotiating position of the Commission -  and consequently of the EEC -  would be 
strengthened. Rey attended the Council of Ministers with the clear objective of 
obtaining more freedom to negotiate in Geneva and hoped, with his proposal, to gain 
some.16
Rey’s suggestion, even if  limited to the Nordic countries and Switzerland and to 
the industrial sector, was approved with no discussion by the Member States. They were 
so concerned with reaching satisfying compromises with European countries that had a 
relevant place in their trade to be disposed to give flexibility and manoeuvring room to 
the Commission. As a result, in mid-January 1967, the Council of Ministers recognised 
that an imbalance existed with the Swiss and Nordics and agreed to let the Commission 
negotiate ad referendum with these countries, to explore how offers could be improved. 
Following the Commission suggestion, the Council as a whole, and despite German 
doubts, concluded that no imbalance existed with the British and the Americans. 
However, the EEC would not table a withdrawing list, in order not to risk the watering 
down of the Round, but the Commission would take a severe line and condemned third 
countries’ lists which, being unjustified, threatened to unravel concessions. Moreover, 
following a French suggestion, the Commission was instructed to continue negotiating 
with the British and the Americans, focusing on the critical questions o f disparities and 
NTBs that, according to the French, had not made any progress until that moment. And 
for this task the Commission was given the same freedom of negotiating manoeuvre as 
with the EFTA countries.17
Hijzen and Rey were satisfied with the negotiating flexibility obtained and for 
the first time felt that some room for manoeuvre existed. Even if this authority was 
above all for discussions with the Swiss and the Nordics, the Commission negotiators 
held that useful discussions could be set up also with the Americans as some problems 
as paper, aluminium, chemicals and textiles concerned both these groups of countries 
and the United States. Thanks to the fact that the Six had realised that in order to 
conclude the Round the Commission had to be given the conditions to meaningfully 
negotiate and achieve results, this institution had finally got that flexibility it had 
requested since the outset of the Round, and that reinforced its role both within and 
outside the EEC.18
12.3 Negotiating round and round
Despite America’s wish to rapidly conclude the Round, the first four months of 
1967 were spent by the linear participants inflating the value of their own offers and 
playing down the value o f offers o f the other participants. US negotiators Blumenthal 
and Roth, the British Denman, Melville and Powell, Rey and Rabot for the 
Commission, together with representatives of the other governments, spent time not 
only dealing with major issues as chemicals, steel and grains but also on detailed 
discussions on duties on canned peaches or excavating machines. On top of this, the 
delay was caused by the fact that the Commission spent the January-March period
16 For Rey's aim see AECB PV 386,6 January 1967 and PV 387, 10 January 1967.
17 CM2 1967/2 PV de la 205£me session du Conseil de la CEE, 12 January 1967; NA 364-130 Rees, of the STR, box 5, 
telegram 3325 from Schaetzel to State Department, 13 January 1967 and ibidem telegram 10499 from Bohlen to State 
Department reporting his conversation with Dromer and Corson, 14 January 1967; ibidem telegram 3468 from 
Schaetzel to State Department, 20 January 1967.
18
AECB PV 388, 18 January 1967; PRO BT 241/847 Telegram 1 from UK delegation to Brussels to Foreign Office, 18 
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discussing, in Geneva, the improvements the EEC could make, and those which third 
countries could make in return, and only in the middle of April did it present EEC 
Council o f Ministers with a list o f proposals to unlock the impasse. The Commission’s 
tactics consisted in stretching the bargain until the very last moment, hoping in this way 
to get last-minute concessions from EEC partners in an effort to rescue the Round from 
eventual deadlock. To put an end to this trend, Roth first set the end o f March as the 
deadline to conclude the negotiations and, when it turned out that not much would be 
attained by that date, he insisted that the Europeans accept 30 April as the final date. 
The Six accepted it, even if French Permanent Representative Boegner termed it as a 
“desirable objective” pointing out that overshooting this date by a week would still 
allow the round to be signed by 30 June.19 Unfortunately, by mid-April, very little had 
been achieved and, at this point, the Kennedy Round entered in a crisis situation that 
last until mid-May, when a framework agreement was eventually reached.
In addition to the question o f reciprocity of offers, the major stumbling blocks 
remained chemicals and steel in the industrial context, and agriculture. And it was on 
these three matters that negotiators concentrated. Particularly difficult was the situation 
in steel, further complicated by the bilateral bargain between the EEC and the UK. The 
British challenged the ECSC “phony offer” and refused to cut their duties. Moreover, 
they were genuinely disconcerted by the Commission’s claim that a balance in offers 
existed and that, consequently, the EEC would not improve its concessions.20 Thus, 
they asked for further offers from the Six for lorries, machinery and whisky also 
because, unlike the Americans, they would not benefit from the EEC’s increased offers 
to the Nordics in aluminium and paper.21 Actually, the British negotiators in Geneva 
had difficulties in bargaining with the EEC because Prime Minister Wilson’s declared 
intention to apply for membership complicated their position. Wilson emphasised his 
determination to join and, at the same time, to successfully conclude the Round, and 
stressed that the two negotiations had to be kept separated. However, keeping the tw o  
negotiations separated did not prove possible.22 As the head of the British delegation to  
GATT, Eugene Melville, put it, if  the United Kingdom pressed hard to obtain 
concessions from the EEC, the Six might think that London was not “serious in wanting 
to join the Community” and could ask why the British were trying so hard to reduce the 
CET that in few years would be applied also to them, doing, in this way, a favour for the 
Americans. Moreover, the EEC would not see any urgency in bargaining down the CET 
for reductions in the British tariffs.23 At the same time, London needed to toughly 
bargain in Geneva with the EEC: given the opposition of de Gaulle, no assurance 
existed that the membership negotiations would succeed, and the opportunity to reduce
19 CM2 1967/11 PV de la 2076me session du Conseil de ia CEE, 7 March 1967.
20
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tariffs through the Kennedy Round could not be lost. In this sense, London’s intention 
to apply had weakened and complicated British position.24
Chemicals remained a major source of conflict between the USA and the EEC, 
and a desperate case as not even a negotiating basis had been found. As a result o f the 
Commission’s increased flexibility to act, some progress was initially achieved, but not 
enough to reach an agreement. In the middle of January, the Commission suggested to 
the Chemical Group to negotiate under a completely different approach that was 
eventually retained in May as the final compromise. No exceptions were to be made to 
the 50% rule, and a ceiling would be adopted in order to reduce rates that would remain 
high even after a 50% reduction. A 20% ceiling would be established for the USA that 
would convert the ASP rates into ad valorem rates, limit them to 40% and then reduce 
them by 50%. A ceiling of 12,5% would be set up for the United Kingdom and the 
EEC. The EEC would reduce duties on chemicals by 50% without claiming disparities 
and virtually no exceptions. The USA found the plan negotiable as it had the advantage 
o f providing a balanced solution, but the basic problem o f how to make cuts remained. 
The USA insisted that some concessions had to be made unconditionally from, and 
separate to, the abolition of the ASP, so not to link them to Congress’s decision on 
ASP.25 Thus Washington pushed for a separation, for a decoupage as the issue was 
labeled, into conditional cuts subject to the removal of the ASP and unconditional cut to 
be made in the general negotiations.26 Johnson was aware that because of the mood of 
Congress and of the chemical industry, even the decoupage solution would be difficult 
to sell to the legislative body, but at any rate it seemed the only solution that had some 
chance to o f receiving approval and EEC would have, soon or later, to come to terms 
with this.27
The Commission opposed decoupage on the ground that it would reduce the US 
incentive to ask Congress for the abolition of the ASP. In truth, it was not totally 
negative, even if it was prepared to offer very little on the non-conditional package. In 
fact, it was not disposed to get to an early compromise also in the hope o f obtaining the 
best counter-concessions for an eventual last-minute acceptance of the two-package 
deal. Moreover, Hijzen held that the French, as was typical of them, would compromise 
only at the last moment and would therefore reject any premature settlement. Having to 
negotiate on two fronts, in Brussels with the Six and in Geneva with the USA, the 
Commission had to pursue the best tactics to convince Member States.28
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The only sector of the industrial negotiations to be rapidly settled was cotton 
textiles. As noted, discussions centered on the extension of the LTA, more liberal access 
to import markets and tariff reductions. At the end o f  March, LDCs finally accepted to 
extend the LTA for three years. In return, both the USA and the EEC agreed to slightly 
enlarge the quota but to make only a 20% reduction o f tariffs, and not a full 50%, in 
order to compensate for the quota enlargement.29 Even if the existence o f quotas made 
the rate of tariff of secondary importance, the 20% reduction -  remarkable lower than 
the 35% average cuts of the Kennedy Round -  and the small increase of the quota 
confirmed the unwillingness o f industrialised countries to make concessions to LDCs, 
despite the opening statement of 1963 that the Kennedy Round would be a major 
breakthrough for trade and development.
As for the cereals arrangement, to conclude the negotiations, four elements had 
to be settled. International prices of reference, access through the self-sufficient rate 
(SSR), the binding of the MDS and the food aid program. While on international prices 
o f references the quarrels continued along the same lines as 1966, some apparent 
progress was made on the MDS. The USA accepted to reciprocate importers’ binding o f 
the MDS with a commitment to hold stock off the markets; Canada and Australia by 
binding their internal price, and Argentina by giving up any support for the future. 
Exporters, however, wanted to remain free to change their policy in case market 
conditions varied, so implicitly weakening the value of their offer. In contrast, 
negotiations on SSR remained blocked. The basic question remained whether the EEC 
would accept an independent food aid program, a decision tied to the room it wanted to 
concede to third countries on its markets and, generally, to its production and 
commercial policies. As Rey warned the Six, if the EEC refused food aid it would be 
inevitable to accept a lower SSR than the 90%, but after having found an agreement in 
July 1966 on the basis of a 90% SSR and a food aid program linked to the existence of a 
surplus, for the Six it was difficult to change it on the basis of what the Americans had 
requested. Belgium, Luxembourg and, above all, Germany remained root and branch 
opposed to an independent food aid program, and preferred to lower the SSR. Italy and 
The Netherlands adopted a more flexible position on food aid claiming to be prepared to 
accept it, if the Americans insisted. France, while opposing the reduction of the SSR, 
could approve food aid but in the very last phase o f the negotiations and if  exporters 
undertook serious commitments on their domestic policy.30
While negotiations over the Cereals Agreement continued at a very slow pace, 
by the beginning of April it became clear that no commodity agreement would be 
negotiated for meat and dairy products. The USA was disappointed by the failure of the 
Meat Group as it had hoped that liberalization of meat in Europe and Japan would take 
some pressure off US beef imports. France and The Netherlands, exporters of beef meat, 
were also disappointed as they considered the agreement to be an instrument to organize 
trade in Europe. With the failure, negotiations between the EEC and the Nordics were 
moved to the bilateral level where the Commission had to face both the firm requests o f 
Denmark, which refused to conclude the Round unless the EEC made suitable offers for 
meat and livestock, and the rejection of France and The Netherlands to make such 
concessions.31 By the same token, the failure o f the Dairy Group shifted negotiations to
be invited to draw the appropriate conclusions about our fitness to be members of the EEC." PRO BT 241/848 Telegram 
162 from Paris to Foreign Office, 15 February 1967.
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the bilateral level, but for the EEC it remained impossible to get concessions for its 
butter and cheese as neither the British nor the Americans had any intention of releasing 
their quota. And the Commission found it difficult to insist on quantitative guarantees 
when it opposed to do the same for grain. Negotiations in dairy products remained 
highly disappointing for the EEC and especially for the Dutch who were big exporters 
of dairy products.32
To cap it all, trade negotiations between the Nordics and the EEC, the fate of 
aluminium and paper on which depended, took a dangerous turn. With the new 
authority to negotiate ad referendum, the Commission started bilateral discussions with 
the Nordics. After thorny discussions, in the middle o f March, Hijzen presented the 
Nordic delegation with the improvements the Commission planned to suggest to the 
Council of Ministers. In particular, the Commission proposed a greater reduction on 
basic paper from 16% to 12%, rather than the previously suggested 14%, and to further 
increase the duty-free contingent on newsprint and the 5% contingent on aluminium. 
Hijzen also promised to do his best to convince the Six to improve offers on live cattle, 
poultry and eggs. In exchange, the Commission asked for the maintenance o f the 
original offers in the industrial sector and improvements in offers for fruits and 
vegetables.33 The Nordics remained disappointed by these proposals, which did not 
consider drastic tariff cuts. And Sweden remained dissatisfied with the lack of offers on 
trucks and Denmark thwarted by the imprecise engagements for agriculture. Convinced 
that the time had arrived to be tough with the EEC and to show their weight resulting 
from negotiating as a block, on 1 April the Nordics withdrew 53% of their offers made 
up until that moment and hit above all German interests in the mechanical sector and 
transport equipment.34 The Nordic move infuriated Rey and led to stormy meetings 
with Swedish Ambassador Montan. Thanks to the authority to negotiate ad referendum, 
Rey hoped to reach a satisfying compromise to be presented to the Council of Ministers 
in mid-April 1967, where the Commission would need to convince Member States of 
the reasonableness of its proposals. But just while the Commission got ready to do so, 
the Nordics tabled their withdrawals and not only complicated the bargain, as faced with 
withdrawals the Six were unlikely to respond with improvements, but also undermined 
the authority o f the Commission to negotiate ad referendum. Rey did not modify the list 
of improvements to be presented to the Council of Ministers in order not to risk a 
watering down of concessions, a priority for the Commission but, certainly, the Nordic 
move had complicated his task.35
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Because of the lack o f results in all fields, in the middle of March a sense of 
crisis prevailed. Roth hoped that the Council of Ministers of the EEC in mid-April could 
give Rey fresh instructions and be the decisive turning point to conclude the Round by 
the end o f the April. The Commission also considered the Council of Ministers 
important in finally assessing the improvements the EEC could table, but the meeting 
did not turn into the final breakthrough to end the Round.
Despite the lack o f progress in Geneva, at the Council o f Ministers meeting o f 
10-12 April, the Six and the Commission showed satisfaction for the EEC performance. 
Rey noted ‘Timportance psychologique qui découle de l’unité de vue qui s’est jusqu’à 
présent manifestée dans les délibérations du Conseil et dont les effets ne manquent pas 
de renforcer la position de négociation de la Communauté”. Neef and Tolloy expressed 
their full confidence in the Commission and their satisfaction with the way it was 
conducting negotiations, while Couve de Murville expressed satisfaction “pour la 
solidarité qui a marqué la définition d ’une position commune au sein de la 
Communauté”.36 After this expression of satisfaction, the EEC dealt with the major 
sectors. For chemicals and grains, the Six expressed confidence in the ability of Rey and 
Mansholt to conclude the negotiations in an advantageous way for the EEC and did not 
alter the 1966 mandate. On the basis of the discussions the Commission had conducted 
in Geneva, Rey also presented his proposals to make improvements to the Nordics and 
also to the Americans both in the industrial and agricultural sector, provided they 
reciprocated and a reasonable solution was found for disparities. Rey aimed at avoiding 
a new discussion on each of the single products in his proposals, like the ones in 1966 
when Ministers spent hours discussing tricky issues such as canned asparagus duties. 
The Six, warned the Commissioner, had to take the political decision to improve offers 
and accept the Commission proposals as they stood.37 Unfortunately, only Neef w as 
disposed to globally approval the orientations o f the Commission, with the other 
governments initially holding reservations. The Commission made recommendations 
for improvements of offers on items o f interest to the USA in the mechanical sector, 
among which excavating machines much reclaimed by Roth, and in the agricultural 
sector for tobacco, poultry, fruits and vegetables. Rey hoped in this way to get the USA 
to improve concessions to the EEC on cheese, fruits and vegetables. Initially, Couve de 
Murville, Tolloy and de Block did not want to make further concessions to the USA and 
did not want to request any. They had a negative attitude towards increasing offers in 
the agricultural sector, as the Americans had a negative attitude on meat, dairy products 
and fruits and vegetables. Despite this initial reservation, warned by Rey that some 
improvements were necessary, the Council of Ministers eventually stated that if the 
Commission could demonstrate that some quid pro quo was possible, protection could 
be lowered on some items.
As for the Nordics, as Rey had expected, the Six adopted a tough position. They 
showed genuine disappointment for the withdrawals and deemed that this group o f  
countries had not appreciated the efforts the EEC was making to improve offers. 
Particularly annoyed was de Block who warned that the Netherlands would toughen 
their position so to balance the restrictive attitude in agriculture o f Denmark and 
Switzerland who were setting bilateral agreements on cheese and butter and, in the 
meantime, asked for further concessions from the EEC under the threat o f withdrawals.
1967. AECB PV 397, 3-6 April 1967; AECB BAC122/1991-22, Délégation de la Commission pour les négociations 
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The Netherlands therefore also opposed concessions to the Danish on livestock. 
Disgruntled by the failure of the Meat and Dairy Groups that denied improved access to 
the British and American market, upset at the agricultural offers received in the 
vegetable sector by the British and the EFT A countries and annoyed at the bilateral deal 
between Denmark and Switzerland, the Dutch refused to grant concessions, in both the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. As a results this country, that had started the 
Kennedy Round strongly supporting liberalization, attended the last part o f the 
negotiations with positions more akin to those of the country that was generally 
considered the most troublesome and protectionist country of the EEC, France.39 Rey 
was worried about the tough stance of the Six and feared they could even withdraw 
offers. His major preoccupation since December 1966 had been to avoid a downward 
escalation that could reduce tariff liberalization. Therefore, he took care in underlining 
that the Nordic withdrawals had been dictated by tactical reasons and not by a real 
willingness to scale down. And he proposed that the EEC make its improvements, 
especially for meat to the Danish and fish to the Norwegians, but on the conditions that 
the Nordics reestablish all offers. The Commission would endeavor to persuade the 
Nordics to moderate their position and together with the 111 Committee would decide 
which improvements were to be made. The Six, aware that it was not possible to 
deadlock discussion with these EFTA countries, accepted Rey’s proposals.40
What was remarkable in the Council of Ministers session was the readiness of 
the Six to follow the Commission’s orientations, to approve its positions, and to 
delegate to it solutions o f problems. The Commission and Rey an in particular were 
highly satisfied for the member states’ attitude and support.41 The lack of tension and 
recriminations among the Six, fundamental to maintain the necessary cohesion to 
bargain in Geneva, was also notable, above all in comparison with the long and 
extenuating Council of Ministers meetings of the previous years. The Commission and 
Rey an in particular were highly satisfied for the member states’ attitude and support.42 
At any rate, the EEC had not changed positions on key issues such as steel, grains and 
chemicals and, consequently, when Rey returned to Geneva a major crisis with the 
Americans was just around the comer.
12.4 Looking for a confrontation
Faced with the general stalemate, Roth settled on adopting a confrontational 
attitude, seeking a showdown with the EEC and setting up a crisis atmosphere in order 
to raise the possibility of a failure and push the EEC to improve offers. Crisis, hard line 
and brinkmanship tactics seemed to be the only way to save the Round.43 In the middle
38 CM2 1967/17 PV de la 212ème session du Conseil de la CEE, 10-12 April 1967. NA 364-130 Rees, of the STR, box 5 
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of April, Roth moved to Geneva to take charge o f the final and crucial phase of the 
negotiations. Because o f the complexity of the questions involved and the rapidity with 
which decisions were to be taken in this last phase, following the proposal of the 
Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Francis Bator, Johnson ordered 
the establishment of a small and secret inter-agency Common Group, operating from the 
White House under the direction of Bator himself, to “run last-minute Kennedy Round 
strategy” and provide the “necessary backstopping for the US negotiators in Geneva” .44 
The aim o f the group was to spell out critical issues for the President’s decisions and 
offer ideas and suggestions to Roth. Since 1964 Bator had been playing a growing 
fundamental role in shaping Johnson’s position in the trade negotiations and the setting 
up of the Command Group further strengthen his role and, at the same time, showed the 
political importance of the Kennedy Round and that matters in Geneva had to be 
analyzed not only from the trade point of view 45 To prevent leaks in this critical phase 
o f the negotiations, again under the recommendation o f Bator, Johnson ordered the 
establishment of a special limited distribution cable series with the funny code name 
“LIMDIS (limited distribution)-POTATOES” as the primary means of communication 
between Roth in Geneva and Bator Common Group in Washington. As Bator put it to 
Johnson, this organization for concluding the Round sounded “like a battle plan. 
However, not only five years o f work, but your entire trade policy is at stake”. Bator 
appeared to be rather optimistic regarding the conclusion of the Round. “My own 
judgment at the moment” wrote Bator to Johnson “ is that we have a 2-to-l change o f  
making a good bargain -  one which will be good economics, good international politics, 
and, overall, even good domestic politics. But we will need cool nerves and fine 
negotiating judgment to pull it o f f ’.4
On 19 April 1967, Rey, Hijzen, Roth and Blumenthal restarted the Geneva 
bargain. Both parties recognized that the fate of the whole Round depended on the fate 
o f chemicals and agriculture and they decided to concentrate on these two issues. Rey 
proposed small increase in offers in non-grain agriculture on the condition that the USA 
accepted EEC disparity lists and made improvements in the agricultural sector. Roth 
and Blumenthal were shocked by Rey’s requests, while Rey was shocked by the 
American refusal. To cap it all, the Commission could not engage on a food aid 
program and did not accept discussing decoupage. For Roth, it remained urgent that the 
EEC, in addition to accepting decoupage for chemicals, improved its token offers in 
non-grains agriculture -  in particular on fruits and vegetables, poultry, and tobacco -  
from the 5% average cut it had offered to at least 13%. Agriculture remained of key 
importance as it was out o f question to end the Round without something meaningful in 
agriculture, as this would cause problems with “an angry farm bloc” 47
Therefore, Roth decided to make crystal clear that unless agricultural offers were 
improved the USA would “not conclude the Round”. Rey, however did not seem very 
impressed by US stance and “fired back” that if  the USA wished to take the
44
In addition to Bator, the common group was composed of Eugene Rostow, the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, Anthony Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Acting Secretary of Commerce Alexander 
Trowbridge, Under Secretary of Agriculture John Schnittker and John Rehm of the STR. Rostow and Schnittker had to 
keep Rusk and Freeman informed of the progress of the negotiations. Memo "The Kennedy Round Crisis April-June 
1967", NSF National Security Council History, Book l-TABSI-6, Box 52, LBJL.
45
On this issue see Lee, D. Middle Powers and Commercial Policy. British Influence at the Kennedy Round (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 114-115.
46
Memorandum for the President from Bator "Management of the Last Minute Strategy in the Kennedy Round", 18 
April 1967, Bator papers, box 12, LBJL.
47 Telegram UMIDIS-POTATOES 866 from Rusk to Roth, 21 April 1967, Roth papers, box 3, LBJL. For an excellent, 
even if a little bit gossipy, account o f this final phase of the negotiations, see Dryden, S., Trade Warriors, pp. 97-113.
374
responsibility for “scuttling the Kennedy Round that was an American business”. 48 Yet, 
the Commissioner underlined that the EEC was not able to make the same liberalizing 
effort in agriculture as in industry, therefore the “USA should not expect any 
meaningful concession”. Because of the protectionist trade in agriculture, it was 
completely unrealistic to think that protection could be drastically reduced, claimed 
Rey. For this reason, the link the United States had put between agriculture and industry 
and the contemplation of industrial withdrawals due to a lack of benefits in agriculture 
would destroy a “historical opportunity” made possible by the TEA and could “even kill 
the Kennedy Round”. Rey, however, remained optimistic as he held that in the next two 
weeks progress could be made and the EEC Council of Ministers meeting of 2 May 
would consider this possibility o f tabling additional offers. In contrast, noting that no 
progress had been made on substantive issue, including grains where the transatlantic 
quarrel over the SSR and food aid continued, Roth fell into a “deep mood of 
pessimism” and wrote to Bator that Johnson would “shortly be faced with having to 
choose between a Kennedy Round with no offers of substance in non-group agriculture 
(and perhaps even no agreement) or no Kennedy Round agreement at all”.49
Because of the full crisis o f the Kennedy Round at the end of April, Roth and 
Blumenthal returned to Washington to report to Johnson the state of the situation in 
Geneva and discuss how to proceed.50 According to Roth and Blumenthal, in addition 
to brinkmanship tactics, the USA had to make fresh proposals to get things moving for 
agriculture and to emerge from the deadlock over grains. Therefore Roth suggested that 
the USA drop its demand on SSR in return for the elimination of feedgrains and MDS 
from the agreement, negotiating a Cereals Arrangement limited to an international price 
of reference for wheat and food aid. Dropping US requests on access would allow 
concentration on food aid and non-grains requests and compensating, in front of 
Congress, the dropping o f access. Consultations with Congress had showed that a 
complex and ineffective access arrangement would be difficult sell to the legislative 
body and Johnson might be better off with an Arrangement involving only food aid and 
price. Roth’s suggestion was of major importance as it implied abandoning the MDS 
that the EEC had presented as a major breakthrough and returning to the standard o f the 
Wheat Agreement plus a food aid program.51 Roth was optimistic that in the end, with 
much pressure on the EEC, a reasonable deal would also be attained for non-grain 
agriculture on which, until that time, the EEC had made concessions only in bits and 
pieces. On chemicals, Roth was convinced that the EEC would come around on the 
two-package deal even it could be the “stopper in whole Kennedy Round bottle”.52
On top of this, in order to improve US ability to obtain concessions from the 
EEC, specifically for non-grains, Roth requested authority from Johnson to table modest 
new offers -  “minor sweeteners” as Roth put it -  to the Europeans and in particular to 
Italy. The Johnson administration believed that Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro fully
48
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supported the trade negotiations for political reasons, but having been hit harder than 
most of the other Kennedy Round participants, Italy had retained a protectionist 
attitude. Receiving more offers, Rome would be encouraged to be more amenable to 
concessions and urge the other EEC countries to do the same. Thus, Roth asked 
authority to make a 20% reduction on some glassware products and to improve its 
offers on leather gloves.53 Bator recommended to Johnson the full approval of Roth’s 
requests, but at the same time asked Johnson to approve the recommendation of the 
Command Group to adopt a more confronting attitude towards the Six -  to play 
“chicken” with the Europeans, wrote Bator -  in order to get them to move on agriculture 
and chemicals. In Geneva, Roth had to announce that he was under instructions to leave 
for good on the evening of May 9 and that if  no agreement had been reached by that 
time, Washington would consider the Kennedy Round a failure. With a precise time 
limit, the EEC would have “ to face the tough political decisions necessary for a 
successful agreement”.54 Johnson endorsed Roth-Bator’s line, despite the opposition o f  
Freeman on the US stance to drop access request for grains.55
On the other side of the Atlantic, the huge task Rey had to overcome was to push 
the Six to make concessions and to give him much more flexibility to bargain. Rey 
appreciated the clear way with which the USA had stated that withdrawals would be 
made, as this would allow the Six to face the consequences of their lack of movement. 
The US stance allowed Rey to return to Brussels and make crystal clear to ministers that 
they had to increase offers.56 Rey was performing a tricky balancing act between the 
Member States and his negotiating partners in Geneva and his success depended on his 
ability to conceal or to soften the impact of withdrawals by the other negotiating 
partners by diverting attention to demonstrable gains which he had obtained.
The discussions between the Six and the Commission took place at the Council 
o f Ministers meeting of 2 May that in the end gave Rey fresh instructions to but not to  
the point of ending the Round. According to Rey, the fate of the Round would be 
decided on chemicals and agriculture between the two biggest partners, the EEC and the 
USA. In fact, obstacles that existed with the small EFTA countries and the UK would 
be overcome once the two economic powers had reached an agreement, as these 
European participants could not insist on their demand at the risk of endangering the 
Round. Hence, the Council o f Ministers concentrated on these two problems. On 
chemicals Rey asserted that the time had arrived to consider decoupage as this seemed 
to be the only negotiating ground with the USA. He suggested that the EEC offer 
limited unconditional offers on the non-ASP package of 20% so to push US Congress to  
remove the ASP if it wanted a further and more substantial 30% cut. Rey also asked to 
be able to engage the USA in discussion on decoupage, with flexibility on its content. 
Being aware that suppleness was needed to unlock the bargaining in Geneva, all the Six 
easily accepted Rey’s request and allowed the Commission to undertake exploratory 
discussions with the Americans on which the Council of Ministers would finally 
deliberate in its next session o f mid-May. While the Six made some progress on 
chemicals, they remained unmoved on cereals. Despite Mansholt’s proposals to accept a 
3 million ton program in order to obtain in exchange US agreement to fix feedgrains
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prices, the Belgium and German Ministers for Agriculture Heger and Hoecherl 
maintained their opposition to the food aid program and asked to reduce the SSR, so at 
least to engage the EEC in a much more limited food aid program. The reduction o f the 
SSR, however, was precluded by French opposition and Faure continued to lament the 
weak commitments exporters were prepared to undertake on MDS. The Six decided to 
let Rey, together with the 111 Committee, negotiate on the SSR and the size of the food 
aid with flexibility so to achieve a compromise with the USA, but bearing in mind the 
orientation o f Member States.
As for steel, the Six decided to include the steel negotiation in the general 
negotiations, letting the Commission negotiate in cooperation with the High Authority. 
In fact, offers in this sector could not be dealt with separately from the general 
negotiations. However, the ECSC Council of Ministers President Wehenkel and Vice- 
President of the High Authority Coppé on the one hand, and Rey on the other, did not 
see eye to eye. Facing what they considered third countries’ poor offers, Wehenkel and 
Coppé started talking about pulling steel out of the Round. On the contrary, Rey judged 
steel in the broader context and, consequently, opposed the withdrawal of the ECSC 
offers for the consequences this would have on the entire Round. As a matter of fact, the 
Americans had already made it crystal clear that if  steel was pulled out, they would be 
obliged to withdraw offers in other sectors. Germany and The Netherlands tended to 
side with Rey, while France, Italy and Belgium, bearing in mind the difficult period for 
the steel industry, considered it a priority that the British improve their offers. The 
Council of Ministers decided to maintain its offers on steel, but asked the Commission 
to continue negotiations in Geneva to push third countries, and the UK especially, to 
improve offers.57
When Roth and Rey returned to Geneva, Rey told journalists UI came back with 
a certain flexibility”,58 while Roth informed that he had been instructed to negotiate 
until 9 May, but, whatever the case, to return to Washington on 10 May 1967. From 4 to 
9 May, negotiations were essentially a bilateral and informal bargaining process 
between the Commission and the USA in Wyndham White’s office on chemicals and 
agriculture, and a trilateral confrontation with the British over steel. This meant that 
only the Commission negotiated on behalf of Member States which were kept informed 
by Rey and the other Commission negotiators through the 111 Committee.59 Therefore, 
in the last and crucial phase of the Round, the Commission was able shed the presence 
of Member States and constitute the only negotiating agent, as it had sought since 1963.
Despite Rey’s claim on flexibility, by 9 May no agreement was in sight, as 
agriculture, steel, chemicals were still blocked and the same was true for the 
Commission’s Nordic delegation. In steel, the hard-hitting row continued between the 
Commission and the British. The British eventually accepted to make a limited 
reduction of ad valorem duty on steel from 10 to 8% so to prove that they “good 
Europeans” as Melville put it, but refused to make a 20% reduction on specific duties, 
as the Commission firmly demanded, and wanted the EEC to reduce duties on lorries.60 
Worse, relations between the Commission and the British were very bad. Rey defined 
the British attitude disappointing. “Sir Richard Powell garde les mains croisées sur son
^  CM2 1967/25 PV de la 215éme réunion du Conseil de la CEE, 2 May 1967.
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ventre et ne bouge ni sur les céréales ni sur l’acier ni sur F agriculture”.61 Faced with 
such attitude, the European Commissioner “hinted darkly that he might have nasty 
things to say about British attitude when he meets the Council of Minister” . Melville 
refused to take this threat seriously and did not expect that “any temporary odium will 
affect” relations between the EEC and the UK. 62 The Americans too were highly 
disappointed with the British. Roth held that “the British have played an entirely 
negative role within the KR over the last several days. They have been difficult if  not 
impossible in steel and on the whole unctuously uncooperative in our general effort” . 
As shown below, a strong American reaction was just in sight.63
In chemicals, as the Commission accepted discussing the découpage formula, 
the question became how to fill the package. Against the impasse, Wyndham White put 
forward his plan according to which the EEC would reduce its tariffs by 20%  
unconditionally from the ASP removal and without claiming exceptions and disparities; 
the USA would reduce its duties by 50% without claiming disparities and exceptions. 
Then the USA would abolish the ASP and in return the EEC would make a further 30%  
c u t64 The Commission expressed a favorable position regarding this proposal, while the 
Americans refused it as they deemed the 20% reduction by the EEC too small in  
comparison to the US 50% cut. Moreover Roth refused to reduce duties on dyestuff to  
less than 30% rather than 20%, as not only Rey was demanding, but also the British and 
the Swiss.65 In the rest of the industrial sector, the USA asked for an improvement o f  
offers in the mechanical and electronic sectors and was prepared to increase its own 
offers. However, as Rey noted, these sectors were too sensitive for the EEC and n o  
improvements could be expected. 66
On non-grain products, to solve the stalled situation, Rey took the responsibility 
-  without consulting the 111 Committee -  to instruct Commission negotiator fo r 
agriculture Rabot to make some concessions on tobacco and canned fruits to which the 
USA attached a political importance. Unfortunately, Roth continued to consider 
insufficient EEC offers and made additional requests on a list o f seventeen products, 
otherwise, to fill the imbalance he declared that he was ready to reduce the offer to a 
value o f $75 million on manufactured tobacco, olive oil for which it duties would be  
reduced by 25 rather than 50%, and make only a 10% reduction -  rather than 50% - on 
EEC priority exports as tomato paste and products, and only a 25% reduction on 
bluegrass seed, starch, cherries and wines. Moreover, on most of the other products, 
reduction would be of 25% rather than 50%. From the original $39 million of offers the 
EEC had made improvements to $100 million. Roth demanded further improvements to
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a total value o f  $200 million.67 Rabot was annoyed by US threat to make such 
withdrawals above all on such sensitive products as olive oil and warned Roth that in 
the face of these withdrawals, there was no question o f further EEC offers as the 
American move left him with no selling points to argue with the EEC ministers for an 
improvement in the offers. In this circumstance, Rabot claimed that “no more could be 
said” and declined to discuss the issue further. However, in order not to further 
complicate the negotiations, Rey instructed Rabot to leave on the table the offers made 
under his responsibility. Rey’s move was surely a hazardous one as he had not been 
authorized by the Six, but the Commissioner held this the only way to make progress.68
For cereals, following fours days of prolonged and useless bargaining on the 
SSR, Roth decided to completely change the negotiating ground and on 9 May at three 
o’clock in the morning he advanced the “revolutionary idea” of giving up the US 
request for access and confining the agreement to wheat prices and a 5-5,5 million ton 
program of food aid. Roth grounded his proposal on the fact that effective and continual 
access to the EEC and the British markets was not attainable. The EEC and the US 
would agree only to a very high SSR and there was, therefore, no point in negotiating 
for worthless concessions for which, in turn, the USA had to undertake commitments of 
domestic policy and price for feedgrains.69 Rey was shocked that Roth would make 
such a breakthrough so late in the negotiations and disappointed because the American 
proposal eliminated all those elements as the SSR and the MDS that the Commission 
had pushed forward to organize the world cereal market. At this point it Rey’s return to 
Brussels became inevitable to discuss the issue with the Council of Ministers, as the 
American proposals were too radical to be accepted -  even ad referendum -  by the 
Commission.7
On 9 May, at four o’clock in the morning, deadlock was complete. The 
disagreement between the Commission and the American negotiators stopped the whole 
Kennedy Round because other countries were waiting for the two biggest partners to 
make a deal, so that they could build up a general agreement on it. Roth took a tough 
position, claiming that no further progress was possible, spoke of the failure o f the 
Kennedy Round and of the consequences to be taken. Rey claimed that discussions had 
to continue, and even if the situation was serious he seemed to be taken aback by Roth’s 
reactions and asked for time to return to Brussels to talk to the EEC ministers.71 After 
an initial refusal and an attempt to force Rey to reach a broad ad referendum agreement 
before leaving for Brussels, Roth agreed to interrupt the negotiations -  and not break 
them off -  and give time to the Commissioner to go back to Brussels. However Roth 
obtained a final and fixed deadline to conclude the Round, hoping in this way to push 
the EEC to take the final decisions.72 Under US and Commission instructions, 
Wyndham White released a public statement to the press saying that all parties accepted
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that the final concluding date o f the negotiations would be 14 May, “win or lose”, which 
meant that the Kennedy Round would be concluded by that date whether or not an 
agreement was reached.73 And to spell out to the Six that Rey had to come back to 
Geneva with constructive directions, Rusk warned the Europeans of “the incalculable 
consequences for the Americans attitude towards the whole Atlantic relationship” if the 
Kennedy Round failed.74
12.5 The last Round of the Kennedy Round in Brussels...
On 9 May Rey returned to Brussels to submit to the Council o f Ministers the 
latest proposals by the Commission and to get final instructions to bring to an end the 
painful and long drawn out Kennedy round. Because of the agreement reached in 
Geneva to conclude the negotiations by 14 May and because the Six had already agreed 
that the 9 May Council o f Ministers meeting would be the last one dedicated to the 
Round, this meeting o f  the Council was the last round of the Kennedy Round in 
Brussels. Like the ones before it, it was also long, with Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Commerce and Agriculture eager to control every single duty of every single items. At 
the same time it was characterized by a lack o f tension among the Six and a full 
awareness that concessions were required. On chemicals, Rey asked the Ministers to  
approve Wyndham W hite’s suggestion -  that the Commission had already approved ad 
referendum -  even if this were to be considered the last concession envisaged by the 
EEC. The Six unanimously condemned the rigid American attitude, but then Couve de 
Murville’s approval paved the way for the Council of Ministers’ rapid endorsement. 
Actually, it also seemed difficult for the EEC to avoid doing so. The proposals for a  
compromise were put forward by who was considered the neutral and esteemed GATT 
Director General, and had already been approved ad referendum by the Commission. A 
refusal would represent a negative answer to Wyndham White, and a rebuff to the 
negotiating agent. On top of this, with the short time remaining, there was not much the 
Six could do if they wanted to keep chemicals in the Round. And to facilitate the 
agreement, France, Italy and Belgium agreed to revise their road tax in exchange for the  
abolition o f the ASR
By the same token, the Six speedily and easily found an agreement on cereals. 
Mansholt was highly disappointed that the Commission MDS plan conceived to  
organize world agricultural markets had been dropped by the USA, together with the 
SSR. In this way the USA gave up an opportunity to regulate world trade and freeze the 
level o f protection in order not to commit on feedgrains or its domestic policy. At this 
point in the negotiations, Mansholt bitterly recommended the acceptance of the US 
proposals as the only way to reach an agreement. Mansholt asked the six governments 
to give the Commission some flexibility, rather than precise directives, in order to  
bargain on the ground o f a 5 million tons food aid. The Dutch Minister o f Agriculture 
Lardinois was upset by the new American stance as he deemed the EEC proposals on 
cereals a good way to arrange cereal trade. In any case, the Dutch were not prepared to 
accept a 5 million ton program, unless the EEC could contribute with other products. 
The Germans remained negative on food aid, refused to accept a program higher than 3 
million and insisted that the Commission remain firm on its engagement on the SSR in 
order to be able to contribute in a smaller way to the food aid. The American move 
changed the attitude o f Italy, France and Luxembourg. With the prospect o f setting up a 
food aid program not linked to the SSR, these three countries wanted a proper program
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to be set up. In order to underline the development policy aspect of the program, Tolloy, 
Faure and Gregoire wanted to separate commitments on food aid from the rest o f the 
Kennedy Round in order to consider the program not as a commercial instrument but as 
a real and independent instrument o f aid, and obtain all the political benefits in the 
relations with LDCs. For this reason, the food aid program had not to be incorporated in 
GATT, and the 3 million tons had to be minimum contributions. Faure, extremely eager 
to set the food aid program, and again demonstrating that the French did not oppose 
giving the Commission the freedom to act , when this corresponded to their trade 
interest, was even prepared to leave to the Commission maneuvering room, allowing 
this institution to negotiate the amount of the food aid program in Geneva, without 
issuing mandate. Against these stances, German opposition was rapidly removed, as at 
this point there was nothing the Germans could do to avoid the food aid program unless 
they wanted the collapse of the Round. As a result, the Council of Ministers agreed to 
give the Commission flexibility to set up in Geneva 3-4 million tons of food aid. Thus, 
the Six and the Commission speedily and painlessly set a bargaining position for the 
two thorniest questions in the negotiations with the Americans.7
By contrast, the reaching o f an agreement on the other questions was not so 
quick and trouble free, even if all the Six made efforts to reach a compromise and 
maintain their cohesion. In non-grain agriculture Rey, under his responsibility, had 
presented some further offers in Geneva that had not been removed despite the 
American withdrawals. After the Americans had requested improvements on a list o f 17 
products, Rey presented a report to the Council containing all new offers on 14 products 
that the EEC should make and, to pressure Ministers to approve it without changes, 
warned that such improvements were vital to conclude the Round. In Geneva, in the 
final confrontation with the American negotiators, the Commission would bear in mind 
the major worry of the Six, but for the moment these proposals had to be approved 
without changes. Rey aimed at avoiding a new time-consuming confrontation among 
the Six like the ones that had occurred previously in 1966, when the Commission 
presented global proposals and the Six asked to pull out. It is worth noting that, being 
aware that Rey’s initiative was necessary, none of the Six criticised Rey for having 
tabled offers for which he lacked authorization. However, not all of the Six had the 
intention of approving the report as it stood, and were inclined to have a new round of 
discussions. Germany opened the way by firmly opposing reducing protection on 
poultry and on unmanufactured tobacco. Couve de Murville did not share Rey’s stance 
that the attitude the EEC would take on these non-grains concessions would determine 
the success or failure of the Round. It was a simple question of bargain, “une simple 
opération de ‘bazardage’”, declared the French Minister. Thus he objected to reducing 
levies on sugar, fish, poultry, canned asparagus and peaches and cigarettes. Tolloy for 
Italy, while expressing his confidence in the Commission, objected the reduction on 
unmanufactured tobacco tariff from 28 to 24% and shared all French requests. The 
Belgian Heger and the Dutch de Block, while sharing Couve de Murville’s position that 
the Kennedy Round was not at risk, could accept the Commission report as it stood, if 
this might push the USA to make counter-concessions on products o f major interest to 
them such as cheese and potatoes. After further negotiations within the 111 Committee 
and a last round of discussions in the Council of Ministers, the Six finally decided to 
approve the Commission proposals, including those on unmanufactured tobacco. Couve 
de Murville gave up French reserves, accepting even to reduce duties on canned fruits. 
However, Germany and France refused to make further concessions on poultry. As for 
Italy, the German minister Schiller successfully put pressure on Tolloy to accept a
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reduction o f duties on cigarettes from 180% to 100-105%, and not 117% as Italy had 
requested, leaving to the Commission the freedom to negotiate the final rate in Geneva.
In the industrial sector, Rey presented to the Council of Ministers the proposals 
to improve offers in the mechanical sector for which the USA continued to demand 
improvements. The Commissioner had declined the majority of them, but could not 
object to all. Again, he did not want the Six to discuss the list of improvements, as this 
would put the Commission in a rigid negotiating position in Geneva. Rey merely 
wanted the Six to express their orientations, and then the Commission would bear them 
in mind in negotiating with third countries. Benelux approved the Commission 
proposals as they stood, Germany was even prepared to increase these offers, while 
France and Italy, even if disposed to increase some offers, wanted to reduce the 
Commission proposals, in particular for the sector of excavating machines and 
machines for public work. In any case, Tolloy and Couve de Murville expressed their 
full confidence in the Commission and the way it would conduct negotiations, and 
accepted R ey’s request to be given flexibility and freedom to move.76
While the talks moved relatively fast on these questions, they stonewalled on 
questions that concerned the small EFTA countries, as the Six adopted a rigid attitude. 
The Commission presented a list o f improvements to be made to this group of countries 
touching on, among other things, aluminium and paper. While Germany and 
Luxembourg were ready to accept it as it stood, the other four had objections. The major 
problems remained paper and aluminium. On newsprint, the Commission suggested to 
increase the original 1966 offer for a tariff contingent of 420,000 tons to 625,000 tons, 
but met with the opposition o f Italy, France, Belgium and The Netherlands. On basic 
paper and transformed paper products the Commission suggested a further reduction o f  
4 points, from 16% to 12%, and again met with the opposition of these countries. 
Moreover, the Dutch wanted to subject tariff reductions to a safeguard clause to be 
negotiated with the Nordics, and allowing a unilateral reduction of imports in case o f  
market disruption. Rey warned that a refusal to make concessions for paper would have 
serious consequences on the relations with the Nordic blocs as this commodity took a 
considerable part of its exports to the EEC. On aluminium, the Commission insisted on 
reducing the duties from 9 to 7% or even to 6% and met the predictable opposition o f 
France. On top of these two sectors, the Commission proposed to reduce from 18 to 
15% the duty on frozen fillet to  benefit Norway. This concession was considered so 
important in Oslo that the Norwegian delegation subordinated to it the reduction of duty 
on cars. However, France put up opposition on the ground that a common fishery policy 
had not been set yet. Moreover, France opposed new concessions to the Swiss in the 
watch sector and The Netherlands in cotton textiles. The former claimed that the Swiss 
had made only small concessions on their NTBs in watches, while the latter held that 
the small tariff concessions made by third countries and the crisis in the Dutch textiles 
sector did not allow major concessions. Rey was worried about the restrictive attitude o f  
the four governments. He held these concessions indispensable in concluding 
negotiations with the small EFTA countries and warned that it was time for political 
decisions. The Commissioner also expressed his surprise for the fact that the Six had 
made a considerable effort to reach an agreement with the USA, while they maintained 
a reticent attitude towards the other European countries. Rey made exerted the pressure 
he could to push Member States and, against the refusal to move, he warned that they 
were simply putting at risk the Round and made clear that the Commission would not to 
be to blame. Rey’s efforts to convince the four recalcitrant governments received the 
support o f the Germans. Neef recalled that the EEC had always considered the GATT
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talks as an opportunity to ease intra-European trade but this result would be achieved 
only if meaningful concessions were exchanged with the EFTA. German and 
Commission insistences were, in the end, successful. Italy and Belgium showed 
flexibility and decided to give up all their opposition. Couve decided to make a step 
forward, suggesting an increase in the 5% tariff contingent for aluminium -  while 
maintaining the opposition to the 9%  duty reduction -  from 100,000 tons to 
120/130.000 tons, agreeing to the Commission proposals on paper, except than for basic 
paper and transformed paper products for which he accepted only a 3 point reduction, 
but maintained opposition to the reduction on frozen fillet. The Dutch firmly maintained 
their opposition to concessions in the paper sector, unless the safeguard measure was 
negotiated, and on cotton textiles. Thus, in the end, the two countries that had often 
been poles apart and that were defined as the most protectionist along with the more 
liberal sided together in refusing concessions. After a second Rey’s warning that the 
reserves requested would seriously complicate negotiations with EFTA countries that 
could withdraw offers on crucial sectors as cars, shoes, glass and machinery, and after 
having assured that he would not offer a decrease in the duty on aluminium and would 
try to negotiate a consultative clause on papers, the Council of Ministers eventually 
agreed to leave to the Commission the responsibility of negotiating the best solution 
possible, but bearing in mind the orientation of the six governments. Thus Rey had 
attained improvements of offers and the flexibility to bargain he had been looking for.
After having settled these issues, the Commission and the Six had still to deal 
with two thorny issues, steel and meat concessions to Denmark. On steel, against what 
he considered the poor offers of the United Kingdom, Coppe called for a mere binding 
of the existing duties, unless the British accepted a reduction in specific duties. As had 
already happened at the Council of Ministers meeting of 2 May, Rey objected Coppe’s 
approach which considered steel to be outside o f the context of the whole Round. A 
mere binding of duties would cause a dangerous and general scaling down of 
concessions in Geneva also outside the steel sector. What the EEC/ECSC negotiators 
had to do was to continue to push for getting improvements but had to be given 
flexibility and maneuvering freedom. Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries shared 
Rey’s worries and Germany and the Netherlands were even ready to let Rey determine 
the final decision to be taken according to the development of the negotiations in 
Geneva. On the contrary, while not holding that steel had to be pulled out, France had a 
firmer attitude and wanted the EEC/ECSC negotiators to make crystal clear in Geneva 
that the Six were ready to put steel in the exceptions unless the British, the Americans 
and the Scandinavians improved their offers. Couve de Murville was disappointed by 
British offers both in the industrial and agricultural sector and held that if  the British 
kept these insufficient offers, the Commission would be forced to withdraw the EEC 
concessions. The final compromise formula was elaborated by the German Minister 
Schiller. The Commission and the High Authority would receive flexible directives and 
would determine whether the EEC/ECSC offers could be maintained as they stood; if  
counter-concessions were not given they would decided on a simple binding of the steel 
duties; and if  no sufficient counter-concessions were obtained they could proceed to 
withdraw the offers.
As for Denmark, both The Netherlands and France were against meaningful 
concessions on meat and live cattle to this country and this made it difficult for 
Mansholt to elaborate a proposal that would be acceptable for Copenhagen that had 
been highly disappointed by EEC offers from the very beginning o f the Round. 
Copenhagen had already underscored that without a satisfying agreement, it would 
withdraw a major part o f its offers and, given that Denmark negotiated as a member of 
the Nordic bloc, the Six and the Commission were aware that the threat could not be
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ignored. The problem in making concessions to Denmark was how to do this without 
altering the mechanism o f the CAP. This was a major priority for Mansholt who could 
not accept German proposals to grant quantitative assurances to Denmark. Under the 
Commission proposals, the Council of Ministers agreed to offer Denmark a reduction in 
tariffs on live cattle and to reduce the import levy, but not in the framework of the 
Kennedy Round but setting up a bilateral agreement with this country or offering a 
unilateral concessions, so to avoid extending the concession to other countries.77
Having settled the Danish question, the session o f the Council o f Ministers was 
over. Rey was highly satisfied with the result o f the Council of Ministers meeting. The 
Six had accepted a large proportion of his requests, dispelled confidence in the 
Commission’s judgment and capacity to bargain to defend the trade interests of the EEC 
and give flexible directives that he would use to negotiate with his partners in Geneva to 
conclude the Kennedy round. All the Six showed flexibility and willingness to conclude 
the Round, and above all the need to maintain cohesiveness. Moreover, each of the Six 
had sector to protect and no clear distinction between liberal and protectionist could be 
said to exist. In closing the session, the Belgian President expressed “ la reconnaissance 
du Conseil pour les efforts déployés par la Commission et par M. Rey en particulier, en 
vue de mener à bien ces négociations. Il exprime encore son entière confiance quant a 
l’aboutissement heureux du Kennedy round” .78 Thus the last round o f the Kennedy 
Round in Brussels was over. Now it was up to Rey and to conduct the last, and more 
difficult, round with Roth and the other Kennedy Round participants.
12.6 ...and in Washington
On the other side of the Atlantic it also was the time for great decisions. In 
particular the US government had to decide whether the Round could be concluded 
despite the results in agriculture being substantially inferior than had been expected in 
1963. A Command group meeting with Johnson had been set for 11 May to take the last 
decisions, and assess whether the conclusion o f the negotiations would provide 
advantages to the USA. Bator sent a memorandum to Johnson illustrating the state o f  
the situations and decisions to be taken. On chemicals, the United States and the EEC 
had accepted a two-package approach and the quarrel had moved on what to insert into 
the two packages. Bator labeled Wyndham White’s proposal a good bargain for the 
USA. Roth had the intention o f trying hard to improve it for cosmetic reasons, as 
Congress could not accept it as fair deal. In any case, Johnson needed to give guidance 
to Roth on whether the failure to get the EEC to move by the 14 May would be a serious 
enough “political business to force the USA to scuttle the negotiations” . Bator did not 
think so, but Johnson would have to hear the positions of the others of the Common 
group. On non-grain agriculture, after three years o f  stonewalling, Bator indicated to 
Johnson that the EEC had finally offered benefits valued at about $100 million with an 
average cut of about 12,5%. This corresponded to US cuts of the same size. While 
Freeman held that withdrawals were necessary, as balance did not exist, the other 
officials o f  the Command Group held that any withdrawal involved a serious risk o f a 
general unraveling. The question Johnson had to settle was whether this bargain was 
enough to avoid a major political war with the farming community. What Bator 
suggested was that the US negotiators in Geneva pushed as hard as possible, but in the 
end, they concluded the final bargain even if  the more pessimistic assumption about the 
EEC proved to be the case. Bator emphasized the absolute necessity of avoiding the
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collapse of the negotiations. In economic terms, the failure of the Round could lead to 
the kind of commercial warfare in which the USA, as trade surplus country, had a great 
deal to lose. But as Bator put it to Johnson, “The central point here is not primarily the 
level o f tariff. Rather, it is holding to a reasonable set o f trade rules without which 
international trade would become a jungle warfare. [...] The failure of the Kennedy 
Round would risk just that kind o f deterioration into spiraling protectionism, with 
parliaments holding the whip hand. The direct political implication o f the Kennedy 
Round failure would [...] be even more serious. It would encourage strong forces now 
at work to make the EEC into an isolationist, anti-US bloc, while, at the same time, 
further alienating the poor countries” Given these issues, noted Bator, the problems that 
still existed in Geneva were not worth these risks, “nor would they give the USA a 
plausible public basis for blowing up negotiations” . Thus the negotiations had 
significant foreign policy implications, and particularly for US policy in Europe, and 
had to be successfully concluded. 79
Like Bator, the State Department also pushed for an agreement to be reached at 
any cost in Geneva and it forecasted all the worst developments from the collapse o f the 
Round. Rusk was genuinely worried about the consequences of a failure of the Round. 
He held that isolationist and protectionist positions would gain great encouragement, 
while the “internationalists and liberal traders in the administration and their allies in 
Congress and in the country at large, would be confused and demoralized, and in no 
state to resist the pressure upon them”.80 The failure would be synonymous with the 
failure of American leadership of the Western world and would reverse the tide moving 
towards one cooperative world and encourage highly destructive economic rivalries. 
“The Atlantic partnership concept would be weakened; Gaullist nationalism 
strengthened; developed and developing countries further divided.” In Europe, the 
difficulties between the EEC and the EFTA countries in adjusting to one another’s 
internal elimination of duties would be aggravated and the chance of the USA 
benefitting from a generalized reduction in intra-European tariffs would be lost. If  the 
United Kingdom succeeded in joining the EEC, the degree of resulting discrimination 
against the US and other third countries’ exports would be higher than in case of 
Kennedy Round cuts. Failing he MFN rule, proliferation o f preferential areas would be 
likely, also causing adverse consequences for the US balance of payments position 
which also depended on US export performance. And even if the achievement o f the 
Round in liberalizing agriculture was modest, it would go further than any other 
multilateral negotiations. Failure would also call into question the existence of GATT 
with its rules of the trading game. It might compromise chances for agreement on 
international monetary reform and presage an eventual return to the economic 
nationalism and autarky of the Depression years preceding World War II. Moreover the 
onus for failure would inevitably fall on the Democratic Party and would inevitably 
result in Congressional recapture o f the tariff determining authority, thereby greatly 
reducing the scope for Presidential action. As a result, the likelihood o f receiving further 
grants of Congressional authority to pursue trade liberalization policies would be 
severely reduced. On top of all this, the failure would reverse a thirty year trend of 
progress in trade liberalization and it would unleash the forces of protectionism in the 
USA and abroad “driving the USA back to the Smoot-Hawley act”. Thus, for the State 
Department the failure was not an option as it would carry with it all these bleak
79
Memorandum for the President from Bator "Your meeting tomorrow on the Kennedy Round", 10 May 1967, NSF 
National Security Council History, Book l-TABSI-6, box 52 LBJL.
80
PRO PREM 13/1869 Telegram 1559 from Sir P. Dean (UK Embassy in Washington) to Foreign Office, 10 May 196.
385
consequences, surely over dramatized to push Johnson to conclude the Round, against 
an eventual opposition o f the Department of Agriculture.81
On 11 May, the Johnson administration had the final meeting on the key issues 
of the Kennedy Round. In addition to Johnson, Vice President Humphrey, Rusk, 
Rostow, Solomon, Freeman, Rehm, Trowbridge, Under Secretary of Labor Reynolds 
and Bator attended. After a full cabinet meeting to reflect on the achievable results, 
including a possible failure, Johnson asked each individual around the table to state 
whether he would vote for or against the Kennedy Round bargain even if US best 
efforts were not able to move the EEC from its present position. All the members of the 
Command Group, Freeman included, voted in favor. They shared Bator’s reasons for 
avoiding the breakdown of the negotiations and held that the opportunity to conclude 
the Round could not be lost, despite the disappointing results in agriculture. An overall 
balance existed with the EEC and the USA got meaningful concessions from the other 
Kennedy Round participants and even Freeman, despite his recrimination for the small 
achievements in agriculture, was aware that a failure would bear too heavy costs. After 
having heard the Common group recommendation, Johnson authorized US negotiators 
in Geneva to approve the agreement as described by Bator. Johnson shared Bator’s 
conclusion and held that for economic and political reasons the Round could not fail. 
Economically the USA would lose a considerable bargain in the industrial sector; 
politically the failure o f the Round would be a major setback for relations with the 
Europeans, a set back that would inevitably influence the negotiations between the USA 
an the Europeans in other sectors, such as monetary relations. Therefore, Roth was 
instructed to conclude the negotiations. 82
12.7 The final bargain
With the major decisions taken in Washington and Brussels the final negotiating 
marathon in Geneva could start. The fact that both sides had the political willingness to 
conclude the negotiations did not imply that a rapid conclusion was just around the 
comer. A total breakdown was unlikely, since the political pressures in favour of a 
settlement were great, but the achievement o f a final compromise remained tricky and 
the bargain between the EEC and the USA fierce. The last round of the negotiations 
took place as an open-ended marathon from 12 to 14 May night when the negotiations 
remained were fully blocked and at this point Wyndham White decided that the time 
had arrived to table his package deal for a final compromise containing impatable 
concessions for all parties.
In the industrial sector, the USA threatened massive withdrawals unless the EEC 
improved its offers on paper, aluminium, mechanical sector and give up half o f 
disparities claims. The Commission improved offers by one third than what the USA 
demanded for the mechanical sector and accepted to reduce the disparities list. On 
aluminium, Rey, being aware that French refusal to cut duty was unmovable, offered to 
bind an annual tariff quota of 130,00 tons at 5%. In response the USA decided to reduce 
its duty by 20 and not 50%, while Japan and the EFTA countries made substantial cuts. 
By contrast, Norway was highly disappointed by the maintenance of the CET at 9% and 
as it was also dissatisfied by the reduction o f the CET on frozen fillet from 16 to 15%, 
and not 11%, it decided to cut duty on cars from 10 to 8% rather than 5%, as requested 
by the EEC. On paper, the Nordic countries reluctantly accepted the Commission offers
81
Memorandum of the State Department written by Hinton, 10 May 1967, Bator papers, box 12, LBJl.
82
Memorandum for the records "Positions taken at the Meeting with the President on the Kennedy Round", 11 May 
1967, Bator papers, box 12, LBJL; Memorandum of conversation between Roth and Bator, 11 May 1967, Bator papers, 
box 12, LBJL.
386
as presented at the Council of Ministers of 11 May. 83 With Denmark and Argentina, 
the Commission agreed to come to a bilateral agreement for live cattle and refrigerated 
meet. Denmark openly made its reduction o f duties on cars dependent to EEC 
concessions on meat, thus the Commission could not avoid some kind of offer. The 
Commission and the two countries decided to negotiate from 15 May to 30 June 1967 
on the basis o f a reduction of duties from 16 to 13% and the settlement of the levies 
according to seasons and level of prices. This agreement would be concluded outside 
the Kennedy Round which meant that even if it extended an MFN rule to all countries it 
would not be bound in GATT.84
With many difficulties, chemicals, steel and agriculture remained to be patched 
up. On chemicals, for Roth it was crucial to work out a compromise of decoupage 
formula that would at least give the USA some presentational advantage before 
Congress. By contrast, the Commission wanted to keep at the minimum the 
unconditional concessions and wanted to make exceptions on plastics. The 
Commission’s stance provoked a reaction from the British who threatened of increasing 
their duty on plastics if the EEC made exceptions. Roth became furious with Powell 
because the British stance “could blow up the whole negotiations even if  an agreement 
with the EEC on decoupage” was found. Worst, the British were also the only ones 
refusing to make NTBs concession in the ASP-package.85
For grains, the dropping out o f the SSR, MDS and price of feedgrains removed 
the major obstacles to an agreement between the Commission and Roth and only the 
question of the size of food aid remained opened. In addition to the EEC-US 
confrontation on this topic, the last days of negotiations saw a tough bargain between 
Canada, Australia on the one side and Japan and United Kingdom on the other, for 
wheat price, with the Americans in the middle to try to convince the two sides to 
moderate their requests, and between the USA on the one side and Japan and the United 
Kingdom on the other on food aid. In this area too, negotiations were deadlocked by 14 
May. 86 The reaching o f an agreement on non-grain stumbled on the EEC final 
concession to the USA. The USA stuck firmly to their requests on the seventeen 
products and threatened to reduce their offers unless the EEC made improvements. Rey 
suggested improvements on tobacco with a reduction o f the duty from 28 to 24%, 
grapefruits, canned fruits, offals, and poultry, but Roth judged insufficient these 
improvements.87
In steel the British had decided to offer a 10% reduction of specific duties if  this 
proved to be necessary to end the Kennedy Round, but conceived this move a last resort 
to be taken only if they were forced to avoid a total breakdown and, possibly, if the EEC 
reduced duties on lorries in return.88 The Americans were annoyed by the British 
attitude. They held that the United Kingdom was causing major troubles on steel, on 
grains with their refusal to agree on price and food aid, and on chemicals with their an 
unhelpful attitude. Worst, the British delegation claimed that an imbalance of offers
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existed with the EEC and submitted withdrawals that hit the EEC hard, including on 
steel and plastic. As a result, Rey decided to withdraw offers on whisky, gin and 
mechanical sector. He took this decision with hesitation because it had not been 
authorized by the 111 Committee and felt that the Germans would be unhappy about 
this move. However, as the British did not move from their position, Rey considered 
this the only way out.89
The American negotiators were particularly upset by the British attitude that, 
according to them, occurred just when the Commission was making meaningful efforts 
to conclude the Round.90 Blumenthal was particularly “furious at them”. Whereas 
British offers had been originally very good, better in fact than the other participants, 
“they have been cut back substantially”, noted Roth, and had an increasingly negative 
attitude towards a successful conclusion of the Round. “If their attitude and position 
continues over the next twelve hours it could tear down the entire structure of the KR. 
Under these circumstances I think it is absolutely essential that a phone call go at least 
from Rusk”, wrote Roth to Bator. The American negotiator wanted Washington to exert 
pressure on the British in order to convince them not to cause trouble at this critical 
moment and, concerning steel, to make all the necessary concessions.91 As a result, on 
13 May American officials “went to London on every channel” to make it clear to 
Wilson, the other ministers involved in the negotiations and to the British Embassy in 
Washington that Johnson was taking risk in supporting the Kennedy Round and the 
British had to improve their offers.92
Rusk called on British Foreign Secretary George Brown to state the danger 
consequences of the British positions in Geneva. US Ambassador in London, David 
Bruce, talked with Wilson to emphasize the American concerns regarding the British 
attitude. Bator and Rostow called the UK Embassy in Washington to express Johnson 
and Rusk’s concern for the British attitude in Geneva.93 The British government reacted 
by assuring that a successful conclusion of the Round was its major interest and that it 
was determined to bring matters to a successful conclusion. Therefore it would check 
with its delegation to Geneva the questions raised by the USA, while Brown “for 
overriding political reasons” would direct Denman and Powell to soften their positions 
on crucial matters as steel, grains and chemicals so to conclude the Round and not be 
blamed for failure.94 The British delegation in Geneva was shaken by what it considered 
America’s unjustified onslaught. According to Powell, the Americans had exaggerated 
in their reaction which gave the impression that obstacles were caused principally by the 
British.95
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Against this deadlock across the board, Wyndham White decided that time for a 
package deal had arrived. He first mediated to fix the minimum price of wheat (Hard 
Winter No.2) at $1.73 a bushel, against the $1.85 asked by exporters and $1,65 asked by 
Japan and United Kingdom, and the a maximum price o f $2.13, reached in the early 
hours o f 14 May. The agreement on price, reached also thanks to Rusk’s intervention in 
London, opened the way for the package deal for chemicals, steel, food aid and EEC 
offers on agriculture.96
In chemicals, after impossible bilateral discussions between Rey and Roth, on 15 
May Roth and Blumenthal persuaded Wyndham White to table a decoupage package, 
elaborated by them, as his own suggestion and as part o f his final package. The EEC 
and UK would reduce tariffs by 20% generally, and by 30% on rates higher than 25%, 
unconditionally and as part of the Kennedy Round. The USA would make a 50% cut 
generally and 20% on rates of 8% or below. Japan and Switzerland would make a full 
50% reduction. For the conditional ASP-package, the EEC, UK and Switzerland would 
make additional commitment on NTBs and a further 30% reduction (so to achieve a full 
50% reduction), the USA would convert the ASP and lower rates where indicated to a 
general 20% level. All parties accepted the plan. As for the NTBs, Italy, France and 
Belgium agreed to remove their road tax, while the British offered a 25% reduction in 
the tobacco preference which would significantly enhance chances for Congressional 
action on ASP as the tobacco industry would be willing to support the its removal. As a 
result, an appropriate compromise was made and the logjam was broken.97
On steel, the British accepted, as a part o f Wyndham White package deal and 
after American move, to reduce ad valorem and specific duties by 20%, while the other 
countries maintained their offers, and despite the EEC not reciprocating with a 
reduction on lorries.98 The British also maintained their offers on passenger cars despite 
the EEC exceptions on commercial vehicles and their parts. In effect, if the UK 
excepted cars, the EEC would follow suit and this would mean no tariff reductions at all 
on motor vehicles. But as the EEC market for cars was important for the British -  trade 
surplus in motor cars and components was in their favor -the  EEC reduction of duty on 
cars could not be forsaken.99
For food aid it was only after Rusk’s intervention that the British accepted the 
size o f program requested by Roth. As part of the Wyndham White package deal, the 
Arrangement on cereals would be composed o f a food aid program of 4.5 million tons, 
higher than Rey had been authorized to accept in Brussels, with the contribution divided 
as follows: 42% for the USA, 23% for the EEC, Canada 9%, Australia, the United 
Kingdom and Japan 5%, other countries 11%. As requested by the EEC, the
i onArrangement would be set up outside the Kennedy Round.
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On non-grain agriculture, an eleventh hour agreement was reached thanks to the 
fact that Rey, under his responsibility as it had not been authorized by the 111 
Committee, and as part of the Wyndham White package deal, decided go further than 
the orientation of the Council o f Ministers and to improve cuts on tobacco from 28 to 
23%, to cut duties on cigarettes by 50% so that the final duty was 90%, notwithstanding 
the Italian opposition at the meeting o f the Council o f Ministers o f 10 May, to cut duties 
on canned salmon, to further reduce duties on offals from 15% to 13% and to make an 
offer on whisky. In response, the USA improved their offers on tomatoes and cheese, 
but made no offers on olive oils.101
The various proposals o f  the Wyndham White package were discussed at the 
111 Committee meeting of 15 May. Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg were ready to 
accept Wyndham White’s package deal, while Italy and The Netherlands were reticent 
to make further concessions on non-grains agriculture, and France asked for time to 
reflect. In the afternoon, the proposals of the GATT director general were accepted by 
USA, UK and Japan. In the meanwhile, Rey obtained from the USA a reduction o f 
requests both in the agricultural and the industrial sectors, in particular, the USA 
accepted a reduction o f the CET duty on poultry from 21 to 17% and not 15%, and 
small increase of offers in the mechanical sector. Rey, after a telephone conversation 
with Couve de Murville in Paris and Neef in Bonn, and after the further improvements 
on tobacco, cigarettes and offals taken to accommodate the American requests, during 
the night session of negotiations in Wyndham W hite’s office, accepted the package 
deal.1®5 In the end, in the early morning o f 16 May, a framework agreement was 
reached thanks to the fact that Wyndham White laid down before the main participants 
“a package which contained elements equally unpalatable to each” . And at this point the 
Director General could announce to the press that the bargaining was finally over.103
Together with this announcement, Wyndham White had to report also the full 
disappointment of the LDCs. As the Kennedy Round entered its final phase the 
problems o f these countries were moved to a second level and developed countries 
constantly ignored their requests. This was even more the case during the last days in 
the negotiations when they mainly concentrated on matters of major concern to them. 
To try to reduce LDCs’ disquiet, two meetings were organized by Wyndham White on 
12 and 13 May during which the LDCs repeated their requests, notably maximum 
reduction on their exports, the bringing to zero o f duties on tropical products and 
implementation of the reduction in one step and not scaled in five years. However, the 
developed countries did not modify their offers. Eventually the LDCs accused the 
developed countries o f having continuously disregarded their interests and under their 
insistence, Wyndham White issued a statement noting that actions taken fell far short o f 
the expectations of the LDCs and making this group of countries’ disappointment with 
GATT clearer than ever.104
Volume I, Chapter III International Trade "The Sixth Round o f Trade Negotiations", undated. See this document for a 
full and technical analysis of the IGA agreement
ANF 724.713, box 7, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances -  DREE, Note «Négociations commerciales 
multilatérales de Genève. Bilan succinct des travaux du 8 au 15 mai 1967», 18 May 1967; AECB BAC 122/1991-12 
«Négociations commerciales dans le cadre du GATT», communication de la Commission au Conseil, NCG (67)35, 31 
May 1967 and CM2 1967/16726 PV de la 284*"* réunion du Comité 111, 30-31 May 1967.
102
ANF 724.713, box 7, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances -  DREE, Note «Négociations commerciales 
multilatérales de Genève. Bilan succinct des travaux du 8 au 15 mai 1967», 18 May 1967.
103 PRO PREM 13/1869 Note "The Kennedy Round", 16 May 1967.
104
ANF 724.713, box 7, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances -  DREE, Note «Négociations commerciales 
multilatérales de Genève. Bilan succinct des travaux du 8 au 15 mai 1967», 18 May 1967; Telegram from State 
Department to various posts, 22 May 1967, Bator papers, box 13, LBJL; CM2 1967/48 PV de la 224*™ session du 
Conseil de la CEE, 26-27 June 1967.
390
Despite the announcement made to the press on 16 May that the Kennedy Round 
had been concluded, actually only an oral and framework agreement had been reached. 
The agreement had to be put on paper and numerous details had to be specified before 
30 June 1967, the date agreed for the signature o f the Final Act. As noted, in order to 
favor an accord with the United States, Rey tabled offers not agreed by the Council of 
Ministers. Already in the aftermath of 16 May, some delegations noted that the 
Commission had accepted a food aid program of a bigger size than that envisaged at by 
Ministers on 10 May. 05 Then, at the end of May, when the EEC list of offers was put 
on paper, Member States realized that offers not agreed by them had been conceded. 
Italy, France and The Netherlands complained about this attitude not only because it put 
the Council o f Ministers in face o f a fait accompli, but also because they opposed such 
improvements on an economic basis. Consequently, they asked for their removal from 
the list. The Dutch complained about the eleventh hour concessions to the 
Scandinavians in the fish sector. Italy and France complained about the improvements 
to the British in food industry sector, even if, in return, the EEC had obtained 
improvements on fruits and vegetables. The Dutch complained that these improvements 
from the British did not concern products of interest to them. The Commission tried to 
avoid the discussion, warning that these withdrawals would push third countries to 
remove the improvements to the EEC negotiated in the last hours of the 15 May.106 The 
final agreement on the concessions was reached among the Six at the Council of 
Ministers of 26-27 June 1967. Here the greatest part of the concessions negotiated by 
the Commission was confirmed by the Six and only minor changes were made. 
However France did not acquiesce to the framework agreement elaborated with 
Denmark and Argentina and as a result, the EEC offered smaller tariff cuts and 
reductions in season levies. Argentina and Demark found these concessions so poor that 
the first refused to sign the agreement, while the second resigned to it but withdrew 
some of its offers on cars.107 Once the agreement ha been reached, under suggestion of 
Rey, the Council of Ministers instructed Hijzen to sign the Final Act o f the Kennedy 
Round.108
On 28 June Johnson approved the series of multilateral trade agreements 
negotiated in the Kennedy Round and authorized Blumenthal to sign the agreement on 
behalf of the USA. The President’s formal authorization was communicated to Geneva 
by telegram on 29 June, and the agreements were signed on 30 June, only hours before 
the expiration of the five-year tariff-cutting authority conferred on the US President by 
the TEA of 1962. At this time the Kennedy Round was truly over.109
Conclusion: Trade and politics in the results of the Kennedy 
Round
At the conclusion of the Round, each of the participants expressed a mixture of 
satisfaction with the result and a sense of relief that the long and intricate negotiations
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had been brought to a conclusion.110 Despite the agriculture imbalance, the results of 
the negotiations remained remarkable and were praised by the press, experts and 
governments. Duties had been cut by an average o f 35% and applied to $40 billion 
worth of goods. Even if  the 50% linear cut had not been achieved, the reductions were 
higher than in the previous round. On top o f this, a food aid agreement of 4.5 million 
tons per year had been agreed. Efforts were also made to attack NTBs: an agreement to 
abolish the ASP was reached and an anti-dumping code among the United States, the 
EEC, the UK, Japan, Canada and most of the EFTA countries to uniform the 
antidumping practices was signed.
President Johnson emphatically defined the Kennedy Round as the “beginning 
o f a new phase of international trade” and “the most successful multilateral agreement 
on tariff reduction ever negotiated” . Roth underlined the impetus the positive results the 
Round would give to US exports and help in reducing the deficit in the balance o f 
payments.111 Rusk, referring to results, defined the deal fair and balanced, giving 
special advantages to the USA thanks to the food aid sharing.112 A telegram of the State 
Department issued on 16 May highlighted that the Round strengthened world 
multilateral non-discriminatory trading system and was “the proof of the solidarity o f  
the industrialized countries and their readiness and ability to deal successfully with 
highly charged problems. We have been drawn together by our overriding common 
interests than divided by economic differences”.113 Thus, even if Roth also held that the 
USA “could have done better here or there” and that Johnson’s remarks were also made 
in praise o f  his own policy, the fact remained that the Kennedy Round was a significant 
result for US economic diplomacy that had been able to move forward, and then 
conclude, a much complicated trade round of negotiations.114
Actually, US Congress remained skeptical, both as it held that no meaningful 
results had been achieved in agriculture and as it was not enthusiastic abut the deal 
reached on the ASP. As shown in the next chapter, Congress would show its displeasure 
by refusing to approve the elimination of this NTB. Commerce Secretary Alexander 
Trowbridge and Freeman, while trying to loyally defend the results of the US 
negotiators, remained dissatisfied for the agreement that did not liberalized 
agriculture.115
The EEC also expressed satisfaction with the results of the Round. The French 
held that the EEC had achieved its major aims. The exceptions list of November 1964 
had been almost maintained and the mechanism of the CAP had not been modified.116 
The Germans too expressed their satisfaction for the liberalization achieved in the 
industrial sector, and also Italy and the Benelux countries claimed to have achieved 
rewarding results.117 In commenting upon the results obtained, Rey claimed that “dans 
le domaine industriel, les résultas de la négociation peuvent être considérer comme 
satisfaisants. La politique agricole commune est sortie intact de la négociation. Dans
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l’ensemble les résultats des négociations dans le secteur agricole sont modestes”.118 By 
the same token, the British too were pleased by the results and Powell held that the final 
agreement was “a highly satisfactory outcome”.119
In effect, as Rey noted, the Kennedy Round produced mixed results. In the 
industrial sector, it produced the remarkabe 35% reduction of duties, with about two- 
thirds of the cut reaching 50%. In 1972, at the end of the Kennedy Round 
implementation period, Japan would have an average tariff level of 11.5%, United 
Kingdom of 10.4%, USA of 9.4% and the EEC of 8.2%. Actually, achievements varied 
across the sectors. Only limited results were achieved for textiles, steel, and aluminium, 
while major results were achieved in the mechanical sector and chemicals, if the APS
J 12Ûwas eliminated.
The rule of exceptions allowed the USA and the EEC to pull out of the linear cut 
the most sensitive industrial sectors, but at the same time they made important 
concessions that would open some economic sectors to increased competition. With an 
average reduction o f 45%, machinery was the industrial sector where the greatest cuts 
were made and this was sure a major concession by the EEC, given that American and 
British products were competitive and that the existing CET was already low, between 6 
and 12%. The EEC, however, because o f the French and Italian opposition, excepted 
business machines and electronics, two new industries it did not want to subject to the 
competition of the USA. In the automobile sector, the EEC reduced the CET from 22 to 
11% on cars, but refused to make any cuts on heavy commercial vehicles and tractors, 
at the displeasure of the British.121 The United States also obtained major benefits with 
all its major trading partners and was particularly satisfied of cuts achieved in 
machinery sectors. At the same time, Washington expressed regret at the minor cuts on 
aluminium, steel, business machines and electronics.
Table 1 shows that reduction of tariffs by major products made by the USA and 
the EEC. As already noted, the major cuts were made in the machinery sector and 
chemicals.
Table 1. EEC Tariffs before and after the Kenncdv Round
Before the Kennedy Round After the Kennedy Round
All Chemicals 14.3 7.6
Leather manufactures 9.2 5.7
Rubber manufactures 15 7.8
Wood and cork manufactures, except furniture 10,9 8.8
Paper and Board manufactures 10,7 7.5
Textile 16 15,6
Mineral manufactures 9.4 5,5
Iron and steel 9.4 6,7
Manufactures of metal 12.8 7.2
Machinery other than electric 11.1 6,4
Electric machinery 14.2 9,1
Transport equipment 15,4 9,9
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Table. 2 U S  Tariffs before and after the Kennedy Round
Before the Kennedy Round After the Kennedy Round
All Chemicals 17,8 9,3
Leather manufactures 16.2 10.4
Rubber manufactures 11.3 6
Wood and cork manufactures, except furniture 7,1 6,8
Paper and Board manufactures 10,9 5.5
Textile 21,4 20,1
Mineral manufactures 9,9 7,5
Iron and steel 6,5 5,7
Manufactures of metal 14,7 7,7
Machinery other than electric 11,9 6
Electric machinery 13,6 7,1
Transport equipment 7,1 3.5
Footwear 21,1 12,1
Instruments 21,1 13.1
Source: see table 1
It is also worth noting that one of the aims o f the EEC in attending the Round 
had also been to reduce intra-European discrimination. Certainly, the Kennedy Round, 
with its average reduction of 35%, lessened this discrimination, however it left out 
major sectors, such as heavy commercial vehicles, and made only token reductions on 
aluminium and minor ones on in the paper sector.
With the significant reduction in tariff barriers, NTBs became the major obstacle 
to trade exchanges and in this sense the anti-dumping code paved the way for to the 
inclusion o f NTBs in the Tokyo Round, where the major focus was indeed on NTBs. 
However tariffs were not rendered redundant. Even if  the average level was low, as 
table 1 and 2 show, in some sectors they remained high. Thus, in the industrial sector 
the interests of all the Kennedy Round participants to lower tariffs of the other 
participants led to a reciprocal substantial reduction o f protectionism, both across the 
Atlantic and in Europe. Even if some sectors remained out of the liberalizing efforts as 
all governments had their trade sectors to protect, meaningful results were achieved and 
in this sense the Kennedy Round reduced protectionism. And the EEC, while 
maintaining its regionalism, was not heading to become a stumbling block in this 
regard. In this sense, the Kennedy Round surely enhanced economic interdependence in 
the industrial sector.
In marked contrast were the results in the agricultural sector For the first time in 
international commercial conference, agricultural trade had been a key issue, but no 
major result was achieved apart from the clear awareness that negotiating in this sector 
was a difficult task. A commodity agreement on wheat and an food aid program were 
set up, and token tariff cuts were made on poultry, fruits and vegetables, offals and 
some more substantial cut on tobacco. But this result did not amount to a major result as 
the protectionist trend was not scratched. For the USA, agriculture was a major 
disappointment, as it had not been able to reduce the protectionism of the CAP, got no 
quantitative access guarantees and was not satisfied with the EEC token tariff cuts and 
sharing of food aid for cereals. For Freeman, the Kennedy Round met with only
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‘‘limited success” in removing or lowering trade barriers, and in the hard-core products 
had “no success at all”. Above all the Secretary of Agriculture pointed at the lesson 
taught by the Kennedy Round. The negotiations showed “a fundamental difference 
among the major trading partners as to international trade philosophy”. Big exporters 
like the USA trade on the basis o f comparative advantages, the EEC adhered to this 
principle only in a few cases, while the LDCs never did. Because of these major 
conflicting views, no major achievement was made at the Kennedy Round.122
In a statement before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on 11 July 
1967, the Under Secretary of Agriculture John Schnittker claimed that the “[CAP] 
system, which insulates home producers from the effects of outside competition 
regardless o f the difference in efficiency, is perhaps the greatest unsolved problem in 
international trade today” . The Kennedy Round, having failed to reduce the CAP’S 
protectionism, did not succeed in reducing EEC protectionism. The Americans had 
started the Round with the clear intention of including agriculture in the liberalization of 
trade. The EEC was setting up its CAP, trade surplus in agriculture was crucial for the 
Americans and therefore, their aim was logical. However they were not able to push the 
EEC to start liberalizing trade. The EEC did not aim at liberalizing agriculture but at 
regulating it, so to bind the existing level of protectionism and defend EEC regionalism. 
Moreover, as the negotiations in the industrial sector had demonstrated, reduction of 
protectionism occurred only when a reciprocal interest in enhancing exports existed for 
a given sector. But in agriculture this situation did not exist. The USA was interested in 
increasing its foodstuff exports to the EEC, while the EEC did not share this priority. 
Thus, as the British had warned in 1963, from the beginning of the Round the 
Americans lacked the bargaining power to push the EEC to reduce its protectionism, 
because the priority of the Six was to set up a regional agricultural market and to 
regulate agriculture at world level, and not to decrease US protectionism and therefore 
be ready, in return, to decrease their own protection in this sector. Actually, it should 
also be recognized that US support for European integration further weakened US 
strength to reduce CAP protectionism. In effect, Washington supported the CAP as an 
instrument to give unity to the EEC and, as a result, never took a confrontational or 
challenging attitude towards this common policy and never questioned in Geneva its 
consistency with GATT. One can wonder what might have happened to the CAP, also 
given German disaffection to this policy, if  the USA had decided to openly and 
confrontationally challenge it.
The EEC also considered the agricultural part of the Kennedy Round to be, if  not 
failure, surely inferior to what had been hoped. Only meaningless cuts had been made 
on products covered by tariffs. On top of this, no commodity agreements had been 
reached on meat and dairy products and only a partial one had been signed for cereals. 
However, the great regret on the part of the EEC and above all of the Commission was 
the refusal of third countries to negotiate under the MDS. The EEC, and the 
Commission in particular had considered the Kennedy Round an opportunity to 
organize agriculture at world level, binding the existing level of protectionism and, 
hence, reducing the protectionist effects of the CAP. According to the Commission, this 
chance was missed and negotiations failed because exporters had not abandoned the 
classical concept of access and quantitative assurance. “Le souci du bénéfice ‘cash1 
immédiat l’a emporté sur les bénéfices plus solides et plus réels à long terme d ’une
122 Administrative History of the Department of Agriculture, Volume I, Chapter III International Trade "The Sixth 
Round of Trade Negotiations*, undated, box 1, LBJL
395
véritable coopération internationale” .123 Despite the regret for this missed opportunity, 
the EEC ended the Round with the CAP intact, thus it achieved a goal set upon entering 
the Kennedy Round. But this also meant that the EEC concluded the negotiations 
constituting major stumbling block in world agricultural trade, as GATT had not been 
able to overcome EEC protectionism with major consequences on world trade. In fact, 
in the following ten years, the EEC shifted from being the prime importing bloc to be 
the prime exporting bloc. In this sense, the results o f the Kennedy Round set the tone of 
international trade: it led to freer trade in the industrial sector and protectionism in 
agriculture.
According to Eckes, "the United States achieved few of its initial goal. Although 
it negotiate down European tariffs on industrial products and preserve the open global 
system trading system, America failed to open agriculture markets or increase 
opportunities for exports from developing countries.124 For Zeiler "pursuing trade 
liberalization for the sake of national security and economic health, the president forged 
an agreement at the Kennedy Round that hurt U.S. interests”. Moreover, the EEC "won 
its aim of lowering industrial tariff while maintaining agricultural barriers” .125
Discussions which took place from 1963 to 1967 showed the problems on the 
way to the liberalization of agriculture, the nature and the size o f the system of 
protection of the domestic policies. The problems o f world agriculture had clearly 
surfaced, even if the political willingness to resolve them had still to mature. A last 
word on the MDS is necessary. The negotiations method proposed by the EC to tackle 
agricultural protectionism was technically a rational and sound one. All factors 
determining the degree o f protection would have to be integrated in the MDS and 
become negotiable both by exporters and importers. Simply binding reduced customs 
tariffs would not liberalize agricultural trade in an effective, sustainable and politically 
acceptable way and would simply lead to circumvention through other distorting 
measures. It was, however, clear to all negotiators that calculations of existing "montant 
de soutien” for all the key commodities for the main participants would be a time 
consuming process that would involve massive research o f data and thereafter 
painstaking and intrusive controls by GATT. While acceptance o f the proposed 
modality by its partners would have led to binding the maximum levels of the ECC 
variable levies -  something it had steadfastly refused until that time -  the ECC was 
prepared to accept that kind of commitment provided that this would take place in the 
context of properly disciplined agricultural policies o f  all key trading nations. After the 
Kennedy Round, developments in the Tokyo Round again made it abundantly clear that 
the traditional way of tackling the agricultural sector in multilateral GATT negotiations 
only at the level of import border measures could never bring liberalization for the 
major agricultural products. In the end, it was to be the OECD, which towards the 
middle o f the 1970s and during the 1980s, produced basic studies on overall support 
levels which helped the GATT in the Uruguay Round to begin dealing successfully with 
agriculture by encompassing all relevant measures: customs tariffs, domestic measures 
o f  support, export subsidization and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. And now, in 
the ongoing Doha Round that started in 2001, the ‘montant de soutien’ approach in fact 
remains at the basis o f the present sophisticated agricultural negotiating techniques.
At the first Council o f Ministers meeting after the end of the negotiations in 
Geneva, Rey addressed "les remerciements les plus chaleureux au Conseil pour la
123
AECB BAC 209/1980-297 PV 409, 31 May 1967 "Dixième rapport general". For the EEC dissatisfaction on agriculture 
see also ANF 724.713, box 7, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances -  DREE, Note «Négociations commerciales 
multilatérales de Genève. Bilan succinct des travaux du 8 au 15 mai 1967», 18 May 1967.
124 Eckes, A.E. Jr, Opening American Market, p. 200.
Zeiler, T.W. American Trade and Power in the 1960s,
396
confiance dont il a bien voulu témoigner a son égard. II souligne que sans cette 
confiance et Ia cohésion communautaire qui ont caractérisé les travaux internes menés 
au cours de ces demiers mois, il n ’aurait pas été possible d ’aboutir aux résultats réalisés 
a Genève” 126 Rey’s remarks at the Council of Ministers contained the two most 
nothworthy aspects of the EEC in the last phase of the Round: the confidence of the Six 
in the Commission and their cohesiveness.
One year after the end of the crisis of the empty chair, the Six had been able to 
maintain the necessary cohesion to attend the last phase o f the Round. Such effort had 
required compromise by all the Six, which had to make concessions in Brussels so to 
achieve the elaboration of the common position and maintain the necessary cohesion to 
negotiate in Geneva. As the French remarked, on the political level ‘TafTrontement du 
monde extérieur a aide les Six a prendre une conscience plus vive de leurs intéréts 
communs et les a conduit a faire preuve dans la phase finale des négociations d’une 
remarquable cohésion.” And this cohesion was the principle strength o f the Six.127 O f 
the same opinion were the Germans who also emphasized the cohesion of the Six and 
their willingness to compromise so to reach a common position.128. In this sense, the 
Kennedy Round strengthened the solidarity of the Six and marked their existence as a 
unit in world trade. To be sure the Six found themselves in disagreement on many 
issues that corresponded to different national economic interests and different 
commercial policies, nevertheless these disagreements did not preclude the reaching of 
compromises. They were aware that negotiating with a unified voiced reinforced their 
bargaining strength and, consequently, concessions to achieve the necessary 
compromise to negotiate as a sole entity were indispensable. They had a relevant trade 
interest in staying together in a Community and, consequently in negotiating as a unit 
and making the necessary concessions. And this also when their commercial policies 
were poles apart, as was the case for grains. In effect, for the Six attending the Round as 
a unit meant elaborating a common commercial policy which needed reciprocal 
concessions to the different trade interests. In this sense, the GATT negotiations 
favoured the elaboration of the common commercial policy.
The second aspect worth emphasising is the confidence of the Six in the 
Commission. One of the aims of the Commission in attending the Kennedy Round was 
to establish itself as the sole negotiator on behalf of the EEC. In the last phase on the 
Round, that is to say after the crisis o f the Empty Chair, the Commission was able to 
achieve this goal, confirming once more that the crisis had had no effect on the role of 
the Commission in such a fundamental field as trade relations with third countries. In 
1963, Germany and The Netherlands had often challenged this aim by asking to attend 
the bargain between the Commission and the other Kennedy Round participants. As for 
the French, who during the crisis o f  the Empty Chair had strongly complained about the 
actions of the Commission, they never questioned the latter’s negotiating role or its 
right to negotiate in the absence o f the Member States. This had been the attitude o f the 
French government before June 1965 and remained also so after January 1966. In 1967, 
the Six were very well aware that to effectively enhance their trade interests, the EEC 
had to be represented by the Commission that could show up in Geneva with a single 
position. Thus Member States allowed this institution to strengthen its role because this 
was in line with their trade interests. Step after step, the Commission was first able to
126
CM2 1967/39 PV de la 221*"* session du Conseil de la CEE, 5-6 June 1967.
ANF 724.713, box 7, Premier ministre, Comité Interministériel pour les Questions de Coopération Economique 
Européenne, Note «Négociations commerciales dans le cadre du GATT» 16 May 1967. See also ANF 724.713, box 7, 
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances -  OREE, Note «Négociations commerciales multilatérales de Genève. Bilan 
succinct des travaux du 8 au 15 mai 1967», 18 May 1967.
128
AAPD 1967, document 170.
397
silence the representatives of the Member States that attended the discussions in Geneva 
and then, finally, to get rid o f them. As a matter o f fact, the last phase of the 
negotiations was conducted by Jean Rey and the other Commission negotiators, while 
representatives of the Member States waited outside the bargaining room to then be 
informed by the Commission itself. Therefore, there is no doubt that the Kennedy 
Round strengthened the role o f the Commission in international trade relations. And it is 
worth noting that the sector in which the influence o f the Commission was stronger was 
indeed the agricultural sector, despite the fact that the Treaty of Rome did not authorise 
this institution to negotiate with third countries. In fact, the Commission negotiated in 
Geneva with a plan, the MDS, that it had itself negotiated and Member States never 
questioned its authority and, on the contrary, they highly considered Manshoit and 
Rabot’s opinion for this sector. In the last phase o f the Round, member states were 
progressively inclined to defer to Rey’s opinions.
At the end of Round Rey praised the major played by his institution and the high 
quality o f the technical work of the Commission in general and of the Commission 
delegation in Geneva in particular. Beyond Rey’s partisan satisfaction, it is worth noting 
that in fact it was also hanks to this high technical work that the Commission was able 
to retain a major role. The Commission underlined not only the major result obtained at 
international political level but also at the institutional level.129
This does not mean that the Council o f Ministers was ready to let the 
Commission decide. On the contrary, in Geneva, the Commission negotiated under the 
control o f the 111 Committee and had to constantly to shuttle back to Brussels to get 
instructions from the Ministers who firmly retained the decision-making authority in 
their hands and controlled every detail o f the Kennedy Round. And this was 
demonstrated by the long Council of Ministers meetings where ministers of the Six 
spent hours discussing tricky issues like duties on canned peaches. But this did not 
impede Rey from table offers not authorised by Member States. At the same time the 
Commission was able, thanks to its technical expertise and the fact that it was 
conducting the negotiations without Member States’ presence, to influence the final 
decisions of Member States. In this sense, it actively participated in the decision-making 
process.
The Kennedy Round was a major confrontation between the EEC and the USA. 
The Six, thanks to their relevance in world trade given that they negotiated as a unit, 
were able to bargain with the USA as a partner o f equal strength. The USA had 
launched the Kennedy Round in order to keep the two sides o f the Atlantic together, 
under US leadership. By reducing barriers across the Atlantic, the Kennedy Round 
strengthened the Atlantic alliance’s cooperation, but it is also true that, in 1967, major 
problems strained relations between the USA and the EEC and a successful GATT 
Round was not enough to hide these strains.
However, Washington highly resented the fact that the CAP protectionism had 
not been reduced. With Congress in a protectionist mood and the US deficit in the 
balance o f payments it became more difficult to justify European discrimination and, 
therefore, to support the EEC. The results o f the Kennedy Round clearly showed the 
direction the EEC was taking in international trade and this was a direction the US did 
not like. It would be with these unresolved problems that President Nixon would have to 
deal in 1969 when The Hague Conference paved the way to British entrance into the 
EEC and uncritical support for European integration and EEC enlargement became 
difficult for the US government to maintain.
129 AECB PV 403, 17 May 1967.
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Chapter Thirteen
Trade and politics across the Atlantic in the aftermath of the
Kennedy Round
Introduction
The previous chapter described the final bargain reached at the Kennedy Round, 
and illustrated the results in the industrial and agricultural sector. We highlighted that, 
in Washington, support for European integration was coming to be challenged both by 
Congress and the economic departments of the Johnson Administration. It also 
emphasized that the EEC ended the Kennedy Round with a clear awareness o f its 
commercial strength as a unit in world trade. In this last chapter, we shall analyze trade 
patterns across the Atlantic during the implementation period of the Kennedy Round 
(1967-1972), and the relations between the EEC and the USA in this same period. The 
analysis of the trade patters will help us to understand the effects of the results o f the 
Kennedy Round. The description o f  the relations between the two sides o f the Atlantic 
allows us to describe the Nixon administration’s reaction to the British entrance into the 
EEC, put on the EEC agenda again by The Hague Conference at the end of 1969. The 
Kennedy Round and the Atlantic partnership between equals initiative had also been 
launched to address changes that were taking place in Europe with British membership 
of the EEC envisaged. Analyzing the reaction of the Nixon administration to the EEC 
enlargement allows us to conclude this thesis by dealing with one of the topics analyzed 
at the beginning, and to shed some light on the crucial question of the extent to which 
Washington desired British entrance, describing the changes that were taking place in 
the US support for European integration. We shall, in fact, conclude that even if  US 
support remained, US policy towards the EEC became more confrontational and 
challenging to such a point that it could be defined as a hostile support.
13.1 Trade patterns across the Atlantic
The Kennedy administration had launched the GATT round in order to enhance US 
exports in order to increase the trade surplus, possibly to a level adequate to compensate 
for the deficit in the balance of payments, and to integrate the EEC into the global 
multilateral system. In this section, we shall analyze what happened to US and EEC 
imports and exports in the aftermath o f the Round. As table 1 illustrates, from 1967 to 
1972, US exports to Canada increased at the fastest pace compared to all other areas, 
fell in 1969 and then started increasing again. US exports to the EEC rose at almost an 
equal pace until 1970, declined in 1971 and in 1972 got back to the 1970 level. In the 
same period, US exports to Japan increased, but at a slower pace in comparison to 
Canada and the EEC, and, just like exports to the EEC, also declined in 1970, only to 
again increase in 1971. US exports to Asia increased at a similar pace to those to the 
EEC. From 1967 to 1972, US exports to central and South America increased at a 
slower pace than those to the EEC and Canada, while exports to the United Kingdom 
also stalled. In general, the EEC remained among the most dynamic markets for US 
exports, until 1970 when US exports to Canada and Asia increased at a faster rate.
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T a b le  1 US e x p o rts  by m a jo r  a re a s  a n d  co u n trie s  (S th o u sa n d )
Source: OECD SITC Rev.2 - H istorical Series 1961-1990 (Paris: O ECD  2000)
As table 2 highlights, US imports from Canada, Asia, Japan and the EEC grew at a 
faster rate compared to exports, as a result, it was believed, o f 1969 recession, o f 
lagging productivity gains, inflation and an overvalued dollar.1










1961 «02  »63  1964 « 6 5  «66  «67  «68  «69  «70  «71 «72
Source: O ECD  SITC Rev.2 -  H istorical Series 1961-1990 (Paris: OECD 2000)
Table 3 summarises Tables 1 and 2 and highlights that the USA had a trade deficit with 
Canada and Japan from 1967 onwards, while it was only in 1972 that a trade surplus 
became a deficit with the EEC as well. Above all, the table shows that in 1971, for the 
first time since 1893, the US trade surplus had become a deficit. In this sense, therefore, 
the Kennedy Round did not help in rectifying the US deficit in the balance of payments 
that, in any case, by the end o f the Round was heavily hit by the Vietnam War and the 
Johnson Great Society program.
1 Eckes, A.E. Opening American Market, p.203.
400
Table 3 US E xports  a n d  im p o rts  1967-1972 (S thousands)
_______________1967______________1968______________1969_____________ 1970_____________ 1971______________1972
Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp 
Total 31147204 26815530 33981658 33113950 37444244 36051731 42590090 39951347 43491775 45562521 48978610 55563193 
Canada 7032994 7099343 7906273 8925154 894257310389918 87873391109196810074961 1269150312057421 14907354 
Japan 2635416 2998659 2915466 4056622 3426652 4888330 4568834 5875410 3990349 7258770 4893613 9067569
Asia 6947564 5429267 7416589 7015801 7868963 8387651 9312502 9689809 9195642118275981107914215217731
C&SAm. 3190031 3839543 3622944 4169081 3770721 4062432 4732496 4608528 4749099 4766264 5154737 5359218
EEC 5486059 4462640 5961426 5891588 6761582 5808173 8272947 6618692 8056723 7532245 8677006 8993678
UK 1784022 1709850 1817789 2047851 1969923 2120570 2445127 2193566 2282094 2498516 2564906 2987080
Source: O E C D
Focusing on US trade with the EEC, table 4 extrapolates US exports and imports to and 
from this area from table 1 and 2,while the following tables illustrate the composition o f 
such trade.








1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Source: O E C D  S1TC R e v .2 ■ H istorica l Series 1961-1990  (Paris: O E C D  2000)
Table 5 illustrate the composition o f US exports to the EEC. It shows that the major 
category of exports remained machinery and transport equipment. US exports in this 
category increased after 1966, while the others lagged behind.
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Tabic 5: US exports to the EEC by main commodities
—* —  0 Food and live animals
1 Beverages and tobacco
2 Crude materials, inedible, 
except fuels
—*—  3 Mneral fuels, lubricants and
related materials
—• —  A Animal and vegetable oils,
fats and w axes
— i—  5 Chemicals and related
products, n.e.s.
— — 6 Manufactured goods
classified chiefly by material
7 Machinery and transport
equipment
8 Mscellaneous manufactured 
articles
9 Commodities and transactions 
not elsw here classified
O EC D  SITC R ev.2 - Historical Series 1961-1990 (Paris: OECD 2000)
Table 2 on US imports from major areas shows that US imports from the EEC rose 
between 1969 and 1972. Table 6 shows that such an increase of imports took 
specifically in the fields o f machinery and transport equipment and manufactured goods.
Table 6 US imports from the EEC by commodities
■0 Foodandlive»nimals 
-1 Beveragetandtobacco
2 Crude met erlel*. inedibl e. except fuel«
3 Mineralfuels lubricant »endrelat ad 
mater i ala
-4  Animal and vegetable oil», tat »and wax«
• 5 CbemicalsandrelatedproducU.nei
-6  Menuf act uredgoodsclaaaitied chiefly by 
material
- 7 Machinery andtransport equipment
- 6 Miscei laneousmenul act ured articles
3 Commodities and transect ton »net etanrhere 
cl assified
O EC D  SITC Rev.2 - Historical Series 1961-1990 (Paris: OECD 2000)
Table 7 concentrates on US agricultural exports to the Six to allow us to appreciate the 
effects o f the CAP. With the setting of the common price for cereals in 1967, US
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exports decreased, even if, by 1972, they had regained 1967 level. Exports of fruits and 
vegetables, after a downturn in 1968, increased again in 1970. By 1972, the main US 
export commodity was oilseed, which entered the EEC duty free, and more than 
doubled between 1968 and 1970.
T abic 7 US a g ric u ltu ra l re p o r ts  to  the  E E C
Commodity 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Variable-levy commodities
wheat 63365 67085 70283 107259 96325 83044 56141 77422 59443 96507
Feed grains 295182 334433 478099 498405 394928 361179 250604 335816 364040 405724
Rice 13399 15378 10139 18823 25717 31205 31038 20957 18070 16891
Beef&veal meat 163 1064 1511 647 567 530 379 419 810 1035
Non variable-levy commodities
Fruits & vegetables 102225 88695 106402 91851 82739 62421 93689 110444 108242 131215
Oilseeds 169860 235840 245208 301624 316847 301111 296970 417592 535373 648779
Unmanufactured tobacco 104983 106877 107738 122690 151295 129685 150069 123963 151276 157659
O E C D  S IT C  R ev .2 -  H istorical Series 19 61 -1990  (Paris: O E C D  2000)
Eckes takes a very negative position in judging the effect o f the reduction of US tariffs 
on the US trade. He notes that as the US implemented the Round tariff cuts, its trade 
merchandise decreased and than vanished. For Eckes the Round is therefore a watershed 
in US trade policy. From 1983 the USA had been experiencing a trade surplus, while 
during the Round implementation period the surplus vanished and a major deficit 
emerged. According to this authir particularly negative was the consequences of the 
Kennedy Round reduction capital goods, automobile and consumer goods. US exports 
in these sectors increased, but so did imports and by a higher percentage. Eckes, 
however, recognized that other factors bored on US competitiveness and therefore on 
the pace of exports. The Nixon administration and economists in general attributed this 
deficit to “Vietnam War inflation, lagging productivity gain, an overvalued dollar, and 
ballooning energy cost”. 2
As for the EEC, Table 8 shows that the EEC increased its exports to both the USA and 
the EFTA countries, and, in this respect, the Six achieved the major goals which they 
had had during the Kennedy Round.
T ab le  8 E xports  o f  th e  Six and  E E C  1959-1972 (in th o u san d s  USS) 
___________ ______  1 9 5 9 ________________________________
Exporting countries Total exports EEC EFTA USA Rest of the World
France 5350 1527 760 470 2953
BLEU 3279 1522 524 444 789
Netherlands 3579 1597 847 209 926
Germany 9756 2731 2649 913 3643
Italy 2876 792 642 345 1097
Total EEC 24840 8169 5422 2381 9408
In % 100 30,121,8 7,3
1962
France 7362 2712 1175 426 3049
BLEU 4325 2458 620 414 833
Netherlands 4584 2256 1057 200 1071
*; Eckes, A. E. Jr. Opening American Market. US F orean Trade Policy s ince. i??5  ¿Chapel Hi!! and Lcndpn;Thp[)n;vFr^iTy 
Of North Carolina Press. 1995Ì. dp. 202-203.
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Germany 13264 4512 3687 965 4100
Italy 4666 1625 957 441 1643
Total EEC 34201 13563 7496 2446 10696
1965
France 10048 4115 1571 594 3768
BLEU 6382 3947 791 532 1112
Netherlands 6393 3561 1210 244 1378
Germany 17892 6306 4830 1436 5320
Italy 7188 2891 1199 618 2480
Total EEC 47903 20820 9601 3424 14058
1968
France 12672 5452 1795 765 4660
BLEU 8161 5249 887 770 1255
Netherlands 8341 4790 1426 436 1689
Germany 24842 9340 5632 2707 7163
Italy 10183 4079 1477 1089 3538
Total EEC 64199 28910 11217 5767 18305
1972
France 20344 10059 2722 1098 6465
BLEU 11969 8270 1218 815 1729
Netherlands 13534 8616 1989 541 2388
Germany 39040 15647 8740 3770 10883
Italy 14974 6688 2030 1469 4787
Total EEC 99861 49280 16699 7693 26252
In % 100 49.3 16.7 7.7
Source: OECD SITC Rev.2 - H istorical Series 1961-1990 (Paris: O EC D  2000)
Table 8 also highlights another aspect which is worthy o f attention. From 1959 to 1972, 
the Six’s trade was centring on the regional area of the EEC. In effect, in 1959 EEC 
exports to the EEC represented 30,1% of total exports, while, by 1972, this share had 
increased to 49,3%.
13.2 The United States and EEC enlargement (1969-1973): from 
support to hostile support
In the previous chapter, w e illustrated how, despite the success of the Kennedy 
Round, transatlantic relations remained strained, and that with Congress in a 
protectionist mood and the deficit in the US balance o f payments it had become more 
difficult for the Johnson administration to justify European discrimination and, 
consequently, to support the EEC and its enlargement. Moreover, in the Round, the 
EEC had toughly bargained with the USA, and had firmly defended its regionalism, 
especially in the agricultural sector. This EEC attitude aggravated mistrust in 
Washington for the EEC. We concluded that it was these unresolved problems that the 
Nixon administration had to deal in 1969 when, after the failed application made by 
British Prime Minister President Wilson in 1967, The Hague Conference of the EEC 
paved the way for British entrance into the EEC. By that time, support for European 
integration still characterised US policy, but discontent in Washington was mounting.
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As a result, uncritical and open support for European integration and EEC enlargement 
had become difficult for the US government to maintain.3
By the time Nixon entered the White House in January 1969, transatlantic 
relations were under considerable strain, and concerns about US support o f European 
unity had proliferated. In addition to the tensions caused by de Gaulle’s policy towards 
NATO and by the Vietnam War, the USA reproached the European partners for their 
failure either to take into account the economic interests of the United States, despite the 
EEC’s economic strength, or to recognize the interrelationship between trade, monetary 
and security issues, and sharing the Cold War burden. According to Washington, the 
Six refused to assist the US in its aim to reverse the balance of payments deficit, which, 
in the former’s eyes, was partly due US military expenditure to defend Europe. They 
had set up a heavily protectionist CAP, and were fully committed to establishing 
preferential trading arrangements that ran counter to US export interests. Congress 
looked suspiciously at these NATO allies which did not sufficiently cooperate in 
sharing US military and monetary-economic burdens. This was also the position of the 
economically oriented departments within the Nixon administration, in particular the 
Treasury department, the guardian o f  the US dollar. Nixon, like Kennedy and Johnson, 
repeatedly underlined the need to share the Cold War burden with United States to the 
European allies. However, for Nixon, burden-sharing became crucial and urgent. On 1 
December 1969, Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield introduced a resolution calling 
for a substantial reduction in American troops numbers in Europe. The Congress’s 
general feeling was that the Europeans had not shared, and would not share, security 
costs with the United States unless they were forced to do so by threatening a partial 
withdrawal of American military efforts overseas. The US President disagreed, fearing 
that after a request to cut the military budget and repatriate the divisions stationed in 
Europe, the next step could be “let’s the rest of the world go hang”.4 Nixon considered 
NATO and US presence in Europe o f foremost importance. As he put it, “we must 
remember we are there in Europe not to defend Germany or Italy or France or England, 
we are in Europe to save our own hides.” Therefore, the US commitment abroad had to 
be maintained and a unilateral withdrawal was not a real option. Yet, Congress’s mood 
could not be ignored.5
Nixon had also to face the protectionist mood of Congress. Tired of tolerating 
what was perceived as discriminatory trade policies -  that the Kennedy Round had not 
eliminated sufficiently -  and selfish monetary policies on the part of the EEC and 
Japan, both injuring US economic interests, Congress pushed for a reconsideration of 
foreign economic policy, and called for a more protectionist policy and less tolerance 
for EEC economic discrimination. Nixon was aware that this Congressional attitude 
could not be disregarded, partly because it made it difficult for the US government to 
maintain its support not only for NATO but also for European integration.6 For Nixon,
3 For the Nixon Administration policy towards European integration and EEC enlargement in 1969-1973, see the recently 
published article of GUDERZO, M. "Gli Stati Uniti e il primo allargamento della Comunità Europea (1963-1973)", in: 
LANDUYTT, Ariane, PASQUINUCCI, Daniele, Gli allargamenti della CEE/UE 1961-2004, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005. See also 
LUNDESTAD, Geir, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic 
Drift, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003. On Nixon's foreign policy, see FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I, docs. 1, 
29, 30 and 90 Editorial Notes; Bundy, W., A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, New 
York, Hill and Wang, 1998, Garthoff, R. Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 
Washington DC, The Brooking Institution, 1994, Reeves, R, President Nixon, Alone in the White House, New York, 
Simon & Schuster, 2001.
4 FRUS 1969-1976 Vol I, doc. 19. Report on Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, 10 April 1969.
5 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I, doc. 59. Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon, 
18 February, 1970, reporting on meetings between Nixon, Kissinger and other government officials and Senators and 
Representatives of the US Congress.
6 FRUS 1969-1976 Vol I, doc. 19. Report on Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, 10 April 1969.
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the link between NATO and trade issues -  “NATO and soybeans” as he put it -  was an 
important tenet of US foreign policy and, at a Cabinet meeting in April 1969, after 
having emphasized the primacy o f the political aspects o f foreign economic issues, the 
President made clear that his support of NATO and the EEC “would be seriously 
jeopardized i f  the Europeans took restrictive action against US exports ”7
Like the previous administrations, Nixon gave strong priority to the Atlantic 
alliance as a framework to contain the European unification process. Where the Nixon 
administration departed from previous policies was in the form it wished this unity to 
assume. The Nixon administration therefore did not push for supranational forms of 
integration, because it was up to the Europeans to decide on how they wanted to 
organize themselves. Even if the support for the European construction process 
continued, as Kissinger put it to Nixon in February 1969, it was necessary to: “ 1. Affirm 
our commitment to NATO; 2. Affirm our traditional support for European unity, 
including British entry into the Common Market”. However, “we should make clear 
that we will not inject ourselves into intra-European debates on the form, method and 
timing of steps towards unity.”8 This did not mean that Washington opposed European 
integration, but rather that Europe had to decide on its own form, while the United 
States had to work on strengthening the Atlantic framework.9
It was against this background that the Nixon administration reacted to the 
Britain’s potential entrance into the EEC. The Summit o f The Hague on 1-2 December 
1969 laid the foundation for further progress within the EEC, and opened the way for 
UK entrance, together with Ireland, Denmark and Norway.10 President Nixon too 
approved o f EEC enlargement for the same reasons Kennedy and Johnson had. UK 
entrance was expected to reinforce European unity and give it a more open and 
Atlanticist outlook. However, because of the concerns o f Congress and the economic 
departments, it had become so difficult for Nixon to continue the previous avocation 
and defence of European integration and EEC enlargement that it was difficult for 
Nixon to support this enlargement process. Furthermore, this difficulty was increased by 
the attitude of the EEC and the United Kingdom, who were so concerned by 
successfully concluding the membership negotiations that, as Washington saw it, they 
were failing to pay due attention to the problems thereby caused to third countries, and 
the USA in particular.
The first format American reaction to EEC enlargement was expressed in 
February 1970 when Nixon informed Congress of the future course o f US foreign 
policy. Referring to the EEC, the US President maintained that “our support for the 
strengthening and broadening o f the European Community has not diminished. We 
recognise that our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe’s evolution, and we 
may have to make sacrifices in the common interest. We consider that the possible 
economic price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political 
vitality to the West as a whole”. Nixon thus emphasized that the political benefits of 
EEC enlargement were greater than the economic difficulties which this process could 
bring to the USA, and he therefore decided to support the British request for
7 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l  doc. 19. Information Memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council 
Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 14 April 1969.
8 KISSINGER, H. A., White House Years, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p. 88-89.
9 Lundestad, G. The United States and Western Europe Since 1945, p. 175-185 and Kissinger, H. "What Kind of Atlantic 
Partnership?" The Atlantic Community Quarterly, 7 (1969), p.32.
10 On the Hague Summit, see Journal of European integration History, 2003, Vol.9, No.2, entirely dedicated to this 
topic, and Ludlow N.P. The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge, 
(London, Routledge, 2006), chapter 7.
406
membership and EEC enlargement.11 Along with this support, Nixon also decided to 
take a detached and low profile approach during the enlargement negotiations in 
Brussels in order to enhance the chances of the UK gaining membership. By the same 
token, prior to enlargement, no major initiative was taken to strengthen links between 
the two sides o f the Atlantic, contrary to what Kennedy had done, in order to avoid 
being accused of interfering with EEC affairs.12
Nixon was soon to discover, however, that his stance towards the enlargement 
was not shared by his administration or Congress, and was therefore difficult to 
maintain. Following the Hague Summit, the National Security Council sent Assistant 
for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, a memorandum on US policy towards 
Europe, stating that US support for UK’s entry was based on political considerations. 
On the economic side, the United States would have to face increasing trade 
discrimination. If the USA desired a stronger Western Europe, concluded the 
memorandum, it needed to subordinate US economic interests to broader political 
concerns.13 However, with the US economy in bad shape, Congress and the economic 
departments of the Nixon administration were not prepared for such subordination. EEC 
enlargement caused problems, and, among these, the CAP and EEC preferential 
agreements played a crucial role which could not be ignored. As EEC enlargement 
moved from theory to reality, concerns mounted and the economic departments started 
to voice protests for US support to it. 14
Congress felt that Nixon’s claim that the economic price of a truly unified 
Europe was outweighed by a substantial increase in Western political strength was an 
open-ended invitation to Europe to ignore US economic interests and strongly 
condemned US government’s subordination of trade policy to foreign policy.13 
Moreover, with the US trade surplus in declining, before eventually becoming a deficit 
in 1971, Congress came to believe that the traditional US slogan in favour of liberal 
trade was simply outdated, above all when dealing with the increased economic power 
of the EEC and Japan.16 US Congress was in a protectionist mood which was 
demonstrated also by its refusal, in 1970, to approve the elimination of the ASP.
Within the Nixon Administration, differences emerged between the Department 
of State on the one hand, and Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture and STR on the other. 
The two sides differed in their estimations of the impact of EEC enlargement on US 
exports, and their opinion regarding what reaction should be taken. The State 
Department expected no adverse effects on US industrial exports, and only moderate 
effects if  free trade arrangements were extended to the neutral EFTA members not
11 FRUS 1969-1976, Voi. I, doc 60. Report by President Nixon to Congress, 18 February 1970 and Historical Archives of 
the European Community -  Florence (HAEC) EM 102, Statement by Ambassador Schaetzel to the House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Europe, 23 March 1970. In his statement Schaetzel reported on the Nixon statement on Foreign 
Policy.
u FRUS 1969-1976, Voi. I ll, doc. 44. Editorial note and KISSINGER, White House Years, p. 389-390.
13 NA Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National Security Council Files, Country Rie Europe, Box 667, Europe General, 
Memorandum "A Review of United States Policy Towards Europe", H. Sonnenfeidt to H.A. Kissinger, Washington, 14 
January 1970, taken from GUDERZO, "Gli Stati Uniti e il primo allargamento della Comunità Europea", p. 1153-1154.
14 "In a few months it began to appear that matters were not quite so simple. The 'enhanced Europe' had its political 
promise, but it was also evidently capable of fierce economic competition with us [the United States], producing 
tensions not foreseen by the grand designs of the Sixties". KISSINGER, White House Years, p. 418.
15 For the general attitude of the Congress towards the EEC and Nixon's stance towards the EEC, see HAEC EM 102, 
Commission Note du bureau de liaison de Washington concemant la nouvelle administration Nixon, SEC (69) 288/2, 3 
February 1969; HAEC EN 1525, Report by Senator Ribicoff to the Committee on Rnance -  US Senate "Trade Policies in 
the 1970s", 4 March 1971; FRUS 1969-1976, Voi. I, doc. 44. Special Message from President Nixon to the Congress, 18 
November 1969 and Ibidem doc. 76. Statement by Secretary of State Rogers before the Senate Rnance Committee, 12 
October 1970.
16 ECKES, Alfred, Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776, Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995, p. 202-218 and FRUS 1969-1976, Voi. I, doc. 44, Special Message from President Nixon to the 
Congress, 18 November 1969; HAEC EN 1525, Nota informative, 23 March 1971.
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joining the EEC. As for agriculture, State Department estimated moderate damages to 
US agricultural trade if  the CAP remained unreformed. The State Department recalled 
that in the past the EEC had caused a boost to European growth and, consequently, to 
US industrial exports and investments. Therefore, British accession would stimulate 
economic growth in the United Kingdom and the EEC and, as a result, American 
exports and investments and would further reinforce the basically free-trade outlook of 
the Commission, Germany, the Netherlands and other liberal countries in the 
Community. As for preferential agreements, the State Department held that the relations 
between EEC and neutral EFTA countries were so fluid and delicate that Washington 
was better off maintaining a low profile and reserving its position until the situation in 
Europe was clarified; The United States should not force the neutral countries and the 
EEC to agree on full membership, because this could undermine the EEC’s political 
development. Likewise, it should not oppose the EEC ’s preferential system, as this 
would be perceived in Europe as undue diplomatic behaviour.
Unlike the Department o f  State, the dissenting departments anticipated sharp 
losses for US exports and, most importantly, they were pessimistic about the future. 
They saw the American competitive position as likely to erode, and expected that 
enlargement and further reinforcing of the EEC would result in European autarkic 
measures, hurting US exports and investments. The Department of Agriculture looked 
with apprehension at declining US exports of cereals and held that if  an enlarged EEC 
refused to reform the CAP, US exports would be curbed further, with aggravating 
effects for the balance o f payments deficit. Thus, Nixon had to act to defend US 
agricultural interests.17 By the same token, the STR wanted Washington to “make clear” 
its opposition to EEC preferential agreements on the ground that they were inconsistent 
with GATT ru les.18
Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and STR longed for a “harder and more 
interventionist tone”. In their view, the Nixon administration should use these 
negotiations to fight the CAP and the system of preferences. They wanted to make the 
US military presence in Europe and support for European integration and enlargement 
dependent on the EEC’s adopting a more liberal policy -  in particular in agriculture -  
and cooperation in monetary and military issues, emphasizing that the American 
willingness to maintain militaiy positions in Europe would be reconsidered if the EEC 
seriously damaged US national economic interests. The economic departments asked 
the Administration to “make clear without delay” and “stress at the outset” that the US 
was “prepared to use such leverage as is available to us as a world power”, to make 
Europe comply with American desires. As such, the economic departments were ready 
to oppose British membership, and made support conditional on a change o f attitude by 
the EEC to make it comply with American requests.19
By contrast, the Department o f State believed that opposition to the EEC would 
be interpreted as a clear reversal o f America’s policy o f for European unity. Given that
17 FRUS 1959-1976, Vol. I l l doc. 42. Letter From Secretary of Agriculture Hardin to Secretary of State Rogers, 18 July 
1970; ibidem doc. 196. Telegram from the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State, 15 November 1971, 
and HAEC EM 102, Note “Aperçus sur la politique économique et la conjoncture aux Etats-Unis", undated, 1969.
18 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. III doc, 40, Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
(Springsteen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels), 7 May 1970.
19 Ibidem. As early as in February 1969 the Treasury Department had shown a tough line with the Europeans. In a 
meeting with the President of the European Commission Jean Rey, Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy expressed US 
concern over the expected proliferation of preferential trading agreements. Against Rey's firm commitment to conclude 
arrangements, among others with Spain, Israel, Switzerland, and Sweden, Kennedy claimed that such a network could 
have adverse effects on US exports and call into question US support for the EEC. FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I ll Foreign 
Economic Policy 1969-1972, 34. Memorandum from Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon, 15 
December 1969 and HAEC EM 102, Note à l'attention de M. Martino (membre de la Commission) du Directeur Général 
de la DG 1, 20 February 1969.
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the European agricultural policy represented one o f the most difficult dossiers of the 
enlargement negotiations, American interference would be counterproductive, as long 
as discussions in Brussels between the Six and the acceding countries were still on­
going . A tough American stance could even jeopardize the overall enlargement process. 
In general, in the State Department’s view, the tactical approach proposed by the four 
departments could be interpreted as challenging the EEC’s right to develop an economic 
union on top o f the existing customs union. The United States should certainly try to 
stimulate a liberal trade outlook in Europe, but opposition to the economic union 
basically meant opposition to overall US support for EEC unity, argued the State 
Department. Thus, the United States had to maintain a low profile and remain outside 
the negotiations in Brussels to avoid becoming “a handy scapegoat if  for any reason the 
negotiations on British entrance would break down” . Washington had to rely on normal 
diplomatic channels and existing international forums such as the OECD to make US 
views known, with the aim o f influencing the enlargement negotiations, but without 
challenging them. Moreover, it was felt, Washington should propose a new GATT 
Round to reduce the negative effects o f  enlargement, to stimulate the outward-looking 
orientation of the Community and to cement the alliance in the economic field.20
The economic departments, because of the protectionist attitude expressed by 
Congress, expressed doubts regarding the possibility of organizing a new GATT Round 
in the near future and, at any rate, did not consider GATT negotiations “as an acceptable 
substitute” for defending US interests during the accession negotiations, also because in 
a new Round the US would be forced to reciprocate tariff reductions. A more direct 
form of action was necessary was seen as necessary in relation to the EEC. In particular, 
they wanted the government to establish a permanent consultative mechanism in 
Brussels to be kept informed of the negotiations and immediately and toughly express 
US concerns.21
Despite opposition from the EUR Bureau o f the State Department, and under 
pressure from the economic departments, the US government asked the European 
Commission for some form of consultative mechanism where problems caused to the 
USA by the enlargement could be discussed. On 5 August 1970, Deputy Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Nat Samuels, approached Commissioner 
Dahrendorf, in charge of Foreign Relations and Foreign Trade, to set up a series o f 
regular US-EEC consultations. The Commissioner responded positively to the 
American proposal with the aim, however, not o f discussing the EEC enlargement, but 
rather to consider, in general, EEC-US problems. Samuels and Dahrendorf agreed to 
instigate semi-annual talks on matters o f  mutual interest, to start in October 1970.22
In view o f the consultation with the Commission, while the State Department 
wanted the US representatives to take a sympathetic stance towards the EEC, the 
economic departments wanted them to adopt a hard line, making clear that EEC 
preferential agreements and the CAP were not consistent with GATT, and, as a 
consequences, either the EEC redressed this situation itself, or the US government 
would address these issues in the GATT context. On top o f  this, they expressed their
20 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l doc. 40. Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
(Springsteen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels), 7 May 1970.
21 ibidem
22 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l doc. 43. Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
(Samuels) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 20 August 1970; HAEC EM 102, Note 
Rapports avec les Etats-Unis d'Amerique pour M. Deniau (membre de la Commission) de Jean Rey 8 April 1970, and 
Ibidem, Note pour Martino (membre de la Commission) de Jean Rey, 8 April 1970. The Commission's position was also 
consistent with the outcome of the meeting between the President o f the Commission Rey and Nixon in Brussels in 
February 1969, when both parties had expressed the desire to avoid trade wars across the Atlantic and to elaborate on 
a solution to existing problems. HAEC EM 102, Telex de Jean Rey à Gaston Thom, 25 February 1969.
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deep-seated hostility towards the EEC and its enlargement. Political considerations that 
had led the US to support the EEC in the past were brushed aside as irrelevant and, 
instead, emphasis was placed on economic considerations, in a manner that the State 
Department considered “out of proportion to our long-term interests”. The State 
Department rejected any formal action while the talks between the EEC and the 
potentially new members were still going on, and it wanted any concerns to be 
conveyed to the Europeans within the framework o f US-EEC relations, without 
reference to the question o f  enlargement.23
It was against this background, that the first bilateral consultation between the 
United States and the European Commission took place in Washington on 15-16 
October 1970. The meeting was attended by Dahrendorf and a US interagency 
delegation led by Deputy Under Secretary o f State Samuels. Searching for a middle- 
ground between the State Department position and that of the other departments, 
Samuels emphasised that the US continued to support EEC enlargement, but the 
Europeans had to take into consideration the economic effects of that process on third 
countries. Furthermore, Samuels proposed to use the bilateral consultative forum for 
raising specific trade problems that could arise during the membership negotiations. 
Dahrendorf did not prove to be receptive o f  the American demands. He deemed it 
dangerous to deal with third countries while the negotiations with the British were still 
going on, and he reaffirmed all the good political reasons why the EEC had to stick to 
CAP protectionism and preferential agreements. In short, each side stuck firmly to its 
own position.24
The Commission’s unresponsiveness to American claims was shared by EEC 
Member States, who also felt that the membership negotiations were already complex 
enough, and did not need to be further complicated by American requests. To cap it all, 
the United States could not even count on the UK to support its view. Prime Minister 
Heath was strongly committed to EEC membership and, as he considered the “special 
relationship” an obstacle to entry, he preferred to keep the United States at arm’s length 
rousing mistrust on the part of Nixon, and above all on that of Kissinger. Significantly, 
during their bilateral meeting in London in November 1970, Nixon and Heath did not 
discuss the EEC enlargement. When they met again in Washington in December, Nixon 
wanted to address the economic problems caused by enlargement, but British Prime 
Minister made it clear that he had no intention of discussing EEC matters bilaterally 
with the United States while the Brussels negotiations were still going on.25
Faced with the European allies ignoring US economic problems, and with the 
hostile attitudes of Congress and the economic departments, Nixon became less 
convinced o f the wisdom of subordinating economic problems to foreign policy aims 
and of the sense in giving open support to European enlargement. Thus, while in 1970, 
the President had focused on the benefits of EEC and enlargement, in 1971 he came to 
openly emphasize that the problems the EEC created to the USA could not be ignored, 
partly in an attempt to pacify Congress and the economic departments.26 Nixon, 
therefore, seemed unwilling to continue to subordinate US economic interests to the
13 FRU5 1969-1976, Vol. I l l doc. 43. Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
(Samuels) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 20 August 1970. See also FRUS 1969- 
1976, Vol. I ll,  doc. 44. Editorial note.
24 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I ll Foreign Economic Policy 1969-1972, Tab A Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State 
Irwin to President Nixon on US-EC Consultation, 15-16 October, Washington, 29 October 1970.
25 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l  Foreign Economic Policy 1969-1972, 91. Report by the President’s Assistant for 
International Economic Affairs (Flanigan), 20 June1972. See also Kissinger, H., White House Years, p. 933-938. For 
Anglo-American relations at the time of British entrance, see Poggíolini, liaría, Alie origini dellEuropa allargata. La 
Grande Bretagna e I'adeslone alia CEE (1972-1973), Pavia, Edizioni UNICOPU, 2004.
26 Office of the Federal Register, Richard Nixon, public messages, speeches and statements of the president - 1971. 
Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 231-232.
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EEC enlargement, and he prepared to assume a more confrontational position towards 
the EEC. This shift was also demonstrated by the setting up, in January 1971, of the 
Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), whose aim was to defend US 
interests in foreign economic policy. It was chaired by Nixon and composed of 
representatives o f the Administration’s main departments and agencies.27 However, it is 
worth noting that, despite the apparent shift in Nixon’s position, in practice no 
American initiative was instigated that could endanger the EEC enlargement 
negotiations. The United States became vocal in showing the Europeans their 
disappointment, but reluctant to take any concrete action. Despite the many complaints, 
US policy towards Europe basically continued along the same lines as previously, 
which meant that the State Department line was still prevailing.
In 1971, US relations with Western Europe deteriorated even further. While the 
Nixon administration voiced its concerns regarding German Chancellor Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik, the European countries, in turn, looked suspiciously at Nixon and 
Kissinger’s overtures towards the Soviet Union and China, fearing that Washington was 
considering “a deal over their head” on crucial security matters.28 O f even greater 
importance for transatlantic relations, however, was the state of monetary affairs. In 
1969, the instability o f the monetary system, the dollar crisis and the inflation it caused 
to the European economies, pushed the German government to float the national 
currency and promote monetary cooperation at EEC level. The German move signaled a 
break with the previous monetary system and with the traditional German support of the 
US dollar. The promotion o f European regional cooperation came as a reaction to long­
standing transatlantic frustrations on this score. Washington obviously looked on with 
apprehension at this new attempt o f European cooperation, but to make the situation 
even worse came the events of 1971. In this year, the dollar crisis forced the Nixon 
administration to take action, and it did so in a manner that had nothing to do with the 
international collaboration principles. In August, Nixon announced a “New Economic 
Policy” and unilaterally imposed a 10% surcharge on imports from abroad. Most 
importantly, he allowed the dollar to float, thereby bringing an end to the “gold 
window”.29 Understandably, these measures provoked negative reactions in Europe, 
both for their content and the manner in which they had been taken. Despite the 
Smithsonian agreement o f December 1971, which temporarily gave a new impetus to 
transatlantic monetary relations, cooperation at EEC level gained momentum with the 
March 1972 decision on a common currency float, the so-called “snake in the tunnel”, 
between the Six, the United Kingdom and Denmark. Thus, failing transatlantic 
cooperation in monetary matters was accompanied by achievements at the European 
regional level.
On 22 January 1972, the EEC, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and 
Norway signed the accession treaty, meaning that from 1 January 1973 the four 
countries would become members o f the EEC. With the success of the enlargement 
negotiations, the Nixon administration started to think o f new initiatives aimed at 
improving relations between the two sides of the Atlantic and reducing the negative 
impact of enlargement. Nixon had refrained from developing any major initiative while 
negotiations in Brussels were still proceeding, but with enlargement accomplished, and
27 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l Foreign Economic Policy 1969-1972, 49. Editorial Note. The CIEP was composed of State, 
Defence, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labour departments; the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget; the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs; the 
Executive Director of the Domestic Council; and the Special Trade Representative.
28 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l Foreign Economic Policy 1969-1972, 83. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to 
President Nixon, 2 December 1971.
29 ECKES, Opening America's Market, pp. 202-218 and FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I, doc. 44, Special Message from President 
Nixon to Congress, 18 November 1969.
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the negotiations on Vietnam in their final phase, the Administration estimated that the 
time was ripe for new initiatives.30
While these initiatives were elaborated, the Nixon administration concluded that, 
with the enlargement achieved, the USA was freer to adopt a more challenging position 
towards the EEC in the hope of seeing its interests respected. This new course was 
clearly showed at the end of May 1972, when Nixon’s assistant for International 
Economic Affairs, Flanigan, visited London, Paris, Rome, Bonn and Brussels to once 
again stress US concerns about EEC policies, and the importance of the Atlantic 
framework for US-EEC relations. Flanigan complained about European regionalism and 
the European preference for inward-looking solutions, the CAP and the web o f 
preferential trade arrangements being good instances o f  this. European “blocism”, as 
Flanigan labelled it, placed the European and Atlantic frameworks in opposition to each 
other. The European spokesmen defended themselves by pointing to the need o f 
regional agreements for socio-political and economic reasons, but Flanigan was not 
prepared to accept the European explanations and “stressed that Americans see them 
[the CAP and the preferential agreements] as a conscious effort by the EC to 
discriminate against us commercially to Europe's advantage while calling upon us to 
accept these disadvantages on the grounds that they serve our common political and 
security interests”. Most importantly, Flanigan spelled out that “this kind of argument is 
no longer acceptable in the US, and that Europe should be aware o f the fact that the 
days when we were able to accept almost any commercial costs for political reasons are 
over” . Therefore, it was necessary for the EEC to reorient its foreign policies in a more 
outward-looking manner.31
No more encouraging was the meeting between Flanigan and Mansholt, who by 
that time had become President of the Commission. In reply to Flanigan’s complains 
about EEC discrimination and remarks that the strengthening of the Atlantic system 
deserved the highest priority, Mansholt pointed out that his priority concerned relations 
with developing countries. The current US-EEC problems were rather unimportant and 
“it was "silly’ to” spend so much time on trade problems between the EEC and the USA 
“when 20 percent of the world was starving”. Therefore, more than with US soybeans - 
“to hell with your soybeans” -  Mansholt was concerned with trade relations between 
developed and developing economies. Further, the President of the Commission took 
also the opportunity to criticize the USA for not spending enough of its GNP for 
development aid expenditure. In return, Flanigan replied that Europe was in the position 
to devote a larger percentage o f its resources to aid, because it was not burdened by 
defence expenditures the way the United States was. In the absence of fundamental 
readjustments in monetary and trade systems, America was not prepared to increase 
expenditure on development aid. Unsurprisingly, reporting back to Washington, 
Flanigan characterized Mansholt as “hostile” towards the United States.32
In view of the coming EEC summit in Paris in October 1972, Flanigan suggested 
to the European partners that they should issue a declaration favouring the Atlantic 
framework and recognizing that EEC enlargement imposed special responsibilities on 
members towards their partners outside. While Belgium and Germany gave positive 
reactions, Commissioner Raymond Barre contested that the summit should give 
attention to this issue, as the EEC was busy consolidating its internal system and the 
development o f economic and social polices linked to monetary union. As for the
30 KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, p. 130-131.
31 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I ll Foreign Economic Policy 1969-1972, 91. Report by the President's Assistant for 
International Economic Affairs (Flanigan), 20 June 1972, reporting on Flanigan's trip to Western Europe.
32 Ibidem, Attachment 2,1 June 1972.
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British, while recognizing the danger of the existing imbalance between internal 
European preoccupations and external relations, at the same time they felt “a constraint 
as new members not to move out in front of the Six either too far or too fast”, 
confirming once again to Nixon and Kissinger that for the time being London could not 
help.33 At any rate, in the final communiqué of the Paris summit, the heads o f state and 
government, in addition to their plan on reaching a European union by 1980, underlined 
the need to consider the “international political implications” o f EEC economic policies 
and pledged for liberalisation on a reciprocal basis.34
It was in this troubled context that the Nixon administration sought to develop a 
strategy towards the EEC. Nixon noted that the trading problems across the Atlantic 
were of foremost importance, as “more is involved here than just questions of ‘horse- 
trading’ between soybeans and cheese. The question is what Europe wants its position 
to be vis-à-vis the USA and the Soviet Union.” A European anti-US trade policy “could 
affect attitudes in the US -  bring about an unenthusiastic attitude toward Europe -  and 
will carry over into the political area. There will be pressure to withdraw divisions and 
NATO would come apart. [...]. If  NATO comes apart, [the Europeans] will be an 
economic giant but a military and political pigmy. The USSR will encroach on them.” 
As such, despite the economic problems across the Atlantic, political cohesion remained 
o f overriding importance. “We should not allow the umbilical cord between the US and 
Europe to be cut and Europe to be nibbled away by the Soviets. We need to strengthen 
the bonds of trade, monetary relations, exchanges, etc.” Among these, foreign trade was 
not the most important, representing just 4%  of US GNP. “Trade is the froth on top of 
the beer, but beer without froth does not taste too bad”, Nixon said. Washington had to 
look at the bigger picture. Trade mattered due to its relationship with security and its 
political dimensions and because it could keep together the two sides of the Atlantic. As 
for the Europeans, they “will have one hell o f a time acting as a bloc. They do not get 
along with each other. The French don't get along with the Germans, the Germans don’t 
get along with the British. It will be some time before they can learn to act as a group. 
This means we have to work with the heads of Government in the various countries and 
not that jackass in the European Commission in Brussels.”35 In this sense, Nixon 
suggested a change of attitude towards the EEC and the Commission. Meetings with 
this institution made the US government all the more convinced that the EEC was 
determined to maximize the economic potential of European regardless of the costs for 
the United States and the Atlantic system. “While paying lip service to the importance 
of Atlantic unity, specific decisions are resolved in favor of the Community and 
contrary to the interests of the United States”. In particular, the Commission was 
“clearly dedicated to a course of action contrary to the US economic interests”. For 
these reasons, the USA had to strengthen relations with the Member States. Therefore, 
America’s stance in support for the Commission, clearly demonstrated during the Crisis 
o f the Empty Chair, underwent a change, as Nixon did not appear worried about the 
future o f the sovranational institution of the EEC. The US President was more
33 Ibidem.
34 Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Robert Hormats to Kissinger, "EC Summit Conference, October 19-20, 1972," 27 October 
1972, NMPM, NSCF, box 322, European Common Market Vol. I ll Oct 72 - Jul 1973, taken from Burr, W. and Wampler, 
R., "'With friends Like These...'. Kissinger, the Atlantic Alliance and the Abortive 'Year of Europe' 1973-1974", in Di 
Notfo, E., Nuti, L., Guderzo, M., (eds.), NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Rise of Détente, 1965-1972, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006).
35 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I, doc 120. Memorandum for the President's File by the Presidents Assistant (Flanigan), 11 
September 1972. The memorandum is a record of the President's meeting with the Council on International Economic 
Policy (CIEP). According to the note of this archival document, the "jackass' was presumed to be Mansholt.
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concerned with the defense o f US interests and, in his view, this aim could be better 
achieved on a bilateral level, with each individual member of the EEC.36
On top o f this, to defend US interests, Nixon decided that he would pursue a 
policy of modified confrontation, exercising controlled but mounting pressures 
concerning issues involving both US trade interests and the principles of the multilateral 
trading system. The United States had to keep a high level of pressure on the EEC in 
order to protect national economic interests, short o f creating an irresolvable 
confrontation. Thus Nixon, who, in 1970, had expressed his support of the EEC, by 
1972 had become more hard-nosed towards the Europeans.37 To prove to the EEC that 
the United States was seriously perturbed by the dismissive European attitude regarding 
the problems caused by enlargement, Washington adopted a confrontational approach 
regarding EEC enlargement during the 1973 GATT negotiations under article XXIV. 
The United States set up a thorough examination framework in Geneva to protect its 
interests, in stark contrast to what Eisenhower had done in 1958 when the Treaty of 
Rome was presented to the GATT. In addition, the United States also took a firm stand 
against the EEC’s preferential agreements with Spain and Israel, arguing that the EEC 
was acting in violation of GATT rules and damaged US trade. The three parties were 
notified that GATT procedures would be invoked to obtain adjustments, so as to reduce 
the preferential margin or compensate the United States with trade concessions.38
At the same time, Nixon held it to be necessary to reaffirm the importance of the 
Atlantic framework in order to maintain the cohesion o f the Atlantic alliance. In order to 
deflect the EEC from its inward-looking course, and create a climate for meaningful 
agreements in the broader areas o f  monetary and trade reforms across the Atlantic, 
Washington looked to the multilateral framework of GATT, exactly as Kennedy had 
done. Only in the context o f  a new GATT trade round could the US try to reduce CAP 
protectionism and the web o f preferential agreements. Washington considered a new 
Round useful not only to be an instrument to defend national trade interests, but also a 
means to promote an open EEC, integrated into the Atlantic alliance. It would enhance 
Atlantic interdependence, and would confirm the notion that Europe and America were 
moving closer together rather than drifting apart.40 In April 1973, Congress gave Nixon 
the green light to launch new GATT negotiations, eventually leading to the “Tokyo 
Round” in Geneva from 1974 to 1979. 41
At the same time, for the Nixon administration, the US strategy regarding 
economic relations with Europe could only be part of broader policy with this area, and, 
as such, a political initiative to strengthen Atlantic cooperation came to be required.42 
At the end of November 1972, Peterson sent Kissinger a memorandum on relations with 
Europe, proposing a ten-year strategy on security, economic and political issues, and 
stressing the interrelationship between trade, defence, energy, monetary and other
36 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l doc. 103. Memorandum from the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs 
(Flanigan) to President Nixon, 11 October 1972.
37 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I ll Foreign Economic Policy 1969-1972, 101. Memorandum from the President's Assistant for 
International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle), 12 September 
1972.
38 FRUS 1969-1976, Vot. I l l doc. 100. Memorandum of Conversation, 11 September 1972, doc 103. Memorandum from 
the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon, 11 October 1972; and doc. 
105. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon, 20 October 1972.
39 Ibidem.
40 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I ll doc. 108. Paper prepared in the Department of State, undated but presumably written at 
the end of 1972.
41 ECKES, Opening America's Market, p. 215. FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l doc, 94. Paper prepared in the Council on 
International Economic Policy, undated but presumably written in November 1972 and doc 103. Memorandum from the 
President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon, 11 October 1972.
42 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l doc. 103. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs 
(Flanigan) to President Nixon, 11 October 1972.
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policies, so that “we would articulate a new set of principles to govern our relationship 
-  a new Atlantic Charter, as it were” .43 Kissinger and Nixon also believed that a major 
and comprehensive initiative was required to prevent transatlantic relations from taking 
a worrisome turn. It was necessary to “address the fundamental problem” of US- 
European relations and to give content to the somewhat empty concept of Atlantic 
partnership. In short, a structure had to be found which accentuated the positive and 
common aims, that subdued commercial and financial policy conflicts and that brought 
together the two sides of the Atlantic. Fearing that détente in East-West relations would 
weaken the incentive towards Atlantic cooperation, Nixon and Kissinger elaborated the 
“Year of Europe” initiative of 1973. The concerns about the uncertain future of the 
Atlantic alliance in the context of tensions regarding monetary, trade, diplomatic and 
security issues -  brought to the forefront by EEC enlargement -  incited the US 
government to shape a renewed political framework for the resolution o f transatlantic 
disputes. Faced with the problems posed by enlargement, the United States responded 
by reaffirming the importance of the Atlantic framework, exactly as Kennedy had 
done.44
Conclusion
When the 1969 Hague Conference opened the way for EEC enlargement, 
President Nixon responded in a constructive way, arguing that the United States 
supported the process due to the expected accompanying political benefits, 
notwithstanding the trade disadvantages it simultaneously caused to the US. However, 
Nixon soon came to realise that his position on Europe was controversial. With the US 
economy in a bad condition, and transatlantic relations strained, the economic problems 
resulting from the EEC’s internal development could not be ignored. Washington 
constantly felt the pressure of US trade interests being damaged by an EEC united 
behind common policies. In these circumstances, it was no longer possible to remain 
deaf to domestic lobbies and to subordinate domestic economic interests to foreign 
policy considerations.
Back in 1961 and 1967, the prospect of EEC enlargement had created problems 
too, but at that time, with the US economy in a relatively healthier condition, the State 
Department and White House found it easy to defend their support of Europe. However, 
as time passed, with the balance of payments running a huge deficit, the balance of trade 
in deficit for the first time since 1893, a hostile Congress, economic departments in 
opposition and an economically strong and independent EEC, it became increasingly 
difficult to maintain the supportive stance. Nixon shifted from open support for the EEC 
and enlargement to a more sceptical attitude, caused by the economic problems 
enlargement posed to the United States.
Under Nixon, US policies towards the EEC changed in form: support remained, 
but Washington became less disposed to accept the disadvantages, less tolerant to what 
was perceived as the negative effect of European unity on US interests, and more 
inclined to openly confront the EEC. Moreover, this support became increasingly less 
ideological, less open to compromise, less concerned with the form of European unity 
and the destiny of the Commission, and more pragmatic, more openly defending US 
interests, to a point that it could even be defined as hostile support.
To the transatlantic problems, aggravated by EEC enlargement, the Nixon 
administration responded by adjusting American support for European integration 
according to the changing environment, and by reaffirming the importance of the
43 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I l l Foreign Economic Policy 1969-1972, 106. Editorial Note.
44 On the Year of Europe, see Burr, W. and Wampler, R.," 'With friends Like These...' *.
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Atlantic alliance. To achieve these aims, Washington redefined its political and 
economic relationship with Europe and launched the Year of Europe initiative and a 
new GATT Round. However, despite these efforts to solidify the Atlantic framework 
and cooperation across the Atlantic, a new phase of US policy towards the EEC had 
begun, a phase characterised by less support and more confrontation.
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Conclusion: The Kennedy Round in a Larger 
Perspective
As explained in the introduction, this thesis has been framed according to three 
levels of analysis: the history o f the EEC, the US approach to European integration, and 
the history of the liberalization of trade and the GATT. In accordance with the method 
of historical narrative, this thesis has presented facts. Now it is necessary to draw some 
conclusions and to integrate these facts into the theoretical framework presented in the 
introduction for each level of analysis.
Concerning the first level o f analysis, the history of the GATT and the 
liberalization of international trade, we noted in the introduction how the United States 
pursued the increasing liberalization o f trade and economic interdependence at the end 
of WWII and how GATT played the key role of promoting and managing this process, 
thus favouring a process that had taken place up to the early years of the XXth century. 
From the facts presented in this thesis, it can be concluded that the Kennedy Round 
represents a watershed in history o f GATT and trade liberalization: it was the first 
Round to address all of the problems that affected international trade at the time, it 
introduced negotiating rules that are still used today, and paved the way for the 
subsequent treatment of certain problems in successive rounds. Agriculture, the 
problems o f LDCs and NTBs, the introduction of a linear reduction of tariffs, and the 
MDS approach to agriculture were all tabled by the Commission. Certainly not all o f 
these problems were solved in a way that would support the liberalization o f trade. In 
the industrial sector, the negotiation over the linear reduction of tariffs was able to 
achieve meaningful results. The 35% average tariff reductions were substantially higher 
than what had been achieved in previous Rounds, however, not all trade sectors were 
affected by the tariff reduction in the same way. Moreover, NTBs were clearly 
pinpointed as obstacles that had to be overcome to favour trade liberalization, but the 
only meaningful result of the negotiations was the antidumping code. Nonetheless, the 
Kennedy Round paved the way for a serious treatment of NTBs in the Tokyo Round 
(1974-1979), the first Round that fully included NTBs.
In what concerns agriculture, the Round did not achieve any degree of trade 
liberalization, and not even any regulation, apart from the International Wheat 
Agreement and the token tariff reductions on some products. The Round, however, 
pinpointed the direction that had to be followed in order to reduce discrimination in this 
sector, making it clear that domestic policies had to be included in the negotiations if  
protectionism was to be reduced, as the Commission had rightly emphasized with its 
MDS plan. The refusal of the EEC to reduce its protectionism and the refusal of the US 
to seriously consider the MDS plan, which in Mansholt’s mind was to control CAP 
protectionism, prevented any progress on agriculture. The EEC ended the Round with 
its CAP intact and remained free to increase its protectionism in this sector. The US had 
no bargaining authority to reduce CAP protectionism. For security reasons -  that is to 
say to protect European integration -  it had chosen not to question the principle of the 
CAP and this represented the first weakening of its position. Most importantly, the US 
had nothing to offer the Six to entice them to renounce their regionalism and 
protectionism in this sector. In any case, their own GATT waiver of 1955 made it 
difficult for Washington to present itself as the sponsor o f  trade liberalization in 
agriculture in Geneva. In this way the Kennedy Round was a lost opportunity to try to 
come to some agreement on the regulation of agriculture. It would only be in the
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Uruguay Round (1986-1994) that agriculture was seriously discussed and some initial, 
albeit limited, results were achieved. After this the EU began to accept timid changes in 
the CAP mechanism with the McSharry reform of 1992 which shifted from price 
support to direct payment support. Agriculture, however, remains a major stumbling 
bloc to the liberalization of international trade. The Doha Round initiated in 2001 is still 
attempting to reduce discrimination.
Despite the many obstacles and partial results achieved, the Round certainly 
increases economic interdependence across the Atlantic with its reduction o f tariff 
barriers. GATT’s flexibility, moreover, made it a suitable instrument to promote and, at 
the same time, to regulate the internationalisation of the world economy and the growth 
of world trade among developed countries since WWII. In addition, it proved the extent 
of its usefulness as an international multilateral framework to enhance cooperation 
among governments at the crucial time o f the coming into existence o f the EEC regional 
agreement. It was to the multilateral framework o f GATT that the Eisenhower 
administration and, then, the Kennedy Administration looked to reduce EEC 
regionalism. And it was again to GATT that the Nixon administration turned to 
decrease EEC discrimination after British membership. In this sense, regionalism and 
multilateralism have always proceeded hand in hand throughout GATT history; one of 
the main functions GATT assumed since the end o f the 1950s was precisely to attempt 
to reduce the discrimination of regional agreements, the discrimination inherent in the 
EEC/EC/EU and its progressive enlargements, and also the US after it established the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement in 1994 with Canada and Mexico.
While the GATT provided a suitable framework for industrialized countries to 
address the problems of their trade relations, LDCs remained unsatisfied with the 
results. The problems of LDCs were considered in the Kennedy Round, even though no 
results were achieved, beyond further alienating LDCs from GATT. LDCs maintained 
that the industrialized countries had not devoted as much attention to their development 
problems as they had promised to. It should be recognized, however, that the non­
reciprocity rule did not help the LDCs to obtain concessions from the industrialized 
countries. GATT worked like a bazaar, and to obtain concessions, it was necessary to 
provide concessions. Thus the non-reciprocity rules marginalized the LDCs from the 
negotiating game. At the same time, it should also be recognized that the industrialized 
countries had no intention o f making any concessions at all in the two sectors in which 
the LDCs countries asked for concessions: textiles and tropical products. It would only 
be during the Uruguay Round in the 1980s that LDCs decided to more actively 
participate in GATT and the liberalization of international trade.
The second level o f analysis o f this thesis concerned the US approach to the 
EEC and European integration. According to Lundestad’s interpretation, we noted that 
the US supported European integration as a means to contain Germany and the Soviet 
Union. Even though they promoted the build up of an alternative center of power, the 
United States did not want Europe to develop into a “third force”. In fact, American 
support for European integration was subordinated to the desire to maintain such pole of 
integration within the wider Atlantic framework o f NATO and GATT. By promoting 
the Round, the Kennedy Administration identified a set o f goals to be achieved through 
a sweeping liberalization o f international trade. In addition to helping rectify the 
balance-of-payments deficit by increasing the trade surplus, it also aimed to promote 
economic interdependence by integrating the EEC in the multilateral trading system and 
to favor political interdependence by containing the development of the EEC within the 
Atlantic framework under US leadership.
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The United States achieved mixed results. By reducing tariffs in the industrial 
sector, the Round contributed to increasing economic interdependence across the 
Atlantic and, in this way, Kennedy’s goal to integrate the EEC into the multilateral 
system was reached. However, this aim was not obtained in the agricultural sector, the 
EEC maintained all protectionist measures and, unquestionably, agriculture remains a 
major problem both politically and commercially across the Atlantic.
Despite the failure of the agriculture negotiations and the complaints of the 
LDCs, the success o f the Kennedy Round contributed to strengthening an important 
framework for the Atlantic alliance, notably GATT. This was crucial given that the 
other central framework of the Alliance, NATO, was under considerable strain. In this 
sense, the success of Geneva was the success of the Atlantic alliance. At the same time, 
it is questionable whether the Round helped to maintain the alliance under US 
leadership. On the contrary, the Round clearly demonstrated that the EEC was an actor 
of equal commercial strength capable o f defending its position and confronting the US.
The United States began the Round believing it had a great negotiating 
advantage over the EEC due to the fact that it was the largest partner of the Atlantic 
Alliance and concerning the support it could expect from the Commission, Italy, 
Benelux and above all Germany, which would strengthen the American vision for the 
Kennedy Round against that of the French. When the Round started, however, 
Washington soon discovered that being the biggest partner in terms of military power 
did not give them leverage over the Six when it came to trade. The US also discovered, 
moreover, that the Commission, Italy, Benelux and Germany’s trade interests were 
more similar to the French than to the Americans and, even if  these countries refused De 
Gaulle’s policy towards the United States, when it came to trade they too wanted to 
defend the regionalism of the EEC.
The United States supported European integration and, as EEC regionalism 
emerged strengthened from the Kennedy Round, the Round enhanced European 
integration and, from this point of view, the security interests of the US. The problem, J 
however, was that EEC politics were not necessarily in tune with American 
expectations. The US supported European integration and encouraged the EEC to speak 
with one voice. Unfortunately, when that single voice spoke up, it was not always so 
pleasant for the US and, in particular, the Treasury, and Agricultural and Commerce 
departments, which, contrary to the State Department, were more concerned with 
defending US domestic interests than security interests. The United States supported the 
EEC for security reasons and hoped that a reduction o f EEC protectionism, particularly 
in agriculture, would make the EEC advantageous from the point of view of trade as 
well. The failure to reduce CAP protectionism, together with the transformation of a US 
trade merchandise surplus into a deficit, compounded by the strains of monetary and 
security relations, made it difficult for the Nixon administration to support European 
integration. This became evident in 1969-1972 during the enlargement negotiations 
when American support turned hostile. By tracing the evolution o f US support for 
European integration from Eisenhower to Nixon we can see how such support evolved 
with the progressive development o f the EEC. While Eisenhower’s main concern in 
1958 was to put the EEC on track and, therefore, he uncritically accepted it, when the 
EEC began to exercise its ability to stand up to the US as a partner of equal strength in 
the early 1970s, the Nixon administration was freer to consider the problems it raised 
and, therefore, to openly criticize it and its enlargement.
One of the most debated issues in the history of European integration and EU- 
US relations is the impact US support for European integration had on the creation and 
subsequent development of the EEC. Authors like Lundestad who ground their analysis
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in security relations contend that the role of the US was determinant because it 
guaranteed European security by containing Germany. Authors like Milward who focus 
their analysis more on economic questions hold that US support was not influential, as 
the EEC was a European answer to a strictly European problem.1 Answering this 
question from the point of view o f GATT history, international trade and the facts 
reconstructed in this thesis, the conclusion can be drawn that the creation of the EEC 
was a European answer to a European problem. At the same time, US support mitigated 
the hostility against the EEC that existed and sometimes even eased relations among the 
Six. This was clearly demonstrated in 1958 when the Treaty of Rome was presented to 
GATT and won approval, once again, despite the hostility of the United Kingdom, 
thanks to US support. By the same token, the US decision not to challenge the CAP or 
to oppose the approval of UGP in 1964 eliminated German arguments for not approving 
UGP and generally eased the way for the establishment o f this policy. During the Empty 
Chair Crisis, the Johnson Administration waited for the crisis to be resolved before 
concluding the Round. This decision was surely dictated by the fact that the Kennedy 
Round without the EEC did not make sense, but also by the interest of the US in 
maintaining a framework within which the EEC could re-gain unity and the 
Commission could negotiate. It is worth noting that the situation changed under Nixon, 
by which time the EEC had clearly demonstrated that it did not need US support to 
exist. Thereafter Nixon was freer to criticize both the EEC and the Commission.
The third level of analysis o f this thesis concerned the history of the EEC from 
the point of view o f the Kennedy Round. The commercial policy of the Six and their 
interests to negotiate as a regional trade area in GATT were analyzed, as well as the 
links between the Kennedy Round negotiations and other issues that concerned mainly 
the Six in the 1960s, notably EEC enlargement, the establishment o f the CAP, the 
Empty Chair Crisis, and relations with the US. In this thesis, the participation o f the 
EEC in the Kennedy Round has been presented in the framework o f Alan Milward’s 
theory of European integration, according to which this process represents a means to 
achieve the goal of the nation state to provide a welfare policy and to ensure citizens’ 
allegiances. This goal is not pursued in a national framework, but, rather, within the 
regional framework of the EEC through European integration and the surrender of 
sovereignty. The regional framework of the EEC was an instrument to accompany the 
increasing internationalisation of trade and the world economy and to promote 
economic growth and full employment through an expansion of trade at the regional 
level.
Analysing this period of EEC history from the point of view of GATT has 
allowed us to shed some light on the motivations the Six had for joining the EEC, the 
elaboration of the CAP, and the Empty Chair Crisis and Luxembourg compromise. The 
history of the creation of the EEC is often described as a quid pro quo between 
protectionist France and liberal Germany. According to this interpretation, France 
joined the EEC because it was interested in selling its agricultural products to the five 
partners, Germany in particular, while Germany joined the EEC because it was 
interested in selling its industrial products to the five partners while at the same time 
refusing the CAP. Yet, according to the facts that have been presented here, this vision 
downplays French interest in the customs union for industrial products. France had, in 
fact, a crucial interest in joining the EEC in order to obtain a regional market for its 
manufactures and this interest is demonstrated by its stances in the Kennedy Round as
1 For the debate on this issue see Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration. The United States and European Integration, 
1945-1997 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), pp.126-146.
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France negotiated to maintain EEC regionalism to preserve the market for its 
manufactures exports. At the same time, however, France was not the country with 
“protectionism in its blood”, as the British often put it. France accepted to reduce tariffs 
in order to enhance its exports to EFT A markets and the US. And even if  it asked for 
protection in given sectors, traditionally more liberal countries such as the Netherlands 
and Germany also had sectors to protect for which they were unwilling to reduce 
barriers. This vision further downplays German protectionism in the agricultural sector 
and ignores the fact that France was not the only country to support the CAP. This 
thesis demonstrated that German agricultural policy could be as protectionist as French 
policy and that the CAP was not only pushed by France, but also by the Dutch who had 
a strong interest in setting up a market for their meat and dairy products. The quarrel 
over UGP, moreover, showed that the CAP was not solely an instrument to obtain 
agricultural outlets for its foodstuff for France, but also a strategy to link Germany to 
the EEC. This quid pro quo vision also depicts EEC history in the 1960s as a bilateral 
deal-making between France and Germany, relegating the other four members to a 
minor role. An analysis o f the Kennedy Round negotiations demonstrated that other 
actors played a full role in the Round and, it follows, in the elaboration o f the EEC’s 
commercial policy. The Dutch were far from passive players, on the contrary, they 
maintained an active and influential participation during all negotiations in both the 
industrial and agricultural phases o f the Round. By the same token, Belgium and 
Luxembourg also played an active role proportionate to their commercial strength. It 
could be said that the only country who did not play a role commensurate to its political 
and commercial strength was Italy, who was often not adequately represented in 
Brussels and capable of mastering all o f the technical questions debated in the Kennedy 
Round. But this is an issue that should be further investigated when the Italian archives 
will be accessible.
An analysis of the adoption o f the CAP from the point of view of the Kennedy 
Round shows that this policy was not elaborated and adopted in isolation in Brussels. 
First, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy considered the effect of this policy on third 
countries, not because they were concerned about the trade balance of these countries, 
but because they hoped to maintain their flow of cheap imports from outside the EEC. 
Second, the CAP was negotiated under the pressure of the Kennedy Round. The 
Germans had to resign themselves to the fact that, to attend Kennedy Round as they 
wished to, they also had to permit a faster elaboration o f this policy than they had 
hoped. In fact, it was in order to negotiate over grains in Geneva that Bonn finally 
resigned to the UGP and, similarly, it was in order to attend the Round that it agreed to 
the settlement of an important CAP lot in 1966.
There is a final point worth emphasizing in this conclusion. The description of 
the Empty Chair Crisis from a Kennedy Round perspective demonstrates that France 
was not the only country that refused to apply the principle o f the unanimous vote when 
crucial interests were at stake. None o f the Six wanted to be placed in a minority 
position. The Germans in particular did not want to find themselves in the minority on 
an issue as important as the CAP. This proves that despite the fact that de Gaulle 
appeared to be the only one screaming against the majority vote, the other Five also 
actually had an identical, even if silent, position.
This thesis showed the strong commercial interests that held the Six together, 
despite the tensions that existed between them. During the last phase of the Round, from 
November 1966 to May 1967, after the internal EEC dispute had been settled, the Six 
stuck impressively together to confront the United States and to defend their trade 
interests. In signing the Treaty o f Rome in 1957 they had decided to face the further
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internationalisation of trade through a regional agreement and a customs union. This 
required the establishment o f a common commercial policy and, consequently, 
attending the Round as a negotiating unit. It was this interest that held the Six together 
and allowed them to overcome problems and to make the compromises necessary to 
reach a common position.
In reality, the elaboration o f a common position was not an easy task. The Six 
agreed that their trade interests would impede the drastic reduction of trade barriers that 
Washington seemed to be pursuing because such reductions would endanger the 
regionalism o f the EEC and its identity. At the same time, the elaboration of a common 
position for the Geneva negotiations overlapped with other negotiations taking place 
among the Six. Concerning the first point, the French veto o f the British application 
gave rise to a period of tension among the Six that was worsened by the dragging of 
German feet on the question o f  the UGP and CAP. This major tension subsequently 
erupted into a full-blown crisis in June 1965, resulting in a postponement of completion 
of the EEC’s offers for the Round to the end of July 1966.
The divergent trade interests o f the Six further complicated the elaboration of a 
common position. The elaboration o f common positions in sectors such as aluminium 
and mechanical and transport equipment were highly complicated as French and Italian 
interests diverged from those of Germany and the Netherlands. In the same way, 
negotiations concerning the automobile sector were complicated by the conflicting 
interests of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. In other cases, the 
Six had common commercial interests, but their positions diverged on tactics. In sectors 
such as paper and steel, for example, all Six were unenthusiastic about the prospect of 
granting concessions to the Nordics and the British successively. However, while 
Germany and the Netherlands were disposed to reduce protectionism in order to obtain 
counter-concessions from EFTA countries, Italy and France were more interested in 
protecting their industries. This proves that none o f the Six were either in favour of free 
trade across the board or fully protectionist. They all had a sector to protect and this 
further complicated the elaboration o f a common position. In the end, the commonly 
held interest to negotiate as a unit led all Six to make compromises that would ensure a 
successful conclusion of the Round.
The Kennedy Round was significant for the EEC because it defined its place in 
world trade and marked the existence o f the EEC as a powerful regional unit capable of 
speaking with a single voice. The Round clearly demonstrated that the EEC had a 
liberal stance on trade in manufactures, but a complete protectionist stance on 
agriculture. In the industrial sector, the Six had a major interest in expanding exports 
outside the EEC, which led them to reduce the CET in order to obtain counter 
concessions. On the contrary, their priority in agriculture was to set up a common 
agricultural policy that would support the welfare of farmers and establish a regional 
market. In reality, the Netherlands, Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy had hoped to 
use the Round to  maintain cheap imports o f food from outside the EEC, but the refusal 
o f the Germans to set a lower price for grain and the refusal of the French to grant 
quantitative assurances to third countries prevented this outcome. An analysis of the 
CAP from the GATT point o f view showed that this policy came to represent the sum of 
all of the protectionist policies o f the Six. As a consequence, the EEC ended the Round 
as a major stumbling bloc in agricultural trade and soon transitioned from a major world 
importer to a major world exporter. As already noted, the CAP, along with the 
protectionist policies of other developed countries and the US, still represents a major 
obstacle to the liberalization o f international trade.
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Pooling sovereignty in international trade relations helped the Six defend their 
trade interests and acquire a predominant position in world trade. The EEC ended the 
Round as a major actor capable of confronting the US on equal terms. In this sense, the 
Round confirmed the existence of the EEC on the world stage and represented its first 
act of foreign policy. International trade is still, today, the only field where EU is able to 
act as a unit in the world arena.
The Six negotiating as a unit created a great deal of rigidity and provoked 
significant delays to the Kennedy Round. In fact, the Six had to coordinate their 
position in Brussels in meetings with the 111 Committee and, then, the Council of 
Ministers, all o f which was complicated by the overlap that emerged between the Round 
and the creation o f the common agricultural policy. This process took a great deal of 
time. Unfortunately there was no other way for the EEC to operate in international 
commercial negotiations and this continues to be a major characteristic o f EC 
participation in GATTAVTO rounds today.
A clear conclusion can be drawn from the participation of the Six in the 
■Kennedy Round concerning the relations between member states and the Commission. 
Member states had a pragmatic approach towards the Commission. In the Round they 
considered how their trade interests might be best represented. Thus governments who 
'openly criticized supranationalism, such as Paris, supported the Commission because it 
had an almost identical vision. On the contrary, governments, such as the Hague and 
Bonn, iiTUieory supporters o f supranationalism, did not hesitate to question the role of 
the Commission when it did not represent the EEC in accordance with their wishes. In 
determining their position towards the Commission, member states did not consider 
ideological issues, but, rather, their trade interests. To successfully conclude the Round, 
member states relied on the Commission for its proposals and role as honest-broker in 
Brussels. In the last phase of the Round, they accepted to allow it to negotiate ad  
referendum  in Geneva. Member states needed the Commission to negotiate as a unit in 
order to defend their trade interests and became aware that they could not challenge its 
role in Geneva. The pragmatism o f member states was also demonstrated by their 
attitude towards the Commission after the Empty Chair Crisis. France never questioned 
the negotiating role of the Commission after the crisis and it was during the last phase 
of the Round that the Commission grew more powerful, maintaining its predominant 
role in the agricultural negotiations, continuing to negotiate on NTBs, and even 
conducting the negotiation concerning the entry o f Poland, all issues for which the 
Commission lacked authority according to the Treaty of Rome. Thus, contrary to what 
is often claimed, the Empty Chair Crisis did not weaken the negotiating role o f the 
Commission regarding the common commercial policy.
The Commission played a significant role. It had a vision o f the Round and tried 
to enhance it. It was, significantly, in the sector for which it lacked authority under the 
Treaty o f Rome, agriculture, that the Commission’s role was most influential. Thanks to 
its technical skill and vision of how trade in agriculture should be managed, the 
Commission was able to elaborate a plan, the MDS, which the Six accepted as the EEC 
negotiating position in Geneva. The Commission also played an important role in 
elaborating lists of exceptions for negotiations in the industrial sector by presenting 
proposals and tabling compromises that could be accepted by all Six. Thus, this 
institution enhanced its role by exploiting the interest the Six shared in pooling their 
sovereignty in international trade. It was because member states allowed it to have such 
an active role, in line with their trade interests, that the Commission gained authority. It 
should be recognised that such an influential role was also earned thanks to its valuable 
Commissioners and officials -  such as Rey, Marjolin, Mansholt, Colonna di Paliano,
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Rabot and Malvé -  who, with their technical skills and valuable proposals, were able to 
play a significant role both in Brussels and Geneva. In fact, the Commission was 
progressively able to rid itself of the presence o f member states in Geneva and to 
negotiate as a sole agent.
Despite the importance of its role, the Commission was not independent. It had 
to play its role within a mandate issued by the Council o f Ministers after prolonged 
negotiations. The negotiations among the Six and the Commission to determine a 
common negotiating position for Geneva clearly demonstrate that governments 
maintained a central role in the elaboration of the EEC’s commercial policy and, hence, 
in this important field of the European integration process. The long and exhausting 
Council of Ministers, COREPER and 111 Committee meetings during which 
governments controlled and questioned every single item from canned peaches to 
sewing machines plainly proves that the elaboration of commercial policy remained in 
the hands of member states, even if the Commission was able to play an influential role. 
The fact that member states had allowed the Commission to play an active and 
important role did not imply that the battle between member states and the Commission 
over the conduct o f foreign commercial policy and the representation in Geneva was 
over. The Commission negotiated over agriculture, tariffs in the industrial sector, some 
NTBs such as the anti-dumping code and the ASP. It also negotiated with Poland over 
its accession to GATT. At the same time, however, member states maintained 
negotiating authority for quantitative restrictions in the textile sector and in negotiations 
with Japan with whom they regulated trade with quantitative restrictions. Thus the 
Commission did not establish its negotiating role in all domains of EEC commercial 
policy and this shows that the economics and politics of the sector are the determining 
factors of the Commission’s powers. This issue is still relevant because member states 
and the Commission continue still today to quarrel over the boundaries of their 
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